We formulate a simple model of optimal defensive disclosure by a monopolist facing uncertain antitrust enforcement and test its implications using unique data on defensive disclosures and patents by IBM during 1955-1989. Our results indicate that stronger antitrust enforcement leads to more defensive disclosure, that quality inventions are disclosed defensively, and that defensive disclosure served as an alternative but less successful mechanism to patenting at IBM in appropriating returns from R&D.

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Tinbergen Institute
hdl.handle.net/1765/31775
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Series
Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute
Tinbergen Institute

Bhaskarabhatla, A., & Pennings, E. (2012). Defensive Disclosure under Antitrust Enforcement (No. TI 12-010/2). Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute (pp. 1–33). Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/31775