Pooling, Access, and Countervailing Power in Channel Governance
Fruit and vegetable marketing organization the Greenery has experienced various governance structure changes, like horizontal merger, forward integration, and the emergence of grower associations. A multilateral incomplete contracting model is presented to account for these changes by analysing the interactions between pooling, access, and countervailing power. This model does not only explain the changes at the Greenery, but it contributes also to the design of efficient channel governance. This paper was accepted by Pradeep Chintagunta and Preyas Desai, special issue editors. This paper was accepted by Pradeep Chintagunta and Preyas Desai, special issue editors.
|Keywords||Agricultural cooperatives, Benefits, Competition, Contracts, Design, Firm, Incentive-system, Management, Models, Operations Research & Management, Strategic analysis, Vertical integration, channel governance, cooperatives, foreclosure, incomplete contracts, market power, pooling|
|Persistent URL||dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1369, hdl.handle.net/1765/23924|
Hendrikse, G.W.J.. (2011). Pooling, Access, and Countervailing Power in Channel Governance. Management Science, 57(9), 1692–1702. doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1369