Chapter 5

Effects of Work-Related Norm Violations and General Beliefs about the World Regarding Feelings of Shame and Guilt: A Comparison between Turkey and the Netherlands [1]

This paper aimed at investigating the effects of work-related norm violations (i.e., violations of interpersonal and work regulation norms) and individuals' general beliefs about the world (i.e., social axioms: reward for application, social cynicism) on feelings of shame and guilt in Turkey and in the Netherlands. An experimental study involving 103 Turkish and 111 Dutch participants showed that work norm violations elicited feelings of guilt and shame differently in Turkey and the Netherlands. Specifically, interpersonal norm violation in Turkey elicited feelings of shame and guilt more strongly than did violation of a work regulation norm, whereas no differential effects were found in the Netherlands. As expected, violation of a work regulation norm elicited feelings of shame and guilt more strongly in the Netherlands than in Turkey, whereas violation of an interpersonal norm elicited feelings of shame and guilt more strongly in Turkey than in the Netherlands. The findings provide further evidence for the moderating effects of social axioms: in both countries, participants high in social cynicism felt less ashamed when they violated a work regulation norm than did those low in social cynicism. Our findings are relevant for understanding the underlying mechanisms of norm violations at work, thereby offering a new avenue for investigating cultural differences in the workplace. The latter may be of particular relevance in times of globalization and diversity in the workplace.

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5. 1 Introduction

When individuals act against norms in society, they experience various feelings such as shame and guilt (Bierbrauer, 1992). Organizations, mirroring the characteristics of society, also function according to certain kinds of norms that employees are expected to follow. Violations of either interpersonal or work regulation norms are considered to be counterproductive (CWB; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Such behavior may range from spreading rumors and taking excessive breaks to lying and stealing. Studies concerning counterproductive work behavior and its relationship to employees' feelings until now have mainly focused on feelings as antecedents of such behavior (Fox & Spector, 2002; Miles, Spector, Borman, & Fox, 2002; Spector et al., 2006). Interestingly, these studies are not conclusive about how employees feel *after* having engaged in counterproductive behavior. Investigating how one feels after such actions may shed light on the question as to whether these experiences may elicit feelings that subsequently – as control mechanisms – could prevent counterproductive work behavior from occurring or reoccurring. Therefore, as a first aim of this study we investigated the effects of work norm violations on feelings of guilt and shame.

Benedict (1946) and Triandis, Leung, Villareal, and Clack (1985) have further argued that feelings of guilt and shame may function differently as mechanisms of social control, particularly so across individualistic and collectivistic cultures. However, the reason remains unclear. The social axiom approach offers one promising framework for explaining differential effects of norm violations on feelings of shame and guilt in individualistic/collectivistic cultures. Social axioms are general beliefs that people have about the world, such as reward for application, which suggests that adversity can be overcome by effort (see Leung et al., 2002). Although the specific role of social axioms in determining feelings has remained under-addressed, several studies have shown the importance of beliefs in relation to one's feelings (Robinson & Clore, 2002; Sprecher, 1999; Tamir, John, Srivastva, & Gross, 2007): that is,

people's general social beliefs have been shown to affect the way they see themselves and the way they perceive and respond to others (Tamir et al., 2007). The second purpose of this study therefore was to examine social axioms as explanatory mechanisms with regard to the effect of norm violations on feelings of guilt and shame in collectivistic Turkish and individualistic Dutch culture. In the remainder of the study, we expand further upon types of norm violations, social axioms, and the effects of both norm violations and social axioms on feelings of shame and guilt across two cultures (Turkey and the Netherlands). Several hypotheses are provided.

Types of Work Norm Violations

Counterproductive work behavior (CWB) is generally seen as behavior that violates significant norms at work and that threatens the well-being of employees, the organization, or both (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Ohbuchi et al. (2004) showed that two types of norm violations are recognized across many cultures (e.g., the United States, Germany, Japan, and Hong Kong): namely, the violation of behavioral norms in personal relationships and the violation of laws and regulations (or societal norms). The first type of norm violation refers to the violation of an interpersonal norm, whereas the second concerns the violation of regulations. More specifically, in the work domain, researchers have differentiated between individually oriented CWB, such as acting rudely towards other organizational members, and organizationally oriented CWB, such as taking organizational property without permission, or intentionally endangering the work flow (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Bennett & Stamper, 2001). In this study, we aim to investigate the effects of these two types of work-related norm violations: the violation of interpersonal norms at work vis-à-vis the violation of work-regulated norms on feelings of shame and guilt.

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Feelings of Shame and Guilt and Norm Violations across Cultures

Ever since Benedict (1946) hypothesized that collectivistic cultures are so-called shame cultures and individualistic cultures are so-called guilt cultures, Shame and guilt feelings have been the focus of many cross-cultural studies (e.g., Bierbrauer, 1992; Eid & Diener, 2001; Fontaine et al., 2006; Triandis, 1988). Shame is regarded as a more public emotion including the fear of criticism from significant others and what others would think in case of unpleasant behaviors (e.g., Mead, 1952; Triandis, 1988). As people in collectivistic cultures define themselves in terms of their long-lasting group memberships (Smith, Bond, & Kâğitçibaşi, 2006) and mind what others would think, shame is regarded as a mechanism for control in such cultures. Guilt is regarded as an internally focused emotion resulting from the violation of personal standards. Since people in individualistic cultures have a high internal focus and see themselves as having separate identities (Smith et al., 2006), guilt has been regarded as a mechanism for control in such cultures.

Fontaine et al. (2006) have described the relationship between culture, shame and guilt as a gordian knot and tried to draw conceptually clear definitions of shame and guilt across three cultures (i.e., Peru, Hungary and Belgium). The definition of shame as an external, interpersonal feeling and guilt as an internal, intrapersonal feeling has indeed been validated by their findings. Yet, these researchers additionally found that guilt also has an interpersonal and a communal focus such as trying to meet others` expectations. Further, shame included some intrapersonal aspects such as feelings of powerlessness and feelings that bad things only happen to oneself. However, the important difference between both feelings is that shame feelings include reactions to instantaneous situations whereas guilt feelings take place after an insightful cognitive evaluation. Guilt feelings thus imply a deep cognitive processing whereas shame feelings imply reactions to the immediate situation.

