Subsidized buyer credits: Atypical results in strategic trade theory
Using subsidized buyer credit as a policy tool, it is shown that the general result of strategic trade policy, namely that, by committing itself to an export subsidy, any government can favorably change the outcome of the Cournot oligopoly, does not necessarily hold.
|Keywords||Cournot-Nash equilibrium, F1, F13, buyer credit, subsidy|
|Persistent URL||dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)00541-9, hdl.handle.net/1765/12972|
Stoelinga, G.J., Viaene, J.M.A., & Visscher, L.T.. (1995). Subsidized buyer credits: Atypical results in strategic trade theory. Economics Letters, 205–210. doi:10.1016/0165-1765(94)00541-9