Corporate Responses to Social Issues:
Essays in Social Entrepreneurship and Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate Responses to Social Issues:
Essays in Social Entrepreneurship and Corporate Social Responsibility

Reacties van Bedrijven op Maatschappelijk Vraagstukken
Essays over Sociaal Ondernemerschap en Maatschappelijke Ondernemen

Thesis

to obtain the degree of Doctor from the
Erasmus University Rotterdam
by command of the
Rector Magnificus

Prof.dr. H.A.P. Pols

and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board.

The public defence shall be held on
17 February 2017 at 09.30 hrs

by

Akpeki Onajomo Paul Akemu
Born in Lagos, Nigeria

Erasmus University Rotterdam
To Sanna
I always felt that I would do a doctorate degree, but until recently I never imagined that I would do one in a social science. Engineering? Yes. Chemistry? Maybe. Management? No. This dissertation is the outcome of intellectual restlessness, curiosity about business organisations, technology, society and economic development. It is also the result of trust, love, and encouragement from a countless number of people. First, to my parents, Ibiwari and ‘Fome Akemu, who gave me a pleasant, carefree childhood and taught me to ask questions. We’ve been through some tough times together, but I know I can always rely on your optimism, resilience, and resourcefulness. Dad, I recall fondly the scent of your dimly-lit library on the top floor of the house at Anthony Village. The library was stocked with books on history, law, philosophy and your precious volumes of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I am sorry I lost two volumes of the encyclopaedia, but would you believe that I read every volume in the collection? Thank you for constantly stoking my sense of wonder about the world. As I read those delightful books at a young age, I was transported to worlds very different from the tropical city of Lagos. Mom, thank you for your steady hand, encouragement and discipline. From your example, I learned important lessons about dreaming, about integrity and about industriousness. You will always be an ‘ayounge’ mama to me.

To my siblings, Bikele, Dan, Edirin, Kareem, and ‘Sone, what would childhood have been without you? Bikele, thank you for your unconditional love. From childhood, your warm-heartedness, your humour, your tenacity always encouraged me to press on no matter the challenge. Edirin, thank you
for taking responsibility in the family in my absence and for your patience—
for tolerating my silly, often ill-tempered questions. I think I have the perfect
excuse: it’s the Ph.D. That’s what a Ph.D does. One starts asking stupid
questions for which the answers are patently obvious. Your pragmatism,
moral compass and deep knowledge of the practice of business inspires me.
Now that this Ph.D. is over, we can do a movie marathon weekend! Dan, had
you not asked me pointed questions about what I wanted to do with my life
in 2009, I might not have considered doing a Ph.D. Funny isn’t it? Thank you
for awakening me from my intellectual ennui. You infected me with a
passion to study management and business. The flame has burned brightly
ever since. Kareem, thank you for introducing helping me appreciate
business practice while I was a teenager. I wager you were one of a handful
teenagers in Lagos who subscribed to *Business Week*, following Lou
Gerstner’s exploits as he attempted to restructure IBM.

To my teachers at the Command Children’s School, Lagos, and the
Nigeria Military School, Zaria, it has been 22 years since I left high school,
but the memories of the valuable lessons you taught me remain etched in my
heart. Mr. Houmia, I cherished your maths lessons, especially your insistence
that our solutions to our math exercises telescope visually as we wrote them
from the top to the bottom of our 2D exercise books. You made mathematics
seem so beautiful to me. Mrs. Soyingbe, thank you for your English lessons.
They set the foundation for my subsequent love of the language. Mr. Ogidi,
Mr. Muhammad and Mr. Udi, thank you for stimulating me to excel at
mathematics, chemistry and geography. It did not matter that in Zaria we
studied distant places like the Indonesian island of Java and desert geological
formations that we had never seen. You enlivened those subjects so
forcefully that even today, whenever I think of Java, I still remember your classes with a smile. I know you expected me to join the army. Perhaps, the Nigerian army is better off without me; I don’t think I would have made a fine officer. Mr. Owvufeti, I admit: you were right. You counselled me at the age of 15 after a test in English composition to consider a career in journalism. You thought I would make a good journalist—in a country ruled at the time by a ferociously anti-free speech military junta. I told my parents about your counsel. As you can imagine, they would have none of it. Engineering school, they said, was the place for a good science student like me. Now, I have come full circle. I am a qualitative organisational researcher. What is a qualitative researcher if not a teller of theoretical, analytically-rigorous, empirically-grounded tales about organisational life?

I have been extremely fortunate to have good friends. When I think of the many friends I have known, particularly from the old country, I recall the words of the great medieval theologian, St. Thomas Aquinas: ‘There is nothing on this earth more to be prized than true friendship’. How do I even begin to appreciate the friends from the military school, from university in Lagos and London, who have provoked me to ask questions about society, discussed with me great books, and supported me through difficult moments? I will inevitably miss out a few names, but I prize your friendship. To the ‘fab’ five Dibia brothers—Emeka, Jude, Uzo and ‘Nayo and Ugo—I enjoy our stimulating debates about religious and political theory, history and economic ideology. And Ugo, thank you for constantly reminding me that the social world is messier, more complex than my favourite sanitised academic theories suggest. Some of the smartest, most socially-sophisticated people I know, from whom I learned the rudiments of small group dynamics
are Sanmi, Bimbo, Notoma ‘Jeffśia’, Ayo Abegs, Ahmed ‘K’ Carew, Shanu, Leye ‘Blau’, Obi Nzewi, and Wole ‘Ollie’ Folayan. Chitu, thank you for those three weeks in 1992 during which you taught me Further Mathematics before our senior secondary school exams. I thought you were the smartest person in the world then, and I still think you are the smartest person I know. I finally made it, but, naturally, you trod the doctoral path ten years before I did.

I began my career at Shell Assen where I was lucky to have Stathis ‘the bulldog’ Kitsios as my manager. Stathis, I learned the hard way not to present half-baked, ill-considered ideas to you because you tore them into bits. From you, I learned the virtues of careful project management, the benefits of face-to-face time with colleagues, and developed a nose for organisational power dynamics. My career stint in icy Siberia would not have happened without your support. Colleagues and friends from Shell days who made work and life in Groningen more fun than it should have been—Loay Al-Haj (Juanito, Oman por sempre!), Rob Smeenk, Vincent Hugonet, Martin Bosma, Julien Brocvielle, Andrew Agenmomen, Eric Ereyi (fada!), Leonard Onuga, Victor van Heeswijk, Marjan Smit, Andrea Caudullo, Thomas Bouchery, Carlo Scarabéo, Cees, and Amit Karnik—thank you.

From Shell Assen, I moved 250km south west to Schlumberger Den Haag. It was not simply a geographical move; it was also an industry move. I had started thinking about the environmental sustainability of the oil industry. Coincidentally, Schlumberger had begun an internal corporate venture (ICV) to develop market solutions for carbon capture and storage (CCS). Hanspeter Rohne, Markus Harting, Ulrike Miermann, Arnaud van der Beken and Suzanne Hurter made Schlumberger an exciting place to work.
despite demanding clients, tight deadlines and constant travelling. At Schlumberger, I learned the difficulties of formulating and implementing organisational strategy in an uncertain business environment. Suzanne, those were heady days in La Defense, weren’t they?

It was at the London Business School (LBS), however, that my desultory, unfocused questions about sustainability, economic development and business coalesced into a plan of action. Professors Rajesh Chandy and John Mullins, your class on entrepreneurship in emerging markets was a source of delight and fascination. Thank you helping me connect the dots between the practice of business and the welfare of broader society. Professor David Arnold, your marketing classes were an intellectual high point. Your teaching repertoires—your authoritative class presence, your superb communication skills and facile command of your subject—provides a model of pedagogy that I strive to emulate. To Corinne Talichet, Otto de Medeiros Carneiro, Riccardo Abello and Lia Barbopolou, despite the pressure of the MBA, we made it. And then I decided to plunge even deeper. ‘What was I thinking?’ you asked.

That plan of action brought me to the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) and the city of Rotterdam. This dissertation would not have begun had the Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) not risked admitting and financially supporting a middle-aged man’s research journey through RSM’s doctoral programme in September 2011. Thank you ERIM. The first thing I learned at RSM was that I had to unlearn most of what I had learned in business. Professor Gail Whiteman made my transition from industry to academia so much easier because of her deep understanding of both worlds. Gail, you challenged me to ask interesting questions about
important phenomena while crafting my own distinctive voice. We started off with no data at all. You warned me that I would be inundated with data once I started collecting it. Two years later, I see what you meant. Thank you for your unflinching support and for having a nose for a good qualitative story. From you, I learned a lot about dealing with uncertainty while conducting grounded qualitative research and writing gripping research accounts. Dr. Steve Kennedy, the review process was gruelling. We started with a ghost of a contribution. One reviewer even rebuffed our claim calling it a strawman argument, but we kept at it. We reworked it through endless discussion and coding. Thank you for your good-natured pragmatism, your scepticism, and for closely reading the work. Professor Pursey Heugens, Professor Will Felps, thank you for the wonderful classes on advanced qualitative methods and philosophy of science respectively. If I was not fully convinced of the methodological diversity and rigour within the qualitative research tradition before I took your courses, I became decidedly so thereafter.

The kind of qualitative research on which this dissertation is based would have been impossible without the help of informants across many organisations who took the time to explain their personal and organisational histories to me. Thank you to my informants at the following organisations (some of whom I will not name for confidentiality reasons): Annette Mutuku, Holy Ranaivozanany, Roland Sladek, John Munene, Carolyn Siboe (Huawei, Kenya and Shenzhen); Professor Harry Kaane (Government of Kenya); LIWA Trust; Peninna Wangari, John Kamonde (Samsung Kenya); Moses Sitati, Sanna Eskelinen (Nokia, Espoo and Nairobi); Télécoms Sans Frontière; Maurice Braga, Sharon Gordon (Columbia Global Centre,
Nairobi); John Muthee (CSR Africa); Nikolai Barnwell (88mph); Abagi Nator (Closet49); Josephine Busolo (Safaricom); Dr. Edwin Ataro (Moi University); Professor Mabel Imuga, Professor Stanley Kamau (Jomo Kenyatta University of Science and Technology), and Michael Niyitega (Makerere University). Thank you Jael Amara, Ayanna Yonemura, and Vicky for welcoming me warmly to your beautiful city. Asante! Kuwashukuru kwa ukarimu wako!

Most of the data used in this dissertation was collected at Fairphone, a very special startup venture based in Amsterdam. Thank you Fairphone’ers for giving me access to your remarkable story and for tolerating my pesky questions. I know I started off as a ‘fly on the wall’ but within 15 months, I became a chronicler of your history—‘Fairphone’s institutional memory’—as someone remarked during a testy management meeting. I salute Fairphone’s founders and leaders: Bas van Abel, Miquel Ballester (gosh, I love your power quotes!), Tessa Wernink and Olivier Hebert. I do not take your trust and support lightly. I also received incredible support from Fairphone staff and associates: Joe Mier, Bibi Bleekemolen, Laura Gerritsen, Mulan Mu, Raluca Radu, Marco Jorritsma, Nur Icar, Esmee Lacle, Michiel Stoop, Phillippe Birker, Beth Russell, Roos van der Weerd, Rick de Groot, David B., Leontine van Geffen (’s up, Geffen?), Sietse van Erve, Erik, Sean Ansett, Gabriel Sebastian, Lidy Sjardin, Sacha van Tongeren, Anna Schwarz, Artur, David K., Marleen Sjardin, Nastasia, Rayda, and Youge. Thank you ladies and gentlemen. How quickly 15 months go by! I am especially grateful to a mysterious pipe-smoking angel investor/organisational consultant/history buff/cultural analyst for giving me privileged access to
Fairphone’s story, and to H.R.H Prince Jaime de Bourbon de Parme for taking the time to explain the workings of OECD committees.

Informants at other organisations associated with Fairphone also kindly provided data on which this dissertation is based: Anna Kakuli, Théo Jaekel (SwedWatch), Natalie Ankersmit, Anneke Galama, Gerno Kwaks, Gijs Verbraak, Victor van der Veen (Niza/ActionAid), Martin de Jong, Casper Jorna, Jochum Heerkens (Vodafone), Peter Westgeest (KPN), Micheal Loch, William Millman (Conflict Free Tin Initiative), Mark Davis (DSI), Joost de Kluiver (Closing the Loop), Paul Miller (BGV) and journalist Natasja van der Berg. Thank you very much.

Whenever the stress of research became unbearable, I could count on my weekly volleyball training to help ease the stress. To Petra, Cornell, Robin, Ozeas, Ivo, Mernout, Hans (ons setupper), Ernst, Kees, Egbert ‘Monsieur Le President’, Jacco, Andre. Jongens, bedankt voor de wekelijks gezelligheid in Rotterdam en ons onvergetelijk weekend in Ameland! Now I will be the third ‘doctor’ on the team. Who says nerds cannot jump?

How could I have gotten through the Ph.D. without the support of my fellow doctoral candidates who were down in trenches with me? Pierre Legault-Tremblay, Nathan Betancourt, Inga Hoever, Maya, Amanda Williams, Victor, Silviu Tieran. Thank you for sharing the joys, the frustration and the wonderful lunchtime conversations. Jonathan Attey (bros!), we had good laughs about Ghana and Nigeria! Samer Abdelnour, technically speaking, you had crawled out of the doctoral trenches when we met, but your support and encouragement helped me through the frustration of the Ph.D. Thank you for those two days in Denver discussing materiality and effectuation theory. Professor Joep Cornelissen, thank you for providing
critical feedback and suggestions on earlier versions of a paper in the manuscript. Wendong Deng, thank you for reminding me of the levity of academic life. Riccardo Valboni, thank you for countless delicious dinners. If you say that my spaghetti Amatriciana is restaurant quality, it is only because I learned it from you. Diana Perra, thank you for lively conversations about culture, qualitative research and politics. I honestly believe that Italians have discovered the secret to happiness. No wonder Alyssa loves you! Thank you Yolanda Jahier and Janneke Suijker for helping me navigate the turbid waters of the ERIM bureaucracy and the SAP system.

To my family, Boudewijn, Joke, Ruben and Marije, thank you for your kindness, love, and encouragement. Thank you Ruben and Marije. De Punt is far away, but not as far as Lagos is from Rotterdam. You have welcomed me with open arms. Being part of the family feels so natural to me now that I struggle to remember a time when I was not. Thank you Boudewijn for your humour, your kind-heartedness, and long conversations about the human condition. Oh, and I will never forget the best wine I have ever had in my life: that 1947 French wine! Thank you Joke for your support, your curiosity about the past and your unquestioning love for the kids.

As I write this acknowledgment, I recall a verse from the Biblical book of Proverbs that I learned in Sunday School many years ago: ‘Lo, children are the heritage of the Lord: and the fruit of the womb is his reward. As arrows are in the hand of a mighty man; so are children of the youth.’ I don’t know that I have done anything particularly virtuous to deserve the joy that my children Alyssa and Zoë give me; they will perhaps be my most satisfying heritage. To Alyssa and Zoë, the sound of the words, ‘Papa!’, as I bicycled into the yard at the end of the day brought warmth to my heart. Your happy
faces lit up my mornings after long nights spent doing research. Your developing personalities—and your occasional vinegary moods—reminded me to put the Ph.D. into perspective. My research trajectory has been much more fulfilling because of your hugs and kisses.

To my wife Sanna, I dedicate this dissertation. Despite being pregnant, you completed your teaching degree and constantly supported my dreams. You comforted me through many ‘dark nights of the soul’ during my research journey. You tolerated my grumpiness, my brooding taciturnity as I contemplated research ideas, spoke to myself in the shower or scribbled imaginary scripts in the air. You reminded me not to take myself too seriously; to laugh at myself—and we did have some good laughs. Thank you for holding the fort, for allowing me to sleep in on Saturdays and Sunday mornings. Sanna, I want us to grow old together, to laugh together, to cry together, watch our children grow, watch them become teenagers, fall in love (by that time I would have gotten my gun licence) and leave the nest. With you, I feel I have won the lottery of life. I pinch my arm every morning to remind myself how lucky I am. I, the grandson of an illiterate peasant farmer born who lived in the shadow of the British Empire, feel blessed with you. I wonder what my grandfather would think if he could see me now. Life is indeed full of the most pleasant surprises.

Orhe ukpe sheke oye dia ohwere. Ukpe re akpome shekevwe vre obo miroro ri. A successful farmer is known by his bountiful harvests. My harvest exceeds my expectations.

A. Onajomo Paul Akem, Rotterdam, November 2016
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** .............................................................................................................. 1  
**TABLE OF CONTENTS** ............................................................................................................ xi  
**LIST OF FIGURES** .................................................................................................................... xiv  
**LIST OF TABLES** .................................................................................................................... xv  
**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS** ....................................................................................................... XVI

**CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION** ........................................................................................................ 1  
Serendipity and Contingency: A Brief Narrative of my Doctoral Experience ........................................... 1  
Themes in Dissertation: Corporate Responses to Social Issues ......................................................... 9  
Research Overview ...................................................................................................................... 21

**CHAPTER 2 : SOCIAL ENTERPRISE EMERGENCE BY DISTRIBUTED AND EFFECTUAL AGENCY: THE FAIRPHONE CASE** ................................................................. 31  
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ 31  
Theoretical Context ......................................................................................................................... 35  
Methods ........................................................................................................................................ 41  
Findings .......................................................................................................................................... 49  
Discussion and Implications ........................................................................................................... 84  
Limitations and Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 94

**CHAPTER 3 : CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PRACTICE IN THE MNE AS SYNCHRONOUS ACQUIESCENCE AND MANIPULATION: THE HUAWEI CASE** ................................................................. 99  
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ 99  
Theoretical Context ....................................................................................................................... 104
Methods ........................................................................................................................................... 120
Findings ............................................................................................................................................... 130
Discussion and Implications .............................................................................................................. 154
Limitations and Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 160

CHAPTER 4: INTEGRATING SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND THICK DESCRIPTION IN ETHNOGRAPHY OF MODERN ORGANISATIONS: REFLECTIONS OF A DOCTORAL RESEARCHER ............................................................... 163
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. 163
Field Member Interaction in Organisational Ethnography ...................................................... 169
An Illustration of Traditional Ethnographic and Social Network Analysis ................................................................. 188
Discussion and Implications .............................................................................................................. 214
Limitations and Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 225

CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ................................................. 229
Summary of Findings ......................................................................................................................... 229
Contributions of Dissertation .......................................................................................................... 235
Implication for Practice ..................................................................................................................... 238
Future Research ............................................................................................................................... 242
Epilogue: Reflections on Methodology and Conclusions ................................................................. 244

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 253

APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................................... 305
Appendix A: Sample Interview Protocol (Study I) ............................................................. 305
Appendix B: Chronological Event and Timeline (Study I) ................................................ 307
Appendix C: Content Analysis Coding Scheme (Study II) ................................................ 309

SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................ 313
SAMENVATTING .............................................................................................................................. 317
ABOUT THE AUTHOR ........................................................................................................... 321
PORTFOLIO ....................................................................................................................... 323
ERIM PH.D. SERIES IN MANAGEMENT ........................................................................ 329
   Dissertations in last five years...................................................................................... 329
## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1. Corporate responses to social issues in the business and society literature.................................................................10

Figure 2-1. Process model of enterprise emergence .........................85

Figure 4-1. Fairphone office layout at two periods during fieldwork in 2014 .................................................................................197

Figure 4-2. Seating arrangement of Fairphone staff in two periods .......207

Figure 4-3. Strike network ordered according to seating location in period I (July–August 2014) (left), and period II (October–November 2014) (right)..............................................................................................................209

Figure 4-4. Social network in period I (July–August 2014) ...............211

Figure 4-5. Social network in period II (October–November 2014) .......212
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1-1. Contrasting corporate responses to social issues: Social entrepreneurship and corporate social action .................................................................19
Table 1-2. Overview of studies in the dissertation ........................................ 26
Table 2-1. Interview data ..................................................................................43
Table 2-2. Evidence for emergent themes from analysis and illustrative data ..............................................................................................................66
Table 2-3. Evidence for effectuation action in the emergence of Fairphone .............................................................................................................. 79
Table 3-1. Typology of organisational responses to institutional demands ........................................................................................................ 105
Table 3-2. Summary description of common worlds ........................................ 116
Table 3-3. Kenyan society and economy at a glance .......................................122
Table 3-4. Data sources ......................................................................................125
Table 3-5. Results of content analysis of public statements showing percentage of passages coded to common worlds ........................................ 141
Table 3-6. Evidence for presence of common worlds in analysis and illustrative data ............................................................................................... 146
Table 4-1. Summary of empirical research on organisational ethnography and social network .................................................................................. 173
Table 4-2. Summary statistics of Fairphone e-mail data ................................. 191
Table 4-3. Summary of network position per Fairphone organisation member ............................................................................................................203
Table 5-1. Summary of contributions of articles in dissertation ................. 232
Table 5-2. Coding scheme ................................................................................ 309
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B&amp;S</td>
<td>Business and society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Computer-mediated communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Corporate social action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate social responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Corporate social performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMNE</td>
<td>Developed country multinational enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBK</td>
<td>Engineering board of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMNE</td>
<td>Emerging country multinational enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-Africa collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB</td>
<td>International business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communication technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNE</td>
<td>Multinational enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNO</td>
<td>Mobile network operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for economic cooperation and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and medium scale enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Social movement organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Social network analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSF</td>
<td>Telecom seeds for the future</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Introductions to doctoral dissertations typically give the impression that the doctoral candidate began the research process with well-articulated research questions, conducted comprehensive, focused literature reviews and then followed appropriate methods to answer the research questions. Undoubtedly, many doctoral research projects unfold that way. Mine did not. My doctoral journey is not a story of prescient foresight. Instead, this dissertation is the outcome of my initially vague interest in the intersection between business practice and social issues, restless intellectual curiosity, serendipitous events, and exploitation of contingencies to address various inter-related empirical puzzles. In this introduction to the dissertation, I recount briefly my doctoral journey. Thereafter, I present the substantive themes that unify the studies in the dissertation and an outline of the dissertation.

SERENDIPITY AND CONTINGENCY: A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF MY DOCTORAL EXPERIENCE

I began my doctoral studies in September 2011 with a broad interest in how corporations, which are ostensibly arenas of private action, create value for constituents, such as customers, shareholders and employees, and are implicated in the welfare of their host societies. My interest in these questions stemmed from two factors: (1) my position as a simultaneous organisational ‘insider’ and societal ‘outsider’, and (2) recent changes in the global economic landscape.

Being an organisational insider and a societal outsider. During my pre-Ph.D. career with two Fortune 500 multinational enterprises (MNEs), I
observed as an organisational insider that my employers had developed capabilities in the conceptualisation, management and execution of complex technological, operational, political and commercial operations around the world. These MNEs developed cutting edge technology, commercialised the technologies and deployed them in hostile environments ranging from the mangrove swamps of the Niger Delta to the Gulf of Mexico. They also attracted highly-talented employees, successfully socialised them within the company, and maintained sophisticated management systems that underpinned successful business operations in over 90 countries around the world.

While I was an insider in these organisations, I was simultaneously a societal outsider. My country of birth, Nigeria, is different—economically, culturally and institutionally—from the countries where I had been educated and subsequently started my career: Western European countries. Being an outsider, I questioned the cultural and institutional arrangements that my native Western European friends took for granted. For instance, to my Western European friends, their home countries seemed ‘natural’, taken-for-granted. Why did these nation states enjoy so much cognitive legitimacy—at least in the judgment of my friends?

Furthermore, I wondered what role organisations like my former employers had played in the tremendous economic and social advancement of Western European societies. What was the nature of the relationship between these corporations and their home societies? And how had that relationship changed over time? At the start of the Ph.D., it seemed to me that the sophisticated organisational capabilities I had observed and contributed to in my industry career were implicated in the generation of
enormous value for the corporations and for their home countries. How had these companies and their home societies done it?

**Recent developments in global economy.** Rapidly-developing countries, such as China, Brazil, India and Russia, command an increasing share of global economic power. For instance, in 2014, China had the world’s second-largest economy after the United States whereas barely three decades earlier (in 1981) it had only the twelfth-largest economy (The World Bank, 2016). As these emerging countries become more prominent in international political and economic affairs (Brautigam, 2009; H. Campbell, 2008), MNEs originating in those countries have provoked admiration (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2000; Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2006) as well as mistrust (Fortune, 2009; Peng, Li Sun, & Blevins, 2011; The Economist, 2012b) within the business press, and triggered significant interest among management and organisational scholars (e.g., Guillén & García-Canal, 2009; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; K. E. Meyer, 2004). I wondered whether these emerging country MNEs were different from the Western MNEs that I had worked for.

Many international business (IB) scholars have certainly argued so. According to these EMNEs are *fundamentally* different from DMNEs: EMNEs are late entrants to industries historically dominated by DMNEs (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2000; Dawar & Frost, 1999); they are more technologically ‘backward’ (Ramamurti, 2012b, p. 41), and smaller in size (Fortune, 2011) than DMNEs. Scholars have also emphasised that EMNEs differ from DMNEs in another important respect: their home country institutions. Emerging countries are thought to have weaker civil society, public governance, and environmental and labour standards than developed
countries (Amaeshi & Amao, 2009; Collingsworth, Goold, & Harvey, 1994; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Kapstein, 1996).

Despite their technological, governance and size disadvantages (relative to DMNEs), many EMNEs were attempting to build sophisticated capabilities in manufacturing, operations and marketing (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Ramamurti, 2012a)—the same capabilities that I had observed in my previous employment. How were they doing it? How did these companies generate social welfare in their home countries? What effects did these EMNEs have beyond their national borders given their supposedly weak home country institutions? These were the questions I pondered as I began my doctoral studies in late 2011. By the end of 2012, after completing my doctoral course work, I decided to investigate the corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices of MNEs.

_A twist in the tale._ The rapid adoption of mobile telephony in Africa in the past decade has been described as a ‘revolution’ (Kalil, 2009). This explosive growth of mobile telephony on the continent caught many research and business audiences by surprise (Etzo & Collender, 2010) and has since triggered significant optimism about the benefits of widely-available telecommunications in Africa (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Banks, 2008; The Economist, 2008). For instance, Professor Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia University, one of the world’s foremost development economists, described mobile telephony in Africa as ‘the single most transformative technology for development’ (Bloomberg Business Week, 2007). High expectations and optimism indeed.

Rhetoric aside, was there any substance to the optimism? It appeared so to me. Whenever I visited Lagos, the city of my birth, in the late 2000s, I
noticed how ubiquitous mobile telephony ‘democratised’ telecommunications. This was a marked difference from the Lagos of my childhood. I remember as a child growing up in Lagos that having a fixed telephone line at home—provided by a notoriously inefficient state-run telephone monopoly—was a rare symbol of social status and privilege. No more. By the late 2000s, virtually everyone in Lagos—from roadside trinket vendors to the occupants of the city’s well-appointed villas—seemed to have a mobile phone.

With the remarkable adoption of mobile telephony in Africa, even sceptical Western business audiences updated their portrayals of Africa. The influential news magazine *The Economist*, which had written off Africa as ‘hopeless’ (The Economist, 2000), rebranded the continent 13 years later as ‘hopeful’ (The Economist, 2013a) while consulting firm McKinsey released a report describing progressive African economies as ‘lions on the move’ (Roxburgh et al., 2010).

The burgeoning telecommunications sector in Africa, unlike the primary resource extraction sector that has historically dominated MNE activity on the continent (UNCTAD, 2012, p. 37, 41), was new, high-technology and driven by consumption within Africa. I thought it a fascinating context to explore my research questions; by 2012 the sector was attracting investment from DMNEs as well as EMNEs. Given the differences in technological endowments between EMNEs and DMNEs (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2000; Wells, 1983), stage of industry entry (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2000; Dawar & Frost, 1999) and in the institutional landscapes of their home countries (Amaeshi & Amao, 2009; Collingsworth et al., 1994; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Kapstein, 1996), I wanted to understand whether a
prominent class of EMNEs—Chinese EMNEs—operating in the telecommunications sector influenced their host countries differently than Western European DMNEs did. Specifically, I wanted to investigate the differences in the pattern of CSR practices of early versus late industry entrants and emerging country EMNEs versus DMNEs in the industry. Thus, I selected five companies that had extensive CSR programmes in selected African countries: Huawei (home country China, EMNE, late entrant), ZTE (China, EMNE, late entrant), Ericsson (Sweden, DMNE, early entrant), Nokia Siemens Networks (Finland, DMNE, early entrant) and Alcatel Lucent (France, DMNE, early entrant).

The study was designed on the assumption that I would interview company informants as well as external beneficiaries of the organisations’ CSR programmes. Armed with appropriate letters of introduction from my promotor, I contacted all five firms through my network of friends and via CSR or sustainability departments mentioned in the MNEs’ sustainability reports. ‘Would they be interested in participating in my study?’ I asked. As I importuned potential informants for interviews, I added two other firms to the study: Samsung and Nokia. Though there were not in the same industry sector as the original five they also claimed to have extensive CSR initiatives related to mobile telephony in Africa.

My contacts at the target firms were friendly, but ultimately unhelpful. Some of them were genuinely excited to be the subjects of interest by a researcher from a reputable business school. One contact from Ericsson promised to give an interview after the company’s annual sustainability report preparation cycle in March 2013. She jokingly remarked, ‘We get requests for research all the time from NGOs, but not from business schools.'
I will do my best for you.’ She did not. Between February and September 2013, I successfully interviewed informants from only two firms: Nokia and Huawei. Despite repeated promises to cooperate in my research project, contacts at Ericsson and Alcatel-Lucent could not commit to a 30-minute interview in 2013 even after I committed to meeting them in-person in their offices on a Friday afternoon. (ZTE contacts did not respond to my e-mails.)

By late September 2013, two years into the doctoral programme, the messy reality of doing qualitative research started to sink in. My carefully-designed multiple case study was being dismantled by the real world challenge of negotiating access to the field. I was not sure how to proceed. Should I continue with the study as originally designed or should I change my research question? I decided tentatively to analyse the data I had collected from Huawei and Nokia. Perhaps, I reasoned, I could unearth novel themes in the data before making a final decision.

That was my situation when my promotor, Professor Gail Whiteman, walked into my office on a Monday morning in mid-October 2013. She spoke excitedly about her weekend. ‘I know that you have been having trouble gaining access to companies for your study’, she said, ‘but hear me out.’ She told me that she had been at a sustainable business event the previous weekend where she met the founder of a social enterprise called Fairphone. ‘The company is worth researching’, she advised. ‘Fairphone have just run the most successful crowdfunding campaign in the Netherlands.’ ‘Ona’, she continued, ‘Speak with these guys. See if they are interested. I met the founder, Bas van Abel, last weekend and I can set up a meeting with him.’

I could tell from the tone of voice that she was insistent, but wanted me to make up my own mind. I was sceptical about changing course mid-way.
into the Ph.D. ‘Why would I want to do that?’ I thought to myself, ‘I would have to do a new literature review.’ Prof. Whiteman knew that I was interested in entrepreneurship. She also knew that I was still trying to make sense of the interview and documentary data that I had already collected. ‘Surely’, I said to her, ‘I needed to complete the analysis of the CSR data before pursuing a research project with Fairphone.’ She responded, ‘Think about it. Do some preliminary research about Fairphone and make up your mind.’ And so I did—reluctantly. I read press releases from Fairphone’s websites and watched YouTube videos about the company.

I was intrigued by what I learned about the company. At the time (late 2013), the new venture Fairphone had eight employees. The Fairphone staff, who announced that they had no experience in the mobile phone industry, spoke rather immodestly about ‘changing the mobile phone industry supply chain’. They described themselves as ‘strategically naïve’; yet, they had raised through crowdfunding over €6 million without producing a smartphone. ‘How had they done it?’ I wondered.

My curiosity whetted, I walked into Prof. Whiteman’s office and agreed, ‘Yes. Let’s arrange that meeting with Bas van Abel’. She immediately sent an e-mail to Fairphone’s CEO, asking for a Skype meeting. Within two hours, van Abel responded to the e-mail. We set up the Skype meeting and had a genial conversation about the company and the possibilities of doing research within Fairphone. Van Abel invited me to Fairphone a week later and introduced me to the Fairphone staff, who occupied two tables in a noisy shared office on the fifth floor of an old grain warehouse in Amsterdam.
Though I had begun my doctoral research with a carefully-designed multiple case study of CSR practices in Africa, my ‘discovery’ of Fairphone, the site that provided most of the data used in this dissertation, was not the result of the deliberate, methodical sampling process that I had initially envisioned. It was, instead, an opportunistic, purposive sample (Patton, 2001, pp. 243–244; Riemer, 1977) that eventually provided a rich site to investigate my research interests. In October 2013 when I began fieldwork at Fairphone, I intended to spend six months within the enterprise. I reasoned that that would be enough time to observe a production cycle within the company. I eventually spent 15 months in Fairphone, wrote a prize-winning teaching case about the company’s organisational challenges, observed three smartphone production cycles, and witnessed the organisation grow from eight to 43 employees.

Despite the emergent nature of my research trajectory, the studies that comprise this dissertation share common themes: they concern the nature of activities that corporations employ to address social issues.

THEMES IN DISSERTATION: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO SOCIAL ISSUES

Social problems abound in the world. Poverty, unemployment, lack of access to basic sanitation, healthcare and education are examples of problems that tax public policy makers, corporations, and civil society organisations around the world (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Martin & Osberg, 2007; Porter & Kramer, 2011; Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011). I discern four broad approaches within the business & society (B&S) literature to theorising and explaining corporate reactions to social issues: partnerships; social intrapreneurship; social entrepreneurship; and corporate social
responsibility. Though there is significant overlap in focus, method and theories, these approaches differ in two significant respects: the nature of the focal organisational entity that is the unit of analysis; and the centrality of the organisation’s social response to its rent-generating process. I explain these two dimensions in subsequent sections of this introduction. Refer to Figure 1-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of focal organisational entity</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social intrapreneurship</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate social action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social entrepreneurship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Centrality of response to rent-generating process

Figure 1-1. Corporate responses to social issues in the business and society literature

In this dissertation, I examine two types of corporate response to social issues: social entrepreneurship and corporate social action. However, before I do so, it is useful to say a little more about scholarship on partnerships and social intrapreneurship.

**Partnerships.** Broadly speaking, this body of research examines the interactions among corporations, governments and civil society
organisations, specifically focused on the influence of non-governmental organisation (NGO) activism, global governance and standardisation, cross-sector partnerships, and national and global governance (Kourula & Laasonen, 2009). As relationships between corporations and NGOs have become less adversarial in the last decade, corporations, NGOs and governments have formed new organisational entities or vehicles—cross-sector partnerships—through which corporate social responsibility practices are conducted in response to some social problem (e.g., De Bakker, Groenewegen, & Den Hond, 2005; Laasonen, Fougère, & Kourula, 2012; Teegen, Doh, & Vachani, 2004; Vachani, Doh, & Teegen, 2009; Vock, van Dolen, & Kolk, 2013). Typically, these partnerships conduct activities that are not central to the rent-generating processes within the firm.

**Social intrapreneurship.** This involves entrepreneurial activities or innovations occurring within established organisations in which resources are combined in new ways to create social value or stimulate social change (Mair & Martí, 2006). Scholars study for-profit enterprises (Halme, Lindeman, & Linna, 2012; Kistruck & Beamish, 2010) as well as non-profit organisations (Grohs, Schneiders, & Heinze, 2013; Summers & Dyck, 2011). However, the entrepreneurial activities studied in this body of work create social value by generating economic rents for the focal organisation through some commercial model (Kanter, 1999).

A key theme in the social intrapreneurship stream of scholarship focuses on the processes by which actors within firms navigate internal obstacles, such as dominant commercial paradigms within firms (Kanter, 1999), business unit and managerial incentive structures (Halme et al., 2012),
and expectations of external constituents (Dees, 1998; Phills, Deiglmeier, & Miller, 2008) that prevent social value creation.

Having said a little about partnerships and social intrapreneurship, my task in the rest of this introduction is to develop the themes in this dissertation and give an overview of the aims, methods and chapters that comprise the work.

**Social Entrepreneurship**

Social entrepreneurship is a process that involves the formation of new organisations and ‘the innovative use and combination of resources to pursue opportunities to catalyse social change and/or address social needs’ (Mair & Martí, 2006, p. 37). In the past two decades, social entrepreneurship has gained popularity. The business press (Bornstein, 2012; Dees, 1998; Westaway, 2011), practitioner-oriented journals (Dees, 1998; Haigh & Hoffman, 2012; Martin & Osberg, 2007), business schools (Mirabella & Wish, 2000) and prominent civil society organisations (Ashoka, 2015; Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship, 2015), have championed social entrepreneurship as a way to address pressing social problems.

Research on social entrepreneurship has proceeded apace. Scholars have documented social entrepreneurs alleviating social problems such as unemployment (Pache & Santos, 2013; Thompson, Alvy, & Lees, 2000; Tracey et al., 2011), lack of access to financial services (Alvord, Brown, & Letts, 2004; Battilana & Dorado, 2010) and poverty in post-conflict societies (Mair & Martí, 2009; Tobias, Mair, & Barbosa-Leiker, 2013). Social entrepreneurship scholars have explained the formation of social enterprises in one of three ways. In the first approach, scholars invoke the putatively virtuous characteristics of the individual entrepreneur or quasi-stable
characteristic of the organisational actor to explain the emergence of social enterprises. For instance, in one of the earliest heroic characterisations of social entrepreneurs, Dees (1998) described social entrepreneurs as a ‘rare breed’ who act as change agents, relentlessly pursuing opportunities to create sustained social value. Similarly, other researchers have ascribed the emergence of social enterprises to the unique psychological traits of venture founders such as drive (Thompson et al., 2000), inspiration and creativity (Martin & Osberg, 2007), and compassion (T. Miller, Grimes, McMullen, & Vogus, 2012).

The main limitation with the ‘heroic’ approach (Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey, 2011, p. 1205) is that social entrepreneurship is neither the sole preserve of the lone heroic entrepreneur nor the single optimally-structured organisation. It is often the outcome of collective action by individuals and organisations (Haugh, 2007; Montgomery, Dacin, & Dacin, 2012; Sud, VanSandt, & Baugous, 2009). Like their commercial counterparts, social entrepreneurs and social enterprises are embedded in networks of relationships with external actors who provide advice, capital and other resources essential to entrepreneurship (Dacin et al., 2011; Kotha & George, 2012; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Thus an atomised view of social entrepreneurship cannot account fully for many social entrepreneurial solutions for complex problems (Montgomery et al., 2012).