Thus the statement that guilt is a private feeling and that shame is a public feeling needs to be reframed: Guilt feelings imply a deep cognitive processing whereas shame feelings imply reactions to the immediate situation. The authors further demonstrated that the salience of shame

and guilt feelings was similar across the three cultural groups which they had studied (i.e., Peru, Hungary and Belgium). Confirming Fontaine and his colleagues` study, recent studies have found that both shame and guilt feelings are both functional for collectivistic and individualistic cultures (De Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008).

Norm violations may have differential effects on feelings across cultures, depending on those cultures' collectivistic or individualistic orientations (Bierbrauer, 1992). Bierbrauer predicted that people with a collectivistic value orientation would respond to norm violations with more shame, whereas those with an individualistic orientation would respond with more guilt. In Bierbrauer`s study, people from collectivistic cultures indeed responded with a higher degree of shame than did people from an individualistic culture when they violated a religious, traditional, or state norm. Interestingly, collectivists also responded with a greater degree of guilt than did individualists when traditional and religious norms had been violated. Further, there was no significant difference between people from individualistic and collectivistic cultures in terms of their guilt feelings when a state law had been violated. The degree of guilt felt among collectivists after having violated a traditional norm shows how important such norms are to them. Apparently, in collectivistic cultures the legitimate social control is formed by traditional norms, which will lead people toward compliance and feelings not only of shame but also of guilt when these norms are violated (Bierbrauer, 1992). Bierbrauer thus showed that the relevance of high guilt feelings for collectivistic cultures is dependent on the type of norm that is violated**.** Therefore, the type of norm seems to matter when the effect of norm violation on feelings of shame and guilt is examined across cultures.

The early notions of Benedict (1946), who labeled collectivistic cultures as shame cultures and individualistic cultures as guilt cultures, have been criticized by many other researchers as well (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Stipek, Weiner, Li, 1989). Specifically, Stipek et al. (1989) demonstrated that people from a collectivistic Chinese culture felt more guilt when they had hurt someone psychologically than when they had violated a law. Furthermore, De Hooge et al. (2008) demonstrated that shame can have a useful interpersonal function

especially among people who have a natural tendency to act in their own interests (i.e., pro-selfs). The authors demonstrated that unless people can escape from shameful situations, they act more socially in order to repair their damaged self-image. Pro-selfs especially have been shown to act more socially toward a person who had witnessed their bad behavior than toward someone who had not observed it. Thus, these studies show that guilt can also be beneficial in collectivistic cultures and that shame can be functional in individualistic cultures. Elaborating on these studies, we argue that shame and guilt are global moral emotions that are functional in both collectivistic and individualistic societies. Therefore, norm violations may elicit feelings of shame and guilt in both Turkey and the Netherlands, but the strength of these feelings may be dependent on the type of norm violation: that is, some norms – and norm violations – might be of particular importance for the feelings depending on the culture. For instance, Turkey is a collectivistic culture in which people define themselves in terms of their relationships with others. Since interpersonal relationships are seen as highly important in collectivistic cultures (Smith et al., 2006), it can be argued that these relations are more internalized, and therefore violating such interpersonal norms may strongly elicit feelings of shame and guilt. Violating work regulation norms, however, will be relatively less important in a collectivistic culture than violating interpersonal norms. In light of these arguments, the following hypothesis is formulated:

Hypothesis 1a. In Turkey, violation of an interpersonal norm will elicit feelings of shame and guilt more strongly than will violation of a work regulation norm.

Bierbrauer (1992) showed that in individualistic cultures, the legitimate social controls are represented by state laws and regulations, and will bring about guilt feelings when these are violated. Since institutional practices are highly valued in the Netherlands (Gelfand, Bhawuk,

Nishii, & Bechtold, 2004), we argue that organizational rules will be important in Dutch individualistic culture. Stipek et al. (1989) even showed that violation of a law or moral rule elicited more feelings of guilt than did the occurrence of hurting someone in the US, which is another highly individualistic culture. Although like the US the Netherlands is a highly individualistic culture, it is also defined as a *feminine* culture in which people attach importance to interpersonal relationships (Hofstede, 1996). We therefore argue that both types of norms may influence feelings of both shame and guilt in the Netherlands to a similar degree. In light of these arguments, the following hypothesis is formulated:

Hypothesis 1b. In the Netherlands, violation of an interpersonal norm and a work regulation norm will elicit feelings of shame and guilt to the same degree.

In most Western cultures, people are expected to act collectively according to the rules laid down by legal authorities (Gelfand et al., 2004). Since institutional practices are highly valued in the Netherlands (Gelfand et al., 2004), violation of organizational rules may have strong deterrent effects with regard to feelings of both guilt and shame. As has been demonstrated by Bierbrauer (1992) and Stipek et al. (1989), laws and regulations are more important in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic cultures. Violation of a work norm therefore may elicit more feelings of shame and guilt in the Netherlands than in Turkey (Gelfand et al., 2004). Therefore, it is hypothesized that:

Hypothesis 1c. In The Netherlands, violation of a work regulation norm will elicit feelings of both guilt and shame more strongly than in Turkey.

As previously stated, the Netherlands is an individualistic culture, and is also characterized as a *feminine* one (Hofstede, 1996). In feminine cultures, people have features that are associated with women, such as kindness, patience, and gentleness. People in feminine cultures value relationships, and they are less assertive and competitive in interpersonal relationships than are people from masculine cultures (Hofstede, 1996). Interpersonal relationships therefore are important in the Netherlands. Since Turkey is characterized as both a collectivistic and a feminine culture (Hofstede, 1996) in which people define their self-concepts in terms of their relationships to others, effects of interpersonal norm violation may be stronger in Turkey than in the Netherlands. Therefore, it makes sense to hypothesize:

Hypothesis 1d. Violation of an interpersonal norm will elicit feelings of shame and guilt more strongly in Turkey than in the Netherlands

Social Axioms, Norm Violations, and Shame and Guilt Feelings

Social axioms. Leung et al. (2002) introduced the concept of general beliefs or social axioms in the cross-cultural literature. Social axioms help individuals to find explanations for interpersonal relations and the events they experience. The authors identified five social axioms: namely, reward for application, social complexity, fate control, social cynicism, and religiosity. Reward for application characterizes a belief that hard work, knowledge, and thorough planning will lead to positive consequences. Social complexity symbolizes a world view that suggests there are no firm rules but several ways of achieving an outcome, and that discrepancy in human behavior is common. Fate control represents a belief that events are predetermined and that there exist ways for people to influence these outcomes by wishful thinking. Social cynicism represents a negative view of human nature, mistrust of social institutions, and disrespect with

regard to ethical means to achieve aims. Finally, religiosity refers to the belief in the existence of supernatural forces and to the useful functions of religious beliefs (Leung et al., 2002).

