Rational Voters, Elections and Central Banks: Do Representative Democracies Need non Representative Institutions?
We show that the welfare-improving property of an independent central bank depends on how voters respond to the time consistency problem. Voters' responsiveness to economic problems may provide some flexibility to revise the policy delegation arrangement of the central bank. This may improve social welfare. Preliminary evidence on voters' behavior in the U.S. is presented, which indicates that voters seem to respond to economic problems in a proper way, taking time-consistency problems into account when making their vote decisions.
|Keywords||central banks, elections, voters|
|Persistent URL||dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0161-8938(97)00157-9, hdl.handle.net/1765/12291|
Lippi, F.. (1999). Rational Voters, Elections and Central Banks: Do Representative Democracies Need non Representative Institutions?. Journal of Policy Modeling, 515–525. doi:10.1016/S0161-8938(97)00157-9