The second set of explanations in the literature invoke the patterns of actions entrepreneurs take to found social enterprises as a key explanation for the emergence of social enterprises. The entrepreneurial actor may create social enterprises by skilfully combining resources through bricolage (Di Domenico, Haugh, & Tracey, 2010; Mair & Martí, 2009) or by purposefully
following a succession of temporally distinct, pre-determined stages (Haugh, 2007; Perrini, Vurro, & Costanzo, 2010; Robinson, 2006). The main difference between the explanations that invoke personality traits (described in the preceding paragraph) and those that rely on entrepreneurial action is that the former locates the cause of social enterprise as unobservable and internal to the entrepreneurial actor whereas in the latter the social enterprise emerges due to observable actions that the entrepreneur takes.

Purposive action by the entrepreneurial actor following an inherently logical opportunity development process implies that the entrepreneurship has clear, fixed goals *ex ante*. The assumption of purposive action ignores the emergent nature of entrepreneurship, specifically how entrepreneurial actors change, update, revise, and improvise their short-term goals as they act on perceived entrepreneurial opportunity in the real world (Sarasvathy, 2001). Hence, while accounts of purposive action provide valuable insight into entrepreneurial decision making, they may overstate the foresight of the entrepreneurial actor. Thus, they may paint an inaccurate picture of the often serendipitous, contingent and non-linear process of social entrepreneurship.

The third approach to explaining the emergence of social enterprises—the least developed in the literature (Dorado & Ventresca, 2013)—highlights the broader *institutional* and *discursive* environments that foster social entrepreneurship. Social enterprises, in this approach, emerge due to changing institutions or taken-for-granted cultural models and the deliberate propagation of discourses supporting the application of commercial logics to address social problems that were historically addressed by public and non-profit sectors (Dart, 2004; Dorado & Ventresca, 2013; Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Lounsbury & Strang, 2009). For instance, Dart (2004), puzzled by the
rise of social entrepreneurship, argues that social enterprises emerge because proffering market-driven solutions to social problems conforms to norms within OECD [Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries that favour neoconservative, pro-market ideologies. As social entrepreneurs create new enterprises they may also do institutional work by championing new organisational forms, drawing on established institutional logics, and connecting the new forms to macro level discourses in a given society (Tracey et al., 2011).

One limitation of the institutional approach is that scholars have stressed the effect of taken-for-granted cultural cognitive models on the emergence of social enterprises, but have paid little attention to other aspects of the institutional environment such as the socio-technological (Orlikowski, 2007) that may influence social enterprise formation.

Given the diverse theoretical approaches to explaining social enterprise emergence, what are the underlying characteristics of social entrepreneurship? Scholars, regardless of their theoretical approach to social entrepreneurship, share at least two assumptions about the phenomenon. First, it is assumed that social entrepreneurship involves the formation of new organisational entities (e.g., Alvord et al., 2004; Mair & Martí, 2006; Martin & Osberg, 2007; Perrini et al., 2010; Robinson, 2006). Second, all approaches imply or assume that sustainable social enterprises are those whose business models, defined as the system of activities by which an enterprise produces and delivers a valuable product or service to its customers and retains economic rents (Teece, 2010; Zott & Amit, 2010), integrate and simultaneously advance the firm’s social mission (e.g., Battilana & Lee, 2014; Dees, 2001; Mair, 2006/2010; Seelos & Mair, 2007).
Thus, sustainable social enterprises are those in which activities that address social problems are central to the rent generation processes of the enterprise.

Second, social entrepreneurship may involve the mobilisation of marginalised groups; against influential institutional actors (Mair & Martí, 2009; Vasi, 2009) and has consequences for the firm, such as venture creation and growth, and for beneficiaries external to the firm (Alvord et al., 2004; Vasi, 2009).

These foregoing characteristics of social entrepreneurship differentiate it from corporate social action, the second type of corporate response to social problems that I study in this dissertation.

**Corporate Social Action**

Scholars in the B&S literature debate the definitions of corporate social action (CSA) and cognate phenomena such as corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate citizenship (Carroll, 1999; Garriga & Melé, 2004; Maignan & Ralston, 2002; Matten & Crane, 2005; Wartick & Cochran, 1985; Windsor, 2006). Despite the apparent definitional differences advanced by these scholars, these phenomena refer to few underlying dimensions of corporate behaviour with respect to broader society: environmental, social, economic, stakeholder and voluntariness dimensions (Dahlsrud, 2008). In this dissertation, I adopt the definition of CSA proposed by Marquis, Glynn & Davis (2007, p. 926) as organisational ‘behaviors and practices that extend beyond immediate profit maximization goals and are intended to increase social benefits or mitigate social problems for constituencies external to the firm’.

Corporations have enacted various CSR programmes that purportedly extend beyond the firms’ immediate profit maximisation goals to alleviate
problems such as poor working conditions in east Asian apparel factories (Smith, 2003; Spar & La Mure, 2003), poor healthcare and basic education in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta (Eweje, 2006; Wheeler, Fabig, & Boele, 2002), and lack of access to HIV/AIDS medication in Brazil (Flanagan & Whiteman, 2007).

Two distinct approaches to examining the drivers of CSAs can be discerned in the literature: those that explain CSA as driven by the intrinsic motives of organisational actors; and those that focus on CSA as extrinsically motivated by actors external to the firm (Muller & Kolk, 2010).

**Intrinsic drivers of CSA.** These explanations locate the antecedents of CSA in the motives of organisational decision makers. An organisation’s managers may enact strategic CSR programmes in order to improve the firm’s financial performance and competitive advantage (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2010; Husted & Allen, 2007; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Also, a corporation may adopt CSR practices for normative reasons. Regardless of any gains in financial performance or competitive advantage to their organisations, managers may pursue CSR programmes out of a personal sense of altruism or duty to society (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Carroll, 1979; Donaldson & Preston, 1995).

**Extrinsic drivers of CSA.** External actors in a firm’s institutional and stakeholder environment include the media (Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 1999), investors (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007), local communities (Marquis et al., 2007) and civil society groups (Doh & Guay, 2006). CSR scholars have also emphasised that firms engage in CSA principally to garner legitimacy with external audiences (Aguilera et al., 2007; Claasen & Roloff, 2012; Swanson, 1999).
CSA like social entrepreneurship is a corporate response to social problems. However CSA differs from social entrepreneurship in the following ways: (1) CSA typically does not involve the formation of a new organisational entity; it is undertaken by established for-profit organisations; (2) Organisations’ CSR practices are usually not integrated into rent-generating processes of the organisation (Husted & Allen, 2007; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Porter & Kramer, 2006); and (3) outcomes of CSA have historically been studied at the firm level (Margolis & Walsh, 2003).

In Table 1-1, I summarise the differences between social entrepreneurship and corporate social action.
Table 1-1. Contrasting corporate responses to social issues: Social entrepreneurship and corporate social action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of differentiation</th>
<th>Social entrepreneurship</th>
<th>Corporate social action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of actor</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profession of social mission/charter</td>
<td>Includes formation of organisation with articulated mission to address some social problem</td>
<td>Performed by for-profit organisation with no explicit social mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality of social mission activities to rent-generation process</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low (supplementary, legitimacy-seeking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to institutional constituents</td>
<td>May include mobilising marginalised social actors and resisting influential institutional constituents</td>
<td>Typically performed in acquiescence to influential institutional acquiesce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>Firm-centric (e.g., new firm creation) and non-firm-centric (e.g., benefits for targeted constituents, solution to social problem)</td>
<td>Firm-centric, such as financial performance, competitive advantage, legitimacy for firm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**CSR practices in the MNE.** MNEs, like purely domestic enterprises, are ensconced in broader institutional and stakeholder environments (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; C. Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). Due to their larger economic and environmental impacts (Christmann, 2004), MNEs have been pressured to address social problems within their operating environments (Flanagan & Whiteman, 2007; Spar & La Mure, 2003; Wheeler et al., 2002). However, scholarly examination of MNEs’ CSR practices has lagged that of domestic firms (J. T. Campbell, Eden, & Miller, 2012; Husted & Allen, 2006; Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006).

Unlike domestic corporations, the sub-units of an MNE operate in multiple heterogeneous institutional environments (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008). For MNEs, whose sub-units (headquarters, affiliates and subsidiaries) navigate those institutional environments, managing the CSR practices as a means to gaining legitimacy in the face of multiple institutional demands is a complex task (Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013) for at least three reasons: (1) the various sub-units of the MNE may enact CSR practices for different strategic ends in response to institutional pressures (C. Oliver, 1991); (2) due to conflicting institutional demands, managers may not know what organisational policies to implement in order to satisfy institutional demands (Wijen & Van Tulder, 2011); and (3) MNEs not only have to enact CSR programmes, they need to communicate and justify those programmes to various institutional constituents that may be removed from location where the programme is implemented (Christmann, 2004). Thus, MNEs’ CSR practices as well as external discursive justification of those practices are likely to be elements of MNEs’ repertoire for managing CSR commitments.
RESEARCH OVERVIEW

Aims and Contributions of Studies

The aim of this dissertation is to increase scholarly understanding in two substantive areas of research as follows:

1. The emergence of one type of response to social problems (social entrepreneurship);
2. The implementation and management another type of corporate response, corporate social responsibility, within an empirical context (MNEs) that has been ignored in the literature.

In addition, the dissertation contributes to the methodological literature, specifically, the organisational ethnography literature. I propose techniques that ethnographers of rapidly-changing modern organisational field sites may employ to compensate for the limits of traditional interviewing and participant observation, and satisfy the key ethnographic criterion of ‘being there’.

Before providing details on the studies that comprise the chapters in this dissertation, I state the ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin the methods in the dissertation.

Methods: Ontological and Epistemological Commitments

A researchers’ participation in any field of scholarship presupposes meta-theoretical commitments, essentially a worldview, comprising ‘sets of understandings regarding the nature of the basic entities forming a field of scholarly interest and the ways these entities interrelate’ (Ramoglou & Tsang, 2015, p. 411). These worldviews, though often unarticulated (Van de
Ven, 2007, pp. 36-37), concern assumptions about the nature of the social world or reality being studied (ontology) and how the researcher attains knowledge of that world (epistemology). These commitments, in turn, influence the choice of method and any truth claims that is made about the phenomenon under study (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Morgan & Smircich, 1980; Schwandt, 2000).

In the reflexive spirit of engaged scholarship championed by Van de Ven (2007), I wish to clarify the ontological and epistemological commitments that guided the methods in this dissertation. I take the perspective of realism (Ramoglou & Tsang, 2015; Van de Ven, 2007, pp. 37–40). In the context of entrepreneurship research, this perspective holds that basic entities central to the field, such as opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) and the phenomena I studied in the dissertation research—entrepreneurial and managerial action (Fisher, 2012; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Sarasvathy, 2001)—are ontologically real; they exist objectively and independently of my cognition (G. Burrell & Morgan, 1979; P. Johnson & Duberley, 2003). Yet, they are complex and multi-faceted.

In epistemology, the realist perspective holds that though social reality is objective, individual understanding of that reality is partial, incomplete and limited; that researchers’ ‘observations [of social reality] are theory laden and fallible’ (Ramoglou & Tsang, 2015, p. 413). Therefore, robust knowledge of social reality demands multiple perspectives (Van de Ven, 2007, p. 38).

Given my realist perspective and my preference for ideographic research, I employed two types of qualitative research designs in this dissertation: ethnography and the case study. I employed ethnography
principally as a type of method of ‘fieldwork activity’ (Bate, 1997, p. 1151). This involved ‘participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, and/or asking questions through informal and formal interviews, collecting documents and artifacts—in fact, gathering whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of inquiry’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 3). The case study design was employed in order to understand a temporally-bounded empirical phenomenon ‘in depth and within its real-life context’ (Yin, 2009, p. 18).

Abstract ontological and epistemological considerations alone did not determine my data collection and analysis strategies. I also considered pragmatic necessity (Bryman, 2007). Though my research was primarily qualitative, I relied on quantitative data and analyses when it suited my research interest. Throughout the research process, I relied on methodological triangulation across multiple, potentially contradictory data sources as I examined the phenomena of interest.

Outline of Dissertation

Study I: Social enterprise emergence by distributed and effectual agency. In the first study of the dissertation (Chapter 2), I theorise the emergence of a social entrepreneurship (the case). This study illustrates distinctive features of social entrepreneurship: the organisation formed (the social enterprise) to address the problem was new; the focal actor was not a heroic singular actor, but a heterogeneous group of actors; and the activities that address the social problems were central to the business model of the firm.
The study is based on a 15-month long study of the social enterprise Fairphone. I draw on social entrepreneurship, commercial entrepreneurship, technology in management (TIM), and social movement theories to analyse the unlikely emergence of the venture. I propose a model of social enterprise emergence from social movement activism. Specifically, I argue that entrepreneurial agency under an effectual logic, originally proposed by Sarasvathy (2001) to inhere within the entrepreneurial actor, is co-constituted by distributed agency, which I define as the proactive conferral of material resources and legitimacy to an eventual entrepreneur by heterogeneous actors external to the venture. I further theorise the role of material artifacts by arguing that artifacts, which were central to effectuation theory, but ignored in subsequent scholarship are essential to the commitment of resources to the venture by the effectual network.

**Study II: Case study CSR in the MNE.** The second study (chapter 3), addresses another type of corporate response to social problems: corporate social responsibility (CSR). Unlike social entrepreneurship, the focal actor is an existing organisation and the activities that address the social problem are performed principally to acquire legitimacy from influential institutional and stakeholder constituents.

The study is an empirical analysis of the CSR practices of the MNE Huawei, based on interviews and secondary data during a six-week visit to Kenya 2013. I employ a paradox perspective to legitimacy management in the MNE (Scherer et al., 2013) and a theory of discursive justification (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006) to analyse the practices and external justifications employed by sub-units of the MNE. The study suggests that the paradox approach may not lead to inherent conflict within the MNE if the
cost of conformity in one domain is low and institutional pressure in another weak.

**Study III: Methodological reflections.** The third study in this dissertation (chapter 3) follows chronologically after the first study. Having emerged, the social enterprise grows (McKelvie & Wiklund, 2010). During fieldwork in a rapidly-changing research site, the lone ethnographer has to make data collection choices, such as whom to interview and whom to observe (Van Maanen, 1979). Due to cognitive and spatial limitations, researchers may miss out on significant aspects of the organisational realities that they seek to understand. In the study, I address a methodological question: how may qualitative researchers exploit the self-documenting (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p. 121) aspects of modern organisations in order to paint compelling accounts of organisational life?

Using my study of the implementation of formal organisational structure, i.e., defined functional roles, responsibilities and reporting relationships, within Fairphone, I argue that social network analysis of modern organisations’ digital traffic (e-mail logs) may be fruitfully combined with conventional ethnographic techniques, such as interviewing and participant observation, to: (1) compensate for the limits of the latter in rapidly-changing organisational research sites; and (2) establish researcher presence in physical and digital spaces that constituted the social worlds inhabited by modern organisational informant. I argue that by doing so ethnographers produce more authentic portraits of modern organisational life.

In Table 1-2, I summarise the three studies, which will be elaborated upon in subsequent chapters.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Study I</th>
<th>Study II</th>
<th>Study III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Study design</td>
<td>Case study</td>
<td>Case study</td>
<td>Ethnography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Social enterprise emergence</td>
<td>Corporate social responsibility (CSR) practice and justification</td>
<td>The integration of thick description and social network analysis in ethnography of modern organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research question/focus</td>
<td>How to theorise the unlikely emergence of a social enterprise from social movement activism?</td>
<td>How does an MNE’s discursive justification scheme change when given organisational CSR practices (CSR) is employed in multiple CSR strategies across its sub-units?</td>
<td>How may organisational ethnographers exploit the self-documenting aspects of modern organisations to compensate for limits of traditional ethnographic data collection?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data sources</td>
<td>Interviews, participant observation, company and public archival records during 15</td>
<td>Interviews, company records during one-month field visits to companies in Amsterdam and Nairobi</td>
<td>Interviews, participant observation, company and public archival records during</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study I</td>
<td>Study II</td>
<td>Study III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>15 months field work within enterprise</td>
<td>15 months field work within enterprise</td>
<td>October 2013 – January 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>Theme analysis, pattern matching, abductive</td>
<td>Content analysis, theme analysis, thick</td>
<td>Theme analysis, social network analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>theorising</td>
<td>description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Declaration of Contribution

In this section of the introduction, following Erasmus Research Institute of Management’s (ERIM’s) doctoral regulations, I declare my contribution to each of the five chapters of this dissertation and acknowledge the contribution of other parties where appropriate.

Chapter 1. The work that constitutes this chapter was done independently by me, the author of the dissertation. I sent a draft of the chapter to my promotor and co-promotor for comments. Thereafter, I incorporated their feedback into the final version.

Chapter 2. A version of this chapter has been published in the Journal of Management Studies (See Akemu, Whiteman, & Kennedy, 2016). I am the first author, and my promotor and co-promotor are co-authors. I collected the data—interviews, participant observation and documentary data—during my 15-month study of the organisation, Fairphone. I wrote the thick description of the organisation’s emergence and validated same with Fairphone staff. I formulated the research question, performed the literature review, coded all 47 interviews and available secondary documentary data. My co-promotor, the third author of the paper, coded ten (of 47) interviews. With input from my promotor and co-promotor, I led the development of the process model and the discussion section of the paper. Lastly, I managed correspondence with the journal reviewers and associate editors throughout the one-year review process, and presented the paper at conferences in Rotterdam, Kos, Tilburg, Denver and Anaheim.

Chapter 3. The work that comprises this chapter was done independently by me. I did the literature review, formulated the research question, collected data via interviews in Nairobi and in Amsterdam and
documentary data from the Lexis Nexis database and companies’ online archives (for annual reports). Furthermore, I analysed the data and wrote the manuscript. In addition, I presented a draft version at an internal seminar and a conference, and circulated to two colleagues—Dr. Samer Abdelnour and Riccardo Valboni—for comments. I also sent a draft of the chapter to my promotor and co-promotor for comments. Thereafter, I incorporated their feedback into the final version.

Chapter 4. The work that comprises this chapter was done independently by me, the author of the dissertation. I collected the data during my 15-month study of Fairphone. I formulated the research question, performed the literature review, analysed the data, interpreted the same and wrote the manuscript. I sent the manuscript to my promotor and co-promotor for comments after which I incorporated their comments before submission to a journal. The manuscript is currently under review (R&R2) at Organizational Research Methods.

Chapter 5. The work that comprises this chapter was done independently by me, the author of the dissertation. I sent a draft of the chapter to my promotor and co-promotor for comments. Thereafter, I incorporated their feedback into the final version.
CHAPTER 2 : SOCIAL ENTERPRISE EMERGENCE BY DISTRIBUTED AND EFFECTUAL AGENCY: THE FAIRPHONE CASE

ABSTRACT

Effectuation theory invests agency—intention and purposeful enactment—for new venture creation in the entrepreneurial actor(s). Based on the results of a 15-month longitudinal case study of Amsterdam-based social enterprise Fairphone, we argue that effectual entrepreneurial agency is co-constituted by distributed agency, the proactive conferral of material resources and legitimacy to an eventual entrepreneur by heterogeneous actors external to the new venture. We show how, in the context of social movement activism, an effectual network pre-committed resources to an inchoate social enterprise to produce a material artifact because it embodied the moral values of network members. We develop a model of social enterprise emergence based on these findings. We theorise the role of material artifacts in effectuation and suggest that, in the case, the artifact served as a boundary object, present in multiple social words and triggering commitment from actors not governed by hierarchical arrangements.

Keywords: Social entrepreneurship; effectuation; distributed agency; material artifacts; social movement; longitudinal case study.

‘I sometimes think that there is an angel somewhere that is looking over Fairphone. The people we met by coincidence at some point, they become crucial people within Fairphone.’

Fairphone co-founder, Miquel Ballester, in interview December 2013

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a vast mineral-rich country in Central Africa, has witnessed devastating civil conflict related to mineral exploitation. Mineral ores mined in the context of the conflict—called ‘conflict minerals’ (OECD, 2013)—are the raw materials used to manufacture the vital components of electronic devices such as smartphones. In September 2009, Peter van der Mark, a public relations (PR) expert, and Bas van Abel, an industrial designer, devised a campaign to raise awareness in the Netherlands about the connection between smartphones and the conflict in the DRC. They called their campaign Fairphone. They invited the Dutch public to develop collaboratively a ‘fair’ smartphone: a phone that would be ‘conflict-mineral free’. They had neither the intention nor the expertise to make a commercial product. They hoped that any resulting prototype would be a non-functional concept device destined for exhibition at a local museum. They were wrong.

By January 2013, Fairphone the campaign had morphed into a social enterprise with van Abel as founder/CEO and with a new objective: ‘to produce a cool phone that put human values first’. In mid-2013, with no

2 Except for Fairphone’s founders, Bas van Abel, Peter van der Mark and Miquel Ballester, His Royal Highness (H.R.H), Prince Jaime de Bourbon de Parme and Waag Society, the names of all informants have been changed to protect their identities.
prototype, no customer base, no employee with industry experience and limited working capital, van Abel and his staff of six launched a crowdfunding campaign via the company’s website. They expected to pre-sell a maximum of 5,000 fair smartphones. They were wrong again. By November 2013, Fairphone had pre-sold 25,000 non-existent smartphones at €325 apiece. How do we theorise the unlikely emergence of Fairphone?

We present the findings of a 15-month longitudinal case study of Fairphone. Drawing on the social movement, commercial entrepreneurship, social entrepreneurship, technology entrepreneurship literatures and on effectuation theory, we develop a model that offers three key insights into social enterprise emergence. First, agency—intention and purposeful enactment—for social enterprise emergence does not inhere solely in the venture founders, as is assumed in effectuation theory (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 15–16). The entrepreneurial intention and capabilities that are presupposed by a purposive enactment of the venture in effectuation theory may also originate from multiple actors, such as the media, corporate actors and government officials, external to the venture founding team. Distributed agency co-constitutes or enables effectual entrepreneurial agency in the creation of a new social venture in two ways: (1) by the proactive commitment of entrepreneurially-valuable material resources, legitimacy, capabilities and contingencies—ingredients that are necessary for the new venture to thrive (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002)—to the (eventual) effectual entrepreneurial agent; and (2) by eliciting a change in the intentions of a previously-reluctant effectual entrepreneur to pursue domain-specific entrepreneurial goals—a necessary condition for new venture emergence (Katz & Gartner, 1988).
Second, material artifacts, which were central to the development of effectuation theory (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2008), but ignored in subsequent work on the theory, are vital to the convention of an effectual network. The symbolic dimensions of a material artifact (a smartphone) triggers resource pre-commitments from members of the effectual network. These members commit resources to the venture not based on assessments of utilitarian benefits, but because they interpret the artifact as symbolising their beliefs and values.

Third, the material artifact served as a boundary object (Star and Griesemer, 1989) because it is comprehensible, possesses emotional power and enables contributions from members of different social domains—consumer electronics firms, government actors, consumers, hackers—who attributed various meanings to the artifact (Bijker, 1987). We propose that the concept be extended to include interactions that are not bounded within a single organisation as is the case in current organisational research on boundary objects (e.g., Nicolini, Mengis, & Swan, 2012; Yakura, 2002).

We begin our paper with a review of effectuation theory and distributed agency, the principal conceptual dimensions of the study. Next, we describe the method used in this paper—a longitudinal case study. We report our findings by presenting a summary of the case, the themes and the model of social enterprise emergence. Thereafter, we discuss the implications of our findings and, finally, we conclude with directions for future research.
THEORETICAL CONTEXT

In this section, we present the main concepts that emerged as we analysed Fairphone’s history by pattern matching and referencing appropriate literatures. As we will discuss in the ‘Methods’ section of the paper, we employed an abductive inferential approach (Van Maanen, Sørensen, & Mitchell, 2007) to adduce the best analytical explanation for the data, rather than deriving these deductively from prior theory. If we presented the paper how the study unfolded, we would have to report our methods and data before the reader learns what the main conceptual components and contributions of the study are likely to be. In order to furnish the reader with advance conceptual clarity (Suddaby, 2006), we abandon an abductive reporting approach. Instead, following traditional paper presentation approaches, we present the theoretical context first to preview the findings and the contributions.

Effectuation and the Creation of Social Enterprises

Like their commercial counterparts, social entrepreneurs act under conditions of uncertainty (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006) as they combine resources to form new products, services or organisations intended to stimulate social change or meet social needs (Mair & Martí, 2006). A valuable starting point for understanding entrepreneurial action under uncertainty is Sarasvathy’s (2001) theory of effectual decision making or effectuation.

Sarasvathy (2001) argued that entrepreneurial action under an effectuation logic differs from action under causal or traditional theories (e.g., Gartner, 1985) in the following ways: (1) effectual entrepreneurs are
more likely to start developing entrepreneurial opportunities not with a specific goal, such as making profit, but by deploying three sets of means—
their identity, knowledge, and networks; (2) they are more likely to assess risk using the principle of affordable loss (advance commitments to how much resources they are willing to lose in a new venture) rather than the principle of expected returns (advance calculations about expected financial returns from the venture); (3) they focus on building alliances with a network of stakeholders, such as potential suppliers and customers, instead of on analysing and outwitting the competition; (4) they exploit unexpected contingencies to mould the emerging enterprise, instead of minimising contingencies; and (5) they act in order to control an unpredictable future instead of predicting an uncertain future.

Effectuation theory has been applied to explain the formation of new technology firms (Sarasvathy & Kotha, 2001) and new industries (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005). In the ‘dynamic model’ of effectuation (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005), the entrepreneur imagines some generalised desired end (e.g., a new venture) achievable using available means. The entrepreneur then interacts with people that she knows or meets. Due to this interaction, a self-selected ‘effectual network’ (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005, p. 548) comprising potential customers, financiers and collaborators emerges. Members of the effectual network pre-commit resources to the entrepreneurial idea based on the principle of affordable loss. This results in an expanded flow of resources and/or change in the entrepreneur’s goals. Assuming the effectual network is not dismantled, this recursive process continues until an expanding cycle of resources and increasing constraints on
the entrepreneur’s goals coalesce to enable the formation of a new firm or new industry.

Though social entrepreneurship scholars have invoked cognate constructs such as stakeholder support and collective action (Corner & Ho, 2010; Haugh, 2007; Montgomery et al., 2012) to explain social enterprise formation, our review of the social entrepreneurship literature suggests that effectuation in the context of social enterprise emergence has not received much attention. Broadly speaking, social entrepreneurship scholars have explained social enterprise formation by explicitly or implicitly invoking traditional and bricolage theories of entrepreneurial action. In traditional theories of entrepreneurial action, the entrepreneur deliberately seeks resources to found a new venture predicated on exploiting some pre-identified opportunity (Gartner, 1985; Katz & Gartner, 1988; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Thus, social entrepreneurs are reported to consciously leverage the assets of target constituencies (Alvord et al., 2004), actively develop social capital (Squazzoni, 2009) and proactively manage risks (Lumpkin, Moss, Gras, Kato, & Amezcua, 2013) to achieve social change through their ventures. They also purposively progress through a trajectory consisting of temporally-distinct, pre-figured stages as they build new social ventures (Haugh, 2007; Mair, Battilana, & Cardenas, 2012; Robinson, 2006). Applying bricolage theory, scholars have reported that social entrepreneurs make do with available resources, creating ‘something from nothing’ (Baker & Nelson, 2005, p. 349), as they found and grow social ventures in resource-poor environments (Di Domenico et al., 2010; Mair & Martí, 2009).

Like traditional and bricolage theories of entrepreneurial action, effectuation theory locates agency for a new venture in the entrepreneurial
actor(s) who embark on the venture creation process with the intention to develop some business aspiration. In Sarasvathy’s (2001) seminal paper, for instance, she illustrates effectuation theory using the example of an imaginary entrepreneur who intended to start a restaurant business, Curry in a Hurry. The entrepreneur then deliberately sought resources and information to realise that goal. However, the nature of the eventual business was an emergent, i.e. unpredictable, outcome arising from repeated interaction and conceptualisation between the entrepreneur and the effectual network. Furthermore, in effectuation theory, the entrepreneurial actor(s) is the basic unit of analysis and the motive force propelling the process of venture creation (Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 244–253). As Arend et al. (2015) have pointed out, effectuation theory overlooks the role played by other actors in the entrepreneur(s)’ broader environment—such as competitors—in constraining or co-constituting entrepreneurial agency and, ultimately, new venture formation.

Scholars in fields as diverse as leadership (Gronn, 2002) and technology entrepreneurship (Garud & Karnøe, 2003; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006; Van de Ven, 1993) have emphasised that the agency for outcomes such as organisational performance and the adoption of technology respectively does not rest in a single actor, but is distributed across multiple actors pursuing their particular, limited interests with varying levels of involvement (Garud & Karnøe, 2003). To illustrate the concept of distributed agency in the context of new firm and industry formation, we turn to emerging scholarship at the nexus of social movement and organisation theory (e.g., Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005; Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert,

Distributed Agency: An Illustration from Social Movement Literature

Social movements, defined as loosely-organised coalitions that provoke social change by challenging prominent social and cultural practices through sustained campaigns (Weber et al., 2008), promote the creation of new (social) ventures and industries. Diverse actors within social movements, such as the media and professional associations pursue varying interests (Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000), and in the process, furnish entrepreneurs with resources, capabilities and legitimacy—ingredients vital for the formation of new ventures.

**Legitimacy for new industry or new venture.** Social movement organisations (SMOs) and their allies in institutionalised political arenas such as policymakers embed their values into regulation, creating legitimacy for entrepreneurial activity that is aligned with those values (Hiatt et al., 2009; Sine & Lee, 2009). Increased legitimacy may foster the founding of organisations that may otherwise not have been formed. In Sine et al.’s (2005) study of the U.S. independent power sector, the passage of the National Energy Act prompted in part by social movement activism in the mid–late 1970s, legitimated the sector. Legitimation then had a stronger positive impact on the founding of firms by entrepreneurs employing risky, novel technologies than those using established technologies.

**Resources.** As SMOs contest prominent social and cultural practices, they may inadvertently expand the pool of resources that entrepreneurs exploit to found new enterprises. In Hiatt et al.’s (2009) study of the American temperance movement in the period 1870–1920, the movement
successfully delegitimated the brewery industry. As a result, owners of disbanded breweries sold their capital equipment at highly discounted rates to opportunistic entrepreneurs in the budding soft drinks industry.

The transfer of resources to entrepreneurs need not be inadvertent; it may also be deliberate. Sine and Lee (2009) studied the rise of U.S. wind energy sector in the period 1978–1992. They reported that ideologically-motivated entrepreneurs and investors, who eventually founded wind farms, were brought together through networks of the Sierra Club, an activist organisation that had been campaigning for legislation in favour of wind energy at the time.

**Consumer demand.** People change their consumption patterns in response to moral suasion by SMOs thereby creating demand for alternative products or services advocated by SMOs (Bartley, 2007; Hiatt et al., 2009; Sine & David, 2003). In a study of the market for certified wood products, Bartley (2007) found that corporate purchasers of wood such as IKEA switched to certified wood products in response to boycotts and market-making practices of a coalition of grant-making organisations and environmental SMOs including the Ford Foundation and the Rainforest Action Network.

In summary, effectuation theory is a valuable lens for examining entrepreneurial action under conditions of uncertainty. However, effectuation theory assumes that agency for a new firm rests with a small, delineable group of actors, namely the entrepreneur(s) and ignores the role played by actors located in the entrepreneurs’ broader environment in constraining or enabling entrepreneurial agency. We address this gap with our study of the emergence of Fairphone. We integrate our empirical results
with insights on distributed agency from fields such as research on social movements, which recognise that multiple actors may contribute resources and legitimacy to enable the founding of new firms.

METHODS

We began this study in October 2013, when the first author became researcher-in-residence at Fairphone with the intention to study the evolution of the organisation’s capabilities. As we studied the organisation’s unlikely history, we developed a focused research question: ‘how do we theorise the emergence of the social enterprise, Fairphone?’

Step 1: Data Collection

To answer the research question, the first author collected data using interviews, participant observation within Fairphone and documentary sources.

Interviews. We employed both deliberate and emergent sampling techniques to recruit informants. For instance, in order to avoid elite bias (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 263), the first author interviewed all members of Fairphone, including temporary staff and interns. To identify informants outside Fairphone, he used snowballing techniques (Patton, 2001, p. 237). He asked Fairphone staff to introduce him to people who were knowledgeable about the company and contacted potential informants—some of whom were critical of Fairphone—mentioned in third-party reports about Fairphone. In total, the first author conducted 47 interviews with 38

---

3 The first author did not receive remuneration from Fairphone during his fieldwork in the organisation. Other than an agreement to respect the confidentiality of Fairphone members, Fairphone’s leaders put him under no obligation.
informants representing 13 organisations. We summarise the interview data in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1. Interview data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation name</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Informants, hierarchical position</th>
<th>Number of interviews(^{a})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fairphone</td>
<td>Social enterprise, consumer electronics</td>
<td>Founder, co-founders, staff, ex-associates</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha-Mobile</td>
<td>Mobile network operator</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beta-Mobile</td>
<td>Mobile network operator</td>
<td>Product and sustainability managers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta-Electronics</td>
<td>Consumer electronics</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epsilon-Electronics</td>
<td>Consumer electronics</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesa</td>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>Programme managers, consultants</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-waste</td>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>Founder/director</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic</td>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>Programme managers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designco</td>
<td>Product development &amp; design</td>
<td>Founder/CEO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation name</td>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Informants, hierarchical position</td>
<td>Number of interviews$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>Government of the Netherlands</td>
<td>Ambassador</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeta-capital</td>
<td>Venture capital</td>
<td>Founder/CEO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eta-investment</td>
<td>Angel investor</td>
<td>Majority investor, Fairphone</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Newspaper columnist, sustainability blogger</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$ The total number of interviews is 47
Interview protocols were structured as follows: informants’ biographical information; their relationship to Fairphone; what role they or their organisation played in Fairphone’s history; the challenges that they had faced in that role; and an open-ended section in which informants provided any information they deemed important to Fairphone’s story. Interviews lasted 55 minutes on average. All but one interview were recorded and transcribed.

We relied principally on retrospective accounts to reconstruct the story of Fairphone before October 2013. Recognising that retrospective accounts might be inaccurate (C. C. Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997), we followed methodological recommendations to improve the accuracy of the accounts. First, we interviewed informants with first-hand knowledge of Fairphone. Second, we asked informants to recall specific events rather than generalised information or opinions. To reduce hindsight bias, we asked informants to remember a time when they thought that Fairphone might fail. Third, we asked the same questions to multiple informants.

Participant observation. The first author had sustained access to Fairphone’s members. Over a 15-month period (October 2013–January 2015), he visited Fairphone’s Amsterdam offices 1–3 times per week (total 130 field visits). During these field visits, which lasted 6–10 hours per day, he observed interactions among Fairphone staff in formal settings, such as team meetings, and in informal settings, such as weekly social events and Christmas dinners. He made detailed notes within 24 hours of a field visit.

Documentary sources. We employed Fairphone’s archival documents and publicly-available data to understand the context in which Fairphone arose and to triangulate interview reports. Fairphone’s archival documents
included grant applications, financial reports, business plans and the results of a survey of Fairphone customers while publicly-available data included Facebook entries, 1,870 Twitter feeds, campaign videos, five press releases, five radio shows, 158 press articles, and three television shows.

**Step 2: Timeline Construction and Informant Validation**

The objective of this step was to produce an accurate, complete and fair account of the emergence of Fairphone (Patton, 2001, pp. 559–561; Yin, 2009, pp. 182–184). The first author prepared a detailed narrative and timeline of Fairphone’s history. He validated the narrative with Fairphone members on two occasions. The first occasion was a dedicated 1½ hour lunch meeting in April 2014 during which he presented the narrative and received feedback from Fairphone staff about the organisation’s history. The second occasion was an informal meeting in June 2014 with three of Fairphone’s founding employees. The staff independently crosschecked the timeline and clarified discrepancies with the first author. At the end of this step, we identified three distinct phases in the emergence of the enterprise, which we label ‘social activism’, ‘transition’, and ‘social entrepreneurship’.

**Step 3: Identification of Emergent Themes**

Our goal was to build theory from a rich, in-depth case study (Eisenhardt, 1989). We employed an abductive inferential approach (Van Maanen et al., 2007), iterating between data and extant theory in order to theorise about the case. Theme analysis was used to explain patterns in the emergence of the enterprise. According to Dutton and Dukerich (1991, p. 524), themes are ‘recurrent topics of discussion, action, or both on the part of the actors being studied…that captures the central ideas or relationships’
regarding our research question. Theme analysis was performed in four stages. First, the lead author noted in contact summary sheets (Miles & Huberman, 1994, pp. 51–54), the concepts that had characterised interviewees’ accounts of Fairphone’s history. Second, these concepts were used as a starting list of codes. Using NVivo 10 qualitative analysis software, we then coded interview transcripts and secondary documents for actors’ decisions, activities performed by the actors, situations in which the actors took those decisions, and events—defined as time-limited occurrences beyond the control of focal actors (Langley & Truax, 1994). We retained informants’ ‘in vivo’ quotes if the quotes succinctly captured decisions, events and states in Fairphone’s story. Examples of first-order codes are ‘legitimacy accretion’, ‘tangible resources’, ‘artifact attributes’, and ‘material ends’.

Third, we then recursively collapsed codes into higher-level theoretically-distinct categories (Eisenhardt, 1989), iterating between the codes and the data. For instance, informant statements about the Fairphone team’s rationale for using a smartphone for an awareness campaign (‘artifact attributes’, ‘material ends’) were grouped into the category ‘artifact as storytelling device’. At the end of this step of the theme analysis, we had a total of 384 codes.

Fourth, we collapsed categories further into themes following Braun and Clarke’s (2006, p. 82) guidelines that themes should be not only prevalent across different data sources, but that they should also possess ‘keyness’, capturing important patterns in the data. In the ‘Findings’ section of the paper, we discuss the themes that emerged from our analysis.
Step 4: Pattern Matching with Extant Theory

In the fourth step, we compared the themes and the rich narrative with similar concepts within the social movement, commercial, social and technology entrepreneurship literatures in order to build a structured analytical explanation of the case (Yin, 2009, p. 141). After a detailed review of those literatures, we agreed to explain patterns of decision making in the data using effectuation theory (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005). We then re-coded the data using constructs from effectuation theory as a list of codes. What means did Fairphone members employ? What goals did they start with and how did those goals change? How did Fairphone’s members interact with an effectual network? What pre-commitments were made by the network? How did Fairphone’s members leverage contingencies?

Step 5: Reliability Checks

In order to improve the reliability of the coding, two authors independently re-coded the ten most ‘information-rich’ interviews. (The first author re-coded all 47 interviews.) Then, all three authors discussed the codes—the codes from step 3 and the effectuation codes from step 4—until agreement on the coding and categories was strong. This form of reliability check has been used to establish coding reliability in qualitative research published in top-tier management journals (e.g., Plowman et al., 2007).
FINDINGS

In this section, we present a detailed account of the creation of Fairphone and the themes that emerged from our analysis of the data.