Relationship of social axioms with norm violations and feelings. Several studies have shown the importance of beliefs in relation to one's feelings (Robinson & Clore, 2002; Sprecher, 1999; Tamir et al., 2007). Robinson and Clore (2002), for instance, demonstrated that people`s beliefs about situations and events affect their interpretations of how they felt in a certain situation. Furthermore, people`s general social beliefs have been shown to affect the way they see themselves and the way they perceive and respond to others (Tamir et al., 2007). In a similar vein, social axioms affect the way individuals interpret the world and experience events (Leung & Bond, 2004). Thus, the way people make sense of the social world may also affect people's feelings after the specific occurrence of a norm violation. Until now, however, the specific role of social axioms in determining feelings has remained under-addressed. We aim to investigate this role further.

Two of the social axioms – *reward for application* and *social cynicism* – seem to be specifically relevant to the two types of norm violations in the present research. *Reward for application* is a world view holding that adversities in life can be overcome by hard work. Thus, it forms an answer as to how to solve problems in life. It represents a general evaluation of the costs and benefits of hard work, and sees hard work as the path to achievement in the end. Reward for application is positively related to the number of working hours per week, and is reminiscent of the Protestant work ethic (Leung & Bond, 2004). The main focus of the Protestant work ethic and of the reward for application belief is on work. As the reward for application belief is relevant to work-related issues, it thus seems relevant to issues of work-related norm violations. Following this line of reasoning, we argue that people who have high reward for application beliefs are expected to feel more guilty and ashamed when they violate interpersonal and work regulation norms (both in Turkey and in the Netherlands). Therefore, the following hypothesis was generated for both countries:

Hypothesis 2a. Reward for application will positively moderate the relationship between norm violations and feelings of shame and guilt. Specifically, the higher one's reward for application belief, the stronger the effect of both types of norm violations will be on feelings of shame and guilt.

Social cynicism appears to be a response to the basic requirement of survival and adaptation in the social world. People high in social cynicism view the world in a negative manner, and this evaluation therefore results in less social engagement, more negative feedback, and lower life satisfaction (Lai, Bond, & Hui, 2007). Social cynicism by definition is related to distrust in other people. People who are high in social cynicism are likely to be unhappy and more prone to run into interpersonal problems, which implies that they will be less cooperative in interpersonal relationships (Chen, Fok, Bond, & Matsumo, 2006; Leung et al., 2002). Furthermore, social cynicism represents a distrust of social institutions. Indeed, research found that social cynicism is negatively related to one`s work satisfaction and attitudes towards the company (International Survey Research, 1995). It therefore can be argued that individuals high in social cynicism will feel less guilty and ashamed when they violate interpersonal and work regulation norms. Building further on this argument, it is hypothesized for Turkey as well as for the Netherlands that:

Hypothesis 2b. Social cynicism will negatively moderate the relationship between norm violations and feelings of shame and guilt. Specifically, the higher one's social cynicism beliefs, the weaker the effects of both types of norm violations on feelings of shame and guilt.

5.2 Method

Participants

Bachelor of Economics students from a Dutch public university and a comparable Turkish public university participated in the study. The Turkish sample size equaled 103 (46% female, M_{age} = 21, SD_{age} = 1.95) and the Dutch sample size equaled 111 (45% female $M_{age,}$ = 22, SD_{age} = 2.64). There were 50 participants in Turkey and 55 participants in the Netherlands in the interpersonal norm violation scenario situation. There were 53 participants in Turkey and 56 participants in the Netherlands in the violation of a work regulation scenario situation. Participants were randomly assigned into each scenario situation in both countries. Data were collected on a voluntary basis. The university instructors in both countries distributed the questionnaires during their class hours and collected them after approximately 30 minutes. The students were assured that their answers would be kept confidential and would only be used for research purposes.

Design and Procedure

We conducted a 2 (Norm violations: Interpersonal vs. Work regulation) by 2 (Country: Turkey vs. the Netherlands) by 2 (Social axioms: Social Cynicism, Reward for application) mixed factorial design with Country and Norm violations being the between subject variables and Social axioms being the covariates. Dependent variables were Guilt and Shame feelings. First, we measured biographics, social axioms, and proneness to shame and guilt (Shame 1 and Guilt 1 are measured before the manipulation). After that, the same participants read either a scenario involving the violation of an interpersonal norm or one involving the violation of a work regulation norm (See Appendix). Subsequently, they filled out a parallel version of the proneness to shame and guilt scale, but now as if they were the individual violating either the interpersonal or the work regulation norm, and imagining how they would then feel (Shame 2 and Guilt 2).

Norm violation scenarios. Two scenarios were developed in which respondents had to imagine being an employee who had violated an interpersonal norm (i.e., lying to a colleague; Scenario A) or work regulation norm (i.e., conveying confidential information; Scenario B). Scenarios were equivalent in length (i.e., the length of Scenario A was 1751 characters in Dutch and 1684 characters in Turkish; the length of Scenario B was 1638 characters in Dutch and 1699 characters in Turkish). Participants were randomly assigned to each scenario in both countries.

In accordance with the test translation guidelines as adapted from Van de Vijver (2003), scenarios had been translated and back-translated by a group of six bilingual experts (i.e., from English to Turkish and then back-translated from Turkish to English, and from English to Dutch and then back-translated from Dutch to English). Two of these experts were linguists whose mother tongue was Turkish and who had studied English language linguistics, and one was an industrial and organizational psychologist. Three of the remaining experts were industrial and organizational psychologists whose mother tongue was Dutch.

