Behavioral biases can result in suboptimal acquisition decisions-with the potential for errors exacerbated in consolidating industries, where consolidators design serial acquisition strategies and fight escalating takeover battles for platform companies that may determine their future competitive position. To guide objective managerial judgment, and to rationally anticipate the irrational behavior of rival bidders or financial markets, this article proposes a modified option-game toolkit for serial acquisition strategy. It brings together insights from both strategy and finance, which quantify acquisition strategies, thus allowing executives to make rational intuitive decisions under uncertainty.

Additional Metadata
Keywords acquisition (serials), business planning, competition, decision making, executive ability, executives, securities markets, uncertainty
Persistent URL hdl.handle.net/1765/22264
Citation
Smit, J.T.J, & Moraitis, T. (2010). Playing at Serial Acquisitions. California Management Review, 53(1), 56–89. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/22264