In a recent paper in this journal, Heckelman explains why senators from the same State often vote differently, and still get re-elected. He argues that in a two-party system, primary elections lead to divergence of party platforms. Moreover, he shows that the introduction of primary elections and overlapping terms into the median voter model leads to the prediction that extremist candidates win the general election. In this comment, I argue that when in primaries voters view office as a means to policy, primary elections strengthens rather than weakens the prediction of the median voter model that policy platforms converge.

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doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00175-5, hdl.handle.net/1765/12286
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Erasmus School of Economics

Swank, O. (2001). A Comment on On Sequential Elections and Overlapping Terms: The Unique Case of Voting for U.S. Senate. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 46(4), 437–440. doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00175-5