Measures

Following test translation guidelines (Van de Vijver, 2003), measures were translated and back-translated by the six bilingual experts mentioned above. Unless indicated otherwise, all items were measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale. Reliabilities overall were acceptable for research purposes (Nunnally, 1978) and can be found in Table 1.

Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations, Alpha Reliabilities, and Correlations among All Variables

		Turkish sample					*Dutch sample*										
		Inter		*Work*			*Inter*		*Work*								
		M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*α*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*α*	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	Shame 1	1.97	.45	1.93	.41	.62	1.94	.41	2.02	.56	.71	--	.43**	.29**	.32**	.12	.24*
2	Guilt 1	2.45	.60	2.44	.52	.72	2.21	.47	2.21	.47	.54	.52**	--	.13	.16	.05	.11
3	Shame 2	2.52	.74	1.96	.71	.76	2.31	.64	2.29	.61	.67	.30**	.02	--	.70**	.08	-.00
4	Guilt 2	3.75	.99	3.12	1.01	.88	3.41	.79	3.30	.68	.76	.16	-.05	.73**	--	.09	-.08
5	RfA	4.40	.50	4.45	.65	.79	3.75	.56	3.71	.58	.63	.01	.16	.03	.16	--	-.14
6	SC	3.65	.67	3.53	.77	.61	2.77	.59	2.89	.66	.62	.14	.20*	.00	.03	.02	--

Note. Correlations for the Turkish sample are presented below the diagonal, whereas correlations for the Dutch sample are presented above the diagonal * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$. Shame 1 = Shame measured at Time 1; Shame 2 = Shame measured at Time 2; Guilt 1 = Guilt measured at Time 1; Guilt 2 = Guilt measured at Time 2; RfA = Reward for application, and SC = Social Cynicism. Inter = Interpersonal norm violation; Work = Violation of a work regulation norm.

Proneness to shame and guilt. An adapted version of the Personal Feelings Questionnaire (Harder, 1990) was used to measure proneness to shame (seven items) and guilt (six items). Examples of items measuring proneness to shame are "feeling embarrassment" and "blushing". Examples of items measuring proneness to guilt are "feeling you deserve criticism for what you did" and "regret".

Confirmatory factor analyses were conducted to analyze the factorial structure of the Shame and Guilt scales. Fit indices were good for the two-factor model of these scales (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Specifically, items for shame and guilt showed a good fit in the Turkish sample: $\chi 2$ (df = 47) = 61.53, *n.s.*; RMSEA = .05; CFI = .93, and in the Dutch sample: $\chi 2$ (df =44) = 54.14 *n.s.*; RMSEA = .03; CFI = .95.

Further, conceptual agreement was reached when testing measurement invariance across both samples. For the shame and guilt scale, the χ^2 of the restricted model slightly increased, but the $\Delta\chi^2$ was non-significant. The practical fit indices for the restricted model did not alter significantly from the fit statistics of the unrestricted model; RMSEA slightly decreased from .03 to .02 and CFI remained the same (.94). Therefore, we accepted the hypothesis of conceptual invariance across both samples for the shame and guilt scale (see Table 2 for values of the relevant fit indices).

Table 2

Overall Fit Indices for Testing Conceptual Equivalence of the Shame and Guilt Scales among Turkish and Dutch Samples

	$\chi 2$	df	*Δχ2*	Δdf	*RMSEA*	*CFI*	*Statistical Significance*
Shame and Guilt							
Model I with no between-group constraints	115.67	91	-	-	.03	.94	--
Model II with factor loadings constrained equal	121.99	99	6.32	8	.02	.94	*n.s.*

Note. *SRMR* = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; RMSEA = Root Means Square Error of Approximation; CFI = Comparative Fit Index. None of the χ^2 values are significant.

General beliefs about the world (social axioms). An adapted Dutch (Bond et al., 2004) and Turkish version (Bond et al., 2004) of the short social axiom scale was used to measure Reward for Application, and Social Cynicism. Each axiom was measured using five items (1 = *do not believe at all;* 5 = *believe very much*). Example items are "Hard-working people will achieve more in the end" (Reward for application) and "Kind-hearted people usually suffer losses" (Social cynicism).

Overall, fit indices were good for each of these scales (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Specifically, the reward for application scale showed a good fit in the Turkish sample: $\chi 2$ (df = 3) = 4.11, *n.s.*; RMSEA = .06; CFI = .99, and in the Dutch sample: $\chi 2$ (df = 3) = 5.07 *n.s.*; RMSEA = .06; CFI = .96. The social cynicism scale showed a good fit in the Turkish sample: $\chi 2$ (df = 3) = 4.95, *n.s.*;

RMSEA = .08; CFI = .98, and in the Dutch sample: $\chi 2$ (df = 6) = 4.35 *n.s.*; RMSEA = .00; CFI = 1.00.

In addition, conceptual agreement was tested. Confirmatory factor analyses showed metric equivalence when measurement invariance was tested across both samples. As expected for the reward for application scale, the χ^2 of the restricted model increased slightly, the unrestricted RMSEA decreased from .04 to .00, and the CFI increased slightly from .98 to 1.00. Also for the social cynicism scale, the χ^2 of the restricted model increased slightly, the RMSEA decreased slightly from .01 to .00, and the CFI increased slightly from .99 to 1.00 (see Table 3 for values of the relevant fit indices).

Table 3

Overall Fit Indices for Testing Conceptual Equivalence of the Reward for Application and Social Cynicism Scales among Turkish and Dutch Samples

	$\chi 2$	df	*Δχ2*	Δdf	*RMSEA*	*CFI*	*Statistical Significance*
Reward for application							
Model I with no between-group constraints	9.18	6	--	--	.04	.98	--
Model II with factor loadings constrained equal	9.76	10	0.58	4	.00	1.00	*n.s.*
Social cynicism							
Model I with no between-group constraints	9.39	9	--	--	.01	.99	--
Model II with factor loadings constrained equal	9.75	10	0.36	1	.01	1.00	*n.s.*

Note. SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; RMSEA = Root Means Square Error of Approximation; CFI = Comparative Fit Index. None of the χ^2 values are significant.

