We empirically examine the determinants of the allocation of decision rights in the context of fruit and vegetable contracting. The main conclusion is that under contract farming, many decision rights are shifted from farmers to firms. Quality, reputation and specific investments by firms positively influence the number of decision rights allocated to agri-business firms under contract farming, while monopsony-oligopsony power and specific investments by farmers have no effect on the allocation of decision rights.

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Keywords china, contractmanagement, contracts, decision rights
JEL D43, Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection (jel), M, Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting (jel), M13, New Firms; Startups (jel), N55, Asia including Middle East (jel), O32, Management of Technological Innovation and R&D (jel)
Publisher Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM)
Persistent URL hdl.handle.net/1765/10717
Hu, Y, & Hendrikse, G.W.J. (2007). Allocation of Decision Rights in Fruit and Vegetable Contracts in China (No. ERS-2007-077-ORG). ERIM report series research in management Erasmus Research Institute of Management. Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM). Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10717