Chronological Narrative: From Awareness Campaign to Social Enterprise

Since the mid-1990s, the mineral-rich DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo] has been engulfed in a civil war. Civil society organisations, such as Global Witness (U.S.) and a coalition of European organisations including SOMO [Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations] (Netherlands) and The Church of Sweden, have contended since the mid-2000s that global demand for mobile phones fuels the conflict because Congolese militia compete violently to control the mines that supply valuable mineral ores to the mobile phone industry (Pöyhönen & Simola, 2007). These NGOs [non-government organisations] and their allies in U.S. and European Union (EU) legislatures have lobbied for legislation against the use of conflict minerals in electronic products.

In September 2009, in this context of social movement activity, Mesa, an Amsterdam-based NGO, approached van der Mark for ideas about an awareness campaign. Founded in the mid-1990s as a merger of three NGOs that had campaigned against Apartheid in South Africa, Mesa had by 2009 shifted to campaigning for equitable distribution of mineral wealth in sub-Saharan Africa. In late September 2009, Mesa commissioned van der Mark to develop an awareness campaign about the connection between smartphones and the conflict in the DRC.
Once van der Mark and van Abel had identified the idea for a collaborative hands-on fair smartphone campaign, they were joined by two programme managers from Mesa to form the Fairphone campaign team. In March 2010, the team secured a public grant to run their campaign. In the grant application they described their plan as follows:

Important minerals used in mobile phones are being mined in degrading circumstances in Congo. We want to make consumers aware of the terrible situation in the Congolese mines. [By making a smartphone] Together with consumers we want to convince smartphone manufacturers of the importance and possibility of making a fair alternative.

None of the four Fairphone team members knew how to produce a smartphone. The campaign was intended merely to raise public awareness as Fairphone’s founder/CEO explained, ‘I didn’t even know about conflict minerals when I started this project…I was interested in making the [‘conflict mineral-free’] phone from a purely design perspective…The whole aspect of bringing the phone to market did not interest me’.

With grant money in hand, the Fairphone team launched Twitter, Facebook and web pages in the summer of 2010 and invited the public to contribute ideas for a fair smartphone. While the campaign was underway in mid-2010, two events kept the DRC in the news: (1) the publication in the Netherlands of a bestselling book about the DRC’s tragic history; and (2) the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S.

**Media and industry get involved.** In October 2010, only seven months after the campaign began, Fairphone was hailed as ‘the world’s first collective non-profit developer of mobile phones’ by widely-circulated
Dutch newspaper, *De Volkskrant*. In March 2011, the Fairphone team travelled to the DRC to source ‘slavery-free’ minerals and publicised the trip on the campaign website.

Shortly after returning from the DRC in March 2011, van Abel was invited by the board of directors of Alpha-Mobile, a mobile network operator (MNO), to present Fairphone. Reflecting on the experience, van Abel confessed, ‘It was really weird...I was doing a presentation to the board of directors. I didn’t even know what to ask these guys…People got excited and pulled me into the whole system [Alpha-Mobile]’. Within the month, Alpha-Mobile agreed to buy 1,000 non-existent fair smartphones.

In the same month, the campaign team presented the Fairphone project to an executive of Macrobank, a large bank, after which the executive publicly endorsed Fairphone. Van der Mark remembered that, ‘They [Macrobank] gave us a little bit of money and they pushed us on their website’. In November 2011, the Fairphone campaign was voted as winners of a prestigious €10,000 prize for sustainable innovation in fair trade. Thus, remarkably by the end of 2011, the Fairphone team with no smartphone prototype, no intention to start a business and no expertise in the smartphone industry, had gained significant support for their project. But then, the Fairphone campaign team reached a crisis point.

*Conflict, uncertainty, funding problems.* Conflict within the Fairphone campaign team led to Mesa’s withdrawal from the campaign. The Mesa members did not understand Fairphone’s campaigning practices as one Mesa programme manager explained, ‘we [Mesa] had one problem—that was the financing. The other problem was understanding Fairphone. What the hell is Fairphone?...It was a new way of communication. And we were
old-school’. Mesa members also believed that being associated with Fairphone threatened their organisation’s reputation:

How fair is Fairphone? Is it 1% fair? Is it 99% fair?...We [Mesa] took a lot of responsibility in the sense that if journalists would find out, like, Fairphone was not as fair as they claim to be, then because with our [Mesa’s] name we were connected to Fairphone—as an organisation it will get back to us. (Mesa consultant #2).

In addition to conflict over campaign practices, Fairphone had also run out of ideas and funds. Van der Mark recalled, ‘Nobody really knew what to do with Fairphone…We were sitting around with some people making plans, but didn’t know what to do. The first thing we thought about is, ‘why don’t we make a battery?’…Nobody dared to say that we were going to build a phone’. By early 2012, with their funds exhausted and no support from Mesa, van der Mark and van Abel could not afford to work on Fairphone. Thus, they returned to their paying day jobs.

In March 2012, Miquel Ballester, a university student, applied to Waag (van Abel’s erstwhile employer) for an internship position. Van Abel immediately recruited Ballester to work on the Fairphone project for latter’s master’s thesis. Two months later, a project manager at Waag serendipitously discovered an opportunity to develop Fairphone: a London-based entrepreneurship incubator had put out a call for sustainable business ideas.

I remember, I think it was a Thursday, and I saw it coming in my inbox…it was not that I was actively looking for an acceleration [incubation] program…but reading the text, I said, ‘this is what
Fairphone needs right now’…And I submitted the Fairphone plan [to incubator] without consulting anyone. (Fairphone ex-project manager)

Fairphone was selected to attend the three-month incubation programme in July 2012. While in London, the Fairphone team, principally represented by the intern Ballester, met telecommunication industry insiders, technology entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.

In September 2012, van Abel and Ballester secured an investment of €400,000 from a business angel to incorporate a company. The angel explained his rationale for investing: ‘Investment for me is not like figures. For me it’s the story, it’s the people…I wasn’t calculating anything [when I invested]. It’s a luxury position...And it’s not a decision made on any plans. Nothing at all’. In January 2013, Fairphone the social enterprise\(^4\) was incorporated with van Abel as founder/CEO, and van der Mark and Ballester as co-founders.

**Crowdfunding drive, media attention.** In February 2013, van Abel was invited to the DRC by Prince Jaime de Bourbon de Parme, a member of the Dutch royal family and The Netherlands’ Special Envoy for Natural Resources. The prince was leading a multi-stakeholder project to source conflict-free tin from the DRC. ‘Would Fairphone be interested in participating in the pilot?’ he asked. Van Abel had played no role setting up the pilot, but he agreed to buy conflict-free tin from the prince’s project.

---

\(^4\) Fairphone is incorporated as a limited liability company. In the Netherlands, there is no legal organisational form to distinguish social enterprises from commercial enterprises. Fairphone’s claim to be a social enterprise is based on its operations and governance model. In 2015, the company obtained B-Corp certification as a ‘for-profit’ company certified by the nonprofit B-Lab to meet rigorous standards of social and environmental performance, accountability, and transparency. (https://www.bcorporation.net/community/fairphone).
Despite their campaign promise, Fairphone could not afford to design a smartphone. Ballester recalled, ‘We didn’t design a phone [during the campaign]. We made…if you like, an artist’s impression of what a phone could look like. To design a phone from scratch, you need millions of dollars’. With only €400,000 working capital, designing a smartphone was out of the question. In early April 2013, van Abel agreed to license a smartphone design from a factory in China and to incorporate therein conflict-free components from Prince Jaime’s pilot programme.

After deliberation, van Abel and the Fairphone staff, now comprising six people (none of whom had phone industry experience), decided to finance production of the phone by appealing to the public in a ‘crowdfunding’ campaign. Their goal was to raise enough funds to cover the production of 5,000 smartphones at a unit price of €325. They were not hopeful that they would reach the sales target. Van der Mark said of the period, ‘At first I thought, “Nobody is going to pay €325 for something you don’t have, that doesn’t exist.”’ Only three weeks after announcing the crowdfunding drive, all 5,000 smartphones were sold out.

The crowdfunding drive generated substantial international media coverage for Fairphone. Reflecting on the period, one Fairphone employee said, ‘I have never been on a train that’s run so fast…I was amazed that Al-Jazeera, the Wall Street Journal, CNBC, The Guardian and the BBC, everyone needed to report about us…the level of attention was quite amazing’. Customers called the company asking to pre-order more smartphones. Van Abel and his staff put an additional 20,000 phones on pre-sale. To their surprise, all smartphones were sold out by November 2013.
Incredibly, in less than a year, Fairphone, the start-up with no industry track record, had pre-sold 25,000 non-existent smartphones.

**Producing the fair smartphone.** Though Fairphone had the financial resources, the start-up did not have the technical expertise to produce a smartphone. In July 2013, van Abel hired a chief technology officer (CTO)—Fairphone’s first employee with smartphone industry experience. With help from contacts at Beta-Mobile, a large MNO, van Abel and the CTO commissioned an audit of the Chinese factory. The results were disappointing: the factory did not have the capabilities to produce smartphones meeting the exacting quality standards of the European market. Following the audit, van Abel hired specialists to ensure quality at the factory.

Nevertheless, quality problems soon emerged as the first prototypes were being made. (The first author joined Fairphone soon after the audit in October 2013.) The defect rate of the prototypes was about 105 per 100 produced smartphones, i.e. on average every prototype had 1.05 defects. The first author witnessed Fairphone staff frustration at the high defect rate and the seemingly intractable quality problems. One exasperated employee explained:

> [T]he quality standards of [prototype] phones were completely different from what you would expect on a phone. There were no two phones that they [factory] built that the [power] button here [points to smartphone]…had the same feeling because of manufacturing differences…If you do not have this [smartphone] that works then you are done. Forget it. Done.
Throughout the prototype development process, however, Fairphone received help. Friendly contacts at MNOs Alpha-Mobile and Beta-Mobile tested prototypes and provided invaluable feedback to Fairphone free of charge. A director at Alpha-Mobile, who had instructed engineers at his company to test the prototypes, explained his support:

It’s also a personal relationship you are [I am] having [with Fairphone]. Much more personal involved than we [Alpha-Mobile] do have with all the other smartphone vendors. We are doing hundreds of thousands of euros with other vendors, but this [relationship with Fairphone] is really only on personal belief, personal commitment.

In October–November 2013, Fairphone staff in Amsterdam and in the factory worked with factory managers and MNO contacts to reduce the prototype defect rates. Van Abel explained the situation at the end of one test in November 2013 to the first author: ‘I [will] only believe it when the phones are here. That’s when I will feel relieved—and that the phones work, of course. We [Fairphone] are managing a lot of the processes [in the factories]. We have three people in five factories looking at the production aspects and working their butts off’.

In the first week of December 2013, Fairphone received more help. Engineers at Gamma-Mobile, a German MNO, voluntarily resolved a software problem they had discovered while testing a prototype smartphone.

Basically, there was a bug [software failure] that made phone calls not work properly with Gamma-Mobile in Germany, which is 40% of our customers...They’ve fixed it now…If we hadn’t connected with the
right people at Gamma-Mobile, we wouldn’t have known. (Fairphone co-founder, Miquel Ballester).

In early December 2013, the defect rates dropped to about 17 per 100 prototypes. Judging this to be an acceptable defect rate, van Abel approved production of the first 2,000 fair smartphones. These were assembled and delivered to European customers on Christmas Eve 2013. In subsequent weeks, the factory shipped several thousand assembled phones per week to customers who had been waiting for three to six months. By February 2014, all 25,000 smartphones had been shipped to customers in 32 European countries.

As we write this paper (October 2015), the company has pre-sold an additional 50,000 smartphones (total 75,000 phones; revenue €27.4million) and grown to 45 employees. Simply put, Fairphone the social enterprise has emerged. Its founders demonstrated entrepreneurial intentionality, secured resources such as capital, established organisational boundaries and engaged in exchange across those boundaries (Katz & Gartner, 1988).

Our analysis revealed three themes that characterise the emergence of Fairphone: ‘perturbed contextual conditions’, ‘issue framing’, and ‘distributed agency’. In the remainder of this section we present the three emergent themes, and then the evidence for effectual decision making.

---

5 Defects during prototype testing phase ranged from the functional, such as improperly functioning power buttons, to the aesthetic (e.g., barely-perceptible scratches on the screen). Defects in late December 2013 were all slight aesthetic defects.
Theme 1: Perturbed Contextual Condition

The data shows that industry actors, who were aware of failures along the electronics industry supply chain, responded to perturbations within the industry and, in the process, advocated various solutions to the problem of conflict minerals.

Awareness of failure. Industry insiders were aware of problems across the consumer electronics industry supply chain. These problems included the opacity of the chain of custody as minerals travelled from the DRC’s mines through traders to ore smelters in Asian, and poor working conditions in East Asian factories where smartphones are assembled. A manager from Beta-Mobile put the point concisely: ‘[W]e [industry] all know there’s something wrong with our supply chain and our business modelling. We all know that. We also know that it’s hard to change that’.

Disruption event. Despite this awareness, the solution space available to address supply chain problems was not expanded until the consumer electronics industry experienced a disruption event (A. D. Meyer, 1982; Sine & David, 2003): the promulgation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act by the U.S. Congress in July 2010. The bill, which had been passed in response to the 2008 financial crisis, contained a section unrelated to the crisis, which required U.S. companies to demonstrate due diligence in sourcing minerals from the DRC.

One informant made plain his assessment of how the legislation affected the industry.

You had a huge bill [Dodd-Frank Act], you know, 10,000 pages,…[it] was passed through very quickly and attached to it was this [conflict mineral legislation] and it landed on the SEC [Securities and Exchange
Commission]…they [SEC]…were, of course, completely unaware of how to handle this…So there you have this piece of badly-contradictory, badly-worded, badly thought-out wish-list [conflict mineral legislation] without any mechanism or idea in terms of how to actually effectively…put it into law…So it was a real mess [for industry compliance]. (Director, Delta-Electronics).

**Solution proliferation.** The Dodd-Frank Act triggered three types of responses by actors: (1) *Avoiding*—Smelting companies and mining companies avoided sourcing from the DRC altogether to eliminate the risk of breaking U.S. law; (2) *Legislating*—European legislators and their civil society allies called for a European equivalent to the Dodd-Frank Act while some industry groups challenged the legislation in U.S. courts; and (3) *Engaging*—Some civil society groups, the Dutch government, and members of consumer electronics industry associations under the auspices of the OECD developed initiatives to source certified conflict-free minerals from the DRC.

**Theme 2: Issue Framing**

Issue framing refers to discursive and symbolic practices within Fairphone’s campaign repertoire consisting of a number of distinct elements: ‘articulated ideals of practice’, ‘employment of artifact as story-telling device’, ‘perceptions of actor distinctiveness’, and ‘establishing category congruence’. Collectively, these elements trigger material support for the enterprise.

**Articulated ideals of practice.** The Fairphone campaign team repeatedly made normative claims justifying the campaign by articulating
two ideals of practice: transparency and fairness. Mesa justified participation in the Fairphone campaign to external audiences by portraying the campaign as part of its fight against economic injustice in Sub-Saharan Africa and by drawing on the organisation’s previous campaigns against Apartheid. Waag, represented by van Abel, justified participating in the Fairphone campaign by stressing the organisation’s hands-on approach to product design. Waag’s slogan, often repeated in documents was ‘if you can’t open it [a product] you don’t own it’.

Artifact as story-telling device. Fairphone’s founders used a smartphone as the centrepiece of their campaign. The attributes of a smartphone—tangibility, ubiquity, emotionality—informed that choice as one Mesa programme manager explained, ‘It’s [a smartphone’s] just something which everybody uses and which is really important in people’s lives. And that’s why we went for the phone’.

Yet, the artifact was employed in differently by various team members. The smartphone was predominantly used for issue prognosis (Benford & Snow, 2000)—as a call to arms to the public to act and change the situation in the DRC. For Mesa, however, the artifact was a means of instrumental exchange.

[NGOs need] stories that are tangible. Mesa was working on something called ‘democratisation of society’ [before Fairphone]. That is not tangible I can tell you. You cannot turn that into a product and ten pictures each year to fund-raise on. But a phone that you and I use? I mean...It was just too good to be true if you could link yourself to something like that. (Mesa consultant #1)
Establishing category congruence. While still a social movement campaign, Fairphone team legitimated the campaign by demonstrating that its objective was symbolically congruent (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001) with an extant product category: Fair Trade. For instance, they chose the name ‘Fairphone’, similar to Fair Trade and portrayed their objective as a variation of a familiar category, Fair Trade consumption. However, they did not attempt to establish category congruence in order to further entrepreneurial goals. Instead, they compared their campaign to Fair Trade in order to increase comprehensibility and ‘taken-for-grantedness’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 582) of the campaign repertoire with audiences.

Perceptions of actor distinctiveness. We surmise from the data that informants perceived Fairphone to be distinct from both NGOs and smartphone manufacturers. Fairphone’s ‘positive’ story, contrary to NGO’s adversarial stance, engendered support from insiders:

They [Fairphone] said, ‘Hey, couldn’t we get conflict-free tantalum [metal used in smartphones]? We want to make a mobile phone’. And I think, this story is fantastic in itself in that the way they turned the story around [from how NGOs tell it] as it were, in that ‘all mobile phone makers were evil’, but actually there was a way in which you could make a fair phone. I think, personally, that was brilliant. (Director, Delta-Electronics).

Distinctiveness, however, did not always yield support for Fairphone. Where an organisation’s norms of practice and external legitimating criteria—for instance Mesa’s—did not match Fairphone’s, the organisation withdrew support for Fairphone.
Theme 3: Distributed Agency

Distributed agency refers to the proactive conferral of entrepreneurially-valuable material resources and legitimacy to Fairphone’s founders by multiple, heterogeneous actors even before the founders had any intention to start an enterprise. We identified five types of distributed agents—corporate actors, the media, the public, government officials, and consumers—who provided direct and contingent endowments to Fairphone’s founders. These endowments were beyond the immediate control or intention of Fairphone’s founders.

Direct endowments (legitimacy, material resources). These endowments were made despite the fact that Fairphone’s founders had no intention of making a commercial phone. Elite corporations provided funds and human capital to Fairphone, furnishing the founders with these vital building blocks for new venture success (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; Zott & Huy, 2007) for free. For instance, one informant lobbied his organisation to support Fairphone financially even though the campaign had no product—in violation of his company’s purchasing policies.

I said to him [van Abel], ‘no company in the world will give an order because we don’t know the price, we don’t know the product...Then I went to the legal department. They said, ‘no, we are not going to make an order’...And then I made a click with in those days a member of the board [of directors]...He said, ‘well, why not? What can be wrong?’ Because I told him the storyline...He said, ‘if it goes wrong, you are responsible’. (Director, Alpha-Mobile).
Furthermore, the media and public granted the campaign moral legitimacy, which Suchman (1995, p. 579) defined as audiences’ ‘positive normative evaluation of an organisation and its activities as “the right thing to do”’. Media endorsement of the campaign assumed that a fair smartphone would materialise in the future despite the campaign’s lack of a performance record and no intention to make a product.

Every mobile phone drips with blood from Congo…Fairphone will make a fair smartphone with help from future users. You [reader] can help with the campaign, contribute to the design or travel to Congo to decide who Fairphone should purchase fair minerals from…Make sure that the fair phone comes. (Article Vrij Nederland, 30 April 2011).

The accretion of resources and legitimacy for the Fairphone campaign provided impetus to the founders to progress the idea beyond an awareness-raising campaign.

[W]hen we joined the prize [voted by public]…and we won…We got a lot of media attention. Every newspaper in Holland wanted to write about Fairphone...But I think the most important thing that happened there was that we all got the feeling: ‘this [Fairphone] has to go on…We have to do something with this great idea’. (Fairphone co-founder, Peter van der Mark).

**Contingent endowments.** These are endowments of material and immaterial resources that occurred after the founders had decided to start an enterprise, but which involve action by the founders to exploit the opportunities inherent in the endowments. (See section on ‘effectual decision making’.) For instance, in 2013, professionals, such as hackers, marketing
experts and experts on Chinese labour law, volunteered their services to Fairphone. These volunteers provided a pool from which Fairphone’s founders hired new employees, thereby eliminating search costs for the start-up. The hiring of Fairphone’s production manager in the Chinese factory, Margaret, illustrates this theme:

Margaret sent us an e-mail from Columbia University [in July 2013]. She said, ‘I have seen Fairphone. I love the idea. I would like to work for you’...For some reason, there was something about Margaret’s application that sparked something...Bas [van Abel] said, ‘you know what, I am just going to invite her to China. We will work there for a week and if it works out, we will hire her’. (Fairphone co-founder, Miquel Ballester).

Fairphone staff exploited unexpected customer attention during the over-subscribed crowdfunding appeal. An ex-intern at Fairphone, surprised at customer support during the 2013 crowdfunding drive, said of the period, ‘we had people [customers] saying, “I don’t care if it’s a brick with numbers drawn on it. I will still buy it because of the mission.” And that was so amazing for me coming from a marketing background. Essentially, we were selling air for €325’.

Though we do not have direct access to the motives or interests of the distributed agents, the data strongly suggests that actors’ normative evaluation Fairphone’s stated goal was crucial to the commitment of material resources. In a March 2014 survey of 730 customers who had pre-paid €325, respondents scored Fairphone very highly (4.2/5.0) on the extent to which the brand fit their personal beliefs and values and reported that they had not
done much rational search and deliberation before pre-ordering Fairphone (2.9/5.0). In Table 2-2, we summarise the evidence for the emergent themes.
### Table 2-2. Evidence for emergent themes from analysis and illustrative data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes and categories</th>
<th>Illustrative data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theme 1: Perturbed contextual condition</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of failure</td>
<td>‘[Before Dodd-Frank Act] was actually law…they [industry association] understood that there was concern being addressed to them by various NGOs that mineral trade from Congo was facilitating fighting and armament in the Eastern provinces of the DRC...So what was occurring with some of the members of the EICC, particularly the electronic consumer brand companies, [they] were being attacked by various NGOs in terms of the fact that they didn’t consider their supply chain sufficiently, that they didn’t fully understand or appreciate what might happen with their buying choice’ (Director, Delta-Electronics).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disruption event</td>
<td><em>Dodd-Frank Act.</em> ‘There are a lot of companies that because of the uncertainties [after Dodd-Frank Act] told their smelters, ‘Don’t source from that region [Central Africa].’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Themes and categories</td>
<td>Illustrative data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We don’t have to submit additional regulatory compliance issues such as the conflict minerals report’. You had people—because of the uncertainty—discontinue their supply. They said, ‘I want a fixed price of tantalum that I can deal with, that I know. Or sign a long-term agreement with a mine or smelter that doesn’t source from the DRC, just so I know’ (Director, Epsilon-Electronics).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Solution proliferation | Avoiding. Avoid sourcing from DRC altogether (mining companies, smelters)  
Legislating. U.S industry groups legally challenge SEC on Dodd-Frank (2013); European legislator and NGOs call for European equivalent to Dodd-Frank Act.  
‘Since the adoption of the Dodd Frank Act in the US I…have emphasized the need for European legislation to stop the trade in conflict minerals. In late 2010 an overwhelming majority of the European Parliament adopted a resolution inviting the European Commission to draft new legislation on this’ (Judith Sargenti, Member of European Parliament, in Report on conflict mineral legislation, May 2011). |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes and categories</th>
<th>Illustrative data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>Establishment of conflict-free metal initiatives in DRC (Government of the Netherlands, consumer electronic companies); OECD provides platform for negotiation between civil society, government and industry.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Theme 2: Issue framing**

| Ideals of practice   | Transparency. ‘In order to give insight into the complex and still opaque supply chain, Fairphone has decided to develop her own mobile phone. By building her own phone, Fairphone exposes the relationships in the supply chain and the accompanying global problems’. (Rationale for Fairphone in grant application, January 2011).
<p>|                      | Fairness. Mesa fights for equal rights and fair distribution of wealth. In this fight, we run campaigns and involve citizens, consumers, companies and governments. Our vision is for an Africa in which incomes from mineral wealth and economic growth is |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes and categories</th>
<th>Illustrative data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>invested in social security for the people’ (Mesa vision statement on grant application, November 2009).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Artifact as storytelling device

**Artifact attributes**

*Tangibility.* ‘We knew it [campaign] had to be a physical product because otherwise you lose all your research into vagueness’ (Fairphone founder/CEO, Bas van Abel).

*Emotionality.* ‘[W]e looked for the electronic device that people cared about the most. Everybody has a smartphone. If I take your smartphone and I walk away with it, you feel really uncomfortable. So different than a television or a tablet’ (Fairphone co-founder, Peter van der Mark).

*Ubiquity.* ‘This [choice of smartphone] was something that happened here [points to chart]. It happened before my time. The phone was definitely intentionally chosen because it is so ubiquitous’ (Fairphone employee).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes and categories</th>
<th>Illustrative data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material ends</strong></td>
<td><em>Instrumental exchange.</em> Mesa director initially supports Fairphone in order to secure funding from donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Issue prognosis.</em> ‘[The phone is] like Anne Frank. Of course, terrible….One of the six million [Jews]. It doesn’t help telling the story about six million Jews in the second World War or the Germans. It helps when somebody has a symbol which you can use...you need a symbol, which is concrete, which is a specific story’ (Angel investor).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing category congruence</td>
<td>‘Consumers have a choice of innovative and trendy Blackberrys, iPhones and other Android gadgets. Yet, consumers do not have a choice for a ‘fair’ variant of these gadgets. Fairphone wants to change the situation’ (<em>Waag Society</em> Magazine, Winter 2010–2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Themes and categories</td>
<td>Illustrative data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions of actor distinctiveness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>David versus Goliath</strong></td>
<td>‘I like[d] the boldness of the [Fairphone] initiative…So it’s quite bold to say, “Let’s do something about that [conflict minerals]…So that’s part of the boldness; it’s a very competing [sic], international, full of big, powerful industrial companies; and you just say with four idealistic people…“We don’t know what…but were going to try to see what’s the problem and what we can do about it”’ (Blogger/Journalist).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urgency versus complacency</strong></td>
<td>‘That situation [in the DRC] is unacceptable for consumers who cannot live with the thought that their purchase of a phone supports armed groups in Central Africa…For consumers with a guilty conscience there is hope. The Fairphone community has since been engaged in a frantic attempt to make a mobile phone which guarantees that your hands stay clean…One thing that the Fairphone promoters hope to achieve: that their plan will shake industry “big boys” out of complacency’ (Article in <em>Vrij Nederland</em>, 23 October 2010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Themes and categories</td>
<td>Illustrative data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tone</strong></td>
<td>‘If you look at the documentary [Blood in the Mobile], it is traditionally set up in the way we didn't want to set up our own campaign. It’s set up as a way to show how bad companies are whereas we wanted to show how good you can do, and what kind of impact you can have as a consumer on changing these things. So we took the positive way’ (Fairphone founder/CEO, Bas van Abel).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Campaign repertoire</strong></td>
<td>‘We [Mesa] had this meeting ...With all the communication people from different Mesa organisations from all around the world…And I presented the Fairphone idea. And these guys, they were from India, from Congo, from everywhere. And they were like: “What?”...these guys started laughing...They just completely didn’t understand what was going on’ (Mesa programme manager #2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimating criteria</td>
<td>‘One of the reasons [Mesa stopped supporting Fairphone] was, for example, well, “this is too much of a risk” because we [Mesa] want to be an NGO that does “good” projects. And if we’re going to be involved in a project that is already from the start...’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Page 72
Themes and categories

Illustrative data

saying, “well, we are never going to be able to [make a 100% fair product]...This phone still partly stinks…That's reality. So do we want to be involved in that? I don’t know’ (Mesa consultant #1).

Theme 3: Distributed Agency

Direct endowments

Legitimacy

accretion

Media endorsement. ‘The billion dollar profits made by Apple and Samsung deserve a counter reaction: the Dutch Fairphone will be fairly produced. And there is a plan. In 1½ years, the clean smartphone will be available in the shop’ (Newsmagazine \textit{NRC.Next}, September 2012).

Corporate endorsement. Macrobank, Alpha-Mobile declare support for Fairphone campaign (March 2011).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes and categories</th>
<th>Illustrative data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public endorsement</strong></td>
<td><em>Public votes Fairphone winner of prestigious ASN Bank prize for fair trade (November 2011)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tangible resources</strong></td>
<td><em>Human capital. Macrobank seconds laid-off project manager to Fairphone free-of-charge (early 2012).</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Financial resources. Alpha-Mobile agrees to buy 1,000 non-existent smartphones, contrary to organisation’s purchase policies (March 2011). Beta-Mobile gives cash to attend incubator programme (June–July 2012).</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contingent endowments</strong></td>
<td><em>Ex-project manager discovers London incubator. Enlists Fairphone without consultation (May–June 2012); Prince Jaime de Bourbon de Parme invites van Abel to participate in conflict-free mineral pilot (November 2012). Crowdfunding campaign over-subscribed (Summer 2013). Academics, industry experts volunteer services to firm.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Effectual Decision Making

The pattern of decision making in Fairphone’s history shows the founders acting within available means, interacting with an effectual network, leveraging contingencies and changing goals to produce an emergent outcome that they did not originally intend. We present the evidence for effectual decision making in the study.

**Acting within means.** Even when they had no intention to form an enterprise, Fairphone’s founders exploited available means—identity, knowledge, networks (Sarasvathy, 2001)—to further the campaign goals. For instance, the idea of co-creating a material artifact with the public drew on the principles of open design, which were familiar to van Abel in his job as industrial designer at Waag. Mesa members of the Fairphone campaign team leveraged their networks with journalists and grant agencies in The Netherlands to secure coverage for Fairphone and finance respectively.

**Interaction with stakeholders.** In effectuation, a self-selected group of stakeholders contribute to the inchoate venture, shaping it in unexpected ways by interaction with the focal entrepreneurial actor (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005). As Fairphone team members acted on their means they interacted with self-selected stakeholders who were interested in the problem of conflict minerals and labour conditions in smartphone factories. Fairphone’s founders interacted with this network in the following ways: (1) in face-to-face meetings and workshops with journalists, government officials, MNO executives and civil society members; and (2) indirectly via print, electronic, social media and the campaign website.

One important member of the effectual network, the business angel, is associated with van Abel’s former employer, Waag. He had heard about
Fairphone through contacts at Waag, who eventually introduced him to van Abel in 2012. The angel explained: ‘Of course I had a lot of information of what was going on here [Waag]. And a lot of things I discussed and I hear because I know them [Waag] very well. So I knew [of Fairphone].’

**Changing means, changing goals.** Despite their original intention, Fairphone’s founders had by September 2012 decided to found a company. This change of goals occurred by interacting with and accumulating resources from stakeholders such as the angel investor.

They [Fairphone campaign] were trying to sell a report about the terrible situation in Congo…They said, ‘It is very difficult. They [the smartphone industry] accept us, but nobody listens’. [I said,] ‘Of course, if you really want to change something you must be dangerous for them [the industry]…You must be part of the game [the industry]. Not just telling other people what they should do, but showing people that it can be different. (Angel investor).

Also, Fairphone founders, by interacting with industry insiders, gained knowledge (new means) about how smartphones were actually produced.

For me, being in London in September 2012, I guess, [it was] the first time that someone told me, ‘we are going to make a phone’…For me, making a mobile phone is like going to Mars, you know, but these guys [van Abel, Ballester] found out pretty quickly [in London] that…you don’t have to make it [on] your own. (Fairphone co-founder, Peter van der Mark)

**Leveraging contingencies.** Contingencies, which are conceived as unexpected events that Fairphone’s founders did not anticipate (Sarasvathy,
2001), occur as a result of the agency of actors external to the founding team. From the perspective of Fairphone’s founders, these actions (resulting in contingent endowments as shown in Table 2-2) were contingencies beyond their immediate control. Yet, the founders acted opportunistically, exploiting these events to further their immediate ends. For instance, in July 2012, van Abel and van der Mark could not attend the incubator programme in London for three months full-time. They encouraged Ballester, the intern with no ties in the Netherlands, to represent Fairphone.

He [Ballester] was a graduation intern before, and he was almost shocked that we gave him the opportunity to go to London. But for me it was very logical. [I said.] ‘You [Ballester] are the only one. You’re available’…and Bas [van Abel] had a family so he could not go full-time to London. (Fairphone, ex-project manager).

Similarly, Fairphone’s founders enlisted the start-up to participate in the conflict mineral initiative and exploited oversubscription of the crowdfunding campaign to produce 25,000 phones, instead of the originally-planned 5,000.

**Affordable loss pre-commitments.** This refers to advance commitments of resources (money, time, expertise) that an actor is willing to lose in supporting a new venture (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 81–84). In our study, members of Fairphone’s effectual network pre-committed material resources and conferred legitimacy on the emerging social venture after the founders decided to make a commercial product. We identify three types of actors who made affordable loss pre-commitments to Fairphone: (1) investors, such as the venture capitalist firm and the angel investor; (2) corporate actors, such as MNOs Alpha-Mobile, Beta-Mobile,
and Gamma-Mobile, who provided industry-specific expertise to Fairphone; and (3) cultural influencers, such as noted British activist George Monbiot (with over 140,000 Twitter followers), who tweeted in support of Fairphone in October 2014: ‘My @Fairphone has arrived. My first smartphone. And, I hope, if it’s as easy to repair as claimed, my last’.

To sum then, Fairphone’s founders acted effectually. They acted within their means, exploited contingencies provided by a distributed network of actors, and, in the process, changed their goals while attracting and maintaining an effectual network of supporters. In Table 2-3 we summarise the evidence for effectuation in the emergence of the social enterprise.
Table 2-3. Evidence for effectuation action in the emergence of Fairphone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effectuation construct</th>
<th>Illustrative data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acting within means</td>
<td>Knowledge. Founder/CEO draws on experience as industrial designer to recommend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>open design of smartphone as social movement campaign; Mesa activists choose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conflict minerals because organisation members had knowledge of DRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Identity</em>. ‘It was really practical events that we set up [for the campaign]….because that’s what we do at Waag…we are practical researchers. We are not like academic researchers on fair trade’ (Fairphone ex-project manager).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction with stakeholders</td>
<td>Social media updates, face-to-face and online interaction. Meeting with Angel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>associated with van Abel’s employer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leveraging contingencies</td>
<td><em>Contingency #1</em>: Discovery of London incubator programme. <em>Action</em>: Van Abel and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>van der Mark cannot attend full-time. Ask Ballester to represent Fairphone in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>programme for three months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectuation construct</td>
<td>Illustrative data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contingency #2:</strong> Discovery of conflict-free mineral projects piloted by Dutch government and consumer electronics firms. <strong>Action:</strong> Founder enlists Fairphone as purchaser of conflict-free component.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contingency #3:</strong> Crowdfunding over-subscribed. <strong>Action:</strong> Founders produce more phones than initially planned.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affordable loss pre-commitments</td>
<td><strong>Volunteers (Expertise).</strong> Academics, industry experts volunteer services to firm. Some recruited by Fairphone.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | **Investors (finance)** Venture Capital firm invests £15,000. Angel invests €400,000 in stage-gate manner. ‘I asked Bas [van Abel] how much we needed. Then he said, “We need millions.” I said, “No, we don’t need millions. We need €300–400,000 until the moment that we’re really going to produce. So let’s make three stages. One is, we need to do this [produce], and then that [second] stage is, “how are we
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Effectuation construct</strong></th>
<th><strong>Illustrative data</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>going to finance it?” We made this whole plan. And this was not very much’ (Angel investor).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Corporates (industry-specific expertise).</em> Alpha-Mobile, Beta-Mobile, Gamma Mobile test prototype fair smartphone for free (August–December 2013), help Fairphone fix bugs. Beta-Mobile pays for audit of Chinese factory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Cultural influencers (Legitimacy).</em> ‘While I was tearing out my hair over Apple’s evasions, Fairphone was launching its first handset at the London Design Festival. This company, formed not just to build a genuine ethical smartphone but also to try to change the way in which supply chains and commercial strategies work, looks like everything that Apple should be but isn’t. Though its first phone won’t be delivered until December, it has already sold 15,000 sets: to people who want 21st-century technology without 19th-century ethics’ (George Monbiot in UK’s <em>Guardian</em>, 24 September 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectuation construct</td>
<td>Illustrative data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in goal</td>
<td>Initial goal (2009–end-2011). Raise awareness about conflict minerals and smartphones. Goal ambiguity (end-2011–mid-2012). ‘We were already going about this for a few months [in early 2012] asking, “What are we going to do with this Fairphone idea? What shall we do next? Should we start our own company?” It is really scary to go that way, you know’ (Fairphone, ex-project manager). New goal (mid-2012). ‘[T]he fact that we were accepted in the “bootcamp” in London had a big influence. Until then, we always said like, “we are making this phone,” but there was no asset to do so. There was no money, not the right relationships...The moment the accelerator [incubator] programme said, and “We want to make this happen. We believe in your story”…You know, it was like, “yeah, actually we can make this happen”’ (Fairphone co-founder, Miquel Ballester).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectuation construct</td>
<td>Illustrative data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in means</td>
<td><em>Networks</em>. At incubator programme, founders meet industry experts, who partner with Fairphone; experts volunteer technical expertise to Fairphone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Knowledge</em>. Realisation due to Ballester’s research that problems in supply chain include poor factory conditions and electronic (e)-waste. Increased marketing and industry knowledge from contacts at MNOs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

We motivated this study by attempting to theorise the unlikely emergence of an enterprise, whose founders originally had no entrepreneurial intention and no capability to produce a complex product. We find that the firm’s founders employed discursive and symbolic practices centred on a material artifact to frame their solution to a social problem. This triggered the accretion of resources and legitimacy, despite the founder’s reluctance to start an enterprise. By acting using available means, leveraging contingencies and interacting with an effectual network, the founders changed goals and decided to found an enterprise. Thereafter, an effectual network provided support and legitimacy, leading to the outcome—a thriving social enterprise. We develop a model of social enterprise emergence, which summarises our findings. Refer to Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-1. Process model of enterprise emergence
Distributed Agency: The Accretion of Legitimacy and Resources

The assumption that new ventures lack legitimacy is a ‘core premise’ among scholars of organisational legitimacy (Überbacher, 2014, p. 668). Scholars have also reported that new ventures need to be legitimate in order to acquire the valuable resources, which they typically lack. Thus, these scholars emphasise that entrepreneurs must act *purposively* to acquire legitimacy from their environments in order to overcome resource constraints (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). Our study of Fairphone suggests that an (eventual) entrepreneurial actor may also inadvertently acquire legitimacy and entrepreneurially-valuable resources despite having no entrepreneurial intention and no competence to transform inputs into economic outputs that its stakeholders want.