Preliminary analyses: Manipulation and randomization checks

First of all, we checked whether the scenarios were perceived as we had intended: namely, violating an interpersonal norm (i.e., Scenario A: Lying to a colleague) and violating a work regulation (i.e., Scenario B: Conveying confidential information). We used three items on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = *totally disagree;* 5 = *totally agree*). The participants had to answer the following Questions: "To what extent is the scenario …." The first item we used was "Violation of an interpersonal norm", the second was "Violation of a legal rule", and the third was "Violation of an organizational rule. Manipulations were successful: Scenario A was understood as a violation of an interpersonal rather than a work norm in Turkey, t (103) = 6.80, $p \leq .05$, and in the Netherlands, t (111) = 7.75 $p \leq .05$. Scenario B was understood as a violation of a work norm rather than of an interpersonal norm in Turkey, t (103) = 7.61, $p \leq .05$, and in the Netherlands, t (111) = 2.43, $p \leq .05$. Results also showed that Scenario A was interpreted as an interpersonal norm violation, and this was equally clear to both Dutch and Turkish participants, F (1, 98) = 2.09, *n.s.* In the same way, Scenario B was interpreted as a work-regulation norm violation, and this was equally clear to both Dutch and Turkish participants, F (1, 98) = .41, *n.s.* Results also showed that the intended meaning of the scenarios were evaluated as norm violations in an equally strong manner in both countries F (1, 202) = .07, *n.s.*

Second, we conducted paired-sample t-tests to investigate the effect of each scenario on feelings of guilt and shame in each country. In the Netherlands, Shame 2 feelings appeared significantly higher than Shame 1 feelings in Scenario A (i.e., violation of an interpersonal norm scenario), t (111) = -4.82, $p \leq .01$, and Scenario B (i.e., violation of a work-regulation norm scenario), t (111) = -2.64, $p \leq .01$. In Turkey, Shame 2 feelings were significantly higher than Shame 1 feelings in Scenario A, t (99) = -5.39, $p \leq .01$, but not so in Scenario B, t (99) = -.39, *n.s.* In the Netherlands, Guilt 2 was significantly higher than Guilt 2 in both Scenario A, t (111) = -10.78, $p \leq .01$, and Scenario B, t (111) = -10.16, $p \leq .01$. In Turkey, Guilt 2 was significantly higher than Guilt 1 in both Scenario A, t (99) = -7.30, $p \leq .01$, and Scenario B, t (99) = -4.41, $p \leq .01$.

Third, we checked whether participants in Turkey and the Netherlands differed in terms of their social axioms. T-tests showed that Turkish students had higher social cynicism beliefs, t (198) = 8.17, $p \leq .05$ and higher reward for application beliefs, t (198) = 8.59, $p \leq .05$. Results also showed that Turkish students were more prone to feelings of guilt than to shame, t (100) = -11.96, $p \leq .05$ and that Dutch students also were more prone to these feelings, t (98) = -4.93, $p \leq .05$. Furthermore, Turkish students were more prone to feelings of guilt than were Dutch students, F (1, 213) = 29.38, $p \leq .05$. However, there was no significant difference in proneness to feelings of shame between Turkish and Dutch samples, F (1, 213) = .08, *n.s.* We also checked whether there were any age and gender differences among participants across scenario conditions. There were no age, F (1, 103) = .46, *n.s.*, or gender, F (1, 103) = .13, *n.s.*, differences across the scenarios in Turkey. Similarly there were no age, F (1, 111) = 1.06, *n.s.,* or gender, F (1, 111) = .03, *n.s.*, differences across scenario conditions in The Netherlands. The age and gender distributions were also equivalent across both countries F (1, 214) = .19, *n.s.,* F (1, 206) = .11, *n.s*. respectively. Thus, there were no gender and age differences across either scenarios or countries.

5.4 Results

To test the hypotheses, we performed a series of hierarchical regression analyses on Shame 2 while controlling for the effect of Shame 1 in the first step, and on Guilt 2 while controlling for the effect of Guilt1 in the first step. We conducted the analyses separately for each country for *Hypotheses 1a* and *1b*. For *Hypotheses 1c*, *1d*, *2a*, and *2b*, we conducted the analyses by combining the two countries in overall analyses while including country as a dummy variable. To test the moderation hypotheses, we mean-centered the variables as reported in Aiken and West (1991). Tables 4-7 show the results of the regression analyses.

Hypothesis 1a predicted that interpersonal norm violation in Turkey would elicit feelings of shame and guilt more strongly than would violation of a work regulation. First, as can be seen from Table 4, there is a main effect of type of norm violation on feelings of shame (β = -.34; $p \leq .01$) and guilt (β = -.30; $p \leq .01$). This means that interpersonal norm violation in Turkey elicited

feelings of shame and guilt more strongly than did violation of a work regulation. *Hypothesis 1a* therefore was supported. *Hypothesis 1b* predicted both norm violations would elicit feelings of shame and guilt to the same extent in the Netherlands. As can also be seen from Table 4, the main effect of type of norm violation is not significant on feelings of shame (β = -.04; *n.s.*) and guilt (β = -.07; *n.s.)* in the Netherlands. This means that both types of norm violations elicited feelings of shame and guilt to the same extent. Therefore, *Hypothesis 1b* could not be rejected.

Table 4

Hierarchical Regression of Shame 2 on Shame 1 and Type of Norm Violation (Hypotheses 1a and 1b)

		Turkey			*The Netherlands*		
		Shame 2			*Shame 2*		
		β	R^2	ΔR^2	β	R^2	ΔR^2
Step 1	Shame 1	.27**	.09**	.09**	.29**	.09**	.09**
Step 2	Type of norm violation	-.34**	.21**	.12**	-.04	.09	.00
		Guilt 2			*Guilt 2*		
		β	R^2	ΔR^2	β	R^2	ΔR^2
Step 1	Guilt 1	-.04	.00	.00	.16	.03	.03
Step 2	Type of norm violation	-.30**	.09**	.09**	-.07	.03	.00

Note. Shame 1 = Shame measured at Time 1; Shame 2 = Shame measured at Time 2; Guilt 1 = Guilt measured at Time 1; Guilt 2 = Guilt measured at Time 2; Type of norm violation: 0 = Violation of an interpersonal norm; 1 = Violation of a work regulation norm.

