Cooperation in a modified version of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game
In this paper we consider a series of finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which the payoff the players receive in a period depends on how they have played the game in the past. We show that this modification of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game makes cooperation a feasible equilibrium configuration in the beginning of play.
|Keywords||Prisoners' dilemma, finitely repeated games, game theory|
|Persistent URL||dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00016-4, hdl.handle.net/1765/11674|
Janssen, M.C.W., Gorter, J., & Meerendonk, S.. (1997). Cooperation in a modified version of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 613–619. doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00016-4