*Resource availability within perturbed context.* Unprecedented perturbations such as regulatory changes to an organisational field may disrupt the expectations of field members (Sine & David, 2003). These disruptions provoke multiple responses from organisational actors intended to obviate negative outcomes to their organisations (Haveman & Rao, 1997; A. D. Meyer, 1982) leading to a ‘solution bazaar’ (Sine & David, 2003, p. 188)—a situation wherein organisational decision makers search for appropriate solutions and other actors proffer solutions to the decision makers’ needs.

Search processes and the solutions devised in the wake of such perturbations reflect different underlying ideologies, norms and values among heterogeneous actors (Garud & Karnøe, 2003; A. D. Meyer, 1982). Our research shows, for instance, that after the passage of the Dodd-Frank
Act, European civil society organisations proffered solutions that: (1) located the cause of the conflict minerals problem in the electronics industry’s sourcing practices; and (2) presumed that legal coercion was the most effective way of changing those practices. Consumer electronics firms, on the other hand, proffered market-based solutions privileging voluntary action by the electronics industry, miners and the Congolese government. Thus, some solutions provided in the wake of the perturbation furnished potentially valuable resources which were conductive to entrepreneurial transformation of inputs, such as conflict-free components, into new economic outputs (Hiatt et al., 2009; Sine et al., 2005).

**Issue framing and resource transference.** While a field-wide perturbation may increase the availability of entrepreneurially-valuable resources, resource holders have to transfer those resources to (eventual) entrepreneurs. Social movement scholars have argued that SMOs’ action-oriented frames are important to the resource transfer process (Benford & Snow, 2000). Resource holders are likely to extend material support to an SMO if the SMO’s frame is internally consistent, the claim-maker credible, and the frame resonates with resource holders’ values and beliefs (Benford & Snow, 2000). Consistent with these social movement scholars, we find that the Fairphone campaign mobilised ideas and symbols that conveyed social meaning to audiences. Fairphone’s founders employed a comprehensible material artifact—a smartphone—to co-opt the attention of the media, NGOs, the public, mobile network operators, and consumer electronics firms to the problem of conflict minerals and link those audiences tangibly and intuitively to the DRC. Unlike social movement scholarship, however, which portrays SMOs’ framing actions as deliberate issue ‘packaging’ intended to
achieve utilitarian ends (Benford & Snow, 2000; P. E. Oliver & Johnston, 2000), we find that Fairphone’s campaign framing was not intended to achieve any stable, concrete domain-specific goal.

Heterogeneous, distributed actors then channelled entrepreneurially-valuable resources towards the firm founders and/or granted moral legitimacy—essential building blocks for the formation and survival of new ventures—to the eventual entrepreneurs because: (1) diverse solutions were available within an organisational field in the wake of an regulatory perturbation. Some of these solutions provided valuable input (resources) for a new social venture; and (2) Fairphone’s issue framing resonated with the values of audiences, some of whom were responding to the perturbed industry context.

**Effectual Entrepreneurial Action**

By acting within expanded means, interacting with an effectual network and leveraging contingencies, some of which occurred due to the action of distributed agents, Fairphone’s founders translated the endowments of distributed agents (material resources, legitimacy) into a new venture. The observed effectuation process highlights an important aspect of effectuation: the role of material artifacts. Prior empirical studies of effectuation have shown how an effectual network make affordable loss pre-commitments in the form of idiosyncratic knowledge, networks, and resources to the proprietors of some technological artifact (Sarasvathy & Kotha, 2001; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 246–254). However unlike in previous studies, we find that the effectual network did not commit resources in order to further instrumental ends, but did so because
the social venture employed a material artifact that embodied their beliefs and moral values (Haveman and Rao, 1997).

The nature of the artifact—being ubiquitous, emotional and tangible—connected to the lives of audiences and enabled them to make commitments that they might not have made otherwise. For members of the effectual network, acting on the artifact was a tangible expression of morality (Fuentes, 2014). We believe our findings on distributed agency and role of material artifacts make interesting contributions to effectuation theory and the literature on boundary objects.

**Contributions and Future Research Directions**

*Effectual agency as co-constituted by distributed agency.* Effectuation theory assumes that agency for a new venture inheres in the entrepreneurial actor (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 15–16). The theory overlooks how actors located in the effectuator(s)’ broader environment are implicated in the emergence of a successful new venture (Arend et al., 2015). We argue that agency does not lie *solely* with the entrepreneur or even the effectual network. The entrepreneurial intention and capabilities that are presupposed by a purposive enactment of the venture in effectuation theory may also originate from multiple actors external to the founding team. We do not imply that the effectual entrepreneur passively complies with the dictates of these distributed actors to channel their varied aspirations into a final commercial artifact. Instead, we suggest that distributed agency co-constitutes or enables effectual entrepreneurial agency in the creation of a new social venture in two ways: (1) by the proactive commitment of entrepreneurially-valuable material resources, legitimacy, capabilities and contingencies—ingredients necessary for new venture flourishment
(Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002)—to the (eventual) entrepreneurial actor; and (2) by provoking a change in the intentions of a reluctant entrepreneurial actor to pursue domain-specific entrepreneurial goals—a necessary condition for the emergence of a new venture (Katz & Gartner, 1988).

Social movements, which are characterised by the contestation of prominent social practices (Weber et al., 2008), may provide a fertile ground for distributed agency because the heterogeneous actors within a social movement are collectively interested in addressing some social problem. Garud and Karnøe (2003, p. 280) suggested that distributed agency in the field of technology entrepreneurship entails ‘the presence of multiple actors with different levels of involvement’. It may be that in the context of social enterprise formation higher levels of involvement by distributed agents involve the transference of material resources to the effectual entrepreneur, whereas lower levels of involvement translate to positive legitimacy evaluations.

**Material artifacts in effectuation theory.** Material artifacts are central to effectuation theory. For instance, Sarasvathy’s (2001) seminal paper was based on experiments in which expert entrepreneurs devised ways to market an imaginary entrepreneurial game (Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 19–40). Similarly, the dynamic model of effectuation was induced from a study of an industry artifact, RFID [Radio Frequency Identification Technology] (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 240–254). Yet, the role of the artifact in convening the effectual network, which is crucial to the emergence of new firms (Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 105–109), has not been explicated.

Material artifacts may influence the affective ways in which the effectual network is assembled. Social entrepreneurs, like their commercial
counterparts, perform meaning work; they produce and mobilise ideas and meaning to make their ventures comprehensible to target audiences. They may do this by ‘story-telling’ (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Martens, Jennings, & Jennings, 2007) or by other symbolic actions calculated to increase legitimacy with key resource holders (Zott & Huy, 2007). This meaning work involves not only discursive elements (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004), but also the socio-material since various social groups attribute functional and symbolic attributes to material artifacts (Rafaeli & Vilnai-Yavetz, 2004; Shavitt, 1990). Thus, members of an effectual network centred on the creation of a material artifact make inferences about the artifact based on their shared interpretations of the artifact (Bijker, 1987; Pratt & Rafaeli, 1997; Zott & Huy, 2007).

The symbolic dimension may be more salient in the case of social enterprises predicated on addressing a morally-charged social problem. Actors may attempt to infuse moral values into the inchoate social enterprise, the purveyor of the artifact, more than might be the case in commercial enterprises introducing risky technological innovations (Fourcade & Healy, 2007). Thus, members of the effectual network self-select and pre-commit resources to the social enterprise not because they expect immediate calculative benefits from the artifact, but because the artifact embodies and symbolises their beliefs and values.

**Boundary objects in non-hierarchical interactions.** Boundary objects are artifacts that are agreed and shared between communities of practice. They are ‘plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites’. (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p. 393). In our study, a material
artifact, a fair smartphone, served as a boundary object. The artifact was not only tangible and ubiquitous in the developed world, but also connected users through a complex supply chain to parts of Asia and Africa. Furthermore, members of various social domains attributed multiple meanings to the artifact. For consumer electronics firms and government actors, the smartphone provided a concrete demonstration of progress on conflict mineral initiatives. For consumers, the smartphone was a way to express their beliefs in fairness and ethical consumption. For hackers, the phone provided an alternative to the closed designs of dominant smartphone producers. In other words, the material artifact occupied different social worlds.

In the organisational literature, boundary objects such as project timelines and engineering drawings have been invoked to explain interdisciplinary collaboration mostly within the context of a single organisational hierarchy (Nicolini et al., 2012; Yakura, 2002). We argue that the concept of boundary objects might be extended to cover interactions of loosely-coupled actors located in multiple domains that are not bounded within an organisational hierarchy and whose inhabitants have no mutual relations of dependence. Such objects, as Nicolini et al. (2012, p. 614) observed have a ‘deep emotional holding power’ and are potent enough to mediate interactions and trigger commitment of resources and expression of values by these dispersed actors.

**Implications for practice.** Our findings show that to facilitate the distributed accretion of resources and legitimacy, social entrepreneurs could embed themselves in communities of practice (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006) that coalesce around addressing a social problem. Even if they are embedded in communities of practice, social entrepreneurs still need to retain
their distinctive identities in order to attract resources (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Van de Ven, 1993). Our findings imply that social entrepreneurs could incorporate a comprehensible material artifact into their entrepreneurial narratives and carefully position their enterprises’ solution as cognate with, but distinct from extant product or service categories in order to attract resources.

Effectual entrepreneurial action is not always possible, or even desirable; it is applicable in environments characterised by uncertainty (Arend et al., 2015; Sarasvathy, 2001). Our findings also suggest that social entrepreneurs need capabilities to assess which contributions are critical inputs to the effectuation process and to understand how they may be successfully accumulated and exploited. To this end, social entrepreneurs may seek to balance their resource-seeking attempts between proactively pursuing contributions and releasing time to act upon contributions and contingencies offered by actors affiliated with those communities of practice.

**Future research.** Our study raises several questions for future inquiry. First, future research could examine how entrepreneurial decision making patterns change in the life of a social enterprise. Read and Sarasvathy (2005) suggested that successful enterprises are more likely to have begun by effectual entrepreneurial action and grown through causal entrepreneurial action as the organisations endure over time. Scholars could explore this prediction using in-depth longitudinal multiple case study designs (McMullen & Dimov, 2013) to examine decision making patterns in social enterprises that originally emerged through effectual action.

Second, while distributed agency enables effectual action in the early phases of the enterprise how does the nature of distributed agency change as
the enterprise grows? If as the enterprise grows and decision making processes become more causal, does the heterogeneity and motives of the previously distributed agents change? Do they, for instance, make calculative contributions to the enterprise, instead of proactive, value-driven contributions?

Third, though scholars have begun to appreciate the importance of material artifacts in the field of organisation studies (e.g., Nicolini et al., 2012; Yakura, 2002), little attention has been paid to the role of objects in social entrepreneurship. How might the nature of material artifacts influence effectual commitment in social entrepreneurship? In our study, there was broad agreement on the functional as well as the symbolic dimensions of the artifact. What if Fairphone’s founders had campaigned using another material artifact, say an electric toaster? If there is low agreement on either functional or symbolic dimensions, would the effectual network commit resources in similar ways? We welcome scholarship investigating the role of material artifacts in social entrepreneurship within loosely-coupled collectives (Haugh, 2007; Montgomery et al., 2012).

LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Despite its contributions, our study has at least two limitations. First, we relied principally on interviews to reconstruct Fairphone’s story before October 2013. We were careful to eliminate bias by developing a thick description of the case, triangulating informant reports using multiple independent data sources, seeking informant validation of the emerging analysis and by seeking discrepant information from informants who were critical of Fairphone. Yet, we still feel residual concern that bias was not completely eliminated. Second, Fairphone is but one organisation. It
emerged within a perturbed industry context in an economically-advanced part of the world. While our study offers rich insights into social enterprise emergence, we do not know with certainty whether our empirical findings are transferrable to other settings. However, recent scholarship at the nexus of social movements and organisation theory may provide clues on the transferability of our findings.

This body of scholarship suggests that social movements are implicated in the formation of new organisational forms and new enterprises (Hiatt et al., 2009; Rao et al., 2000; Schneiberg & Bartley, 2001; Sine & David, 2003; Sine, David, & Mitsuhashi, 2007; Swaminathan & Wade, 2001; Weber et al., 2008). Studies in this emerging stream of literature are typically large N studies that identify and explain the historical formation of a new organisational form or new class of enterprises based on variance in the presence and contestation activities of social movement organisations. While insightful, these studies do not present fine-grained process accounts of how new organisational forms or new enterprises emerge in the wake of social movement contestation. We conjecture that such a fine-grained account of enterprise formation in the wake of social movement activities, such as the temperance movement in the U.S. (Hiatt et al., 2009) or the grass-fed beef movement (Weber et al., 2008), will reveal effectual entrepreneurial decision making processes and distributed agency to be important precursors of enterprise formation, as we have observed in the Fairphone case (see Figure 2-1).

Social entrepreneurship scholars have often depicted social entrepreneurs as visionary individuals who drive social change by innovatively combining resources (Dacin et al., 2011; Mair & Martí, 2006).
We highlight social enterprise emergence as driven by distributed agents who provide the impetus to eventual effectual entrepreneurs. An effectual network pre-commits resources to the emerging social enterprise not based on instrumental exchange calculations, but because the artifact served as a boundary object, accessible to multiple social worlds and as embodying the moral values of network members.

Due to changing public expenditure priorities, social enterprises are being called upon to address social problems (Haugh, 2007; Santos, 2012). Social enterprises need to be innovative as they reconfigure resources into new organisations, products and services to address these social problems as well as commercially-viable in order to have sustainable impact. These are formidable challenges for social entrepreneurs operating in highly-competitive market environments. Yet, in the face of human suffering, social enterprises may find themselves surrounded by a groundswell of supporters who, given the opportunity to express moral values, commit resources to address those challenges.
This page was intentionally left blank
CHAPTER 3 : CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PRACTICE IN THE MNE AS SYNCHRONOUS ACQUIESCENCE AND MANIPULATION: THE HUAWEI CASE

ABSTRACT

Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have adopted discretionary corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives that purportedly go beyond the immediate profit maximisation goals of the firm to address broader social, environmental and economic problems. The CSR literature has portrayed MNEs’ CSR practices as singular corporation-wide legitimacy-seeking responses to acquiesce, compromise with, or avoid the demands of influential institutional constituents. Scholars have ignored how various subunits of an MNE may simultaneously adopt CSR practices and discursively justify those practices in multiple strategic responses to the demands of salient local institutional constituents—an approach to legitimacy management that has been labelled a paradox approach (Scherer et al., 2013). Based on the results of a case study of CSR practices and public justifications of Chinese MNE, Huawei, I show how a CSR programme that is developed in one country to acquiesce to local institutional demands is discursively justified by another subunit of the MNE to constituents geographically removed from the site of those practices. I suggest that the paradox approach to legitimacy management CSR may not lead to inherent conflict as assumed in the literature if the MNE’s cost of acquiescence in one domain is low and institutional pressure in another weak.
Keywords: Common worlds; corporate social responsibility (CSR); multinational enterprise (MNE); discursive justification; paradox approach to legitimacy; corporate response to institutional pressure.
In the past two decades, multinational enterprises (MNEs) have adopted discretionary corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices in response to pressure from governments, civil society groups and host communities to address economic, social and environmental problems (Flanagan & Whiteman, 2007; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Van Tulder & Kolk, 2001; Wheeler et al., 2002). Existing research on MNEs’ CSR practices emphasises that MNEs’ implement CSR programmes as single legitimacy-seeking responses to acquiesce, comply with or avoid the demands of influential institutional actors (Brammer, Pavelin, & Porter, 2009; Spar & La Mure, 2003; Surroca, Tribó, & Zahra, 2013).

Yet, CSR practices by MNEs need not simply instantiate single corporation-wide responses to institutional demands. MNEs consists of geographically-dispersed, goal-disparate subunits ensconced in multiple, fragmented institutional environments (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Pache & Santos, 2010). Subunits of the MNE have diverse legitimation needs. Therefore, for instance, they may employ CSR practices to simultaneously conform with and resist institutional demands as they seek legitimacy with locally-salient institutional actors (Surroca et al., 2013). This approach to CSR-legitimacy management in MNEs, which Scherer et al. (2013) label a paradox approach, has not been empirically examined in the CSR literature (Pedersen & Gwozdz, 2014; Scherer et al., 2013).

Given the complexity and heterogeneity of the institutional environments that MNEs navigate, corporations that adopt a paradox approach to managing legitimacy using CSR practices may be more successful in the long term than those that do not (Scherer et al., 2013). Therefore, empirical research illuminating how MNEs employ their CSR
practices in a paradox approach to legitimacy is a vital area of interest to CSR and international business (IB) scholars.

The starting point for an empirical examination of a paradox approach to CSR-legitimacy management should include analysis of organisational action as well as discursive aspects of legitimation (Vaara and Tienari, 2008; Geppert, 2003) because to gain legitimacy MNE actors not only align organisational practices with institutional demands (C. Oliver, 1991), but also justify their actions to external institutional constituents. My research question is thus: in the paradox approach to CSR-legitimacy management, how does public discursive justification of CSR practices relate to strategic response across MNE subunits?

I present the findings of a case study of the CSR practices of the Chinese MNE Huawei. Based on field work in Kenya and applying Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) theory of justification, I examine the actual CSR practices by Huawei’s Kenyan subsidiary and public discursive justification of those practices by Huawei actors. I find that the company’s flagship CSR initiative, which was adopted by Huawei Kenya to reduce local recruitment costs and to acquiesce to local institutional pressure, was publicly justified to influence perceptions of non-Kenyan constituents. Specifically, Huawei actors justified these practices by principally appealing to notions of technical efficiency, certified professionalism, competition and economic value while ignoring demands for social action in other domains such as conflict minerals and factory conditions. Moreover, the justification scheme was consistent regardless of the intended audience.

These findings contribute to scholarship on the CSR practices of MNEs, an area of inquiry that remains understudied (Doh & Lucea, 2013;
Husted & Allen, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2006; Yang & Rivers, 2009), in two ways. First, employing multiple response strategies as presupposed in a paradox approach may not lead to inherent conflict as assumed (Scherer et al., 2013) if the cost of acquiescence in one domain is low and institutional pressure in another weak.

Second, studies have shown that the higher the external pressure for social action from entrenched, influential and pervasive elements of the institutional environment the more likely that a corporation’s externally-directed CSR rhetoric will not match actual practice (Weaver et al., 1999). The study suggests that an MNE’s justificatory statements for CSR practices may be coherent (and match practice), regardless of the audience if the MNE’s industry is perceived to be benign to society, if there is weak international institutional pressure, and if there is fit between CSR practices and product market strategy in the host country.

This paper is structured as follows. First, I present the theoretical context for the study by reviewing the literature on CSR in the MNE using Oliver’s (1991) organisational response framework and Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) theory of justification. Next, I describe the method used in this paper. I report the findings by presenting an overview of Huawei in Kenya, the company’s CSR initiative and the public justification used by Huawei actors. Thereafter, I discuss the implications of my findings and conclude with directions for future research.
THEORETICAL CONTEXT

Organisational Response to Institutional Pressure

Organisations are ensconced in and respond to pressure from their institutional environments (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; C. Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). In an influential article, Oliver (1991) developed an exhaustive typology of organisational response to institutional pressure. These are as follows (in increasing order of resistance): (1) Acquiescence—Refers to an organisation’s complete accession to the demands of institutional constituents; (2) Compromise—In this response, organisations attempt to, at least partially, meet the demands of all institutional constituents. Compromise includes conforming minimally to institutional demands and bargaining with institutional actors in order to exact concessions; (3) Avoidance—This is a strategic response wherein the organisation does not conform to institutional demands, but masks non-conformity behind a façade of symbolic compliance, protecting core activities from scrutiny by external actors, or escapes altogether exiting the institutional domain within which the pressure is being exerted; (4) Defiance—Refers to an active form of resistance to institutional demands. Organisations exercise defiance by ignoring institutional demands or explicitly challenging institutional rules and values; and (5) Manipulation—Refers to purposeful attempts by the organisation to influence institutional constituents by lobbying and control of influential institutional constituents who are sources of approval. In Table 3-1, I summarise Oliver’s (1991) response typology.
Table 3-1. Typology of organisational responses to institutional demands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquiescence</td>
<td>Habit</td>
<td>Following invisible, taken-for-granted norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imitate</td>
<td>Mimicking institutional models</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comply</td>
<td>Obeying rules and accepting norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>Balancing expectations of multiple constituents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacify</td>
<td>Placating and accommodating institutional elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bargain</td>
<td>Negotiating with institutional stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoidance</td>
<td>Conceal</td>
<td>Disguising nonconformity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Buffer</td>
<td>Loosening institutional attachments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Escape</td>
<td>Changing goals, activities, or domains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defiance</td>
<td>Dismiss</td>
<td>Ignoring explicit norms and values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Challenge</td>
<td>Contesting rules and requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>Examples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assaulting sources of institutional pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation</td>
<td>Co-opt</td>
<td>Importing influential constituents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shaping values and criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dominating institutional constituents and processes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oliver (1991, p. 152)
In the remainder of this literature review, I employ Oliver’s (1991) typology as a lens to examine existing scholarship on the CSR of MNEs.

**MNEs’ Corporate Social Practices as Response to Institutional Pressure**

In the past two decades, institutional actors, such as governments (Flanagan & Whiteman, 2007; Margolis & Walsh, 2003), civil society groups (Muthuri & Gilbert, 2011; Spar & La Mure, 2003), and host communities (Eweje, 2006; Wheeler et al., 2002), have pressured MNEs to alleviate economic, social and environmental problems in their operating environments. MNEs have responded by enacting discretionary corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes that purportedly address those problems beyond the immediate profit maximisation goals of the firm (Muthuri & Gilbert, 2011; Tan & Wang, 2011). MNEs’ CSR practices include formalised codes of ethics for conducting business around the world (Amaeshi & Amao, 2009; Van Tulder & Kolk, 2001), philanthropic contributions (Brammer et al., 2009; Muller & Whiteman, 2015), healthcare programmes for underprivileged communities (Eweje, 2006), ecological restoration (Claasen & Roloff, 2012), and the adoption of industry self-regulation standards (Christmann & Taylor, 2002).

Despite the proliferation of MNEs’ corporate social programmes, these practices remain an understudied phenomenon (Doh & Lucea, 2013; Gugler & Shi, 2009; Husted & Allen, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2006). Addressing this gap is of scholarly interest for at least two reasons. First, IB scholars have theorised that the practice of CSR by MNE subsidiaries leads to increased legitimacy for MNE subsidiaries within the host country (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova et al., 2008). Yet, this link has not been widely empirically demonstrated (Claasen & Roloff, 2012;
Eweje, 2006). Empirical explication of this oft-theorised link between CSR practices and legitimacy will enable researchers understand the conditions under which social action results in increased legitimacy.

Second, as they attempt to attain legitimacy, MNEs are likely to employ action as well as discursive practices (Überbacher, 2014). However, existing research has focused on MNEs’ CSR actions, but not on discursive aspects of legitimacy attainment (Castelló & Galang, 2014). Thus, studying the actions and discursive elements of MNEs’ CSR responses will enable researchers to better understand the content of the strategic repertoires that MNEs employ as they seek legitimacy from their environments.

**Predominant Conception—CSR practice as single general response strategy.** Broadly speaking, scholarship on CSR by MNEs emphasises how MNEs’ CSR practices correspond to a single response strategy (of the five summarised in the preceding section). In a large body of work, it is assumed or implied that MNEs enact CSR programmes to *acquiesce* to the demands of institutional actors (J. L. Campbell, 2007; Eweje, 2006; Flanagan & Whiteman, 2007; Greening & Gray, 1994; Matten & Moon, 2008; Muller & Whiteman, 2015; Muller & Kolk, 2010; Spar & La Mure, 2003). Thus, for instance, Whiteman and Flanagan (2007) examine the negotiation strategy deployed by the Brazilian government to successfully pressure pharmaceutical companies into securing access to low-cost HIV medication. Similarly, Spar and La Mure (2003) report how a coalition of NGOs pressured Adidas, Sara Lee and Levi Strauss to withdraw from Burma due to the poor human rights record of the country’s ruling junta.

A smaller body of work highlights how MNEs’ CSR practices instantiate strategies of *compromise* with (e.g., Brammer et al., 2009; Meznar...
& Nigh, 1995), and avoidance of institutional demands (e.g., Crilly, Zollo, & Hansen, 2012; David et al., 2007; Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006; Surroca et al., 2013; Van Tulder & Kolk, 2001). For instance, Brammer et al. (2009) find that charitable contribution by firms in a sample of UK MNEs was positively related to the firm’s presence in at least one of 27 ‘countries of concern’, which are characterised by ‘lack of political rights and/or civil liberties’ (2009, p. 572). The MNEs, they theorised, made charitable contributions to offset negative impressions among home country constituents that may have arisen due to the firm’s presence in those countries.

Surroca et al.’s (2013) study of MNEs’ response to home country institutional demands for CSR illustrates strategies of avoidance. The authors show that in response to increased home country demands for social responsibility, MNEs across 22 countries exploited their organisational structures to transfer socially-irresponsible practices from headquarters to overseas subsidiaries while maintaining the appearance of social responsibility to home country audiences. Comparatively little empirical work has examined how MNEs employ their CSR practices as response strategies of defiance and manipulation of the institutional context (Pedersen & Gwozdz, 2014; Whiteman & Cooper, in press).

There are notable exceptions to the assumption that MNEs enact CSR as a single response strategy. In their study of Shell’s response to pressure from European activist groups and Ogoni communities in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, Wheeler et al. (2002) show that the company defied pressure by initially challenging the legitimacy of the Ogoni and then attempted to
manipulate the environment in Nigeria by co-opting reputable local academics in its CSR communication.

**A Gap in the Literature—Paradox approach to CSR in the MNE.** MNEs are not unitary, integrated entities taking univocal actions in response to their external contexts. Instead, MNEs consist of geographically-dispersed, goal-disparate subunits ensconced in multiple, fragmented institutional environments (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Pache & Santos, 2010). Actors, such as NGOs and governments, do not necessarily cooperate across institutional boundaries to pressure MNE subunits in similar ways across the world (Ghemawat, 2007; Wijen & Van Tulder, 2011). Thus, the legitimation needs of an MNE’s subunits may markedly differ and they may enact different strategic responses to meet local legitimation needs (Surroca et al., 2013). Drawing on Oliver’s (1991) typology and broader resource-based and institutional perspectives, Scherer et al. (2013) characterise this approach to CSR in the MNE as a paradox approach.

In the paradox approach, various MNE subunits do not choose a single response as implied by much of the empirical literature on CSR practices by MNEs. One subunit of the MNE may enact CSR to, for instance, acquiesce to institutional demands in its host country, whereas another subunit may develop CSR practices to defy similar demands in its host country (Scherer et al., 2013). The paradox approach to CSR in the MNE has not been empirically examined in the literature (Scherer et al., 2013). Given the complexity and heterogeneity of the institutional environments that MNEs navigate, corporations that adopt a paradox approach to managing legitimacy using CSR practices may be more successful in the long term than those that
do not. Therefore, empirical research illuminating how MNEs employ their CSR practices in a paradox approach to legitimacy is a vital area of interest to CSR and international business (IB) scholars. The present study addresses this gap in the literature.

The starting point for my study is that any empirical explication of the paradox approach should include: (1) the examination of actual organisational CSR action—corresponding to more passive response strategies (C. Oliver, 1991); and (2) the discursive aspects of CSR practices, i.e. speech and textual acts which language is employed to influence social action (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005)—corresponding to subunits’ defiance or active manipulation of institutional demands (C. Oliver, 1991).

I make this assumption for two reasons. First, there is an abundant literature examining the CSR communication of domestic corporations (e.g., Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995; Livesey & Kearins, 2002; Maignan & Ralston, 2002; Morhardt, 2010; Tregidga, Milne, & Kearins, 2014). These studies show that domestic firms employ communication channels to promote their interests and manage external impressions of internal organisational reality.

Second, CSR remains an ill-defined concept among the publics who grant legitimacy to MNEs, i.e. industry peers, civil society organisations, governments and consumers (Garriga & Melé, 2004; Matten & Moon, 2008). Given this conceptual ambiguity, MNE decision makers may instrumentally deploy CSR practices as ‘corporate spin’ to manipulate and defy institutional constituents (Banerjee, 2008; Jahdi & Acikdilli, 2009).

Though limited, existing research on CSR in the MNE has focused more on organisational action than on discourse (Castelló & Galang, 2014).
Indeed, there is a paucity of research on the discursive processes that MNEs use to establish legitimacy for their actions (Geppert, 2003; Kostova et al., 2008; Vaara & Tienari, 2008). Nevertheless, there is a body of empirical work that examines the CSR/sustainability communications of MNEs via annual sustainability/CSR reports (Jose & Lee, 2007; e.g., Kolk, 2003; Rondinelli & Berry, 2000). These studies do not systematically examine how MNE subunits use CSR to influence gain legitimacy; they are mainly taxonomic in character. In a review of 53 such studies, Morhardt (2010, p. 437) states, ‘the main purpose of most of these studies is simply documentation of the types and quantity of sustainability reporting done by various subsets of companies at the time of the study’.

In order to explicate the discursive processes by which an MNE may employ CSR in a paradox approach, I turn to a theory of justification developed by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006).

**On Justification: Boltanski and Thévenot’s Common Worlds Theory**

How do social actors, such as MNEs, influence external constituents in their environments to reach agreements without resorting to violence? Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot developed a theory to address that question in their seminal work *On Justification: The Economics of Worth*. Drawing on their previous empirical work and an analysis of classic works of political philosophy (St. Augustine’s *City of God*, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet’s *Politics*, Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, Jean-Jacque Rousseau’s *Social Contract*, Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*, and Henri de Saint-Simon’s *Système Industriel*), Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) propose that actors’ public justificatory accounts are made in reference to six mutually-exclusive
bases for justification or conceptions of the common good, which they call concrete ‘orders of worth’ or common worlds. They are as follows.

**Inspired world.** This is the world of creativity and imagination. In this world, what is worthy is original, passionate, inexpressible, emergent, and spontaneous. Actors are unworthy if they deliberately seek public approbation or behave in routinised ways.

**Domestic world.** This is the domain of tradition and place. In this world, worth is assigned based on people’s hierarchical position in a chain of personal dependencies. Actors are unworthy if they do not ‘stay in their place’ (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 176). Justifications in this domain invoke notions of locality as elements of the common good. In Thévenot et al.’s (2000) study of a public dispute over the construction of a road linking France and Spain through a picturesque valley in the south of France, opponents of the project justified their position by appealing to the domestic world: they argued that they wanted to ‘protect the region’s treasured culture and heritage…of which the valley’s landscape is a significant part’ (2000, p. 249).

**World of fame.** In this world, what is most valued is renown—positive recognition for distinguishing oneself in the opinion of the public. Public knowledge in this world determines the worth of a cause. Consequently, actors are unworthy if they do not command public attention or are banal in the eyes of the public.

**Civic world.** In this world, those who are granted higher states of worth are ‘not human persons but rather the collective beings that they constitute

---

6 Following Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), I use the terms common world and ‘orders of worth’ interchangeably.
by meeting together’ (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 185). Actors are considered worthy if they work to promote collective welfare by achieving unity, equality, solidarity. The civic world counters the personal dependencies on which the domestic world is based and public opinion that is the basis of the world of fame (Jagd, 2011).

**Industrial world.** What is most valued in this world is efficiency and utility. The industrial world is the world of technological artifacts, the scientific method, and the certified professional. Actors are unworthy if they produce nothing useful, unqualified or inefficient while artifacts are unworthy if they are subjective (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, pp. 159–211).

**Market world.** In this world, actors are worthy if they own desirable objects. They are assessed by success in competing in the market place. In Thévenot et al’s (2000) study of disputes over infrastructure projects, disputants over the proposed construction of a dam in a pristine region of California invoked the market world to justify their positions, but arrived at different conclusions: opponents labelled the dam as ‘economically unfeasible’, while proponents claimed that the project was the ‘cheapest’ way to meet the energy demand of local residents (2000, p. 242).

The market world, according to Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), should not to be confused with the industrial world. In the market world, worth is based on the economic value of goods and services (and short-term profits) in a competitive market whereas in the industrial world, worth is valued based on technical efficiency, professional planning and expertise (Thévenot et al., 2000, p. 240).

Summarising the significance of Boltanski and Thévenot’s theory, Cloutier and Langley (2013, pp. 366–367) state that it ‘effectively represents
a repertoire or a toolkit of cognitive, symbolic, and material elements that actors can actively draw upon to justify their actions and beliefs or to convince others as to what beliefs or actions are appropriate in a given situation’. In Table 3-2, I present a description of the common worlds.
Table 3-2. Summary description of common worlds


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common world</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic world</td>
<td>The sphere of duty and solidarity. What is valued in this world is are collectives, such as organisations and nations. The main test of worth is equality and solidarity. Individuals are ascribed worth if they freely become members of the collective, sacrifice immediate self-interests and pursue the collective welfare. Actors are deemed unworthy if they pursue self-interest above that of collective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic world</td>
<td>The realm of tradition and hierarchy. Worth is based on people’s hierarchical position in chain of personal dependencies. The main test of worth is firmness, loyalty, selflessness and trustworthiness. Material artifacts, such as gifts, and immaterial customs, such as etiquette and manners, support hierarchical relationships and are highly valued. Actors are unworthy if they ‘break rank’, ‘behave inappropriately’ or do not ‘stay in their place’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common world</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial world</td>
<td>The world of technology and the scientific method. Justification depends on technical efficiency, professionalism, planning. An actor’s worth is based on technical efficiency, productivity, and ability to meet functional needs as they perform some task. Professionalism, precision and usefulness are highly-valued. Waste, inefficiency are undesirable while pursuit of optimisation and progress are noble in themselves. Actors are unworthy if they produce nothing useful, are inactive, unqualified or inefficient while artifacts are unworthy if they are subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspired world</td>
<td>The world of artists and creative imagination. Assignation of worth is similar to inspiration—a ‘gratuitous benefit’. What is most valued is original, experiential, emergent, passionate, spontaneous, and unmeasurable. Worthy actors understand others not be representing them (as in the civic world), but by asserting their uniqueness. Repetition, habit are anathema.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market world</td>
<td>The higher common principle in this world is competitive rivalry for rare, saleable goods. The mode of evaluation of actors’ worth is price/cost. Actors’ worth depends on how well they</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common world</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade in the market place to reap its rewards. Wealth is taken as a proxy for actors’ worth. Actors are unworthy if fail in the market place (i.e., they lose money) or lack the means to engage in buying and selling. Objects are unworthy if they are not desired by market actors—and hence cannot be traded.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| World of fame | The realm of fame and popularity. The higher common principle is the reality of public opinion. Mode of evaluation of actor’s worth is public renown. Actors’ worth depends on fame, influence, visibility to and recognition from the public. Banality and public indifference to makes an agent unworthy. |
The common world model was developed for application in contentious situations (Thévenot et al., 2000, pp. 229–230). Thus, unsurprisingly, management researchers have applied the model to explicate the justifications of actors involved in public disputes (McInerney, 2008; Patriotta, Gond, & Schultz, 2011; Ramirez, 2013). Patriotta et al (2011) employed the model to analyse how the media, environmental NGOs and a utility company engaged with discourses and objects to maintain the legitimacy of institutions that were relevant to their activity in the wake of public debate about the legitimacy of nuclear power in Germany.

However, since public justification need not occur only within disputes, other scholars have applied Boltanski and Thévenot’s model to non-conflictual situations (Boivin & Roch, 2006; Fronda & Moriceau, 2008; Rousselière & Vézina, 2009). Rousselière and Vézina (2009) apply the model in a textual analysis of activity reports of a Canadian financial cooperative to explicate the process of identity formation within the bank. Boivin and Roch (2006) analyse Apple’s public communications in the period 1985–1995 to examine executives’ justifications for Apple’s failure to license its Mac operating system through alliances. Following the scholars cited above, I apply Boltanski and Thévenot’s model in a non-conflictual situation to analyse an MNE’s justification scheme across different institutional contexts and subunits.

So far I have argued that scholars have emphasised how MNEs (and their subunits) adopt CSR initiatives as single corporate-wide strategies of acquiescence, compromise and avoidance of institutional demands (C. Oliver, 1991), but have ignored ways in which MNE subunits employ CSR simultaneously as multiple approaches to achieving legitimacy in response
to institutional demands—the paradox approach (Scherer et al., 2013). I have also argued that an empirical examination of the paradox approach should include the analysis of actual CSR actions as well as discursive process by which the subunits of an MNE justify those CSR programmes. My research question then is as follows: in the paradox approach to CSR-legitimacy management, how does public discursive justification of CSR practices relate to strategic response across MNE subunits?

In the next section, I describe the empirical case on which the study is based: Huawei Technologies’ CSR practices in Kenya.

**METHODS**

The selected case was part of a broader research project comparing the CSR initiatives of two sets of MNE subunits operating in a developing country. The first set of MNE subsidiaries had parent companies that originated in economically-developed countries—or ‘high-CSR’ environments (Muller & Kolk, 2010, p. 2)—whereas the second set of MNE subsidiaries had parent companies originating in another developing country—or ‘low-CSR’ contexts (Muller & Kolk, 2010, p. 2). The cases were selected so that all companies operated in a relatively new industry, the information and communication technology (ICT), industry, that had not yet developed strong agreed-upon ‘preconscious or taken-for-granted rules’ (C. Oliver, 1991, p. 152) for corporate social action within the host country but which have nevertheless was subject to pressure for CSR.

**Huawei in Kenya: A Brief Overview**

With a population of about 42 million spread over an area approximately equal to France’s, Kenya is a low-income country located in
east Africa. Since gaining independence from Britain in 1963, Kenya has enjoyed a relatively stable political system. Between 2002 and 2012, Kenya’s economy grew by an unprecedented average annual rate of 5%. The ICT sector has played an important role in that growth: export of technology-related services increased from $16 million in 2002 to $360 million in 2010. Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi, now attracts Western venture capitalists, multinational ICT companies such as Google, and academic institutions such as Columbia University (The Economist, 2013b). Table 3-3 summarises key social and economic data about Kenya.
Table 3-3. Kenyan society and economy at a glance

All data refer to 2011, except stated otherwise

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population [millions]</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth [years]</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population living on less than $2 a day•</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population living in rural areas</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% share of income by bottom 10%/top 10%</td>
<td>2/32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality/1,000 live births</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of urban/rural population with access to improved sanitation†</td>
<td>32/32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of urban/rural population with access to improved water source†</td>
<td>82/52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literary rate among women/men 15 and above† [%]</td>
<td>84/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed phone lines/100 people</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile phone lines/100 people</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% population with access to internet*</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank, CIA Factbook; Communications commission of Kenya (2013, p. 21) ‡ 2000; • 2005;† 2010; *2013
Huawei began operations in Kenya in 1998. The company is perhaps China’s best-known MNE (The Economist, 2012a) and the world’s largest telecommunication equipment provider with 2014 revenues of $46.5 billion and 170,000 employees (Huawei Investment & Holding Co., Ltd., 2015a, pp. 10, 46). Huawei’s entry into Kenya coincided with a boom in mobile telephony in the country (The Economist, 2013b). As mobile network operators (MNOs) rapidly expanded their networks in the 2000s to keep pace with demand, Huawei positioned itself as a low-cost alternative to its Western rivals Alcatel Lucent, Nokia Siemens Networks and Ericsson (Bettuzzi & Karjalainen, 2010, p. 11; Luo, Cacchione, Junkunc, & Lu, 2011) for supply of telecommunication products and services to the MNOs.