* $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$.

Further, *Hypothesis 1c* predicted that violation of a work regulation would bring about stronger feelings of shame and guilt in the Netherlands than in Turkey. According to *Hypothesis*

1d, an interpersonal norm violation would elicit feelings of shame and guilt to the same extent in both countries. As can be seen from Table 5, a significant main effect was found for type of norm violation on feelings of shame (β = -.20; $p \leq .01$), and the moderation term (Type of norm violation by Country) was also significant (β = -.58; $p \leq .01$), indicating that an interpersonal norm violation brought about stronger feelings of shame in Turkey than in the Netherlands, and that the violation of a work regulation norm elicited stronger feelings of shame in the Netherlands than in Turkey (see Figure 1). Further, as can also be seen from Table 5, a significant main effect was found for type of norm violation on guilt feelings (β = -.19; $p \leq .01$), and the moderation term (Type of norm violation by Country) was also significant (β = -.48; $p \leq .05$). As can be seen from Figure 2, this means that interpersonal norm violation led to stronger feelings of guilt in Turkey than in the Netherlands, and violation of a work regulation norm led to stronger feelings of guilt in the Netherlands than in Turkey. Thus, both *Hypotheses 1c* and *1d* were supported.



Figure1. Effect of Type of Norm Violation on Feelings of Shame (Turkish and Dutch samples)



Figure 2. Effect of Type of Norm Violation on Feelings of Guilt (Turkish and Dutch samples)

Table 5

Hierarchical Regression of Shame 2 on Shame 1, Type of Norm Violation and Country (Hypotheses 1c and 1d)

		Shame 2		
		β	R^2	ΔR^2
Step 1	Shame 1	.29**	.09**	.09**
Step 2	Type of norm violation	-.20**	.13**	.04**
Step 3	Country	-.01	.13	.00
Step 4	Type of norm violation X Country	-.58**	.16**	.03**
		Guilt 2		
		β	R^2	ΔR^2
Step 1	Guilt 1	.03	.00	.00
Step 2	Type of norm violation	-.19**	.04**	.04**
Step 3	Country	-.01	.04	.00
Step 4	Type of norm violation X Country	-.48*	.06*	.02*

Note. Shame 1 = Shame measured at Time 1; Shame 2 = Shame measured at Time 2; Guilt 1 = Guilt measured at Time 1; Guilt 2 = Guilt measured at Time 2; Type of norm violation: 0 = Violation of an interpersonal norm; 1 = Violation of a work regulation norm. Country: 0 = Turkey; 1 = the Netherlands. * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$.

Hypothesis 2a predicted that reward for application would moderate the relationship between norm violations and feelings of shame and guilt in both countries. As can be seen from Table 6, no significant interactions were found between Type of norm violation, reward for application, and feelings of shame ($\beta = .01$; *n.s.*) and guilt ($\beta = .08$; *n.s.*), including when country

was taken into account for shame (β = .00; *n.s.*) and guilt (β = .08; *n.s.*). Reward for application had a main effect on feelings of guilt (β = 12; p = .07). *Hypothesis 2a* was partially supported, indicating that participants from both countries who had high reward for application beliefs felt more guilty when they violated norms than did participants with low reward for application beliefs (β = .12; p = .07).

Table 6

Effects of Reward for Application on Feelings of Shame and Guilt (Hypothesis 2a)

		Shame 2		
		β	R^2	ΔR^2
Step 1	Shame 1	.29**	.09**	.09**
Step 2	Reward for application	.03	.08	.00
Step 3	Type of norm violation	-.20**	.12**	.04**
Step 4	Country	-.02	.12	.00
Step 5	Type of norm violation X Country	-.58**	.15**	.03**
Step 6	Reward for application X Type of norm violation	.01	.15	.00
Step 7	Reward for application X Country	.02	.16	.01
Step 8	Reward for application X Type of norm violation X Country	.00	.16	.00

Note. Shame 1 = Shame measured at Time 1; Shame 2 = Shame measured at Time 2; Guilt 1 = Guilt measured at Time 1; Guilt 2 = Guilt measured at Time 2; Type of norm violation: 0 = Violation of an interpersonal norm; 1 = Violation of a work regulation norm. Country: 0 = Turkey; 1 = the Netherlands.* $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$.

Table 6 (continued)

		Guilt 2		
		β	R^2	ΔR^2
Step 1	Guilt 1	.03	.00	.00
Step 2	Reward for application	.12†	.02†	.02†
Step 3	Type of norm violation	-.19**	.05**	.03**
Step 4	Country	-.02	.05	.00
Step 5	Type of norm violation X Country	-.49*	.07*	.02*
Step 6	Reward for application X Type of norm violation	.08	.07	.00
Step 7	Reward for application X Country	.14	.08	.01
Step 8	Reward for application X Type of norm violation X Country	.08	.09	.01

Note. Shame 1 = Shame measured at Time 1; Shame 2 = Shame measured at Time 2; Guilt 1 = Guilt measured at Time 1; Guilt 2 = Guilt measured at Time 2; Type of norm violation: 0 = Violation of an interpersonal norm; 1 = Violation of a work regulation norm. Country: 0 = Turkey; 1 = the Netherlands.* $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$.

Hypothesis 2b anticipated that social cynicism would negatively moderate the relationship between norm violations and shame and guilt feelings. Regression analyses similar to those conducted for Reward for application were conducted for Social cynicism. As can be seen from Table 7, the interaction of social cynicism and type of norm violation on feelings of shame was marginally significant (β= -.18; p = 06), indicating that participants who had high social cynicism beliefs felt less ashamed when they violated a work regulation norm than when they violated an interpersonal norm violation (see Figure 3). Therefore, *Hypothesis 2b* was partially supported.



Figure 3. Effect of Social Cynicism on the Relationship between Type of Norm Violation and Feelings of Shame.

