Dynamic Coordination Failures and the Efficiency of the Firm
This paper examines the role of coordination devices such as work norms in creating and sustaining inefficient organizational practices in firms, in a dynamic environment. The role of signalling norms and product market competition in alleviating such inefficiencies is also examined. In particular, we show that Cournot competition may increase the inefficiency of organizational practices.
|Keywords||coordination games, game theory, incentive schemes, organizational slack, signalling|
|Persistent URL||dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(95)00033-X, hdl.handle.net/1765/11661|
Goyal, S., & Janssen, M.C.W.. (1995). Dynamic Coordination Failures and the Efficiency of the Firm. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 223–239. doi:10.1016/0167-2681(95)00033-X