A. Konovalov
http://repub.eur.nl/ppl/2338/
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RePub, Erasmus University RepositoryEquilibria without the survival assumption
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/61300/
Sat, 01 Apr 2006 00:00:01 GMT<div>A. Konovalov</div><div>V. Marakulin</div>
It is well known that an equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu model may fail to exist if a very restrictive condition called the survival assumption is not satisfied. We study two approaches that allow for the relaxation of this condition. Danilov and Sotskov [Danilov, V.I., Sotskov, A.I., 1990. A generalized economic equilibrium. Journal of Mathematical Economics 19, 341-356], and Florig [Florig, M., 2001. Hierarchic competitive equilibria. Journal of Mathematical Economics 35, 515-546] developed a concept of a generalized equilibrium based on a notion of hierarchic prices. Marakulin [Marakulin, V., 1988. An equilibrium with nonstandard prices and its properties in mathematical models of economy. Discussion Paper No. 18. Institute of Mathematics, Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, 51 pp. (in Russian); Marakulin, V., 1990. Equilibrium with nonstandard prices in exchange economies. In: Quandt, R., Triska, D. (Eds.), Optimal Decisions in Market and Planned Economies. Westview Press, London, pp. 268-282] proposed a concept of an equilibrium with non-standard prices. In this paper, we establish the equivalence between non-standard and hierarchic equilibria. Furthermore, we show that for any specified system of dividends the set of such equilibria is generically finite. As a consequence, we have generic finiteness of Mas-Colell's equilibria with slack, uniform dividend equilibria, and other special cases of our concept.The core of an economy with satiation
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/69217/
Fri, 01 Apr 2005 00:00:01 GMT<div>A. Konovalov</div>
It has long been known that in economies with satiation, the set of competitive equilibria does not coincide with the limiting core of an economy. In dividend equilibria, introduced independently by a number of authors, the budget excess is allowed to be divided among consumers as dividends and equilibrium existence is restored. In this paper a new notion of blocking which leads to core - dividend equilibrium equivalence is introduced. Specifically, it is shown that an allocation is a dividend equilibrium if and only if a corresponding equal treatment allocation of a large economy is in the core.Hybrid R&D
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/943/
Thu, 07 Aug 2003 00:00:01 GMT<div>S. Goyal</div><div>A. Konovalov</div><div>J.L. Moraga-Gonzalez</div>
We develop a model of R&D competition and collaboration
in which individual firms carry out independent in-house research
and also undertake joint research projects with other firms. We
examine the impact of collaboration on in-house research and
explore the circumstances under which a hybrid organization of
R&D which combines the two is optimal for firms and
society. We find that investments in independent research and in
joint research are complementary: an increase in the number of
joint projects also increases in-house research. Firm profits are
highest under a hybrid organization if the number of firms is
small (less than 5) while they are highest with pure in-house
research if the number of firms is large (5 or more). However,
social welfare is maximized under a hybrid organization of R&D in
all cases. Our analysis also yields new results on the role of
cooperative R&D. We find that non-cooperative decision making by
firms leads to larger R&D investments and higher social welfare
than fully cooperative decision making. However, a hybrid form of
decision making where there is bilateral cooperation in joint
projects and non-cooperative decision making in in-house research
yields the highest level of welfare in concentrated industries.Hybrid R&D
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/6708/
Thu, 05 Jun 2003 00:00:01 GMT<div>S. Goyal</div><div>A. Konovalov</div><div>J.L. Moraga-Gonzalez</div>
We develop a model of R&D competition and collaboration in which individual firms carry out independent in-house research and also undertake joint research projects with other firms. We examine the impact of collaboration on in-house research and explore the circumstances under which a hybrid organization of R&D which combines the two is optimal for firms and society. We find that investments in independent research and in joint research are complementary. Firm profits are highest under a hybrid organization if the number of firms is small; otherwise they are highest with pure in-house research. However, social welfare is maximized under a hybrid organization of R&D in all cases. Our analysis also yields new results on the role of cooperative R&D. Non-cooperative firm decision making leads to more R&D and higher social welfare than fully cooperative decision making. However, bilateral cooperation in joint projects and non-cooperative decision making in in-house research yields the highest level of welfare in concentrated industries.Generalized equilibrium in an economy without the survival assumption
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/537/
Mon, 16 Dec 2002 00:00:01 GMT<div>A. Konovalov</div><div>V. Marakulin</div>
It is well known that an equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu model may
fail to exist if a very restrictive condition called the survival
assumption is not satisfied. We study two approaches that allow
for the relaxation of this condition. Danilov and Sotskov (1990),
and Florig (2001) developed a concept of a generalized equilibrium
based on a notion of hierarchic prices. Marakulin (1990) proposed
a concept of an equilibrium with non-standard prices. In this
paper, we establish the equivalence between non-standard and
hierarchic equilibria. Furthermore, we show that for any specified
system of dividends the set of such equilibria is generically
finite. We also provide a generic characterization of hierarchic
equilibria and give an easy proof of the core equivalence result.