Table 7

Effects of Social Cynicism on Feelings of Shame and Guilt (Hypothesis 2b)

		Shame 2		
		β	R^2	ΔR^2
Step 1	Shame 1	.29**	.08**	.08**
Step 2	Social cynicism	-.06	.09	.01
Step 3	Type of norm violation	-.20**	.13**	.04**
Step 4	Country	-.02	.13	.00
Step 5	Type of norm violation X Country	-.58**	.16**	.03**
Step 6	Social cynicism X Type of norm violation	-.18 †	.17 †	.01 †
Step 7	Social cynicism X Country	.07	.17	.00
Step 8	Social cynicism X Type of norm violation X Country	-.33	.18	.01
		Guilt 2		
		β	R^2	ΔR^2
Step 1	Guilt 1	.03	.00	.00
Step 2	Social cynicism	-.02	.00	.00
Step 3	Type of norm violation	-.18**	.04**	.04**
Step 4	Country	-.01	.04	.00
Step 5	Type of norm violation X Country	-.47*	.06*	.02*
Step 6	Social cynicism X Type of norm violation	-.05	.06	.00
Step 7	Social cynicism X Country	.11	.06	.00
Step 8	Social cynicism X Type of norm violation X Country	-.35	.07	.01

Note. Shame 1 = Shame measured at Time 1; Shame 2 = Shame measured at Time 2; Guilt 1 = Guilt measured at Time 1; Guilt 2 = Guilt measured at Time 2; Type of norm violation; 0 =Violation of an interpersonal norm, 1 = Violation of a work regulation norm. Country 0= Turkey; 1= the Netherlands. †$p \leq .10$; * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$.

5.4 Discussion

This study showed the importance of the type of norm that is violated for examining feelings of guilt and shame in two cultures. Early notions about shame and guilt, which categorized collectivistic cultures simply as "shame cultures" and individualistic cultures as "guilt cultures", were disconfirmed by our results, since participants from a collectivistic culture also felt guilty and participants from individualistic culture also felt ashamed when they violated norms. Interestingly, an interpersonal norm violation elicited feelings of guilt and shame more strongly than did a work regulation norm violation in collectivistic Turkey. This finding demonstrates that norms about interpersonal relationships are of central importance, and seem to be more important than work regulations. This finding is line with Kâğitçibaşi (1994) who described Turkish culture as a culture of relatedness, where dependent interpersonal relationships go beyond personal family boundaries.

Both types of norm violations elicited feelings of shame and guilt in the Netherlands. Specifically, no differential effects of the type of norm violations on feelings of shame and guilt occurred in this country. This may imply that for Dutch participants both types of norms seem to be equally important. A potential explanation for this finding may be that The Netherlands is a country with high scores on "femininity", which means that interpersonal relations are valued in Dutch society, whereas at the same time individualism is valued as well (Hofstede, 1996).

Nevertheless, violation of an interpersonal norm elicited feelings of shame and guilt more strongly in Turkey than in The Netherlands. This shows that adherence to interpersonal norms is more important in Turkey than in the Netherlands. Although the Netherlands is a feminine country where people care about obeying rules in interpersonal relationships and respect each other (Hofstede, 1996), our results also showed that interpersonal norms are less crucial in the Netherlands than in Turkey. Although the feminine nature of Dutch society may bring about kindness and tenderness in interpersonal relations, our findings showed that people in collectivistic cultures are more concerned with the harm they cause in interpersonal relationships than are people from an individualistic culture. Furthermore, violation of a work regulation norm

elicited feelings of guilt and shame more strongly in the Netherlands than in Turkey. This finding supports the general idea that rules laid down by legal authorities have central importance, and therefore a violation of them results in more feelings of shame and guilt in the Netherlands than in Turkey (Gelfand et al., 2004).

Reward for application only had a marginal main effect on guilt feelings but not on shame feelings. Because reward for application implies that people get what they deserve, it makes sense that people who highly endorse this belief feel guiltier when they violate norms. This finding is in line with previous research that showed that reward for application is positively related to an internal locus of control (Smith, Trompenaar & Dugan, 1995), being the attribution of the causes of events to one's own behaviors rather than to external factors (Rotter, 1966). Furthermore, a feeling of guilt is regarded as an internally focused emotion that reflects a deeper cognitive analysis of situations, including self-reproach, regret, and attempts to correct one's faulty behavior (Fontaine et al., 2006). Given these findings, people with high reward for application beliefs (an internal focus) may feel more responsible for their actions and hence feel guiltier. Feelings of shame, however, include a more superficial analysis of situations on the spot, characterized by an orientation toward significant others and by feelings of being stared at, wanting to disappear (Fontaine et al., 2006), and trying to repair one's damaged self-image in the eyes of others (De Hooge et al., 2008). This may explain research findings for feelings of guilt, but not so for those of shame. Another plausible explanation of our finding may be that reward for application is concerned with an internalized belief about the importance of effort. It therefore makes sense that reward for application shows a stronger effect with relation to feelings of guilt than to shame, because norm violation involves a lapse of effort.

We expected social cynicism to negatively affect the relationship between norm violations and feelings of shame and guilt in both countries. Our results showed that people who had high social cynicism beliefs felt less ashamed when they violated a work regulation norm than did people who had low social cynicism beliefs. No effects were found for feelings of guilt. This finding may be explained by differences in the self- versus other-related nature of shame and social cynicism. In the literature, a distinction is made between feelings that focus on others and those that focus on oneself as well as the differential effects on several outcomes (e.g., see

Proost, Derous, Schreurs, Hagtvet, & De Witte, 2008, for a discussion on this distinction in the context of anxiety). Feelings of shame focus on the immediate situation and include beliefs about what *others* would think about oneself after he or she had done something wrong. Hence, feelings of shame are more other-oriented in nature. Social cynicism, in contrast, is basically more self-referenced in nature: cynical people are less able to respond in an empathic manner, taking others' viewpoints into account (Bond, Leung, Au, Tong, & Chemonges-Nielson, 2004). In addition, people high in social cynicism would care less about what other people think because they do not believe or trust them. Therefore, those high in social cynicism (a self-referenced belief) may feel less ashamed (an other-referenced feeling) when violating norms than would those low in social cynicism beliefs. Effects, however, were only found for violation of a work regulation norm and not for interpersonal norm violation. We suggest that work norm violations may be more prone to effects of social cynicism on feelings of shame because work norm violations are perceived as less important compared to interpersonal norm violations. Additional research may test assumptions further with regard to the interplay of self- and other-related feelings and to beliefs. The main effect of reward for application and the moderation effect of social cynicism were marginal.The small sample sizes on which these findings are based can be considered as a limitation, because the statistical power may be too low to detect significant effects.