Huawei Kenya also benefited from the Chinese government’s diplomatic and economic initiatives in Africa. In 2000, the Chinese government launched the Forum on China-Africa Collaboration (FOCAC) under which it offers concessional loans to African governments. These loans are tied to purchases of Chinese goods and services (Brautigam, 2009, pp. 77, 87, 114–115). Between 2007 and 2012, Kenya’s government secured concessional loans under FOCAC to build the country’s national fibre optic ‘backbone’—the infrastructure through which Kenyans access the internet—and awarded the contract for its construction to Huawei (Bettuzzi & Karjalainen, 2010, p. 10).

Data Collection

Though corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been defined in many ways in the literature (Garriga & Melé, 2004), I did not adopt an apriori definition of CSR. Instead, following an approach that has been used in the CSR literature (cf. Barnett & Lee, 2012; Claasen & Roloff, 2012), I relied on the
perceptions of Huawei actors and government stakeholders to identify the organisation’s CSR practices. To answer the research question, I collected data using interviews and publicly-available documents, such as sustainability reports and newspaper articles about Huawei’s CSR initiative.

**Interviews.** Through a colleague, who had contacts in Huawei, I secured in February 2013 a teleconference interview in Amsterdam with Huawei’s global CSR managers. (The managers were located in Shenzhen, China and Nairobi, Kenya.) Thereafter, I employed snowballing techniques (Patton, 2001, p. 237) to recruit informants. I asked Huawei managers whom I had interviewed in February 2013 to introduce me to people who were familiar with Huawei’s CSR programme. For a total of six weeks in 2013 (three weeks in April 2013, three weeks in October 2013), I travelled to Nairobi to interview Huawei managers, beneficiaries and government stakeholders. I also contacted potential informants such as technology journalists and beneficiaries mentioned in the press coverage of the CSR initiatives. In total, I conducted interviews with 22 informants representing 13 organisations. I summarise the interview data in Table 3-4.
Table 3-4. Data sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Hierarchical position interviewee</th>
<th>Number$^a$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huawei</td>
<td>Telecommunication equipment vendor, Consumer electronics firm</td>
<td>Vice president, managers, engineering staff (ex-beneficiaries)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asiaco</td>
<td>Consumer electronics firm</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europaco-Alpha</td>
<td>Consumer electronics firm</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europaco-Beta</td>
<td>Telecommunication equipment vendor</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOV</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
<td>Ministerial Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech-Mobile</td>
<td>Mobile network operator</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Boundaries</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
<td>Founders</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Development Centre</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR for Development</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
<td>Founder/CEO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mu University</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Industry expert, lecturer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Hierarchical position</th>
<th>Number&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delta University</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Head of department</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epsilon University</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Head of department</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeta University</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Head of department</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source/Author</th>
<th>Documents type</th>
<th>Number&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huawei</td>
<td>Annual corporate and sustainability reports</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huawei</td>
<td>Press releases</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Newspaper/newswire articles</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huawei</td>
<td>Internal corporate magazine</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huawei</td>
<td>Presentation slides to external CSR conference</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Total number of interviewees = 22; <sup>b</sup>Number of documents = 62
Interview protocols were structured as follows: informants’ biographical information; their relationship to Huawei and the company’s CSR initiative in Kenya; their experience of the programmes; and an open-ended section in which interviewees discussed their impressions of Huawei, its motives for the CSR programme, and any other information that they thought relevant to understanding Huawei’s programme. Interviews lasted on average 70 minutes. All interviews were recorded. I made detailed electronic and hand-written contact summary sheets (Miles & Huberman, 1994, pp. 51–54) after each interview noting the themes and my impressions of the interview.  

I validated informant reports of Huawei’s history and CSR practices in Kenya during interviews in 2013. I sent the transcripts to all three Huawei managers interviewed. They, in turn, read and validated the transcript. The Huawei managers I interviewed were public relations (PR) specialists. I assumed that they wanted to project a socially-desirable image of the corporation (Huber & Power, 1985). Therefore, I took care to corroborate their accounts of Huawei’s CSR programmes by asking non-Huawei informants in Nairobi about the details of the CSR programme.  

In addition to conducting formal interviews, I had lengthy informal conversations with a Huawei informant in Nairobi during which I obtained ‘backstage’ information (Goffman, 1956, p. 69) about how the company’s CSR initiative was actually run.

7 In mid-December 2013, my workbag containing my hard disc and laptop—containing the interview data—was stolen. I lost electronic data for 7 of 22 interviewees. Hence, I relied on my handwritten summaries of these interviews. All remaining electronically-recorded interviews were transcribed.
Publicly-available documents. I collected publicly-available documents for two purposes: (1) to triangulate interview reports about Huawei’s CSR programme, and (2) as data sources for content analysing the company’s public justifications of its CSR programme.

The sampling unit for content analysis—those documents that are included in the analysis (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 98)—are public documents in which actors justified Huawei’s flagship social initiative, the ‘Telecom Seeds for the Future’. These documents include newspapers (Kenyan and international), company websites, and CSR/sustainability reports. Using the Lexis Nexis database, I searched for all newspapers in English that appeared in the period 2010–2015 containing the following terms: ‘Huawei’ and ‘Telecom Seeds’. The search yielded 83 newspaper and newswire articles. I deleted duplicate articles, i.e., those articles with the same number of words, same titles and same date of publication, leaving a total of 51 articles. (I cross-checked the completeness of the LexisNexis search by performing a Google search for news articles featuring the phrase ‘Telecom Seeds’ and ‘Huawei’. The search yielded 15 articles which were all included in the LexisNexis search.)

I also included two press statements published on Huawei’s websites, seven annual CSR/sustainability reports, an article from Huawei’s internal staff magazine and a slide deck about the company’s CSR programmes that I had received from Huawei’s managers. In total, therefore, I used 62 documents in the analysis.

Analysis

This phase of the study was conducted in two steps. First, using interviews and documentary data, I wrote a 50-page report detailing
Huawei’s CSR practices in Kenya and the industry/institutional context in which the company operates. I did this for two reasons: (1) to produce an accurate account (Patton, 2001, pp. 559–561) of Huawei’s CSR practices; and (2) to articulate ‘intimate familiarity’ with the phenomenon under study (Lofland, Snow, Anderson, & Lofland, 2006, pp. 15–16).

Second, I established the common worlds (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006) used to justify the company’s CSR practices to Kenyan and non-Kenyan audiences. I did this by deductive content analysis (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999), a method which assumes that the frequency of use of a conceptual category—in this study, the common worlds—indicates users’ emphasis on the idea embodied in the category (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 59). I read all 62 documents to ‘get a sense of the whole’ document (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1287). Then, I coded the documents according to date of publication, author and location of the author—‘Kenyan’ (articles written by Kenyan news organisations) or ‘international’ (documents written by non-Kenyans). In total, 49 documents were coded as ‘international’ and 13 as ‘Kenyan’.

I chose the recording unit for content analysis, defined as ‘the specific segment of content that is characterized by placing it in a given [conceptual] category’ (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 100), to be sentences in which actors justified Huawei’s CSR programme. In deductive coding, assigning these recording units to conceptual categories is essentially a task of pattern matching (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999). A major challenge in pattern-matching categories from Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) theory is that real-life justifications rarely fit into the mutually-exclusive archetypal common worlds (Patriotta et al., 2011; Ramirez, 2013; Thévenot et al., 2000):
actors simultaneously employ elements of different common worlds in their discursive justification. Thus, real-life justifications might be a ‘compromise’ (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 277) between the various of orders of worth.

To facilitate coding, I developed a coding scheme based on Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006, pp. 159–211) description of the common worlds, and three articles in which the model has been explicated or empirically applied (Cloutier & Langley, 2007; Patriotta et al., 2011; Thévenot et al., 2000). Using NVivo qualitative data analysis software, I coded sentences (Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 99–101) in the 62 documents to a particular common world if statements met at least two criteria for inclusion in that world: mode of evaluation of worth and test of worth (Thévenot et al., 2000, p. 249).

FINDINGS

In this section of the paper, I describe Huawei’s CSR practices in Kenya, the host country institutional context (based on interview reports triangulated using documentary data) and the company’s justifications of its CSR initiative (based on analysis of publicly-available documents).

**Huawei’s CSR practices in Kenya: From Philanthropy to ‘Telecom Seed for the Future’**

Huawei’s historical approach to social responsibility in Kenya has been philanthropy. In the company’s first annual CSR report from 2008, it described its CSR practices in Kenya as ‘social donations’; Huawei claimed that it ‘donated food supplies to Kenya’s Red Cross to help the homeless refugees’, ‘endowed food and materials to needy children in Kenya to
celebrate an abundant Christmas’, and sponsored the ‘Safaricom Lewa Marathon in Kenya...to raise awareness for education of children in remote areas and for protection of wild animals’. (Huawei Technologies Company Ltd, 2008, pp. 22–23). In its 2009 CSR report, the company repeated the same words as the 2008 report.

However, since 2010 Huawei’s approach to CSR in Kenya has changed. Currently, the company’s main social initiative in Kenya is its Telecom Seeds for the Future programme (hereafter TSF). According to Huawei, the objective of the programme is to ‘bridge the gap between what is learned in IT education and what is necessary in the industry’. An informant\(^8\) explained the rationale for Huawei Kenya’s CSR practices:

I have seen them [Huawei Kenya] change. [In the past] Huawei was maybe giving cash to society and the like. Children’s home here, planting trees there. Then they realise at the end of the day when they go to recruit, they are competing for a small portion of unprofessional or rather not well-trained graduates. So they decided...to work on the talents pipeline. So go to the universities and create talent programmes...Partner with universities, let your students work with modern equipment and training. (Founder, CSR for Development)

One Huawei informant called the TSF in Kenya the company’s ‘flagship’ CSR programme that ‘we are most proud of’. In its external communication, Huawei claims that the TSF, piloted in Kenya in 2011, provided a template that has been implemented in 20 countries (Huawei Technologies Company Ltd, 2013). The scope of the CSR programme

---

\(^8\) The names of all informants have been disguised to protect their identity.
(Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006) in Kenya includes provision of internships, donation of equipment, review university curricula and hosting career develop talks. I describe each element below.

**Host visits to learning centre.** In 2008, Huawei Kenya built a learning centre in Nairobi to train company staff and customers in the use of its equipment. The learning centre appears to have been set up as part of a product market strategy of being responsive to local customer needs (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). In fact, such a strategy is employed by Huawei’s competitors such as Cisco Systems (Luo, 2007).

Under the TSF programme, Huawei hosts one-day visits from students of three universities (Delta, Epsilon and Zeta universities). During those visits Huawei staff introduce students to telecommunication equipment. A Huawei manager enthused that the visits were a ‘wonderful opportunity for students to interact with networks and state-of-the-art equipment’. Yet, the only other informant that mentioned benefits from the visits was less enthusiastic: ‘You [student] may see the equipment…but is hard to learn in one day. But it [learning centre] is a good place they [Huawei] use for introducing students to how the equipment looks… telecommunication is a big field…they [students] get the knowledge, but not much’ (Huawei staff #1, former beneficiary of CSR programme).

**Internships for students.** Huawei provides annual internships to 30 students per year from the three Kenyan universities. During the internship, students follow a training schedule mentors and are assigned from the company. Assessing the internships, a Huawei manager claimed, ‘Our training has been very important for them [students] because it puts the students on the same level with other global peers…So when they graduate
these students will be ready for the market as opposed to when they just have the theory’.

One former beneficiary, a Huawei employee, was positive about her experience of the internship:

Most of my colleagues normally say that Huawei is like another school. [Laughter]. They [Huawei] are teaching us a lot….They give you everything you need to learn. So it’s up to you to decide whether you want to learn or not. (Huawei staff #2, former beneficiary of CSR programme)

**Donation of equipment.** Huawei donates telecommunication equipment in partnership with a network operator, Tech-Mobile (a pseudonym), to the three universities for use in classroom instruction. An informant at one university that had received telecommunication equipment (a radio tower), explained that ‘ these radio towers…installed on our premises to help us in training in that particular area…[the tower] has improved some of our training, especially microwave communication’ (Head of department, Epsilon University).

**Review of engineering curriculum.** Universities in Kenya are required by law to review their curricula every five years in order to align course content with industry requirements. The review process is elaborate. Informants at each of the three universities—Delta, Epsilon and Zeta—told me that as part of the review process, engineering departments are required to incorporate feedback from industry actors such as Huawei and the industry association, the Engineering Board of Kenya (EBK), into the curriculum.

Huawei claims to support the curriculum review by: (1) sponsoring three-day retreats at which Huawei experts work with university staff to
review course content; (2) delegating at least two members of staff to follow up on the review process after the retreat; and (3) paying a stipend to the academic staff during the review process.

**Career development talks at universities.** Huawei sponsors career fairs at partner universities. One informant at Delta University explained, ‘They [Huawei] have been quite visible on campus in their participation in career development talks and other conferences’. Another informant said his students’ reactions to the career talks: ‘students found it [career talks] very inspiring and it showed from their response during these public lectures... Especially, some of the engineers who came to talk to the students were actually former students, graduates of the department’ (Head of department, Epsilon University).

Taken together, Huawei’s CSR programme in Kenya, the TSF, is designed to develop engineering talent by working closely with three public universities that offer undergraduate courses in engineering and information & communication technology (ICT).

**Drivers of CSR: Local Market and Institutional Pressure**

**Market driver—a dearth of skilled ICT professionals.** In developing countries like Kenya, there is a shortage of skilled ICT professionals (Cooke, 2014). The rapid growth of the Kenyan telecommunication sector meant that telecommunication companies could not meet demand for skilled labour by recruiting within Kenya. They had to recruit expatriate workers at significant cost. A human resource manager from Tech-Mobile, which partners with Huawei to provide telecommunication equipment to Kenyan universities, explained his company’s rationale for doing so.
We had a cost problem. We had a development & recruitment budget that was increasing. We had to do something about it. We were surviving with expatriates. We had to find a way to put costs under control. Instead of recruiting expat staff from South Africa and Nigeria, we want to recruit locally. Because historically we had go abroad to fetch that talent, but if you can get that locally it reduces your costs. (Manager, Tech-Mobile)

Even when new staff were recruited locally, Tech-Mobile and Huawei had to train the recruits.

In the past when our graduates came out, they joined Huawei or any other company, they would need a lot of extra training. Somebody [a new recruit] would be taken to South Africa or Italy to learn about fibre optics communication…So the companies were…investing a lot of money to kind of retrain these engineers... But I think some of them have recognised that by supporting the universities and equipping them to be able to give better training, they are going to spend less in sending the graduates elsewhere for further training. (Head of department, Epsilon University)

Interviewee reports suggest strongly that Huawei’s TSF programme in Kenya is closely-aligned with the company’s local recruitment needs. The TSF provides a filtered pool of engineering talent from which the company recruits for its operations. An informant, speaking about Huawei Kenya’s recruitment process, ‘Yes, there is always first priority [for Huawei interns] whereby they [Huawei] want people that they have already trained, who have knowledge of their products to get employed’ (Huawei staff #2). While
another Huawei informant summarised the effect of the programme thus: ‘[B]ut so far as of end of last year [2012],….we trained 209 and five of those students were employed by Huawei…They have been observed [sic] after their internships, and they were employed by Huawei. That is, five of them for Kenya’. (Huawei Manager #2).

Huawei publicises the TSF as CSR. However, an informant at Tech-Mobile, who worked closely with Huawei Kenya, was emphatic that his company participation was not CSR:

It would be CSR to Huawei, but not CSR for us [Tech-Mobile]…We don’t take it like CSR…Our outlook is not CSR. It [management of company commitment] does not sit in the CSR team…It sits in the HR [human resources] team….It is a human resource development initiative for us. (Manager, Tech-Mobile)

**Host country institutional pressures.** Huawei’s current CSR approach is not only a response to a business need, but also a response to institutional and stakeholder pressure within Kenya. The data suggests that two sources of institutional pressure were most salient to Huawei Kenya managers. First, the Kenyan government’s drive to promote industry-academic collaboration as part of an ambitious development plan launched in 2008 by President Mwai Kibaki: ‘Vision 2030’. Informants often invoked Vision 2030 to explain Huawei’s CSR initiative: ‘For us in Kenya, it [Huawei’s CSR programme] is in line with our [Kenyan government’s] Vision 2030, which uses ICT actually at the base to both promote political, social, and economic pillars’. (Huawei Manager #1).

The plan identifies business process outsourcing (BPO) as one of six economic sectors that are expected to contribute to Kenya’s economic
competitiveness by 2030 (National Economic and Social Council of Kenya (NESC), 2007, p. 81). The Kenyan government has stated that shortage of engineering and ICT talent is an obstacle to its development goal. Consequently, the plan recommends increased collaboration between industry and academia to develop needed talent (National Economic and Social Council of Kenya (NESC), 2007, pp. 78–80).

The recommendation to increase collaboration between academia–industry collaboration has been incorporated into ministerial policy (Gainer, 2015) and codified into the curriculum review process: every five years, engineering schools are required to incorporate feedback from industry stakeholders into their curricula before the curricula are approved by universities’ governing council. An informant explained the importance of industry-academia collaboration.

In fact when we go to the Senate [governing board], these are some of the things we’re always been reminded, ‘We [the professors] must network with industry to remain relevant otherwise we will start teaching outdated stuff’… So they [Senate] have been very supportive. In fact this is one of the things in our [university’s] strategic plan; to partner with industry…In fact sometimes it is even the Vice Chancellor who…initiates some of these collaborations. (Head of department, Delta University)

I inadvertently confirmed the importance of industry-academia collaboration to university administrators during my visit to Delta university. As I walked to the carpark with my host, we met the Vice Chancellor of the university. After introductions, I told him about my research. He responded
pointedly, asking me to state in my dissertation that ‘we [Delta University] are looking for ways to collaborate with even more companies’.

Second, Huawei Kenya is required by law to ‘Kenyanise’ its workforce. Foreign-owned firms operating in Kenya are legally required to sign an agreement with the Kenyan government pledging to train Kenyans to phase out expatriates in their workforce (Business Daily, 2012; US State Department, 2012). In 2012, Kenya’s immigration law may have been strengthened to stem an influx of low-wage immigrants from China (Olopade, 2012).

Huawei’s CSR programme, which emphasises training Kenyan students, complies with the employment legislation as an informant explained when I asked about Huawei’s motives for its CSR initiative.

That is where legislation comes in. When you have expatriates, they have to develop local talent [by law]…You [companies] are required to develop local talent. You have to demonstrate to the government that you are more and more relying more on local talent than expatriates. (Manager, Tech-Mobile).

Another informant corroborated the importance of the Kenyanisation law:

You know, there is a law in Kenya, when they [MNEs] give you work you should be able to train other people. So the people in the universities and colleges should be given internships...So one of the reasons [for TSF] is because of that law. (Huawei staff #2).

Aside from pressures to comply with local law, Huawei Kenya’s CSR programme is motivated by demands of influential government stakeholders in Kenya. Huawei Kenya managers maintain relationships with senior
government stakeholders in Kenya’s ICT and education ministries. One informant, a senior official who had been instrumental in setting up the partnership between Huawei and the three universities, spoke admiringly of the company as an exemplar of China’s industrial emergence. During our interview, he said that MNEs in Kenya ought to be developing local Kenyan talent instead of simply setting up sales offices in the country to sell their products. In other words, the CSR initiative is a form of acquiescence (C. Oliver, 1991) to the demands of an influential institutional constituent: the Kenyan government.

Giving his impression of Huawei’s reputation among government officials, one informant stated:

Huawei is well-regarded with government officials. At some of the academic activities conducted by Huawei, there are key government officials invited...When people in government talk about industry and academia collaboration, one of the companies that are mentioned as examples is Huawei. I have heard this from at least two people [senior government officials]. (Head of department, Epsilon University)

In summary, Huawei’s CSR initiative in Kenya, Telecom Seeds for the Future, is driven by market and institutional pressures: the company’s drive to reduce its recruitment cost; and the need to comply with local labour law and to acquiesce to the demands of influential institutional actors.

**Discursive Justification of CSR practices**

I identified a total of 382 passages in the 62 documents in which at least one common world was invoked to justify Huawei’s CSR programme: 94% of documents (59 documents) invoked the industrial world; 56% the market
world; 50% the civic world and 31% the world of fame. (A single document may contain multiple orders of worth justifying the CSR practices.) The domestic and inspired world were not invoked in any document. In Table 3-5, I show the prevalence of the common worlds across all documents targeted at Kenyan and international audiences.
Table 3-5. Results of content analysis of public statements showing percentage of passages coded to common worlds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common world</th>
<th>Target audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kenyan (Total 94 passages; 13 documents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial world</td>
<td>48 (51.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market world</td>
<td>19 (20.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic world</td>
<td>19 (20.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World of fame</td>
<td>8 (8.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic world</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspired world</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Industrial world. This order of worth was most consistently invoked in both documents targeted at Kenyan and international audiences: 51.1% of passages targeted to Kenyan audiences and 54.9% of justificatory passages in documents targeted to international audiences. The prevalence of this common world is not surprising since it is the reason that was adduced in interviewees as a primary justification for the CSR programme in Kenya. In the documents, Huawei spokespersons justified the CSR programme most often by claiming that the programme would improve the professional skills of participants and advance development of Kenya’s ICT industry.

There is a significant gap between Kenyan universities’ curriculum offered to engineers, and the actual status of the ICT Industry. This can impede the development of the ICT industry. Thus, we launched the ‘Telecom Seeds for the Future’ project in Kenya…(Huawei statement on CSR Africa, 22\textsuperscript{nd} March 2013)

As theorised by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), the industrial world involves certification of professionalism.

The ‘Seeds for the Future’ programme is aimed at up skilling top engineering students drawn from various local [Kenyan] universities with the requisite ICT skills and providing them with the opportunity to learn and apply the latest technologies…Following completion of the program, students were awarded certificates in addition to professional mentorship acquired in China. (CIO East Africa, 31st December 2014)

Market world. This was the second-most invoked order of worth—20.2% and 18.4% of coded passages in documents targeted at Kenyan and
international audiences respectively. In the market world, worth is evaluated based on the economic value of a good or service in a competitive market. The data suggests that actors, such as Kenyan government officials, Huawei spokespersons and journalists, claimed that Huawei’s CSR programme would enable students to compete more favourably in the job market and/or for the country Kenya to compete economically in the ICT industry. For instance, quoting a senior Kenyan government official, Huawei reported, ‘The facets of technology keep changing every day, and for students to remain competitive in the job market or in their own entrepreneurial endeavors, they require modern training. Thanks to Huawei for making this possible’. (2011 Huawei Sustainability Report, p. 81).

Huawei spokespersons also appealed to the supposed economic value of its CSR initiatives to justify the practice. Explaining the company’s CSR programme, a Huawei east and south Africa Region president, Li Dafeng said, ‘Through such initiatives, we can continue tapping and promoting local talents especially in the universities to increase localised content and spur [economic] growth’. (Nairobi Star, 09.12.2012)

**Civic world.** This was the third-most invoked order of worth—20.2% and 16.0% of coded passages in documents targeted at Kenyan and international audiences respectively. In this world, worth is evaluated based on goals such as equal access, solidarity, and civil rights (Thévenot et al., 2000, p. 246). Huawei actors consistently justified the CSR programme by claiming that the programme addressed the ‘digital divide’, a concept which has been defined since the late 1990s to denote ‘the gap between those who have and do not have access to computers and the Internet’ (Van Dijk, 2006, p. 221).
Huawei’s claims about the efficacy of its CSR programme in addressing the digital divide are ambiguous. In some statements, Huawei actors imply that the digital divide exists between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ of technology within a country. For instance, the company claimed that it ‘launched the “Telecom Seeds for the Future” program in an effort to bridge the digital divide in emerging markets’. (2010 CSR Report, page 19). Yet, in other statements, the digital divide denoted a mismatch between institutions in a given country. In a 2013 article in *Kenya London News*, a Huawei spokesperson claimed that its CSR programme in Kenya ‘bridges digital divide between the academia and industry and promotes local talent’.

Despite the ambiguity in its use of the concept, Huawei’s claim to address a social divide between technology haves and have-nots is an invocation of the civic order of worth as the company purports to promote equality of access to technology within and across countries. Huawei Kenya CEO justified the CSR programme thus:

We believe in empowering the youth and creating an opportunity for them to grow as individuals and contribute to the development of this country...He added that in 2011, Huawei started the Telecom Seeds for the Future initiative, which bridges digital divide between the academia and industry and promotes local talent’. (Xinhua Economic News Service, 7th July 2013).

*The world of fame*. This was the fourth-most invoked order of worth—8.5% and 10.8% of coded passages in documents targeted at Kenyan and international audiences respectively. In this world, worth is evaluated by public renown (Thévenot et al., 2000, p. 253) or approbation from influential arbiters of public opinion. The data suggests that Huawei spokespersons

Page 144
invoked the world of fame the least of the four orders of worth. Huawei, for instance, claimed that its CSR programme has been recognised by a United Nations body: ‘Telecom Seeds for the Future was endorsed by the UN-backed Principles for Social Investment (UNPSI) as a best practice of social investment’ (Huawei Investment & Holding Co., Ltd., 2014, p. 9). While in other publications, the company’s CSR programme was awarded honours by private sector organisations:

Huawei…was honored with four awards at the World CSR Day conference. The company received one [award] for ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in Education’... It is an honor to receive these awards that recognize Huawei’s CSR efforts, Edward Chen, Chairman of the CSR Committee, Huawei said. (‘Huawei wins four awards at the World CSR Day conference’ Web newswire, 12th March 2012)

In Table 3-6, I summarise the evidence for the common worlds in the documents analysed.
Table 3-6. Evidence for presence of common worlds in analysis and illustrative data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common world</th>
<th>Illustrative data</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic world</td>
<td>‘As part of Huawei’s commitment to responsible corporate citizenship, it works to bridge the digital divide and improve the livelihood of the communities in which it operates. In Kenya, Huawei launched “Telecom Seeds for the Future” a project that aims to improve the ICT education system in the country through partnerships with local universities, the government, and telecom operators’.</td>
<td><em>China Business News</em>, 12 August 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘In 2012, all around the world, we enriched people’s life by bridging the digital divide, by promoting environmental sustainability, by creating opportunities through education and by contributing to the society where we operate’.</td>
<td>Report on CSR programme in internal magazine, <em>Huawei People</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common world</td>
<td>Illustrative data</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial world</td>
<td>‘The agreement [between the Kenyan government and Huawei] has also incorporated a program under Huawei’s CSR initiative, “Telecom Seeds for the future”, which focuses on nurturing and empowering students to be technology leaders of tomorrow...Cabinet Secretary Ministry of ICT, Dr.Fred Matiangi said, “Research has shown that we [Kenya] have a scarcity of high-end ICT skills with many ICT companies hiring expatriates to bridge the gap. This shows that in addition to strengthening courses at the university level, companies should offer practical on-the-job training which will up-the skills of our graduates...Huawei CEO, Dean Yu said that Huawei was honoured to have entered an agreement with the government to bring value to Kenya through ICT’.</td>
<td>Article titled, ‘ICT Authority, Huawei Partner to Equip Students With IT Skills’. <em>CIO East Africa, 5 June 2014</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common world</td>
<td>Illustrative data</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘To improve ICT education, helping bridge the gap between what is learned in IT education and what is necessary in the industry, and develop a pool of local ICT talents’.</td>
<td>Huawei presentation on aims of CSR programme (19 February 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market world</td>
<td>‘The main challenge [of Huawei’s CSR programme] is to provide up to date ICT trainings to students, as there is a gap between what is learned in class and what is happening in the industry. Students moreover require up to date training to remain <em>desirable</em> in the job market: we make that possible through this program’.</td>
<td><em>CSR Europe</em>, 22 March 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Kenya is already a leader in ICT on the continent and we want to ensure that we maintain this <em>leadership</em> and also grow the momentum internationally…for Kenya to <em>compete</em> globally in technology there is a continued need to nurture local ICT talent,’</td>
<td>CEO, Kenyan ICT Authority quoted in <em>CIO</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common world</td>
<td>Illustrative data</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enhance knowledge transfer while promoting a greater understanding of and interest in the telecommunications sector’.</td>
<td><em>East Africa</em> (9 December 2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World of fame  ‘Huawei…was today awarded the 2012 Communitas Award by the Association of Marketing and Communication Professionals (AMCP) for its dedication to community service and corporate social responsibility...In Kenya, Huawei launched “Telecom Seeds for the Future”, a project that aims to improve the ICT education system in the country through partnerships with local universities, the government, and telecom operators’.</td>
<td>Article titled, ‘Huawei Wins 2012 Communitas Award for Excellence in Community Service’, (<em>ENP Newswire</em>, 7 August 2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common world</td>
<td>Illustrative data</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huawei has signed MoUs [memoranda of understanding] with local governments or universities...Huawei’s efforts have been widely recognized by governments in various countries such as the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Nigeria, and Russia.</td>
<td>2014 annual sustainability report, p. 84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
International Institutional Pressure

The ICT hardware industry (of which Huawei is a part) has faced pressure for social responsibility. This pressure has centred on practices within the industry supply chain including the sourcing of minerals, working conditions in the factories where electronic products are assembled, and the environmental impact of ICT hardware at the end of their useful lives (Dwyer, Lamond, & Lee, 2009; Runhaar & Lafferty, 2009; Yu, Welford, & Hills, 2006).

NGOs such as Global Witness (US) and MakeITFair, a coalition of European civil society groups including SOMO (Netherlands) and the Church of Sweden have accused the industry of using ‘conflict minerals’ (OECD, 2013)—minerals mined in the context of civil conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—and ignoring the human suffering in the DRC (Pöyhönen & Simola, 2007; United Nations, 2001). They and their legislative allies have since lobbied for US and EU [European Union] legislation against the use of conflict minerals in electronic products (Global Witness, 2015; SOMO, 2011).

NGOs have also campaigned against branded hardware firms like Apple and Samsung to improve working conditions in the east Asian factories where consumer electronic goods are assembled (Monbiot, 2013; Overeem, 2009; Schipper & de Haan, 2005), especially since a spate of worker suicides at the factory of Chinese mobile phone manufacturer Foxconn were attributed to poor working conditions (Chan, 2013).

The electronics industry has responded in various ways. Most notably, electronics industry firms and their suppliers in the mining industry have developed reporting templates with which member firms demonstrate due
diligence in their sourcing practices (Azapagic, 2004; Conflict Free Sourcing Initiative (CFSI), 2015; Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), 2015).

In addition to pressure directed against the ICT hardware industry as whole, Huawei in particularly has been subject to negative scrutiny from an influential actor: the US government. As Huawei expanded into the US telecommunications market in 2008–2010, the US Congress’ Select Committee on Intelligence launched an investigation into Huawei and ZTE (a state-owned Chinese telecommunication MNE) activities. The committee’s report was unequivocal:

The United States should view with suspicion the continued penetration of the U.S. telecommunications market by Chinese telecommunications companies…Huawei and ZTE cannot be trusted to be free of foreign state influence and thus pose a security threat to the United States and to our systems. (Rogers & Ruppersberger, 2012, pp. vi–vii).

The company’s CSR/sustainability reports, which are prepared by staff at headquarters in Shenzhen China and in which its TSF programme is discursively justified, does not respond to demands by NGOs and the US government for industry action conflict minerals, data security and improvement of factory working conditions. (The company’s sustainability reports hardly mentions these issues.) At the time of writing this paper, Huawei has published seven annual CSR or sustainability reports (for the years 2008–2014). According to these reports, manufacturing staff worked at one facility in China and never exceeded 8% of the workforce (in 2011). There are two mentions of the company’s overtime policy in the factory
(2011–2012), but no details on actual overtime. Reports prior to 2011 make no mention of conflict minerals. In reports after 2011, conflict minerals are mentioned in ¼–½ page statements of the company’s conflict minerals policy. For instance, in the 2014 annual sustainability report, it is stated that:

The problem of conflict minerals has drawn the attention of the electronics industry and others….Huawei takes the problem of conflict minerals very seriously, and has taken action to reduce the risk of using these minerals on an ongoing basis. Since 2002, Huawei, in tandem with our customers, has investigated the use of conflict minerals in the supply chain…pledging to never knowingly procure or support the use of conflict minerals (Huawei Investment & Holding Co., Ltd., 2015b, p. 80)

To summarise the findings, Huawei’s CSR initiative in Kenya, Telecom Seeds for the Future, is driven by local market and institutional pressures: the company’s need to reduce its recruitment cost in Kenya; to comply with Kenyan labour law; and to acquiesce to the demands of influential institutional constituents in Kenya. However, in external communication to Kenyan and non-Kenyan audiences, Huawei actors justify these practices as CSR—drawing principally on the industrial and market world of justification (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006)—while ignoring international institutional demands for social action in other domains such as conflict minerals and factory conditions.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

I began this study by asking how in the paradox approach to CSR-legitimacy management within MNEs, discursive justification relates to strategic response across MNE subunits. I examined CSR practices as a strategic response to institutional pressure (acquiescence) by Huawei Kenya and discursive justification by two subunits—Huawei Kenya and Huawei HQ. I argue that external justification by the latter subunit instaniates a manipulation strategy (C. Oliver, 1991). My findings show that the justification schemes—the rank ordering of common words—are virtually identical whether the audiences are located in Kenya or not and whether the subunit is acquiescing or manipulating. (Refer to Table 3-5.)

The industrial world (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006), characterised by notions of technical efficiency and certified professionalism, and the market world, characterised by competition and economic value, are the principal conceptions of the common good that are employed to justify CSR practices, regardless of the nature of the response (acquiescence or manipulation) by the MNE unit. (Refer to Table 3-5.) How do I explain these findings given the heterogeneity in institutional demands that the company faces and difference in strategic responses?

CSR as Synchronous Acquiescence and Manipulation Responses

*High locally salient pressure, low cost of organisational change.* Strategic or economic approaches to corporate social action suggest that a firm invests to meet institutional demands for CSR if the perceived benefits of legitimacy exceed the costs of doing so (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Orlitzky, Siegel, & Waldman, 2011; Sprinkle & Maines, 2010). If the cost of
meeting the demands of institutional constituents is low and pressure is applied from a few clearly-identifiable constituents, then the firm is likely to acquiesce to institutional demands (Scherer et al., 2013).

Huawei’s acquiescence to Kenyan institutional demands supports this argument. In the case, Huawei Kenya, which had had philanthropic CSR policies in Kenya acquiesced to the demands of influential institutional constituents—principally the Kenyan government—to ‘contribute to the development of local Kenyan ICT talent’. Huawei Kenya did so at low cost. The company had already built a learning centre as part of its product market strategy. It did not need to recruit CSR specialists or implement structural solutions like a new CSR functional department to meet the institutional demand. Instead, Huawei Kenya employed existing staff at the learning center and in management functions (as communication specialists) to implement its CSR initiative, which it retrospectively labelled as ‘Telecom Seeds for the Future’.

**Fragmented international institutional pressure, high cost of organisational change.** Institutional approaches to corporate strategies of legitimation suggest that organisational strategy is determined by the consistency of societal expectations that the firm has to meet (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Scherer et al., 2013). If institutional constituents are fragmented, i.e., high number of uncoordinated actors to whom the corporation needs to respond with no centrally-recognised actor (Pache & Santos, 2010), then pressure is likely to be weak and organisations ignore or challenge institutional demands.

Though the electronics industry faces demands from influential actors like the United States government and the EU, and to a lesser extent, from
civic society groups, these demands are not cumulative. Hence, they may be weak. For instance, the United States has passed anti-conflict mineral legislation whereas the EU has not, despite repeated calls from NGOs and European Members of Parliament (SOMO, 2011). Various NGOs have pressured the electronics industry to improve labour conditions in east Asian factories, but there is no binding legislation in the US or the EU. There are voluntary guidelines such as the *OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises* and the *EICC code of conduct*, but these self-regulatory schemes may lack credibility because enforcement is not independently monitored and there are no sanctions for malfesance (Christmann & Taylor, 2002; King & Lenox, 2000).

Huawei may be subject to even weaker international institutional pressure for several additional reasons. First, Huawei is a private company with headquarters in China. It is not listed on any US securities exchange. Hence, the company is not subject to US anti-conflict mineral legislation, which applies only to US-listed firms.

Second, civic society groups have directed their attention principally towards firms with strong retail brands (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson, & Sasser, 2001). Historically, Huawei’s customers were predominantly large enterprises. In 2014, for instance, these customers made up 74% of its 2014 revenue (sale of branded smartphones comprised 26% of revenue). Thus, Huawei may have escaped most of the NGO pressure that familiar ICT hardware brands like Apple and Nokia have been subjected to (e.g., Monbiot, 2013; Oberndorff, Vanheste, & Korai, 2010; Poulsen, 2010).

Third, the company may be operating in an industry segment that is considered benign by consumers and policy makers. Fombrun and Gardberg
(2006, p. 339) argue that MNEs in ‘visible’ industries face greater pressure to enact CSR programmes than those that operate in less visible industries. They argue that visibility stems from two features of an industry: the amount of economic, environmental or operational risk the industry impose on society; and the extent to which the industry generates benefits such as employment and taxes for the local economy.

The ICT industry comprises service companies such as MNOs and equipment providers operating in complex global supply chains (OECD, 2007). Unlike extractive or manufacturing industries, the service sectors in the ICT industry do not entail obvious high levels of operational or environmental risk to society. (Huawei is an equipment as well as a service company.) On the contrary, the penetration of mobile telephony and broadband services in Africa has been widely celebrated as bringing increased economic efficiency and fostering new industries such as mobile banking on the continent (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Bloomberg Business Week, 2007; Etzo & Collender, 2010; Röller & Waverman, 2001).

The telecommunications industry in Africa may be perceived to deliver more widespread developmental benefits than the extractive industries, which have traditionally dominated MNE activity in the region (UNCTAD, 2012, p. 37, 41). Hence, MNEs like Huawei, have not attracted the high levels of sustained direct international pressure for corporate social action that extractive MNEs like Shell have been subjected to in Africa (Amaeshi & Amao, 2009; Wheeler et al., 2002).

