Partisan Profiles in Presidential Policies: an Extension of Presidential Preferences for Inflation versus Unemployment
In a recent article, Zaleski does not find any clear difference between the political preferences of Republican and Democratic administrations with respect to the choice between unemployment and inflation. This paper provides empirical support for the opposite conclusion in a generalization of Zaleski's approach allowing for instrument costs.
|Keywords||Partisan politics, inflation, unemployment|
|Persistent URL||dx.doi.org/10.1016/0164-0704(94)90024-8, hdl.handle.net/1765/12307|
Siebrand, J.C., & Swank, O.H.. (1994). Partisan Profiles in Presidential Policies: an Extension of Presidential Preferences for Inflation versus Unemployment. Journal of Macroeconomics, 553–558. doi:10.1016/0164-0704(94)90024-8