In summary, the added value of this research is threefold. First, this study highlighted the importance of differentiating between types of norms in the analyses of feelings of shame and guilt across two different cultures. Second, this study investigates effects of norm violations on people's feelings of shame and guilt. This is particularly important in understanding and preventing the occurrence and reoccurrence of counterproductive work behavior. Finally, this study showed that there are differential moderating effects of social axioms on the relationship between norm violations and feelings of shame and guilt.

Limitations and future research opportunities. This is one of the first studies to investigate effects of norm violations and social axioms on feelings of shame and guilt across two different cultures. As with any study, however, certain limitations and further research opportunities need to be mentioned. A first limitation relates to the sample investigated. We

agree that student samples can be a serious threat to the external validity of study findings, particularly if undergraduates are used as participants. However, business students from economics/management departments participated in the current study; they were well acquainted with workplace simulations and already had relevant work experience. Our manipulation checks also showed that participants perceived the scenarios as intended. Therefore, we believe our findings do not imply a substantial threat to external validity. Nevertheless, we suggest that future research include real employees if possible. To this end, a research design other than policy capturing could be used.

Another potential limitation relates to the number of social axioms investigated. We only included reward for application and social cynicism, as these axioms seemed highly relevant to the type of norm violations and feelings investigated. However, further research might explore the theoretical and practical value of other social axioms such as social complexity, fate control, and religiosity (Leung et al., 2002) in explaining type of norm violations on feelings of guilt and shame in the workplace.

Finally, it would also be interesting to examine the effects of norm violations on feelings of shame and guilt among ethnic Turkish minorities in the Netherlands, because Turkish minorities form one of the country's largest minority groups (Myors et al., 2008). It is feasible that patterns of integration and acculturation may affect findings. For instance, Turkish minorities in the Netherlands may adhere to the Dutch work ethos to some extent, and this would be interesting to investigate in terms of better understanding and increasing intercultural communication and cultural awareness among ethnic minority-majority groups in the workplace.

Practical relevance. Our results show that violation of an interpersonal norm seems a more delicate issue than does violation of work regulation norms in the Turkish culture. One practical implication of this finding is that Turkish organizations may require more time and effort to build a good social climate at work, as this may prevent counterproductive work behavior. Violation of a work rule such as conveying confidential information can be as important as violation of an interpersonal norm if Turkish employees care about their relationships with the person who is in charge of communicating the rule. Hence, people who are

responsible for communicating the rules in organizations should take into account the importance of interpersonal relationships in Turkish society. Furthermore, violation of a work regulation norm elicits feelings of guilt more strongly in the Netherlands than in Turkey. These findings are highly significant for intercultural awareness in multicultural work places and international organizations, where people have to take into account these cultural nuances in work norms.

By investigating the effects of work-related norm violations and social axioms relating to feelings of guilt and shame in two different cultures, we have furthered insights into the underlying mechanisms of work behavior, and have also offered a new avenue for investigating acculturation in the workplace. The latter may be of particular relevance in this period of globalization, and may support diversity in the workplace.

Appendix

Work Norm Violation scenarios

Scenario A (Violation of an Interpersonal Norm)

You are working as an insurance sales agent. You sell life, property, health, and other types of insurance and arrange interviews with prospective customers in order to sell these insurance policies. Before conducting the interviews, you customarily draw up an interview plan with a team of four colleagues. You are the coordinator of the team. You then inform the management about the interview plan in order to receive their confirmation stating that each team member can individually engage in interviewing customers.

You work in the same office as your colleague Ahmet (Jan in the Dutch version). He is a member of your interview planning team and also your best friend. You share both work and personal problems. You spend most of the weekends with him and his family. You assist each other by helping one another to move house, and by lending money.

Ahmet received bad news from the management: They did not want to prolong his work contract. Although you personally did not like this decision, you thought it was a fair one. Ahmet was competent with regard to presenting and selling insurance, and he also had considerable knowledge of marketing strategies. However, he was not able to keep up with recent developments such as those involving computer skills.

Ahmet asked you to talk to the management in an effort to persuade them to change their minds. You felt responsibility and wanted to maintain your harmonious relationship. However, you told lied to Ahmet and told him you had spoken to the management team but could not alter their decision. You saw that your friend became very unhappy and depressed because he had been dismissed. After some time, he and the others became aware of your lie. Although you were not totally responsible from the situation, you could have supported and comforted Ahmet instead of using a lie to rid yourself of any responsibility.

Total number of words: 314

Scenario B (Violation of a Work Regulation Norm)

You are working as an insurance sales agent. You sell life, property, health, and other types of insurance and arrange interviews with prospective customers to sell these insurance policies. Before conducting the interviews, you customarily draw up an interview plan with a team of four colleagues. You are the coordinator of the team. You then inform management about the interview plan in order to receive their confirmation stating that you can individually engage in interviewing customers.

The economical conditions become worse in Turkey (in the Netherlands). The company you are working for has also been affected by this situation, and the number of clients has declined. Therefore, the number of employees needed for interviews has decreased as well.

You learned from the management that three people from your interview planning team were going to be laid off. As the team leader, you were informed about this situation and your comments have also been taken into account. The management wished to keep this confidential because they wanted the employees to complete the project they had started. They also wanted to maintain the general unity and harmony of the team. Management was planning to inform the employees of the layoff within the legally required time: namely, eight weeks in advance.

While you were talking to one of the team members, you told him about the layoff decision. You could not keep your mouth shut, and thereby disobeyed a work rule. You could not resist the desire to speak of this layoff decision. What you did was against company policy. You could not keep the information confidential and so you broke an organizational rule. Hence, the organization's layoff decision was diffused and everyone knew the management's plan.

Total number of words: 292