Fourth, the ambiguous meaning of CSR may enable manipulation by organisational actors. Customers, media, civil society groups, governments and academics, who are the principal targets of MNEs’ CSR communications
(Pomering & Dolnicar, 2009; Sweeney & Coughlan, 2008), do not have agreed-upon definitions of CSR (Garriga & Melé, 2004; Matten & Moon, 2008). While acts of corporate social irresponsibility by extractive industry MNEs are well understood and challenged by activists (Frynas, 1998; Wheeler et al., 2002), corporate social responsibility by a service industry MNE in a supposedly benign industry may be less clear.

Huawei actors may be exploiting this conceptual ambiguity. An organisational practice that appears to benefit constituents external to the MNE—regardless of the intention of the practice—can be ‘spun’ as CSR. In the case, Huawei Kenya’s partner in its CSR programmes did not consider the provision of equipment and training as social action; whereas Huawei’s managers clearly did—and justified their practices externally in those terms.

**Implications and Future Research**

This study contributes to scholarship on the corporate social actions of MNEs, a phenomenon that remains understudied (Doh & Lucea, 2013; Husted & Allen, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2006; Yang & Rivers, 2009), in the following ways. First, empirical studies of CSR in MNEs have emphasised CSR programmes as single strategies of acquiescence, compromise or avoidance in response to institutional demands (C. Oliver, 1991). The study provides an empirical illustration of the paradox approach to legitimacy management by MNE subunits in the face of multiple demands for corporate social action; this approach has been theorised, but not examined empirically (Scherer et al., 2013).

A single set of organisational CSR practices may be enacted by one MNE subunit to acquiesce to local institutional demands and simultaneously discursively justified by another subunit to influence perceptions of a
different set of institutional constituents. Employing multiple response strategies across the MNE may not lead to inherent conflict as supposed by Scherer et al. (2013) if the cost of acquiescence in one domain is low and the institutional pressure in another weak.

Second, scholars of CSR communication are often sceptical that MNEs’ CSR practices actually match the rhetoric contained in CSR communication (L. T. Christensen, Morsing, & Thyssen, 2013). Thus, CSR communication in MNEs has been reported as corporate spin (Jahdi & Acikdilli, 2009), ‘without any real substance’ (Kolk, 2003, p. 290), and as expressions of ‘ideological movements that are intended to legitimize and consolidate the power of large corporations’. (Banerjee, 2008, p. 52).

The findings from the study complement previous empirical studies, which show that the higher the external pressure for social action from entrenched, influential and pervasive elements of the institutional environment such as government, media, and standard-setting bodies, the more likely that a corporation will adopt decoupled CSR practices rather than integrated practices (Weaver et al., 1999), i.e., that externally-directed CSR rhetoric does not match actual practice. The study suggests that an MNE’s justificatory statements for CSR practices may be coherent (and match practice), regardless of the audience. I conjecture that the perceived benign social impact of the MNE’s industry, weak international institutional pressure, and the fit between CSR practices and product market strategy in the host country may provide MNE actors berth to make coherent external discursive justifications.

This study raises several questions for future inquiry. My account of Huawei’s justification of its TSF programme suggests that operating in an
industry that is perceived to be benign (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006) might enable an MNE to maintain a coherent justification scheme without resorting to the structural solutions, such as disguising socially-irresponsible practices from relevant external constituencies (Surroca et al., 2013), that MNEs in less benign industries have adopted in response to institutional pressure. How does nature of the industry influence the match between CSR practices and public discursive justification?

Second, the growing literature on home country institutions and MNE CSR practices (Amaeshi & Amao, 2009; J. L. Campbell, 2007; Fransen, 2013; Van Tulder & Kolk, 2001) suggests that CSR practices in foreign subsidiaries reflects the attributes of MNEs’ home country institutional/national business system. Using ideographic research designs, such as ethnography or longitudinal case studies, scholars could empirically examine recent claims that there is ‘Chinese-style concept of CSR’ (Wang & Juslin, 2009, p. 440) that carries with Chinese MNEs as they internationalise. They could also examine whether Chinese MNEs’ public invocations of the common good used to justify their CSR practices reflect the home country national business system.

LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Despite the contributions, I see three limitations in this study. First, there is potential for bias in the data collection process. I relied on informant interviews in Kenya to reconstruct the history of Huawei’s CSR practices in the country. I was careful to minimise bias, especially in the accounts of Huawei’s managers, by seeking corroborating accounts from non-Huawei informants and triangulating interview reports using documentary evidence. However, I had only one informant from Huawei’s most influential
stakeholder in Kenya: the Kenyan government. Furthermore, I sampled only newspaper articles, press releases and Huawei corporate communication documents written in English. I ignored other forms of news such as video documentaries and non-English sources. Thus, I still feel residual concern that bias was not completely eliminated in the study.

Second, I coded and analysed only texts in the corporation’s CSR/sustainability reports. I did not analyse photographs and other graphical material. Omitting these materials, which may be effective non-textual means of communication, from the analysis might lead to an inaccurate characterisation of the justification scheme I presented (Preston, Wright, & Young, 1996; Unerman, 2000).

Third, I assumed that Huawei’s public discursive justification amounted to manipulation (Oliver, 1991) of the perceptions of external constituences. This assumption was based on existing literature on CSR communication and in the facts of the case—the CSR function within the organisation is run by communication/PR specialists. In order to validate this assumption, I sent a complete draft of this article to Huawei informants at the company headquarters and in Kenya. I asked them specifically to comment on the assumption that I had made about the role of the CSR function in influencing external perceptions of the company. However, I did not receive any feedback from my Huawei informants. Hence, I could not validate the assumption.

MNEs are being called upon to address economic, social and environmental problems around the world (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). MNEs and their subunits need to be agile and responsive to these demands because doing so may be fundamental to maintaining legitimacy (Scherer et al.,
Whether MNE subunits respond to institutional pressure by substantively altering their organisational practices and/or employing discursive influencing strategies has been a subject of debate, with scholars maintain a sharp distinction between communication or ‘talk’ and CSR ‘action’ (L. T. Christensen et al., 2013). The paradox approach suggests that MNEs can infact do both. It is time to examine both substantive practice and discursive acts in order to understand the multiple responses that MNE and their subunits employ in response to complex institutional demands.
CHAPTER 4: INTEGRATING SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND THICK DESCRIPTION IN ETHNOGRAPHY OF MODERN ORGANISATIONS: REFLECTIONS OF A DOCTORAL RESEARCHER°

ABSTRACT

Conventional ethnographic data collection techniques, such as participant observation and interviewing, were developed for the study of territorially-specific human interactions. Applying these techniques in ethnography of modern organisations may limit the authenticity of ethnographic accounts of modern organisational life because: (1) the singular physical locale (office, for instance) is becoming less central to organisational life; and (2) research subjects within modern organisations interact using computer-mediated means, which are not amenable to researchers’ ocular observation. I argue that in the ethnography of small, rapidly-changing organisational research sites, traditional thick description of the texture of organisational life, based on interviews and participant observation, may be fruitfully complemented with social network analysis (SNA) of unobtrusive digital interactional data that is self-produced by organisations to produce more authentic accounts of organisational life. I illustrate my argument by drawing on my 15-month long study of a rapidly-growing entrepreneurial venture. By combining analyses of multiple forms of interactions, ethnographers of modern organisations can expand the notion of the ethnographic field, which has historically being

° A version of this paper is currently under review (R&R2) at Organizational Research Methods.
conceived as a bounded, physical space in which social interactions occur, to include digital spaces characterised by a rich vein of informant interactions that are constitutive of the social worlds within such organisations that ethnographers seek to study.

**Keywords:** Computer-mediated communication (CMC); ethnography, social enterprise, participant observation, social network analysis.
Qualitative methodology books provide guidelines on the elements of fieldwork including gaining access to the field (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 41–62), interviewing (Ellis, 2005), participant observation (Adler & Adler, 1994; Jorgensen, 1989), and note taking (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2001). These guidelines rest on the assumption that the habits, rituals and patterns of interactions of human research subjects constitute a social world—the ethnographic field—circumscribed within a physical locale that is in principle accessible to the researcher (Bate, 1997; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 4, 52).

The assumption that the ethnographic field is physically bounded has enduring valence among ethnographers; the mainstays of data collection in the ethnographic method—interviews, participant observation—emerged from the study of territorially-specific human interactions (Deegan, 2001; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 1–2; Platt, 1983). Nevertheless, the assumption that the social world of ethnographic study coincides with a single physically circumscribed site is limiting for the study of modern organisations for at least two reasons. First, in modern organisations, research subjects, such as employees, managers, and executives, are not necessarily located in a single clearly-demarcated work space characterised by face-to-face member interaction. Market globalisation and advances in information and communication technology (ICT) have reconfigured the boundaries, hierarchies, and governance mechanisms within modern organisations (Kallinikos, 2007; Smets, Burke, Jarzabkowski, & Spee, 2014). Furthermore, modern organisational life has become fast-paced, complex and fragmented (Barley & Kunda, 2006; Brown-Saracino, Thurk, & Fine, 2008; Van Maanen, 2001). Thus, organisations no longer exist as
clearly-bounded entities or in territorial isolation. Unsurprisingly, given these changes, some organisational ethnographers questioned the primacy of the conventional ‘single-site, single scribe’ model of ethnography (Slutskaya, Game, & Simpson, 2016, p. 7).

Second, even if the organisational members being studied are located in a single physical space, they interact increasingly via computer-mediated means, such as e-mails and online chats (Beaulieu, 2010; Hallett & Barber, 2013; Howard, 2002; Maznevski & Chudoba, 2000), which are not amenable to researchers’ direct observation. Thus, in many modern organisations, it is likely that a researcher’s reliance on ocular observation of face-to-face interactions among research subjects will produce a limited understanding of even the mundane patterns of organisational life, the subject of study within organisational ethnography (Bate, 1997; Van Maanen, 2001).

Regardless of the increasingly complex nature of the field site, however, organisational ethnographers still need to satisfy the ethnographic criterion of “being there” in order to produce authentic accounts of organisational life (Bate, 1997; Golden-Biddle & Locke, 1993). The nature of modern organisations provide an opportunity to achieve this and to compensate for the limits of traditional interviewing and participant observation data collection techniques. Modern organisations are ‘self-documenting’ entities (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 121). They produce voluminous amounts of documents, such as press releases, diaries, memos and letters; they also continuously log in real-time the digitally-mediated interactions of their members using sophisticated information technology (IT) infrastructure. Yet, despite these changes in the nature of organisations, ethnographers of modern organisations have been slow to
exploit self-documenting practices in their accounts of organisational life. Instead, they have preferred traditional interviews and close observation of members’ face-to-face interactions (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004; Garcia, Standlee, Bechkoff, & Cui, 2009; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 121–138; Murthy, 2008). My research question then is: How might ethnographers exploit the self-documenting aspects of within the context of a small rapidly-changing modern organisational site to produce more compelling accounts of organisational life?

I argue that in small, rapidly-changing organisational research sites, traditional thick description (Geertz, 1973) of the texture of organisational life, based on data conventionally collected or interpreted via interviews and participant observation, may be fruitfully complemented with social network analysis (SNA) of unobtrusive digital interactional data that is self-produced by organisations (electronic mail) to produce a richer understanding of organisational life. I illustrate my argument by drawing on my 15-month long study of a rapidly-growing venture, Fairphone. I expand on the results at the outset.

Throughout 2014, the leaders of Fairphone strove to implement a formal organisational structure specifying explicit functional roles and reporting relationships (Scott, 2003, p. 20) for the company staff. My thick description of the implementation process—based on interviewing and close participant observation of physical informant interaction—suggested that as the formal organisation structure was being implemented, discontinuities emerged across the organisation while SNA of self-documentated digital interactions showed a stratification of staff into a ‘core’ and a ‘periphery’ in the social networks. These analyses complement one another: Taken
together, they suggested that differences in the nature of interactions among core and peripheral members was due to differences in the task environment (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) faced by each group. If I had relied on only thick description of physical informant interaction, I would have reported on fragmentation in the organisation but would have missed differences in nature of intra-team interactions in the enterprise. If I had performed only a social network analysis of digital informant interaction, I would have observed distinct patterns of interaction (core versus periphery) across the teams, but would have missed the meanings that informants’ imputed to their evolving roles, the implementation process and how they purposefully acted to form ties and change their relational positions within the company’s social network.

Combining traditional thick description of small modern organisational field sites with analysis of the organisation’s self-documented digital interactional data contributes to the ethnographic analytical repertoire in at least three ways. First, doing so enhances the readability and validity of organisational ethnography studies (J. C. Johnson, 1994) because it enables access to a vein of data rich in interactions that are constitutive of the social worlds within such organisations, but which have been largely ignored by organisational ethnographers (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004, pp. 56–57; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 121–128). Researchers thus can compensate for their cognitive limitations as well as the weaknesses of participant observation and interviewing, especially in rapidly-changing organisational field sites. Second, by analysing multiple forms of member interaction (face-to-face participant observation, interviewing and digital), organisational ethnographers in such field sites acknowledge an expanded
notion of the ethnographic field as one in which the traditional physical locale as well as virtual spaces intersect.

The paper begins with a broad overview of research on social networks and ethnography in the organisational literature. Next, I present the illustrative case and the discussion. Finally, I conclude with the limitations of including digital data, such as e-mails, in ethnographic studies.

FIELD MEMBER INTERACTION IN ORGANISATIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY

Ethnography does not have a standard definition (Bate, 1997; Bryman, 2001; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 2–3). In terms of data collection, however, ethnography is distinct from other forms of qualitative research. It involves ‘the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, and/or asking questions through informal and formal interviews, collecting documents and artifacts – in fact, gathering whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of inquiry’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 3).

Organisational ethnographers have produced fascinating accounts of organisational life using rich, textured descriptions of the interactions, beliefs, habits and practices of organisational members, as well as the analysis of the macrostructure of interactions or the social networks within which those interactions occur. In this section, I review the use of social network analysis (SNA) first in organisational ethnography and then in the broader organisation literature.
Organisational Ethnography and Social Networks Analysis

Social network analysis, a method that focuses on the ties or relations among people rather than on their attributes (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Wasserman & Faust, 1994, pp. 20–21), has a rich history in organisational research. Organisational ethnographers, particularly producers of realist ethnographic accounts (Van Maanen, 2011a, pp. 45–72), have combined rich description of work settings with social network analysis to present compelling accounts of organisational life. For instance, the famous Hawthorne studies conducted between 1927 and 1932 at Western Electric’s Hawthorne bank wiring observation room—and which discovered the existence of informal organisation mechanisms (Scott, 2003, p. 62)—included analysis of informal networks among employees. Using a sociogram (a graphical representation of actors and ties among them), Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939/2003, pp. 361–363) showed that the employees formed two spatially-separated groups that played different types of gambling games. The researchers suggested that the groups used games to express and cement interpersonal relations and that group membership was related to economic productivity of the workers.

Kapferer’s (1972) study of an Indian-owned garment factory in newly-independent Zambia is another exemplar of rich ethnographic description and social network analysis (as cited in Kilduff & Tsai, 2003, pp. 14–17). Kapferer (1972) mapped instrumental social networks among Zambian workers in the factory at two time points to predict a worker strike. As the workers become more densely-connected, they successfully organised a strike to demand higher pay from their Indian employers.
More recently, Barley’s (1990) ethnographic study of the effects of new technology on organisational structure in two Massachusetts hospitals employed thick description—based on participant observation of and interviews with radiologists and technologists—and social network analysis of the ties among over 40 members of both organisations. He found that the effect of new technology on organisational structure was mediated by individuals’ roles and their positions in social networks.

Other researchers using qualitative case study and quantitative research designs have combined social network analysis with the mainstays of ethnographic data collection—participant observation and interviewing. My review of the organisational ethnography literature (see Bate, 1997; Hodson, 1998; Morrill & Fine, 1997; Wadham & Warren, 2014; Ybema, Yanow, Wels, & Kamsteeg, 2009) and the literature on social network analysis in organisation studies (see Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; Jack, 2010; Kilduff & Brass, 2010), suggests that in ethnographic and quantitative studies that include social network analysis, sociometric questionnaires, interviews and participant observation were the principal data collection techniques used to build social networks. Only one study, Burt and Ronchi (1990), employed archival records to construct the social network.

Burkhardt and Brass’ (1990) case study of a U.S. Federal government agency was done using questionnaires and interviews. Krackhardt’s (1995) case study of a failed union initiative within a Silicon Valley start-up combined thick description with interviews and questionnaire data from which a friendship social network was developed. Similarly, in his influential article in which he found that arms-length transactions formed a small subset of inter-firm transactions, Uzzi (1997) employed participant observation and
in-depth interviews to ascertain the nature of inter-firm relationships. Taken together, these studies show that social network analysis and thick description are complementary analytical strategies that enable researchers to infer not only the pattern of interactions among organisational members, but also the antecedents and the consequences of members’ roles in social networks on outcomes such as promotions, power, influence and job performance (Brass et al., 2004; Zwijze-Koning & De Jong, 2005).

I present selected empirical research that has combined traditional ethnographic data collection techniques with social network analysis in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1. Summary of empirical research on organisational ethnography and social network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author, Year</th>
<th>Research design</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Questionnaire (free recall, roster)</th>
<th>Interviews (in-depth, unstructured, structured)</th>
<th>Participant observation</th>
<th>Archival documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Weiss and Jacobson (1955)</td>
<td>Case study</td>
<td>U.S. government agency</td>
<td></td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author, Year</td>
<td>Research design</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Questionnaire (free recall, roster)</td>
<td>Interviews (in-depth, unstructured, structured)</td>
<td>Participant observation</td>
<td>Archival documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lincoln &amp; Miller (1979)</td>
<td>Multiple case study</td>
<td>Five research, educational and alcohol rehabilitation organisations across U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Author, Year</td>
<td>Research design</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Questionnaire (free recall, roster)</td>
<td>Interviews (in-depth, unstructured, structured)</td>
<td>Participant observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Barley (1990)</td>
<td>Ethnography (one year)</td>
<td>Two hospitals, Urban and Sub-urban, in Massachussetts, U.S.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author, Year</td>
<td>Research design</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Questionnaire (free recall, roster)</td>
<td>Interviews (in-depth, unstructured, structured)</td>
<td>Participant observation</td>
<td>Archival documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ibarra (1992)</td>
<td>Single case study</td>
<td>Large advertising firm, U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Author, Year</td>
<td>Research design</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Questionnaire (free recall, roster)</td>
<td>Interviews (in-depth, unstructured, structured)</td>
<td>Participant observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Brajkovich (1994)</td>
<td>Ethnography (undetermined duration)</td>
<td>Medical technology start-up, U.S.</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Burkhardt (1994)</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>U.S. federal government agency</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Kilduff &amp; Krackhardt (1994)</td>
<td>Single case study</td>
<td>Technology start-up firm, Silicon Valley, U.S.</td>
<td>● ●</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author, Year</td>
<td>Research design</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Questionnaire (free recall, roster)</td>
<td>Interviews (in-depth, unstructured, structured)</td>
<td>Participant observation</td>
<td>Archival documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Hansen (1995)</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>44 entrepreneurs who had founded new companies in the preceding five years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Human &amp; Provan (1997)</td>
<td>Multiple case study</td>
<td>52 firms belonging to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author, Year</td>
<td>Research design</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Questionnaire (free recall, roster)</td>
<td>Interviews (in-depth, unstructured, structured)</td>
<td>Participant observation</td>
<td>Archival documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>regional networks in U.S. secondary wood products industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Mehra, Kilduff, &amp; Brass (1998)</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>159 second-year MBA students at U.S. institution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author, Year</td>
<td>Research design</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Questionnaire (free recall, roster)</td>
<td>Interviews (in-depth, unstructured, structured)</td>
<td>Participant observation</td>
<td>Archival documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Steier &amp; Greenwood (2000)</td>
<td>Case study</td>
<td>Founders and senior managers of oil and gas service company, Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author, Year</td>
<td>Research design</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Questionnaire (free recall, roster)</td>
<td>Interviews (in-depth, unstructured, structured)</td>
<td>Participant observation</td>
<td>Archival documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Elfring &amp; Hulsink (2003)</td>
<td>Multiple case study</td>
<td>Three high-technology firms, Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Klein, Lim, Saltz, &amp;</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>1,056 members of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author, Year</td>
<td>Research design</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Questionnaire (free recall, roster)</td>
<td>Interviews (in-depth, unstructured, structured)</td>
<td>Participant observation</td>
<td>Archival documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayer (2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td>102 teams in ten-month long national service programme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author, Year</td>
<td>Research design</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Questionnaire (free recall, roster)</td>
<td>Interviews (in-depth, unstructured, structured)</td>
<td>Participant observation</td>
<td>Archival documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Currie &amp; White (2012)</td>
<td>Single case study</td>
<td>Paediatric nephrology unit of hospital (36 employees)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Scholars have recognised that there are several limitations with these widely used techniques for mapping social networks.

**Sociometric questionnaires.** The advantage of questionnaires is that: (1) they present standardised questions to research subjects; and (2) they rely on the respondents themselves to provide information on ties to other organisational members. Questionnaires, however, are not unproblematic: social networks developed using questionnaires may be biased by the education and experience of the researcher administering the questionnaire (Marsden, 2003; Van Tilburg, 1998); and for reasons of social desirability, informants may report relationships that are different from those they actually possess (Zwijze-Koning & De Jong, 2005). Some scholars have even disputed the presumed ability of informants to accurately who they talk to on a given day (Bernard, Killworth, Kronenfeld, & Sailer, 1984).

Regardless of the ability of research subjects to recall network information, the process of gathering questionnaire responses is labour-intensive even in small to medium sized organisations (Human & Provan, 1997; Krackhardt, 1995; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). The labour intensiveness of the data collection effort is multiplied if network data is collected at multiple points in time during a longitudinal research project.

**Interviews.** Unlike questionnaires, interviews are flexible formats that enable the researcher to obtain rich data about informants’ worlds (Ellis, 2005). They give the researcher access to how research subjects maintain social categories, such as their identities, and to subjects’ private feelings, which may not be on accessible through participant observation (Kleinman, Stenross, & McMahon, 1994). However, there are at least two disadvantages to using interviews to build social network. First, interviewing is not simply
a neutral exchange between interviewer and interviewee, but an active process loaded with human interests and feeling (Ellis, 2005). Thus, interviews are amenable to manipulation by politically-motivated informants who might be uncomfortable with revealing their personal support networks (Burt & Ronchi, 1990).

Second, interviewing is inherently intrusive. To conduct an interview, the researcher needs to interrupt the daily routines of research subjects. In many cases, the researcher cannot interview every organisational informant. Thus, the choice of whom to interview during an ethnographic study will influence the patterns of informant interactions that the researcher reports (Fine, 1993; Van Maanen, 1979).

**Participant observation.** This involves the researcher’s empathetic first hand sharing or observation of the subjects’ experience that is being studied (Platt, 1983). The main advantage of this technique for collecting social network data is that it builds on the skills most ethnographers are trained to execute: direct, ocular observation of the minutiae of everyday life. Due to limits in human cognitive capacities, its application to social network construction is usually limited to small groups (cf. D. R. Gibson, 2005; Zack & McKenney, 1995).

Participant observation as a technique for mapping interactions is applicable if member interactions are not only limited in size, but also constrained in space (Jorgensen, 1989, pp. 13–15). If field members interact across multiple physical locations, or interact in ways that are not amenable to ocular observation, then it is likely that observation by the lone researcher will be impractical. For instance, Gideon Kunda writes of the limitations of
direct observation that he experienced in his exemplary ethnography of an American high-tech engineering firm:

Some of the events that were of interest to me occurred in inaccessible places: off-site meetings, private, after-hours discussions, secret one-on-ones...My access was further curtailed by the nature of my involvement. By limiting myself to relatively standard working hours and to the main working facilities and their close environment, I restricted the range of events that were accessible for direct observation (Kunda, 2006, p. 245).

Modern organisational life does not necessarily occur in a clearly-demarcated physical space characterised by face-to-face member interaction and amenable to researchers’ direct, ocular participant observation (Beaulieu, 2010; Van Maanen, 2001) or interviewing (Sedgwick & Spiers, 2009). Even if members are physically co-located, they may interact in ways that are not observable by the researcher. For instance, organisational members within the same physical space may communicate using digitally-mediated means such as chats and e-mails (Ahuja, Galletta, & Carley, 2003; Beaulieu, 2010; Markus, 1994). Thus, even if researchers can observe all face-to-face interactions within the studied group, they may miss out on these digital interactions. The nature of modern organisations offers the possibility to compensate for the limits of participant observation and interview data collection techniques.

**Modern Organisations as Self-Documenting Entities**

Modern organisations are self-documenting (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 121–122). They produce huge volumes of documents in the form
of reports, e-mails, pictures and videos that capture everyday intra-organisational interaction. Despite the proliferation of these forms of data, organisational ethnographers have prioritised the study of face-to-face interaction—accessible by interviewing and participant observation—in their accounts of organisational life; they have largely ignored the voluminous amounts of texts produced in these organisations (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004, pp. 56–57; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 121–128) and computer-mediated communication (CMC) among organisational members (Murthy, 2008).

Organisations’ self-produced documents hold significant promise for ethnographic researchers. Records of the CMC of organisational members are an inexpensive, but rich data source that researchers could analyse to produce a continuous pattern of social ties and roles among organisational actors (Kleinbaum & Stuart, 2014; Quintane & Kleinbaum, 2011; Zwijze-Koning & De Jong, 2005). Digital self-produced organisational data is even more important organisational ethnographers as organisational work is increasingly done digitally making digital informant interactions more constitutive of the social world with organisations (Garcia et al., 2009; Ruhleder, 2000). By exploiting this data, ethnographers can address the limitations of surveys, interviews and participant observation discussed in the preceding section.

Using data on CMC to map intra-organisational interaction is complementary to interviews, participant observation and questionnaires in at least three ways. First, the data is produced unobtrusively by the organisation without the agency of the researcher. Thus, it is less susceptible to manipulation by research subjects and to researcher bias. Second, e-mail
data is continuously produced in real-time by the information technology (IT) infrastructure of the organisation. It can be used to explore longitudinally the dynamics of member interaction within organisations. Third, CMC data provide a record of interaction even among members that are geographically-dispersed. Thus, in organisations where influential members are not physically co-located with the rest of the organisation or are difficult to reach, CMC data, such as e-mails, may be used to produce a record of interactions.

I illustrate how exploiting a particular form of CMC (e-mail) complements traditional interviews and participant observation in my study of the rapidly-growing enterprise, Fairphone.

AN ILLUSTRATION OF TRADITIONAL ETHNOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

The social venture Fairphone provided a rich, purposive sampling site (Patton, 2001, pp. 243–244) for my research interest: the processes of growth in new ventures. Within Fairphone, I could observe the content and patterns of employee interaction for an extended period of time as they implemented the organisation’s growth strategy in response to their external environment.

Research Design

The field—Fairphone the social enterprise. Fairphone was founded in January 2013 by two Amsterdam-based entrepreneurs: Bas van Abel (CEO) and Miquel Ballester. In May 2013, the venture launched a successful crowdfunding campaign to finance the production of 25,000 ‘fair’

---

10 The names of all Fairphone staff (except Bas van Abel and Miquel Ballester) and the functional groups that they belong to have been disguised in order to protect their identities.
smartphones for delivery by December 2013. I began fieldwork in October 2013 while Fairphone staff (numbering eight) were in the midst of the crowdfunding campaign. The entire staff occupied two tables in a cluttered shared office space on the fifth floor of a refurbished grain storehouse. During my 15-month fieldwork, the enterprise grew from eight to 43 employees. As the number of employees grew, the company initially expanded to occupy the entire office floor, re-arranged the layout of the space, and eventually secured a spacious office overlooking Amsterdam’s river IJ.

**Data collection—participant observation, interviews, documents.** I visited Fairphone’s office 1–3 times per week (total 130 field visits lasting 6–10 hours per visit) and observed over 800 hours of interpersonal interactions among Fairphone members. These ranged from ‘daily corridor and office talk’ (Van Maanen, 2001, p. 245) to more formal interaction at team meetings and off-site strategy meetings. I electronically recorded all meetings that I attended (over 170 hours) and kept detailed field notes of my observations (Emerson et al., 2001). I wrote memos at the end of each visit in which I noted: (1) my impressions of the visit; and (2) and the themes emerging from the analysis of interactions that I had observed.

In addition, I conducted 64 interviews (average duration 60 minutes) all but two of which were electronically recorded. During interviews, I typically elicited information about my informants’ roles in the enterprise and various events in company life. At the end of each interview, I made contact summary sheets (Miles & Huberman, 1994, pp. 51–54), summarising my impressions of and concepts from the interview.

**Data collection—e-mail logs.** I obtained e-mail data of all Fairphone
members for the period July–November 2014. The data consisted of log files showing e-mail addresses of sender and recipient, subject headings, and the date and time of the e-mail correspondence. The data excluded the content of individuals’ e-mails, i.e., I did not read any individual’s e-mail messages.

I cleaned the data in three steps. First, I removed e-mails sent as part of mass mailing distribution lists (Kossinets & Watts, 2006). Second, I eliminated all e-mails between Fairphone and non-Fairphone accounts with the exception of one external advisor who had separate Fairphone and non-Fairphone accounts. I merged the accounts to represent one node. Third, I stripped the data of all subject headings, leaving behind only the name of the sender, the time and date on which e-mail was sent, and the name of the recipient of the e-mail. I then used a web-based random name generator to conceal the identities of individuals.

The result of the cleaning process was two datasets containing 18,501 e-mails from 35 Fairphone members. Table 4-2 summarises the e-mail data for two periods: period I (July–August 2014); and period II (October–November 2014).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Period I: July–August 2014</strong></th>
<th><strong>Period II: October–November 2014</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Fairphone members sampled</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of e-mails</td>
<td>8,763</td>
<td>9,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average degree(^a) of individual in network</td>
<td>23.13</td>
<td>22.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation of degree of individual in network</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density of network</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td>0.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree centralisation of network</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness centralisation of network</td>
<td>0.00867</td>
<td>0.00884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness centralisation of network</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Degree refers to the number of connections that an individual has
Ethnographic Data Shows Discontinuity within a Growing Enterprise

Fairphone began life with no formal organisation structure. In its first year of operation (2013), the venture was characterised by ad hoc decision making, little functional specialisation and informal relations among the staff. Recalling the first year, one employee said, ‘It’s [was] so untidy…everybody is [was] just working very hard, but…no one is [was] working to the same point at the horizon. It’s more coincidence than that it is planned.’

Due to pressure to deliver smartphones to customers by end of 2013, Founder/CEO Bas van Abel had not given much thought to enterprise design. In November 2013, as we spoke about the company’s design, he admitted:

I think the whole company is being run like [an ad hoc] project with a deadline, whereas it should be run like a company...And the reason for that is that there is so much happening [to meet delivery deadline] that you can’t work on next steps. It is like giving birth and thinking about your second [next] child. It is not something that you can do.

By January 2014, the pressure to meet the delivery deadline had abated. Van Abel hired new employees and announced to the staff that he would be lead a ‘formal structure trajectory’ to implement formal organisational structure within the company. He addressed a company meeting in mid-January 2014:

Last year [2013] was about setting up. And now it is about gaining control over what we are doing. That means that we are going to set up structure, we are going to destroy the past in a way...We’ve
achieved the impossible in a way, you know…We did grow a lot from two people to a full table [21 people]. It is kinda weird for me.

While van Abel spoke, Terrence, a staff member, chuckled. Van Abel noticed Terrence and asked in a light-hearted tone of voice, ‘Why are you laughing?’ Terrence put down his notepad and responded with a grin on his face, ‘I am laughing because I am happy that we are finally going to get structure.’ There was hearty laugher around the meeting room. Van Abel acknowledged Terrence’s concern: ‘Yeah, I know you really need some structure.’

Following subsequent consultations with staff, the CEO presented an organogram at a company meeting in February 2014. He announced that all staff had been assigned to one of five functional groups: Team Alpha, Team Beta, Team Gamma, Team Delta, and Team Epsilon. Van Abel repeatedly emphasised during the meeting that the formal structure would not result in functional compartmentalisation: ‘It doesn’t mean that we are going to have departments… [with] their own separate rooms…No, it is just to be able to…cluster also in terms of people.’

At the February 2014 meeting, Fairphone staff appeared to agree on the formal structure. Yet, the subsequent implementation of the structure was contested. Some employees questioned the efficacy of formal structure in a mission-driven enterprise.

[M]aintaining nimbleness and flexibility…should be unique to our model and not getting overburdened on structure…Yes, it’s important; it ticks a box, but does not necessarily create change…Look at other…big players and how they haven’t…even gotten close to
cracking the [social] issue[s], but they have very sophisticated policies and procedures. (Fairphone staff Anne-Marie, March 2014).

Other staff viewed talk of structure as imprecise semantic shorthand masking their colleagues’ ignorance.

I think that people here use ‘structure’ in order to name a hellful of things…People [Fairphone staff] just name structure [as] everything that they don’t know; as everything that they feel they lack. Even if it is structure, even if it is risk assessment, if it’s more knowledge, they just name it structure. (Fairphone staff Coleman, April 2014).

Some staff viewed a formal structure as alienating. In a May 2014 interview Jacqui, a founding staff member, recalled the spirit within the company in 2013: ‘Last year [2013], all of us attended every meeting...We could directly react on things we saw happening with the media and with public opinion. We were very naïve, but flexible.’ I asked, ‘Would she be invited to a strategy meeting in 2014?’ She responded, ‘Well, actually, I think no. Because, they made a structure and they [her emphasis] didn’t make it for nothing. If you are going to invite everybody then why [make a structure]?’

Not everyone in the growing company was negative or ambivalent about implementing formal structure. Some employees such as Terrence and Lawrence welcomed functional differentiation.

You can see that Bas [van Abel] is a bit allergic for the word ‘department’…I think, when you don’t have departments, Bas is responsible for everything. When you have departments, then you have head of departments [sic], and you [van Abel] delegate those responsibilities...I don’t think that’s a bad thing. It’s becoming bad
when every department is becoming a company on its own. (Fairphone staff, Lawrence, May 2014).

‘Who are all these new people?’ Between January 2014 and September 2014 the number of employees at Fairphone increased from 21 to 34. Despite van Abel’s ‘allergy’ for functional compartmentalisation, the founding Fairphone staff, i.e., those who had been with the company since 2013, tended to interact more with each other than with new recruits.

A founding employee, Chad, illustrates the point. Chad was articulate, politically-savvy and was well-respected by his colleagues. (One informant spoke admiringly of Chad during an interview, ‘Man, that guy [Chad] can project manage!’) He constantly elicited information from his colleagues in course of a regular workday and attended various team meetings. An informant in Team Gamma said of Chad, ‘though he is not in our team, he is just really involved with us.’

I asked Chad about his interaction with recent recruits. His response:

Maybe it is hard for me to trust…I am sceptical of bringing people into the fold...If you are going to represent the company, then I have to trust in you a lot. And so…I looked around when everyone [the founding team] was away on a business trip …I am like, ‘who are all these new people?’ (Fairphone staff Chad, May 2014).

Chad’s ambivalence towards new recruits was not an isolated phenomenon. Another founding employee nostalgically recalled the first year of the company when interpersonal interaction among employees was more informal and intuitive:
Last year, it [Fairphone] felt like a band…And now you are [Fairphone is] like a classroom in terms of the amount of people that you have…I remember walking into Fairphone [in 2013]. There were five people in the team and we said, ‘We’re going to do this.’…Now it feels like a classroom. (Fairphone staff Claudio, May 2014)

**Functional compartmentalisation.** As different functional groups coalesced within the company, they developed different routines for performing tasks. For instance, in the period February–July 2014, Team Alpha held weekly team meetings while Team Beta held only one meeting. Members of one team used web-based financial accounting software while members of another team primarily used graphics design software. Externally, another team dealt with customers while another dealt with production partners and suppliers.

One Team, Team Gamma, illustrates the effects of functional compartmentalisation. Team Gamma consisted of employees recruited in 2014, i.e. no member of the team was a founding employee. Members of Team Gamma were co-located at a table physically separated from the rest the company. (Refer to Figure 4-1 in which I show the separation between Team Gamma and the rest of the company.) Team Gamma held daily meetings between 08.30 a.m. and 10.00 a.m., the highest frequency of meetings of any team in the company. At these morning meetings, discussion centred on monitoring one performance metric: the number of open client enquiries or—‘tickets’ as they called them—that were to be addressed.
Figure 4-1. Fairphone office layout at two periods during fieldwork in 2014
Left picture shows the office space in January 2014 before re-configuration. Right picture shows the same space after configuration in March 2014.
I observed members of Team Gamma conversing loudly and debating work-related problems. They shared humorous ‘war stories’ about their dealings with clients. I recorded one such interlude in my field notes:

Emory takes a call from a client. The client mentioned that she had had a problem with the phone, but was afraid to take out the battery...Emory took her through the process of removing the battery. Thereafter, he tells the rest of the team that the customer was very satisfied with the help. Emory exclaims loudly to no one in particular, ‘what a great customer!’ (Field notes January 2014).

Unlike other team members, Team Gamma socialised outside office hours; they attended yoga classes once a week before the start of the workday and went once a month in the summer of 2014 to sporting events. The team appeared to be cohesive and goal-focused as one member of staff explained to me.

I think not everybody really sees what we [Team Gamma] do actually—like the broad scope of it. On the other hand, I do think, we are a team...we have a clear goal. Every morning we see the numbers [tickets] and everybody knows that the numbers need to go down…For a team like Team Alpha, it [goals] is much more difficult. (Fairphone staff Ai, July 2014)

Nevertheless, members of Team Gamma appeared to be systematically disconnected from the rest of the company. For instance, the team members did attend weekly company-wide morning meetings. Emory, a member of staff, summarised the disconnection.
[T]he pity was that in the beginning we [Team Gamma] were next door. So we were not really involved actually with…the rest of the team [the company]. We met at lunch a little bit, but not really that much. But then since we moved here [into the same office], I always had the idea that you had your tables and you had your ‘departments’ working separately.

**Shifting team membership—‘No one wants to be in Team Gamma’**.
Members of Team Gamma constantly sought to move to other teams within the company. Why, I wondered? I got the first glimpse of an answer during a Team Gamma meeting in June 2014. During the meeting, I overheard two staff members, Taisha and Shantel, complaining about their work in Team Gamma. Taisha said, ‘But the problem also [with Team Gamma] is that everybody is really high-educated [sic]. Just [working in] Team Gamma *can* [her emphasis] be really boring.’ What did Taisha mean when she said that Team Gamma was ‘boring’, I asked. A Team Gamma member explained:

I think most people joined Team Gamma because they had the motivation that they wanted to do something else [within Fairphone]…Team Gamma is not the cool part of company. It is much cooler to be like Team Alpha or Team Beta…Like Team Gamma is normally just not ‘cool’…I couldn’t picture them [Teams Alpha, Beta] working as Team Gamma whereas we [Team Gamma] would do their job. (Fairphone staff, Emory)

In 2014, at least six staff who had been recruited to Team Gamma lobbied for new roles in other teams. They actively pursued joint projects that had been developed during the formal structure implementation trajectory.
(Three successfully switched teams.) One person who had done so expressed satisfaction with her choice:

The thing is that since you are working on other projects, you don’t have time to work on Team Gamma…In a way, it is good. Because now I am growing and there is opportunity [in the company]… It is responsibilities. You are taken serious, but it is as I expected: you have the opportunities to grow, to do other things and then you just take it. So I am actually very happy. (Fairphone staff, Shantel, May 2014).

In sum then, Fairphone Founder/CEO Bas van Abel led what he called a ‘formal structure trajectory’ to implement an organisational structure (i.e. a leadership hierarchy, reporting relationships, and functional specialisation). Traditional ethnographic data (interviews and participant observation) collected during the trajectory strongly suggested that: (1) despite van Abel’s intentions the formal structure was contested by staff: (2) members of Team Gamma were disconnected from the flow of information in the rest of the company; (3) Team Gamma, though disconnected from the rest of the company, was internally cohesive; and (4) members of Team Gamma attempted to switch team membership to pursue what they perceived to be more interesting job opportunities within the company.

How could I develop a more systematic understanding of interpersonal workflow interactions in the study? I needed to do so for two reasons. First, as the enterprise grew, the physical layout of the office space changed. Members of Team Gamma were hastily recruited in December 2013 and temporarily located in an office separated from the rest of the Fairphone staff. By choosing to observe Team Gamma members I could not observe simultaneously the rest of the Fairphone staff. Even after Team Gamma
relocated to the same office as the rest of the Fairphone staff in January 2014, they were physically separated from the rest of the company staff (Refer to Figure 4-1.) This separation caused the same problem for observation: choosing to be located with Team Gamma prevented simultaneous observation of other Fairphone staff.\(^{11}\)

Second, even when physically co-located with all Fairphone members, I could observe only a small set of interactions during a field visit. As the number of employees increased from eight in December 2013 to 21 in January 2014 and then to 34 in September 2014, the number of potential interactions increased. Hence, I could not keep track of direct face-to-face interaction among the staff. I needed a complementary systematic assessment of work-related interaction. For this, I turned to social network analysis.

**Social Networks within Fairphone**

I assumed that: (1) e-mails exchange among Fairphone members were mostly work-related (cf. Kleinbaum & Stuart, 2014); and that: (2) the frequency of e-mail exchange between two individuals indicated the strength of work-related interaction between the pair (cf. Granovetter, 1973; Krackhardt, 1992, pp. 216–218).

*Centrality of Fairphone members in social network.* Individuals within a social network vary with respect to their connectedness within the network. Freeman (1979) proposed three measures of centrality: degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality. Degree centrality of an individual, defined as the number of other individuals to which the focal individual is connected as a fraction of the maximum possible number of

\(^{11}\) I split my time between the teams in order to observe staff interactions
connections, is a measure of the involvement of that individual in the network (Ahuja et al., 2003). The higher the centrality score of an individual (maximum score = 1) the more central she is in the social network. A person with a high degree centrality score is ‘in the thick of things’ (Freeman, 1979, p. 219) within the organisation.

Betweenness centrality of an individual is a measure of the ability of that individual to control the flow of information within the network while closeness centrality is a measure of the independence of an individual or ‘the extent that it can avoid the control potential of others’ (Freeman, 1979, p. 224).

The density of the entire network is the average degree centrality score of all individuals in the network. In Table 4-3, I summarise the centrality scores of Fairphone members.
Table 4-3. Summary of network position per Fairphone organisation member

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Period I (July–August 2014)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Betweenness</td>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Betweenness</td>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Betweenness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>centrality</td>
<td>centrality</td>
<td>centrality</td>
<td>centrality</td>
<td>centrality</td>
<td>centrality</td>
<td>centrality</td>
<td>centrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ai†</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.0156</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>0.0157</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annemarie</td>
<td>0.552</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.683</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branden</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.0021</td>
<td>0.674</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>0.0157</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breanne•</td>
<td>0.897</td>
<td>0.0075</td>
<td>0.906</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>0.0157</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cayla</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>0.659</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>0.0157</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.0156</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>0.0157</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrystal†</td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td>0.0087</td>
<td>0.879</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>0.0037</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudio</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.0156</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td>0.0099</td>
<td>0.903</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coleman</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.0156</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.793</td>
<td>0.0071</td>
<td>0.849</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emory†</td>
<td>0.655</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exie</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>0.0030</td>
<td>0.763</td>
<td>0.897</td>
<td>0.0105</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaylene</td>
<td>0.655</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>0.655</td>
<td>0.0031</td>
<td>0.757</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Period I (July–August 2014)</td>
<td>Period II (October–November 2014)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hendra</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.586  0.0011  0.718</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacqui</td>
<td>0.793  0.0057  0.829</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaye</td>
<td>1.000  0.0156  1.000</td>
<td>0.931  0.0142  0.966</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landon</td>
<td>1.000  0.0156  1.000</td>
<td>0.862  0.0092  0.903</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leslie</td>
<td>0.897  0.0092  0.906</td>
<td>0.862  0.0092  0.903</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcela†</td>
<td>0.793  0.0056  0.829</td>
<td>0.862  0.0087  0.903</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martina</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.621  0.0018  0.737</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melani</td>
<td>0.690  0.0048  0.763</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melodee†</td>
<td>0.793  0.0036  0.829</td>
<td>0.966  0.0157  1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melynda</td>
<td>0.828  0.0057  0.853</td>
<td>0.759  0.0050  0.824</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meyers</td>
<td>1.000  0.0156  1.000</td>
<td>0.621  0.0010  0.737</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikki</td>
<td>0.931  0.0116  0.936</td>
<td>0.966  0.0157  1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolas</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.586  0.0010  0.718</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orval</td>
<td>0.586  0.0021  0.707</td>
<td>0.552  0.0005  0.700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanta†</td>
<td>0.724  0.0046  0.784</td>
<td>0.655  0.0014  0.757</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Period I (July–August 2014)</td>
<td>Period II (October–November 2014)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shantel 0.793 0.0036 0.829</td>
<td>0.828 0.0071 0.875</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Susana† 0.759 0.0033 0.806</td>
<td>0.857 0.0067 0.875</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taisha† 0.828 0.0071 0.853</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tamera† 0.690 0.0015 0.763</td>
<td>0.655 0.0021 0.757</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrence 0.759 0.0077 0.806</td>
<td>0.690 0.0029 0.778</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wilburn 0.759 0.0044 0.806</td>
<td>0.966 0.0157 1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yahaira 0.759 0.0044 0.806</td>
<td>0.724 0.0047 0.800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Normalised to correct for network size. (Maximum value of centrality scores = 1.) Correlation between tenure in organisation and degree centrality is 0.44 in Period I and 0.10 in Period II; Greyed out cells mean that organisational member was not included in network for period.

• Team Gamma members in Period I only; † Team Gamma members in Periods I and II
While centrality scores indicate the structural positions of individuals in a social network, *centralisation* measures the cohesion of the entire network. A network with a high centralisation score is one in which ‘information spreads easily, but the center is indispensable for the transmission of information’ (De Nooy, Mrvar, & Batagelj, 2011, p. 123). The higher the centralisation score of the network, the more indispensable the core members of the network are to the transmission of information.

Since I was interested in the involvement of Fairphone members in the network, i.e. who interacts with whom, which individuals or functional groups interact more frequently than others and who is central in the flow of information, I focus on degree centrality of individuals and the degree centralisation of the networks.

**Comparison of social networks.** I computed the correlation between the networks in periods I and II using the quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) (Krackhardt, 1987), which is considered the appropriate method for comparing social networks (Quintane & Kleinbaum, 2011). I also computed the correlation between tenure of a Fairphone staff and the normalised degree centrality of the staff in the networks in periods I and II. (The scores reported below Table 4-3.)

**Interaction among staff in social network.** Figure 4-2 shows the seating arrangements of Fairphone members in periods I and II. Fairphone staff occupied an open plan office in which all members were located at one of three seating areas—seating areas 1, 2 or 3. (The names of Fairphone staff belonging to Team Gamma are highlighted by the symbol ‘†’.)
Period I (July–August 2014)

Seating Area-1

Chad    Exxie    Jacqui
Claudio  Nikki   Landon

Seating Area-2    Annemarie

Cayla  Melani  Branden  Coleman  Leslie
Orval  Yaharia  Terrence  Meyers  Gaylene

† Marcela  † Shantel  † Taisha  † Emory  † Susana
† Breanne

Seating Area-3    † Tamera

Jaye  † Melodee  † Ai  † Melynda  † Shanta  † Chrystal

† Team Gamma Members.

Period II (October–November 2014)

Seating Area-1

Chad    Exie     Wilburn
Claudio  Martina  Nikki  Landon

Seating Area-2

Melynda  Coleman  Leslie  Annemarie
Orval  Yaharia  Terrence  Meyers  Gaylene

† Marcela  † Shantel  † Hendra  † Emory  † Susana
Breanne

Seating Area-3    † Tamera

Jaye  † Melodee  † Ai  † Nikolas  † Shanta  † Chrystal

Figure 4-2. Seating arrangement of Fairphone staff in two periods
I ordered nodes according to seating locations in order to visualise interactions (Weiss & Jacobson, 1955). These matrix of interactions, called the strike network, within the company is shown in Figure 4-3.
Figure 4-3. Strike network ordered according to seating location in period I (July–August 2014) (left), and period II (October–November 2014) (right)
The darker the cells in Figure 4-3, the higher the frequency of interaction between the individuals representing the column and rows bounding the cell and, hence, the stronger the ties between them. Visual inspection of Figure 4-3 suggests that in periods I Fairphone members Susana and Leslie had the strongest tie in period I. Also, in period I and II: (1) within a given seating area, Fairphone members seated in areas-1 and -2 had stronger ties with each other than those working in area-3; and (2) between seating areas, Fairphone members seated at areas-1 had stronger ties with those in area-2 than with those seated in area-3.

Figure 4-4 shows the social network in Fairphone in period I while Figure 4-5 shows the network in period II. These sociograms are a visual representation of the interactions of Fairphone members.
Figure 4-4. Social network in period I (July–August 2014)
700 e-mails

- **Seating area-1**
- **Seating area-2**
- **Seating area-3**

Figure 4-5. Social network in period II (October–November 2014)
The size of a node indicates the number of e-mails sent by the Fairphone member in the period. The colours of a node in Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 indicate the seating area at which Fairphone member is located: cloud grey indicates seating area-1; the medium shade of grey (smoke grey) indicates area-2; and the dark shade (lead grey) indicates seating area-3. The further an individual is from the centre of the network diagram, the weaker her social ties to other organisation members.

Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 show company members at the core and periphery of the networks. Core members are located near the centre of the sociogram. They have stronger ties among themselves and with other members than peripheral members. All founding members of the enterprise (those who joined in 2013) are located in the core of both social networks. Figure 4-4 shows that apart from Ai, Breanna and Susana (who belonged to Team Gamma and were located in seating area-3), all other members at the core of the social network were located at seating areas-1 or -2. Similarly apart from Branden and Cayla, who were temporary interns, all members at the periphery of the network were located at area-3. Figure 4-4 shows that members of Team Gamma, except Ai, Breanna and Susana, were at the periphery of social network within Fairphone in Period I.

The social network in period II (Figure 4-5) was slightly less centralised (degree centralisation decreased from 0.217 to 0.209 as shown in Table 4-2) than in period I’s, but still shows a core and a periphery. Susana and Ai were ensconced in the core of the social network in period II while the remaining members of Team Gamma were on the periphery. In period II (Figure 4-5), Breanne was no longer a member of Team Gamma even though she continued sitting in the same area (area-3) as Team Gamma members.
The correlation coefficient between the networks from QAP analysis was 0.70 ($p < 0.0002$). This high correlation coefficient suggests that both networks reflect similar patterns of interaction in the two periods.

The sociograms shown in Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 confirm interviews reports, my ocular observations about discontinuities between Team Gamma members and the rest of the company staff. The figures also show that Team Gamma members had few ties with each other. I checked whether individuals at the periphery of the network formed cohesive sub-groups using the component and $k$-core commands in Pajek (De Nooy et al., 2011, pp. 66–72). Both networks could not be split into unconnected clusters. There was no evidence of clustering of Team Gamma staff located at seating area-3. The implication of this finding is that in both periods, though the peripheral members of the Fairphone social network in periods I and II have fewer and weaker ties with the core members, they (the peripheral members) did not form a distinct cohesive cluster.

This finding contradicts reports of members of Team Gamma, like Melynda, who reported that, ‘We’re [Team Gamma] like basically an island, together. Yes, like basically, you have to see it like this...They, like Team Alpha or Team Beta, they make decisions. And we are the first line, basically. As I see it, I see it different, we have more as a team together.’

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

So far, I have presented the findings of my study of implementation of a formal organisational structure within the venture Fairphone. In this section of the paper, I discuss complementarities between analysis of traditional ethnographic data and social network analysis using digital interactional data. I then discuss potential contributions that complementary analysis may
make to organisational ethnography and the ethical issues involved in analysing individuals’ e-mail within the context of an ethnography.

Complementarity between Thick Description and Social Network Analysis

Analysing digital data and producing thick description bases on conventional ethnographic data—interviews, observations—was complementary in three respects: it enabled (1) triangulation of reports and observations; (2) enriched understanding of interaction patterns; and (3) identification of the sources of discontinuities.

**Triangulation of interview reports and observational data.** Formal analysis of the social network confirmed interview and observational data about some members of Fairphone. For instance, consider the employee Chad (seating area-1), who had no formal authority and who I had observed to be articulate and politically-savvy. The social networks based on e-mail exchange (Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5) show that Chad, located at the core of both networks, was ‘in the thick of things’ (Freeman, 1979, p. 219). The social networks show him to be at the nexus of information flow within the company, corroborating interview and observational data that suggested he was central to the functioning of various teams.

The social networks also confirmed interview and observational data on Team Gamma members (who had the shortest average tenure in the company): they occupy the periphery of both social networks. They were ‘disconnected’ and ‘left out’ from the rest of the company during the study period.

**Enriched view of interaction patterns.** However, network analysis suggests a more complex pattern of interaction than the observational and
interview data do. The social networks do not show Team Gamma members as ‘like basically an island’, as one informant suggested. Instead, extending the geographical metaphor, Team Gamma members were scattered archipelagos at the periphery of Fairphone social network (see Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5). How do I reconcile these accounts of Team Gamma forming a cohesive sub-group with the social network analysis which shows clearly that they did not? I believe that the nature of various teams’ task environment explains this difference.

Team Gamma faced a task environment that was unique from the other teams’ in two respects. First, members of Team Gamma dealt with a sub-environment (clients) that routinely provided instant performance feedback to the team whereas other teams in Fairphone dealt with sub-environments or stakeholders, such as the media, production partners, universities who provided feedback only at the completion of long-term interactions (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Second, Team Gamma, unlike the other teams, had a clear performance metric: client satisfaction. As a result, Team Gamma members held daily meetings during the study period—more frequently than other teams—during which they constantly focused on this widely-agreed, explicit performance criterion.

Furthermore, unlike members of other teams in Fairphone, members of Team Gamma socialised with each other outside working hours. It is likely that the high frequency of face-to-face work-related and personal interaction among Team Gamma members minimised the need for e-mail exchange within the team. Team Gamma members, on average, exchanged comparatively few e-mails (see the size of the circles in Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5) with each other than the rest of the company.
Taken together, these suggest that the social networks shown in Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 do not capture adequately the work-related ties among Team Gamma members. The pattern of communication within the team was different from those in the other teams. It is likely that due to the task environment within Team Gamma, which demanded frequent interactions with company clients, frequent team meetings, informal conversations and friendship ties substituted for work-related electronic communication (e-mails).

**Member agency reflected in social network structure.** By combining analysis of e-mail traffic with thick description (gained from observation and interviews), I could explain members’ structural position in the network in terms of purposeful action of the members. Six members of Team Gamma—Breanne, Chrystal, Hendra, Shantel, Susanna and Tamera—had lobbied to join other teams in company. However, only three successfully did so (Breanne, Shantel and Susanna).

These employees began working closely with Teams Alpha and Beta because they wanted to exploit more rewarding career opportunities within the company. Their calculated action to leave Team Gamma resulted in changes in their structural positions. For all three staff, centrality scores increased throughout the study periods. (See Table 4-3.) Breanna’s centrality score increased from 0.897 to 0.966, Shantel’s from 0.793 to 0.828 and Susanna’s from 0.759 to 0.857. At the end of the study period, the three staff were more in ‘the thick of things’ (Freeman, 1979, p. 219) than they were at the start due to their purposive actions.

In sum, combining analysis of Fairphone’s (electronic) social network and rich description of organisational life over an extended period of time,
enabled me to develop a nuanced understanding of the interaction of Fairphone staff as the formal structure was being implemented. If I had performed only social network analysis, I would have observed the varying structural positions (centrality) of Fairphone members in the networks. However, I would have missed rich interpretations through which Fairphone actors perceived and acted to exploit opportunities within the company, and in the process, change their positions in the network. If I had performed only a rich description based on traditional ethnographic data, I would have biased findings to observational and interview reports about discontinuities in the company as the formal structure trajectory was being implemented. However, I would have missed the differing nature of intra-team interactions in Fairphone. Specifically, I would have missed how Team Gamma members relied on interpersonal and face-to-face communication as a substitute for electronic communication due to the nature of the task environment facing the team.

The combination of traditional ethnographic and the organisation’s self-documented data enabled me develop a richer interpretation of intra-organisational interactions within Fairphone. Using these multiple complementary data forms in the ethnography of modern organisations offers the potential to contribute to the practice of organisational ethnography and social network analysis.

**Contributions**

*E-mail logs—an inexpensive product of organisational self-documentation.* In a review of the contribution of ethnography to social network analysis, J. C. Johnson (1994, p. 134) observed that ‘formal social network analysis in combination with the richness of ethnographic
description and analysis can significantly enhance both the validity and the readability of a given [ethnographic] work.’ To organisational ethnographers, there are at least two practical methodological benefits of using e-mail traffic to construct social networks. First, an organisation’s e-mail logs are an unobtrusive record of member interaction. Unlike using interviews and observational data, using the e-mail record for social network analysis does not involve researcher interruption of the routine of research subjects or the active participation of the researcher. E-mail logs are less susceptible to researcher bias, informant self-reports and to purposeful manipulation than interviews and questionnaires (Zwijze-Koning & De Jong, 2005). Hence, they are suited to studying informant interaction in highly-contentious organisational settings (Burt & Ronchi, 1990; Krackhardt, 1995).

Second, no ethnographic account of organisational life is complete (Emerson et al., 2001; Jorgensen, 1989, pp. 83–86). It may be difficult for a researcher to reach all influential organisational members because they may not be physically co-located with the rest of the organisation (Howard, 2002; Human & Provan, 1997; J. C. Johnson, 1994). Even if all organisational members are located in the same physical space and are, at least in principle, accessible to the researcher, close participant observation and interviewing will miss out on many aspects of organisational life. This may be due to the cognitive limitations and data collection decisions of the researcher (Fine, 1993; Van Maanen, 1979) and to spread of CMC within organisations (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 121–133; Murthy, 2008), which are not amenable to direct ocular observation.

The organisation’s e-mail record, logged continuously in real-time by the organisation’s IT infrastructure, then, provides a broad readymade
Inexpensive self-documenting (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 121) dragnet with which the researcher can scour the organisation for valuable information on members’ interactions that are not directly observable.

**Dynamic characterisations of social networks in organisation research.** Studies of organisational social networks have usefully shown that the structural features within which actors operate (e.g., centrality) are associated with outcomes such as status (Lincoln & Miller, 1979) and power (Ibarra, 1992). Yet these studies have been criticised for providing limited explanation of the qualitative content of the ties between actors (Jack, 2010; Kilduff & Tsai, 2003, pp. 113–123; Kilduff & Brass, 2010; Rodan & Galunic, 2004) and for ignoring the dynamic processes by which organisational actors purposefully form network ties (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Ibarra, 1992; McPherson et al., 2001).

Diachronic research designs that include complementary analysis of an organisation’s e-mail data and thick descriptions can address these weaknesses in organisational social network research. By exploiting an organisation’s continuously self-generated e-mail traffic, researchers can obviate the high-cost and time-consuming work of repeated cross-sectional data collection for social network construction while thick description based on researcher’s deep immersion in and understanding of the organisational context setting in which member interaction occurs will provide context of network ties (Borch & Arthur, 1995; Jack, 2010; Lincoln & Miller, 1979).

**The field in organisation ethnography.** Though I have focused in this paper on organisational ethnography, I do not imply that social scientists in general have neglected the advent of digital communication technology on society. In fact, the study of computer-mediated interaction using research
designs called ‘virtual ethnography’ or ‘cyber ethnography’ (Hine, 2000; Markham, 2004) has proceeded at pace and has stimulated vibrant debates about ethnographic concepts, such as the ‘field’ (Amit, 2003; Beaulieu, 2010; Howard, 2002; Ruhleder, 2000), ‘fieldwork’ (J. Burrell, 2009; Ruhleder, 2000), and ‘community’ (Wilson & Peterson, 2002), among sociologists and anthropologists.

Where is the field then in ethnography of modern organisations? Is it synonymous with the shared physical, public space in which employees interact for limited periods during a typical work week as is assumed in methodology books (Amit, 2003; Deegan, 2001; Platt, 1983) and in much exemplary scholarly research (Barley, 1990; Kunda, 2006)? Or does the field embrace and extend beyond that single physical space?

Marcus (1995), in the earliest explication of ‘multi-sited ethnography’, describes it as a research design that involves “chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations in which the ethnographer establishes some form of literal, physical presence, with an explicit posited logic of association or connection among sites that in fact defines the argument of the ethnography” (Marcus, 1995, p. 105). In multi-sited ethnography, ethnographers move beyond “committed localism” (1995, p. 99) to study people, knowledge, objects and discourses as they move across physical boundaries. In Marcus’ (1995) conception, may adopt a “follow the people,” “follow the metaphor,” or “follow the object” approach (Marcus, 1995, p. 106–108) as they track research subjects across physical space.

Due to the distributed nature of modern organisational life (Berthod, Grothe-Hammer, & Sydow, 2016; Van Maanen, 2001), high levels of digitally-mediated interaction (Beaulieu, 2010; Howard, 2002) and
organisational self-documentation (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007), the field—the spaces in which social interactions occur—are physical sites as well as digital sites. In other words, modern organisations are multi-sited.

In Marcus’ (1995) conception of multi-sited ethnography, researchers may adopt a “follow the people,” “follow the metaphor,” or “follow the object” approach (Marcus, 1995, p. 106–108) as they track research subjects across physical space. By combining analysis of CMC with traditional thick description based on interviews and ocular observation, organisational ethnographers adopt a “follow the people” approach and advance a more expansive notion of the ethnographic field as one in which physical and digital spaces intersect. In so far as an organisation’s members interact via face-to-face as well as digital means (and other self-documenting practices), combining both forms of analysis enables researchers to be co-present in the real and virtual spaces that research subjects occupy, rather than being simply co-located in only the same physical space (Beaulieu, 2010).

**Epistemological Considerations**

Being co-present in the virtual and physical spaces that constitute the field in organisational ethnography implies that ethnographers embrace diverse analytical techniques. For instance, social network analysis is primarily quantitative (Wasserman & Faust, 1994) whereas the analysis of traditional ethnographic data is primarily qualitative (Gephart, 2004). This raises the question of methodological compatibility.

Methodologists have debated the irreconcilability of quantitative and qualitative approaches in the social sciences for at least 40 years, with purists emerging on both sides of the debate (Bryman, 1984; R. B. Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). These debates, which are often superficially about
methods or technical issues, are usually a manifestation of more fundamental ontological and epistemological differences among social science researchers (Bryman, 1984; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Yet, quantitative and qualitative approaches to organisational ethnography are not mutually exclusive (Berthod et al., 2016; Van Maanen, 1979). Thus, more practically-inclined organisational ethnographers while remaining abreast of these debates—as they are worthwhile and are unlikely to abate anytime soon—may need to eschew the metaphysical and epistemological dualisms (e.g. subjectivism versus objectivism) that animate methodological debates between qualitative and quantitative researchers (Halton, 2005, pp. 646–649; R. B. Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).

As Berthold, Grothe-Hammer & Sydow (2016, pp. 18–19) argue, each analytical approach to understanding the mundane interactions, habits, rituals and patterns of organisational life ‘must be detached from its usual [philosophical] paradigms to contribute jointly with insights about the same phenomenon’. Organisational ethnographers need not de-emphasise traditional techniques, such as interviewing and participant observation, in their research. On the contrary, since it is likely the organisational members interact differently depending on the medium (Markus, 1994), analysing the face-to-face as well as digitally-mediated interactions will produce a richer account of organisational life.

**Ethical Issues in using Organisations’ Digital Data**

Analysing individual’s digital data, such as e-mail exchange, in an ethnographic study raises complex ethical issues. Hammersley & Atkinson (2007, pp. 209–229) suggest that ethical issues in ethnography fall into five categories: informed consent, privacy, harm, exploitation and consequences
for future research. I used the first four to guide my actions and reflection on the ethics of analysing the e-mail exchange of Fairphone staff.

**Informed consent.** I requested access to Fairphone’s e-mail logs only after I had achieved a high level of trust with every individual within the company. At that point (late 2014), I had interviewed every company member at least once. Despite the high level of trust I enjoyed with the organisation, I requested restricted access to the e-mail logs—only three days. I did so for two reasons: (1) to restrain myself from downloading any data that was not necessary to my original request; and (2) in order to forestall the possibility that accessing the data would jeopardise Fairphone’s IT infrastructure. Before obtaining the data, I made it clear to Fairphone leaders that I did not want to read individuals’ e-mails.

**Privacy.** I anonymised the e-mail data using a web-based random name generator. To check that the data had been properly anonymised, I asked three founding Fairphone employees to read independently a draft version of this article in order to identify their colleagues. Two of the staff correctly identified themselves, but could not identify their colleagues.

**Harm.** Throughout the study, I continually clarified to Fairphone staff that my research was strictly for academic purposes. I emphasised that the results of my study would not be communicated to the company’s leaders and would have no bearing on the staff’s performance evaluations. Nevertheless, two employees asked me for behavioural feedback during the study. They reasoned that since I had observed how they interacted with their colleagues for over a year, I could give them informed feedback about their behaviors. I politely refused to do so even though I had my personal opinions on their behaviors.
Exploitation. This involves asking the question, ‘What do research subjects get in return for providing information to the researcher?’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 217). As the study progressed, my role changed from an unobtrusive ‘complete observer’ to a ‘participant-as-observer’ (Gold, 1958). I periodically shared my insights into the rapidly-changing organisation with Fairphone’s leaders. For instance, in July–August 2014, I helped the organisation’s leaders assess the company culture using an influential framework from the organisational literature and a thematic analysis of interviews I had conducted up to that time. I also acted as a ‘sounding board’ as they debated the organisation’s structure and strategy in October 2014. I became involved to the extent that during a leadership meeting, one of Fairphone’s leaders jokingly referred to me as ‘Fairphone’s institutional memory’. I believe that taking these steps engendered trust and goodwill from Fairphone staff during and after my fieldwork in the company.

LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Analysing digital and physical, face-to-face human interactions are not equivalent ways to study human subjects. By carefully observing subject interaction and eliciting informant perspectives through interviews, researchers can adduce the meanings that informants impute to rituals, relationships and other events in organisational life. Indeed, this approach to deep contextual understanding of human thought, metaphors, and action is one of the strengths of ethnography as applied to organisation theory (Bate, 1997; Cornelissen, 2016; Van Maanen, 2011b; Watson, 2011). In my study of Fairphone, some organisational members interpreted the formal structure as a threat to the creative spirit of the entrepreneurial firm while others
interpreted it as alienating leadership from the staff. Barring access to the contents of e-mail messages, analysing e-mail exchange enables researchers, at best, to explain the structure of a digital social network; the researcher cannot infer participants’ meanings from such networks.

Network analysis assumes that organisational actors are embedded in social relationships that engender and constrain their behaviour (Brass et al., 2004; Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). I exploited the self-documenting practices (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007) of a small rapidly-growing organisation that produces huge volumes of digital information to assess the structure of informant interaction. Though there are practical advantages to exploiting an organisation’s digital traffic, there are at least three methodological limitations to this approach. First, in my case, I assumed that e-mail exchange between the Fairphone staff captured socially-meaningful relations within the organisation. I did not distinguish between e-mails that were sent directly to recipients from those in which the recipient was only copied in the transmission. Standard e-mail protocol suggests that there is a difference between being copied in an e-mail and being the direct recipient of one. The former typically suggests passive interaction between parties to the e-mail while the latter involves active interaction (hence, more socially-significant relations). Not making the distinction between direct and copied recipients implies that I may have over-estimated the occurrence of socially significant relations in the social network.

Second, I assumed that the frequency of e-mail exchange between any two members is indicative of the strength of work-related ties between them (Granovetter, 1973; Krackhardt, 1992, pp. 216–218). But does a high frequency of e-mail exchange between any two organisational members
mean that the pair have a socially significant relationship? Based on my observations of Fairphone staff, I believe this to be the case. However, this may not be case in other organisations, especially larger organisations. In some large organisations, e-mails are used for complex communication and may be preferred to ‘richer’ face-to-face or telephone interaction (Markus, 1994). This supports the case that frequency of e-mail exchange is a good indication of the strength of socially-significant relationships. In other large organisations, professional staff frequently exchange e-mails with assistants, but that exchange is only an administrative relationship that lacks social significance (Quintane & Kleinbaum, 2011). In that case, using frequency of e-mail exchange to indicate tie strength will lead to misleading conclusions about the nature of social relations in the organisation.

Third, I assumed that e-mail networks best capture work-related interactions across the organisation. Yet, research suggests that multiple social networks may exist simultaneously even within small organisations (Brass, 1984; Lincoln & Miller, 1979). There may be friendship and personal support networks which rely on face-to-face or other forms of interaction and which may complement or substitute for e-mail communication.

A modern organisation’s digital traffic provides researchers an inexpensive, unobtrusive vein of data rich in informant interactions that are constitutive to the social worlds that ethnographers study within such organisations. Organisational ethnographers have been reluctant to incorporate such self-documents into their research toolkits, preferring instead face-to-face observational and interview data (Garcia et al., 2009; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 121–133; Murthy, 2008). In modern organisations, computer-mediated communication occurs between
informants outside the conventional physical and temporal boundaries of organisational life. Incorporating digital interactions into traditional ethnographic data collection repertoires—participant observation, interviews—will not only enable researchers overcome the limitations of these methods especially in small rapidly-changing organisational research settings, but also foster co-presence (Beaulieu, 2010) with our informants as their mundane interactions recursively move between observable physical space and unobservable virtual space.
CHAPTER 5 : GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter, I summarise the main findings and the key scientific contributions of the dissertation. Next, I highlight the implications for practice and areas for future research. Finally, I conclude with a reflection on the methods that I employed in the dissertation.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In this dissertation, I examine two types of corporate response to social issues: social entrepreneurship and corporate social action (CSA). Social entrepreneurship involves the formation of new organisations and ‘the innovative use and combination of resources to pursue opportunities to catalyse social change and/or address social needs’ (Mair & Martí, 2006, p. 37) while CSA involves the enactment of programmes that go beyond the profit maximisation goals of an established for-profit corporation to alleviate some social problem. In social entrepreneurship, the activities that address the social problem are central to the business model of the enterprise whereas in corporate social action those activities are usually not integrated into the corporations’ business model—the system of activities by which an enterprise produces and delivers a valuable product or service to its customers and captures economic rents (Teece, 2010; Zott & Amit, 2010). Instead, CSA is typically supplementary to the business model and done to acquire legitimacy from influential institutional constituents. Specifically, I aim to contribute to scholarly understanding of the emergence of social entrepreneurship and the implementation and management of corporate social practices within MNEs. In addition, the dissertation also aims to
contribute to the practice of organisational ethnography within rapidly-changing organisational research sites. In the remainder of this section, I summarise chapter by chapter the findings of the papers that comprise the dissertation.

In chapter 2, we theorise the unlikely creation of a social venture, Fairphone. The chapter is based on a 15 month study of the organisation. We performed an abductive analysis of qualitative data, such as interviews, participant observation, electronic, archival data and a thick description (Geertz, 1973) of the organisation’s emergence. We drew on insights from the social movement, technology entrepreneurship, commercial entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship literatures to craft a structured analytical explanation of the case. We find that the enterprise emerged in a perturbed industry context (A. D. Meyer, 1982; Sine & David, 2003) in which the eventual founders employed a comprehensible material artifact to frame their solutions to a social problem. In the process, they inadvertently garnered legitimacy and resources from diverse audiences. Thereafter, a distributed set of actors further committed resources to the founders who acted effectually, drawing in an effectual network of supporters (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2008), that enabled the venture to emerge.

In chapter 3, I examine corporate social action. I investigate the implementation of CSR practices by a Chinese multinational enterprise (MNE), Huawei in Kenya, and the discursive public justification of those practices. In contrast to chapter 2 in which I employ abductive theorising, my approach in chapter 3 is deductive. I applied Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) theory of justification to perform a content analysis of public justification of
the firm’s CSR practices. I find that CSR practices implemented to acquiesce to institutional pressure in one domain (Kenya) are discursively justified by other subunit of the MNE to manipulate institutional constituents in another domain—a paradox approach to legitimacy management in the face of multiple demands for social action (Scherer et al., 2013).

In chapter 4, which is based on the ethnographic study discussed in chapter 2, I address a methodological question: how may organisational researchers in rapidly-changing modern organisational field sites exploit the self-documenting aspects of modern organisations to produce more compelling accounts of organisational life? I show that the information technology (IT) infrastructure of modern organisations unobtrusively produce a rich vein of digital data that constitutes the social world occupied by informants within these organisations. I argue that researchers may fruitfully combine this data on digital informant interaction with data on physical informant interaction traditionally generated through interviews and face-to-face participant observation. By combining digital and physical informant interaction data, researchers compensate for their cognitive limitations in observing small, rapidly-changing research site and for the limitations of the conventional ethnographic techniques. I illustrate my argument using the case of formal structure development within Fairphone in 2014. In the case, thick description, thematic analysis of interviews and participant observation, and social network analysis of Fairphone staff e-mail traffic provided complementary insights about the nature of inter-team fragmentation, leading to a richer understanding of interaction patterns in the organisation. In Table 5-1, I summarise the findings and key contributions of the articles comprising the dissertation.
Table 5-1. Summary of contributions of articles in dissertation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Main findings</th>
<th>Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Chapter 2 | Social enterprise emerged in a perturbed industry context in which founders employed a comprehensible material artifact to garner legitimacy. Thereafter, a distributed set of actors committed resources to the founders who acted effectually, drawing in an effectual network of supporters who further committed resources and legitimacy enabling the venture to emerge | Agency for new venture—May not lie solely in the entrepreneurial actor(s) as is assumed in effectuation theory. Distributed agency co-constitutes effectual entrepreneurial agency  

**Material artifacts in effectuation**—Entrepreneurs perform meaning work, which involves the socio-material. Material artifacts possess material and symbolic attributes salient to effectual network, who make inferences about the artifact and channel resources to the effectual entrepreneur.  

**Boundary objects in non-hierarchical interactions**—Concept be extended to cover
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Main findings</th>
<th>Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>CSR practices implemented to acquiesce to institutional pressure in one domain (Kenya) are discursively justified by other subunit of the MNE to manipulate institutional constituents. Study illustrates a paradox approach to CSR.</td>
<td>Interactions of loosely-coupled actors located in multiple domains that are not bounded within an organisational hierarchy and whose inhabitants have no relations of mutual dependence. I provide an empirical illustration of the paradox approach to legitimacy attainment through CSR practices by MNE subunits. Literature assumes that the paradox approach entails inherent organisational tensions as multiple strategic responses are simultaneously enacted. I suggest that these tensions may be minimal if the cost of acquiescence in one institutional domain is low and the institutional pressure in another weak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Main findings</td>
<td>Contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Modern organisations produce voluminous amounts of documentary and unobtrusive data that shed light on organisational life. Using illustrative case, I show that these forms are complementary to traditional ethnographic data such as interviewing and participant observation.</td>
<td>Combining multiple data forms in organisational ethnography allows researchers: (1) compensate for their inability to make ocular observations of all subjects’ face-to-face interactions; and (2) become co-present in the virtual spaces that characterise much of modern organisational life.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTRIBUTIONS OF DISSERTATION

This dissertation contributes to the entrepreneurship, corporate social responsibility and organisational ethnography literatures. Below, I expand on these contributions.

Contributions to Entrepreneurship Literature

Effectuation theory is an influential emerging theoretical perspective for explaining entrepreneurial action under uncertainty (Fisher, 2012). This dissertation contributes to effectuation theory in three ways. First, we highlight how agency for the creation of a new venture may not lie solely in the entrepreneurial actor(s) as is assumed in effectuation theory (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 15–16). In the context of social movement activism, the entrepreneurial intention and capabilities that are presupposed by effectuation theory may also originate from diverse actors external to the entrepreneurial team—a process we term ‘distributed agency’. Distributed agency co-constitutes or enables the agency of an effectual entrepreneurial actor in the creation of the new venture: (1) through the proactive commitment of entrepreneurially-valuable material resources, legitimacy, capabilities and contingencies to the entrepreneurial actor(s); and (2) by changing the intentions of the actor to pursue entrepreneurially-specific goals—a necessary condition for the emergence of a new venture (Katz & Gartner, 1988).

Second, we theorise the role of material artifacts in effectuation theory. We show that material artifacts, which were central to the development of the theory (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 19–40, 240–254) but ignored in subsequent work, may influence the
affective ways in which an effectual network is assembled. Entrepreneurs perform meaning work by using symbolic actions to make their ventures comprehensible to target audiences (Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; Zott & Huy, 2007). This meaning work involves not only discursive elements (Phillips et al., 2004), but also the socio-material since various social groups attribute functional and symbolic attributes to material artifacts (Rafaeli & Vilnai-Yavetz, 2004; Shavitt, 1990). Thus, members of an effectual network convened for the creation of a material artifact make inferences about the artifact based on their shared interpretations of the artifact (Bijker, 1987; Pratt & Rafaeli, 1997; Zott & Huy, 2007). In the context of social movement activism, they, in turn, commit resources to the creation of the artifact as an expression of moral values.

Third, in the organisational literature, boundary objects have been invoked to explain inter-disciplinary collaboration mostly within the context of a single organisational hierarchy in which members share similar goals and relations of dependence (Nicolini et al., 2012; Yakura, 2002). We argue that the concept of boundary objects could be extended to cover interactions of loosely-coupled actors located in multiple domains that are not bounded within an organisational hierarchy and whose inhabitants have no relations of mutual dependence.

**Contributions to Corporate Social Responsibility Literature**

Despite the proliferation of CSR programmes by MNEs, scholarly work on these programmes is surprisingly sparse (Doh & Lucea, 2013; Husted & Allen, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2006; Yang & Rivers, 2009). Extant empirical studies of corporate social actions in MNEs emphasise that MNEs’
CSR practices are single corporate strategies that correspond to acquiescence, compromise or avoidance of institutional demands (C. Oliver, 1991) in the organisations’ attempts to obtain legitimacy from salient institutional constituents. Moreover, these studies focus on corporate actions, but ignore the discursive aspects of legitimation.

I provide an empirical illustration of the paradox approach to legitimacy attainment through CSR practices by MNE subunits in the face of multiple demands for corporate social action. In this approach to legitimacy management, various subunits of the MNE simultaneously employ corporate social action and discursive tactics to passively comply with, as well as defy, institutional expectations. This approach has been theorised, but not examined empirically (Scherer et al., 2013). It is assumed that the paradox approach entails inherent organisational tensions as multiple strategic responses are simultaneously enacted. I suggest that these tensions may be minimal if the cost of acquiescence in one institutional domain is low and the institutional pressure in another weak.

**Contributions to Organisational Ethnography**

In their accounts of organisational life, organisational ethnographers have largely ignored documents and artifacts produced by modern organisations, privileging instead interviewing and ocular observation of the face-to-face interaction of research subjects (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). I suggest that organisations produce a vast array of documents, particularly continuous real-time digital data such as email logs that constitute a space of digital interaction vital to modern organisational life. As organisational ethnographers seek to provide authentic accounts of organisational life that meet the ethnographic criterion of ‘being
there’ (Bate, 1997), they may exploit this vein of informant interaction to complement qualitative analysis of traditional ethnographic data and produce richer accounts of organisational life. In rapidly-changing modern organisational field sites, such as growing new ventures, analysis multiple data forms—the physical and the digital—enables researchers to: (1) compensate for their inability to make observe subjects’ face-to-face interactions; and (2) become co-present (Beaulieu, 2010) in the virtual spaces that characterise modern organisational life.

By incorporating analysis of continuous real-time data into the ethnographic analytical repertoire, researchers not only produce more valid and readable accounts of organisational life, but also extend the notion of the ethnographic field, which is usually conceived as a physical, circumscribed space in which the interaction of research subjects occurs. The field then includes the virtual digital spaces that pervade much of modern organisational life and which are not accessible by traditional ethnographic data collection techniques.

**IMPLICATION FOR PRACTICE**

The studies in this dissertation have implications for the practice of entrepreneurship and corporate social action and organisational ethnography.

**Entrepreneurship.** Traditional and bricolage theories of entrepreneurial action emphasise how new ventures are created by entrepreneurs deliberately assembling resources to exploit some pre-existent opportunity (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). My in-depth study of Fairphone highlights that new ventures can also be created by effectual entrepreneurial action (Sarasvathy, 2001). Thus, entrepreneurs need not begin the successful venture creation process purposively with a fixed
end goal, such as creating serving a particular market segment, but may act effectually using their means and drawing an effectual network to produce an emergent outcome (a successful firm).

Regardless of their paths to venture creation, entrepreneurs need to acquire resources and legitimacy in order to succeed (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). Our findings suggest that they may deliberately pursue venture creation within communities of practice (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006), i.e. groups of individuals and organisations that coalesce to address pressing social problems. These communities, such as social movements, provide information, networks, resources and legitimacy to their members.

However, the accretion of legitimacy and resources is not an automatic consequence of membership in communities of practice. Entrepreneurs need to create distinct identities within these communities in order to attract legitimacy and resources. The study in chapter 2 suggests that they may achieve this in two ways: First, by incorporating a comprehensible material artifact into their entrepreneurial narratives; and, second, by carefully positioning their enterprises’ solution as cognate with, but distinct from extant product or service categories.

Our findings also have implications for managers with established MNEs, such as the large telecommunication MNEs. MNEs face increasing pressure to improve sustainability within their operations (Scherer et al., 2013). Addressing sustainability concerns may involve changing organisational practice as well as introducing new products or services into current or non-existent markets (Hart & Milstein, 2003). Yet, managers within large complex organisations may face institutional inertia as they attempt to address sustainability concerns. Managers may not recognise the
opportunity to develop new sustainable products, services or markets due to the power of their organisations’ dominant logics (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Prahalad, 2004)—powerful cognitive schemas or conceptualisations of business that managers employ to filter information from their environment—which favour existing business models. Even if managers recognise opportunities to address sustainability by developing new products or markets, they often have to champion these innovations in the face of conflicts with business models established for the firm’s existing products or services offerings (Chesbrough, 2010; C. Christensen, 1997).

The emergence of Fairphone (chapter 2) suggests that sustainability champions within MNEs, who are skilled at navigating complex intra-organisational obstacles (Dorado & Vaz, 2003), could exploit industry-wide perturbations to advance their sustainable innovation ideas. They may do so by channelling resources to support external entrepreneurs developing products that address sustainability. In effect, these managers/champions can purposefully experiment with new business models by making affordable loss commitments of entrepreneurially-valuable material resources and legitimacy to a new venture. The potential payoff of such a commitment, as the study of Fairphone suggests, is the establishment of a profitable business venture whose product may expand the MNEs’ product offerings.

**Corporate social action (CSA).** Like resource-constrained entrepreneurs, MNEs subunits need to acquire legitimacy from their environment in order to thrive. However, the various sub-units of an MNE need to navigate complex, heterogenous institutional environments in order to thrive (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Pache & Santos, 2010; Wijen & Van Tulder, 2011). The results in this dissertation
suggest that in order to manage demands for social action from multiple institutional constituents, managers may enact practices to acquiesce to demands in one domain while simultaneously deploying discursive tactics to justify those practices to elements of another institutional domain. The results also suggest the conditions under which such synchronous justification or manipulation are likely to succeed: if the latter institutional domain is weak and fragmented, and the MNE’s industry context considered benign.

**The practice of organisational ethnography.** Unlike the non-literate societies and social worlds studied by earlier generations of ethnographers, modern organisations produce voluminous documentary and digital records of organisational life (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 121–122; Murthy, 2008). As argued previously, these records provide the potential to compensate for the limits of traditional ethnographic data collection techniques and, thereby, increase the validity and richness of ethnographic accounts.

However, to exploit these records, particularly in rapidly-changing organisational contexts, ethnographers need to embrace diversity in the analytical repertoires. Thus, thick description of the field site and reductive techniques, such as theme analysis of interviews and close participant observation of physical in-person interactions, need to be combined with quantitative techniques such as social network analysis and content analysis.

In practice, however, accessing individual digital data raises ethical concerns about obtaining the informed consent of research subjects, the potential for exploitation by the researcher and organisational decision makers, and privacy. Though I do not provide a comprehensive template for addressing these questions, my reflection on my experience using such
individual level data suggests that the ability of the researcher to garner the trust of research subjects is a *sine qua non* for avoiding harm to subjects.

**FUTURE RESEARCH**

In this dissertation, I have documented the case of a venture that emerged by effectual and distributed agency. In the case, causal entrepreneurial action, defined as an entrepreneur’s purposive acquisition of resources to pursue a pre-identified opportunity, played no role in the creation of the enterprise. This dissertation raises several fascinating questions for future study. First, how do the patterns of decision making change as an enterprise grows? Read and Sarasvathy (2005) suggested that successful enterprises are more likely to have begun by effectual entrepreneurial action, but grow through causal entrepreneurial action as the organisations endure over time. They suggest that while effectual decision making may be more prevalent in the formative stages of the enterprise, subsequent decision making in the life of the organisation is likely to be dominated by casual processes. Why is this the case?

A strong tradition within organisation theory provides well-supported reasons for Read and Sarasvathy’s prediction. For instance, a high degree of *internal* uncertainty prevents effective individual and organisational decision making. Thus, organisational actors develop formal decision making and role structures that reduce role ambiguity, control performance variability and decrease coordination costs within their organisations (Mintzberg, 1979; Perrow, 1986). Yet, empirical work within this tradition has been performed mostly on large, established organisations; it is not known whether these theories apply to nascent rapidly-growing ventures (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; Sine, Mitsuhashi, & Kirsch, 2006).
Read and Sarasvathy’s prediction may be tested using a longitudinal multiple case study design. Researchers may examine longitudinally decision making patterns, especially on critical elements of strategy such as product innovation, and formal role assignation in ventures like Fairphone. It may be that social enterprises whose business models incorporate an explicit social value proposition may evolve in different ways than strictly commercial enterprises.

Second, how does the nature of resource and legitimacy commitment by previously distributed actors change as the enterprise grows? For instance as the social enterprise grows, it may incorporate more of a commercial, for-profit logic than its original social movement logic (Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014; Jay, 2012; Santos, Pache, & Birkholz, 2015). If so, will the motives of the previously distributed agents change? Will they, for instance, make calculative commitments to the enterprise, instead of proactive, value-driven contributions?

Third, though scholars have begun to appreciate the importance of material artifacts in the field of organisation studies (e.g., Nicolini et al., 2012; Yakura, 2002), little attention has been paid to the role of objects in social entrepreneurship. How does the nature of material artifacts influence effectual commitment in social entrepreneurship? In the study in chapter 2, there was broad agreement on the functional as well as the symbolic dimensions of the artifact. What if Fairphone’s founders had campaigned using another material artifact, say an electric toaster? If there is low agreement on either functional or symbolic dimensions, would the effectual network commit resources in similar ways?
Fourth, my account of Huawei’s justification of its CSR programme (chapter 3) suggests that operating in an industry that is perceived to be benign (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006) might enable an MNE to maintain a coherent justification scheme without resorting to the structural solutions, such as disguising socially-irresponsible practices from relevant external constituencies (Surroca et al., 2013), that MNEs in less benign industries have adopted in response to institutional pressure. How then does the nature of the industry influence the match between firms’ CSR practices and public discursive justification of those practices?

Finally, the growing scholarly work how an MNE’s home country institutions influence its CSR practices abroad (Amaeshi & Amao, 2009; J. L. Campbell, 2007; Fransen, 2013; Van Tulder & Kolk, 2001) suggests that CSR practices in foreign subsidiaries reflects the attributes of MNEs’ home country national business system. Using ideographic research designs, such as ethnography or longitudinal case studies, scholars could empirically examine claims that there is ‘Chinese-style concept of CSR’ (Wang & Juslin, 2009, p. 440) that carries with Chinese MNEs as they internationalise. They could also examine whether Chinese MNEs’ public invocations of the common good used to justify their CSR practices reflect the home country national business system.

**EPILOGUE: REFLECTIONS ON METHODOLOGY AND CONCLUSIONS**

Philosophers of science often distinguish between method, which denotes ‘a procedure, tool, or technique used by the inquirer to generate and analyze data’ (Schwandt, 2007, p. 191), and methodology, ‘a theory of how inquiry should proceed…a particular social scientific discourse (a way of
acting, thinking, and speaking) that occupies a middle ground between discussions of method… and discussions of issues in the philosophy of social science’ (Schwandt, 2007, p. 193). In this dissertation, I have employed interviews, participant observation, and documentary techniques to collect data and performed thematic analysis, content analysis and social network analysis on the data. I employed these methods within case study and ethnographic methodologies.

As various scholars observe (e.g., Bryman, 1984; W. Gibson & Brown, 2009, p. 56; Stake, 2010, p. 15), researchers’ preferences for particular methodologies typically reflect personal choice and pre-disposition. I am no different. My preference for idiographic methodologies for the study of organisational phenomena reflects: (1) my previous education and career background in an natural science-based industry that privileges exhaustive empirical descriptions of local natural phenomena while recognising the value of global, parsimonious theories of the phenomena; and (2) an intellectual fascination with understanding how human action in naturalistic organisational settings produces value for proximate stakeholders and broader societies in which those organisations are ensconced. My research goals were to explicate the theoretical mechanisms underlying human action in context, rather than to generalise my inferences to a population of similar organisations removed from the original context of research.

Case Study versus Ethnography?

One methodological challenge I had to deal with in my research journey was the distinction between case study and ethnography. Influential qualitative methodology books (e.g., Creswell, 2007, pp. 73–81; Patton, 2001, pp. 81–84) suggest a straightforward distinction. The main difference
between these research designs lies in their foci: ethnographies focus on describing a group’s culture (Patton, 2001, p. 81) while case studies provide in-depth understanding of an activity or event within some bounded system (Creswell, 2007, p. 73). However, in the first study in the dissertation (chapter 2), the distinction was not as clear as the methodology books suggested. I began the study intending to observe processes of organisational growth and capability development within Fairphone using ethnographic methods to capture the meanings—the *emic* perspective—of organisational participants as they developed capabilities to produce a complex product and coped with the challenges of rapid growth. Yet, I also wanted to impose analytical order—the *etic* perspective—on the ethnographic data.

By the time I submitted the first draft of the article to the *Journal of Management Studies* (JMS) in January 2015, I had been immersed in the organisation for about 15 months. In the first draft of the paper, I did not feel confident to ‘let the data speak’. It felt inauthentic to present the *emic* perspective since the events described in the article mostly covered occurred before I joined the organisation. Hence, I did not observe first hand most events reported in the paper. I relied mainly on retrospective interviews carefully triangulated using multiple independent data sources.

During the review process at JMS, a perceptive reviewer observed this tension and wrote in his/her review letter:

I do not see any evidence of a meaningful contribution from the participant observation data and was disappointed to find that the researcher was not able to capture the emergence process while themselves [sic] embedded in the company. This sadly strips away a
layer of *emic* understanding of the emergence process since post-hoc interview data is all that can be acquired. (Anonymous reviewer).

Upon reflection, I realised that though the overall research design was an ethnography, the subject of the article in chapter 2, the emergence of the enterprise, was a case study. Furthermore, by allowing themes to emerge from the data and by pattern matching the data with constructs from effectuation theory, I was reporting an *etic* perspective that was strongly-grounded in multiple data sets and validated by my informants.

In the second study (chapter 3), it was not difficult to make the distinction between case study and ethnography. There was no need. The topic (corporate social action) and the unit of analysis (MNE subunit) were straightforward. Moreover, I had not performed participant observation in the study of Huawei—a necessary condition for organisational ethnography (Bate, 1997).

Thus, the exchange between reviewer and researcher during review process triggered a reflection on methodology, enabling me to articulate the nature of my research designs clearer than methodology textbooks had done.

**The Normative versus the Descriptive Model of Research**

Despite my preference for notoriously messy idiographic qualitative research (cf. Fendt & Sachs, 2008; Pratt, 2008; Suddaby, 2006), I subscribed unconsciously to a normative model of research at the start of my doctoral journey. In the normative model, research unfolds in a linear, sequential process that starts with the formulation of a research question and ends with the final research report (W. Gibson & Brown, 2009, pp. 9–10). As I reflect on the last three years of data collection, analysis, writing and presentation,
I am struck by the iterative, open-ended nature of qualitative research. In my time at Fairphone, for instance, I gathered a vast amount of data across multiple units of analysis: over 800 hours of structured and unstructured observation; 83 interviews (average duration 56 minutes); about 60 pages of single-space typed memos; 270 pages of typed field notes (excluding handwritten notes); 142 pictures; 11 videos; and over 170 hours of company-wide and team meetings. I also collected over 1,800 tweets, about 160 press articles and countless archival documents, radio and television shows. As I gathered the data, I navigated diverse scholarly literatures including organisational capabilities, social movement, commercial entrepreneurship, social entrepreneurship, and the methodological literatures to make sense of the data.

Unlike in the normative model of research where data collection neatly precedes data analysis, data collection and data analysis during my research in Fairphone occurred concurrently. Indeed, data analysis guided my subsequent data collection efforts. As I identified the conceptual categories in the data, my initially well-formulated research question changed from one about enterprise capabilities to one about enterprise emergence. This resulted in constant iteration between disparate scholarly literature—such as entrepreneurship, social movement, and technology in management literatures—and the data in order to ground the emerging theoretical insights and craft a conceptual contribution. While the normative research model was a useful guide throughout the research process, I concur with Paul Bate who observes in his excellent review of organisational ethnography that ‘ethnography is not so much method in the madness, as madness in the method’ (Bate, 1997, p. 1152).
Whatever frustrations I encountered as I navigated the methodological madness were surpassed by the intellectual satisfaction of achieving conceptual clarity in the explanation of the enterprise emergence. I marvelled as the mass of raw data were first reduced to manageable forms and then marshalled into codes, categories, and ultimately themes (Saldaña, 2009) that hinted at interesting scientific contributions.

My idiographic research journey involved more than abstract theorising, data reduction and analysis; it was an intensely human affair. As I researched Huawei’s CSR programme in 2013, I also became friendly with a key informant in Kenya. Over a period of three weeks, my informant shared stories about his family, career aspirations and about Huawei. During an informal dinner, the informant even gave me ‘backstage’ information (Goffman, 1956, p. 69) about how the company’s CSR initiative was conceived and run, and how organisational members perceived the programme.

Human interaction within my other research site, Fairphone, was even more intense and long-lasting. Being embedded within Fairphone, I became friendly with many of my informants. They shared with me organisational gossip. Over lunch, we exchanged light-hearted banter, compared notes on the latest episodes of Game of Thrones and The Wire, and in more philosophical moments, we discussed religion. They invited me to their housewarming parties and to company social events at which I met their spouses, partners and their children. Consequently, I did not leave the field as I had initially planned.

At the start of the research, I anticipated that I would spend a maximum of six months within the organisation. Following methodological guidance,
I reasoned that that was enough time to become familiar with the company and to observe a sufficient number of production cycles (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 94–96). I ended up staying at Fairphone for 15 months. This lengthy fieldwork duration reflected my commitment to observe the growth of the firm through three production cycles. It also reflected—and I grudgingly admit so—my reluctance to leave the field. I had conflicted feelings about leaving my informants: they had been very kind to me as they shared with me their personal stories, confidential organisational data and their perspectives on their rapidly-changing organisation. For instance, during interviews, some informants became emotional, breaking down in tears while others often joked that speaking to me was like therapy. At least one Fairphone staff even thought that I was trained in psychology. Was it ethical, I wondered, to take away all that confidential information without maintaining some ties to Fairphone? As I struggled to maintain links to Fairphone, I also realised that I needed to leave the field in order to gain the analytical distance vital for the research process.

While researching Fairphone in mid-2014, I compared notes with a fellow doctoral candidate who had also conducted a nine-month ethnography. I remarked to her that I had a compelling thick description, an exhaustive, holistic explanation for my case, but could not yet adduce a conceptual contribution. She replied, ‘Ona, that’s qualitative research for you. But I promise you, as long as you keep questioning and reflecting on the data, you will find a contribution. It’s there. You just have to look hard enough’. It is my sincere hope that this dissertation accurately reflects my efforts to interrogate the data, to critically examine the literature and to craft
a contribution to scholarship on corporate responses to social issues, particularly to the practice of CSR and entrepreneurship.
REFERENCES


expressions of corporate codes of conduct in Nigeria. *Journal of Business Ethics, 86*(2), 225-239.


http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate+News/Kenya+locks+out+young+and+low+paid+foreign+workers+-/539550/1450584/-/rh7efhz/-/index.html


Ghemawat, P. (2007). Why the world isn't flat. *Foreign Policy, 159*(March/April), 54-60.


Kilduff, M., & Brass, D. J. (2010). Organizational social network research: Core ideas and key debates. *The Academy of Management Annals, 4*(1), 317-357.


Morgan, G., & Smircich, L. (1980). The case for qualitative research. 


social change in the case of San Patrignano. *Entrepreneurship & Regional Development*, 22(6), 515-534.


Ramirez, C. (2013). ‘We are being pilloried for something, we did not even know we had done wrong!’ Quality control and orders of worth in the British audit profession. *Journal of Management Studies, 50*(5), 845-869.


Robinson, J. (2006). Navigating social and institutional barriers to markets: How social entrepreneurs identify and evaluate opportunities. In J. Mair,
J. Robinson & K. Hockerts (Eds.), *Social entrepreneurship* pp. 95-120. New York: Macmillan.


SOMO. (2011). *Roundtable on conflict minerals legislation: Towards prevention of trade in conflict minerals and promotion of trade in clean minerals from congo. ( No. 3689).*


# APPENDICES

## APPENDIX A: SAMPLE INTERVIEW PROTOCOL (STUDY I)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic area</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>Opening introduction. Doing in a Ph.D. in business at the Rotterdam School of Management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Note: Set the rules of the game:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Confidentiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Processing of interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Recording – Ask for permission to record interview?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Transcripts – s/he gets a transcript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biographical</strong></td>
<td>What is your background and role within <strong>NORDIC</strong>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Probe—How long have you worked for <strong>NORDIC</strong>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How did you become involved with the CAMPAIGN project?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Your organisation</strong></td>
<td>Tell me about your organisation, <strong>NORDIC</strong>. What does the organisation do?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and the project</td>
<td>Probe—How did your organisation become involved in the human rights in the electronics industry?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(campaign and research)</td>
<td>How did <strong>NORDIC</strong> fund its activities in this project?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What did <strong>NORDIC</strong> hope to achieve within the CAMPAIGN project?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Probe—Who was the target of the project?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thematic area</td>
<td>Question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The social movement</td>
<td>What role did <strong>NORDIC</strong> play in the CAMPAIGN? What did you and your team actually do?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Probe</strong>—What other organisations were involved in the conflict minerals and CAMPAIGN campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges in performing the role</td>
<td>Could you tell me about some positive and negative experiences that you faced as part of the project? What were most difficult challenges that were faced?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>What is your current relationship with CAMPAIGN?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>How did the project end?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship between organisation</td>
<td><strong>Was NORDIC</strong> involved with Fairphone?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Fairphone</td>
<td><strong>What were the main challenges that you saw for Fairphone at the time? (if applicable)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snowballing</td>
<td><strong>What do you think you achieved as NORDIC?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Is there anything else that you that you would like to add?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Who else should I speak with if I want to know more about CAMPAIGN?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close—out</td>
<td><strong>Do you have any questions for me?</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: CHRONOLOGICAL EVENT AND TIMELINE (STUDY I)
Legend

- Events – Time bounded occurrences over which Fairphone actors have no control
- Decisions – choices made by Fairphone actors or by other actors over whom Fairphone actors influence
- Activities – Tasks conducted by Fairphone actors as part of campaign or enterprise repertoires
- States – Situations within organisations

(-) Represents events, decisions, activities that negatively influenced the emergence of enterprise

(+) Represents events, decisions, activities that positively influenced the emergence of enterprise

(+++) Represents critical events, critical decisions that were necessary to eventual emergence of enterprise; precipitating marked changes in entrepreneurial cognition, networks, resources
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common world</th>
<th>Assumption</th>
<th>Mode of evaluation</th>
<th>Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market world</td>
<td>Competition for jobs, money, financial security is good. Trade, i.e., buying and selling is a worthy act</td>
<td>By doing (x), company helps recipients/other companies compete in the market place for resources/jobs etc. By doing (x), company helps government/country win the competition to attract investment/economic value (jobs, money etc.) We are doing (x) because it contributes to the economy, is economically feasible</td>
<td>Demonstration or claim that doing (x) has brought economic value, such as jobs, taxes, financial rent, income, salaries in the context of competition in the short-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry world</td>
<td>Efficiency, professionalism of people is a good</td>
<td>By doing (x), company helps recipients/companies/customers/governments</td>
<td>Demonstration or claim that doing (x) has made some entity (person,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common world</strong></td>
<td><strong>Assumption</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mode of evaluation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Test</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>thing, inefficiency.</td>
<td>become more professional, more competent in performing jobs</td>
<td>company, government) more efficient, more professional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amateurism, lack of professionalism is a bad thing.</td>
<td>We are doing (x) because it is the efficient/competent/ /scientific thing to do</td>
<td>Demonstration through third-party certification that some entity is more professional, more efficient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We doing (x) on the basis of standards/rules.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World of fame</strong></td>
<td>Public recognition, renown is a good thing. The public is an appropriate arbiter of worth</td>
<td>Doing (x) leads to public approval, improved image, better reputation. Doing (x) is good because we have received fame, renown from the public</td>
<td>Demonstration or claim that doing (x) has brought renown, notoriety, fame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common world</strong></td>
<td><strong>Assumption</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mode of evaluation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Test</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic world</td>
<td>We are a “citizen”. We are part of a valued collective</td>
<td>Doing (x) is part of duty as part of collective (the country/the industry/the local context)</td>
<td>Claim that doing (x) leads to equality (of access to some benefit), solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Doing (x) is justified because in doing so, company promotes collective welfare, creating equality (people are on a “level” playing field) or creating solidarity and brotherhood among members of the collective. Doing (x) meets needs of the “common person”, democracy/access for a particular benefit for all people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic world</td>
<td>Tradition, place, hierarchy, history is valuable in itself</td>
<td>Doing (x) is expected due to traditional role. By doing (x) entity (company) is preserving tradition, history, locale, place</td>
<td>Claim that doing (x) leads to trust, preservation of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common world</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>Mode of evaluation</td>
<td>Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspired world</td>
<td>Novelty, creativity, imagination is good. Repetition is bad.</td>
<td>Doing (x) is original, never been done before, a product of genius and creativity</td>
<td>hierarchy or the domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Claim that doing (x) breaks previous mould, or is unique</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUMMARY

Corporations face pressure from governments, civil society groups and consumers to respond to social problems in their operating environments or to improve the sustainability characteristics of their products, services and supply chains. Companies respond to these problems in order to gain legitimacy with these stakeholders while entrepreneurs new develop products/services to take advantage of opportunities to address these social problems through market mechanisms. In this dissertation, I examine two forms of corporate responses to social issues: social entrepreneurship and corporate social action (CSA). Specifically, I aim to theorise the emergence of social entrepreneurship and explicate the implementation and management of CSA in a multinational enterprise (MNE). In addition, I aim to contribute to the practice of organisational ethnography by proposing techniques that researchers may employ to compensate for the limits of traditional interviewing and participant observation in the study of a rapidly-changing organisations.

The three studies in this dissertation advance scholarship in entrepreneurship, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and organisational ethnography. In the first study, I conduct a 15-month study of Amsterdam-based social venture, Fairphone. I argue that effectual entrepreneurial agency is co-constituted by distributed agency, the proactive conferral of material resources and legitimacy to an eventual entrepreneur by actors external to the new venture. I show how, in the context of social movement activism, an effectual network pre-committed resources to an inchoate social enterprise to produce a material artifact because it embodied the moral values of
network members. I develop a model of enterprise emergence based on these findings and theorise the role of material artifacts in effectuation. I suggest that a material artifact served as a boundary object, present in multiple social words and triggering commitment from actors not governed by hierarchical arrangements.

In the second study, I investigate the implementation of corporate social actions (CSA) and public justifications of those actions by a Chinese MNE operating in Kenya. I show how a corporate social responsibility (CSR) programme that is developed in one country to acquiesce to local institutional demands is discursively justified by another subunit of the MNE to constituents geographically removed from the site of those practices. I suggest that the paradox approach to legitimacy management by social action—an approach that has been theorised but not empirically examined—may not lead to inherent conflict as assumed in the literature if the MNE’s cost of acquiescence in one domain is low and institutional pressure in another weak.

In the third study, I investigate the limits of traditional data collection techniques in the ethnography of modern organisations and examine how organisational ethnographers may employ self-documenting practices in these organisations to produce compelling accounts of organisational life. I argue that modern organisations produce voluminous amounts of documentary records and digital data that organisational researchers can exploit to increase the validity of ethnographic studies and produce compelling portraits of modern organisational life. I illustrate my argument by drawing on my 15-month long study of Fairphone. I suggest that by combining analyses of multiple forms of interactions, researchers of modern
organisations can expand the notion of the ethnographic field, which has historically being conceived as a bounded, physical space in which social interactions occur, to include the virtual spaces comprising digitally-mediated interactions that characterise modern organisational life.
SAMENVATTING

Overheden, maatschappelijke groeperingen en consumenten oefenen druk uit op bedrijven om ze te laten reageren op maatschappelijke problemen in hun werkgebied of om de duurzaamheid van hun producten, diensten en wijze van bevoorrading te verbeteren. Bedrijven reageren op deze problemen met de bedoeling om belanghebbenden aan hun kant te krijgen, terwijl ondernemers nieuwe producten/diensten ontwikkelen die hen in de gelegenheid stellen om via marktwerking de maatschappelijke problemen aan te pakken. In deze dissertatie onderzoek ik twee manieren waarop bedrijven reageren op maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen: sociaal ondernemerschap en bedrijfs sociale actie (CSA). Specifiek streef ik ernaar om de opkomst van sociaal ondernemerschap te theoretiseren en de toepassing en management van CSA toe te lichten in een multinationale onderneming (MNO). Tevens streef ik ernaar om een bijdrage te leveren aan de uitvoering van de organisatie-etnografie, door technieken voor te stellen die onderzoekers ter compensatie van de beperkingen die ze ondervinden bij traditionele interview- en observatieparticipatie kunnen gebruiken in het bestuderen van een snel veranderende, moderne organisatie.

De drie studies in deze dissertatie zijn een wetenschappelijke stimulans voor ondernemerschap, maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen (MVO) en organisatie-etnografie. De eerste is een studie van 15 maanden bij de in Amsterdam gevestigde organisatie Fairphone. Ik stel dat de acties van een ondernemer onder een logica van effectuation mede is gevormd door distributed agency, de pro-actieve toekenning van materiële bronnen en legitimiteit voor een mogelijke entrepreneur, gegeven door spelers buiten het
nieuwe bedrijf. Ik toon hoe, in de context van sociaal betrokken activisme, een netwerk van hulpbronnen gaf steun aan een opkomend bedrijf om een tastbaar product te maken omdat het de morele waarden van het netwerk belichaamt. Ik ontwikkel een model van enterprise emergence gebaseerd op deze bevindingen en ik theoretiseer de rol van tastbare artifacts in de ontwikkeling. Ik suggereer dat een tastbaar artifact als een begrensd object dient, aanwezig in meerdere sociale werelden en dat het zorgt voor een verbinding van spelers die niet geleid worden door hiërarchische regelingen.

In de tweede studie, onderzoek ik de realisatie van sociale bedrijfssacties door een Chinese MNO die opereert in Kenia en de publieke rechtvaardiging van die acties. Ik toon hoe een programma voor maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen (MVO) dat ontwikkeld is in het ene land volgens lokale institutionele voorwaarden, discursief is toegestaan door een andere onderafdeling van de MNE die geografisch verwijderd is van de plek van de sociale acties. Ik suggereer dat de paradoxal manier van legitimatie management van sociale actie—een benadering die getheoretiseerd is maar niet empirisch onderzocht—misschien niet leidt tot inherente conflicten zoals verondersteld wordt in de literatuur, mochten de MNO kosten van berusting in één domein laag zijn en internationale druk in een ander zwak is.

In de derde studie onderzoek ik de grenzen van de traditionele technieken voor dataverzameling in de etnografie van moderne organisaties en onderzoek ik hoe organisatie-etnografen de zelf documenterende aspecten van modern organisaties kunnen benutten om sterker, authentische portretten van moderne organisaties te creeren. Ik stel dat moderne organisaties grote hoeveelheden documentatie en digitale data produceren die
organisatieonderzoekers kunnen gebruiken om de validiteit te vergroten van hun etnografische studies en treffende portretten kunnen maken van moderne organisaties. Ik illustreer mijn argument door het schetsen van een 15 maanden lange studie van Fairphone. Ik stel voor dat door het combineren van analyses van verschillende vormen van interactie, onderzoekers hun begrip van het etnografische veld kunnen verbreden. Het etnografische veld, dat historisch gezien beschouwd werd als een begrensde fysieke plek, zal nu ook digitale interactie omvatten die zo kenmerkend is voor moderne organisaties.
This page was intentionally left blank
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

A. Onajomo ‘Ona’ Akemu (Lagos, 1975) received an MBA from London Business School and an M.Sc. in Engineering from Imperial College, London. He joined the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) as a doctoral candidate in 2011 where his research was funded by the Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM). His research interests lie at the intersection of strategic management, entrepreneurship and social issues in management (SIM). Specifically, he aims to understand how business organisations are implicated in the creation and erosion of value for proximate stakeholders, such as employees and shareholders, and for the broader societies in which the organisations are ensconced. In his doctoral dissertation, he examines the emergence of a technology/social venture founded to address a social problem and the implementation of corporate social practices by an established multinational enterprise (MNE). One of the three articles in the dissertation has published in the Journal of Management Studies while another article is under review (R&R2) at a top research methodology journal.

He has presented his research at various conferences including the Academy of Management Conference (Boston, 2012; Anaheim, 2016), EGOS (Rotterdam, 2014) and Process Organization Studies (Kos, 2015). He has also served as an ad-hoc reviewer for Journal of Business Ethics,
Business Ethics Quarterly and Small Business Economics. He was awarded first prize (with Professor Gail Whiteman) in the social entrepreneurship category of the 2015 oikos teaching case competition.

Prior to his doctoral studies, Ona held positions as a technologist and technology consultant in two multinational companies in The Netherlands, United Kingdom and in Siberia, Russia. In addition to conducting social science research, Ona enjoys discovering Italian cuisine and watching his two daughters grow.
# PORTFOLIO

## Publications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Working papers

Akemu, O. The role of signal amplifiers in the longitudinal crowdfunding in technology ventures: Who matters for signalling quality?


Teaching and Supervising Activities

2016  Sustainable Business Models, Masters Global Business and Sustainability, **Rotterdam School of Management**

2015  Thesis Workshop Qualitative Data Analysis, Methodology course for Masters in Business Administration, **University of Amsterdam Graduate School of Business**

2015  Sustainability Leadership and Planetary Boundaries, Masters Global Business and Sustainability, **Rotterdam School of Management**

2013  Leadership, Sustainability and Governance Dilemma Sessions, Masters Global Business and Sustainability, **Rotterdam School of Management**

2011–2013  Innovation & Entrepreneurship, Masters Chinese Business & Economy, **Rotterdam School of Management**
2012–2015 Supervised or co-read 12 Masters (M.Sc.) students theses. Topics include effect of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) on Dutch innovation system, CSR implementation in a multinational enterprise (MNE) in Nigeria, and food marketing in China. Research methods include qualitative (case study, ethnography) and quantitative (survey, regression) designs.

**Doctoral Coursework**

- Strategic entrepreneurship
- Applied econometrics
- Philosophy of science
- Statistical methods
- Introduction to qualitative research methods
- Advanced qualitative research methods
- Advanced logit and probit models
- Economic foundations
- Managerial economics
- Publishing strategy
- Case study research design
- Foundations of international business
### Conferences Attended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 2015</td>
<td>Presented paper ‘Social Enterprise from Social Movement: The Fairphone Case’ at <strong>Seventh International Symposium on Process Organization Studies</strong>. Kos, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2015</td>
<td>Presented paper ‘Social Enterprise from Social Movement: The Fairphone Case’ at conference convened by Guest Editors of <strong>Journal of Management Studies</strong>, Denver, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2015</td>
<td>Presented paper, ‘Social Enterprise Emergence by Distributed Agency: The Fairphone Case’ at Growing Sustainable Businesses Conference hosted by <strong>Tilburg University</strong>, the Corporate Entrepreneurship Research Center, and the Tilburg Sustainability Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2014</td>
<td>Presented paper, ‘How do social movements lead to formation of a market niche’ at paper <strong>European Group for Organisation Studies</strong> (EGOS) Conference, Rotterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2013</td>
<td>Presented paper, ‘Why Should Corporate Social Action Lead to Increased Legitimacy?’ at the 24th conference of the <strong>Chinese Economic Association</strong> conference, Leiden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2012</td>
<td>Presentation: ‘Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Netherlands.’ Presented at the <strong>Clingendael Institute, Den Haag</strong>. Audience: Dutch foreign policy specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2012</td>
<td>Presented paper, ‘CSR of Chinese companies in Sub-Saharan Africa’ at paper development workshop (PDW) at <strong>Academy of Management Conference, Boston</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2012</td>
<td>Presented paper, ‘Chinese Investments in Central Asia: Patterns and Problems.’ at the <strong>International Association of Chinese Management Research Conference, Hong Kong</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This page was intentionally left blank
ERIM PH.D. SERIES IN MANAGEMENT

The ERIM Ph.D. Series contains Ph.D. dissertations in the field of Research in Management defended at Erasmus University Rotterdam and supervised by senior researchers affiliated to the Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM). All dissertations in the ERIM Ph.D. Series are available in full text through the ERIM Electronic Series Portal: http://repub.eur.nl/pub. ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) and the Erasmus School of Economics at the Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR).

DISSERTATIONS IN LAST FIVE YEARS


Benschop, N, *Biases in Project Escalation: Names, frames & construal levels*, Promotors: Prof.dr. K.I.M. Rhode, Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur, Prof.dr. M.Keil & Dr. A.L.P. Nuijten, EPS-2015-375-S&E, hdl.handle.net/1765/79408


Deng, W., *Social Capital and Diversification of Cooperatives*, Promotor(s):
Prof.dr. G.W.J. Hendrikse, EPS-2015-341-ORG,
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77449

http://repub.eur.nl/pub/23268

Dollevoet, T.A.B., *Delay Management and Dispatching in Railways*,
Promotor(s): Prof.dr. A.P.M. Wagelmans, EPS-2013-272-LIS,
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38241

Doorn, S. van, *Managing Entrepreneurial Orientation*, Promotor(s):
Prof.dr. J.J.P. Jansen, Prof.dr.ing. F.A.J. van den Bosch, & Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2012-258- STR, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/32166


Duca, E., *The Impact of Investor Demand on Security Offerings*,
Promotor(s): Prof.dr. A. de Jong, EPS-2011-240-F&A,
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/26041

Duyvesteyn, J.G. *Empirical Studies on Sovereign Fixed Income Markets*,
Promotor(s): Prof.dr. Verwijmeren & Prof.dr. M.P.E. Martens, EPS-2015-361-F&A, hdl.handle.net/1765/79033

Eck, N.J. van, *Methodological Advances in Bibliometric Mapping of Science*, Promotor(s):


Essen, M. van, *An Institution-Based View of Ownership*, Promotor(s):


Evangelidis, I., *Preference Construction under Prominence*, Promotor(s):


Page 336


Korkmaz, E., *Bridging Models and Business: Understanding Heterogeneity in Hidden Drivers of Customer Purchase Behavior*, Promotor(s):
Prof. dr. S.L. van de Velde & Prof. dr. D. Fok, EPS-2014-316-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76008


Loos, M.J.H.M. van der, Molecular Genetics and Hormones: New Frontiers in Entrepreneurship Research, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. A.R.


Page 343


Tuncdogan, A., *Decision Making and Behavioral Strategy: The Role of Regulatory Focus in Corporate Innovation Processes*, Promotor(s):


