http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/11688/ List of Publications en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/30849/ 2011-10-01T00:00:00Z Enhanced surveillance of infections due to the pandemic A(H1N1) influenza virus, which included monitoring for antiviral resistance, was carried out in the Netherlands from late April 2009 through late May 2010. More than 1100 instances of infection with the pandemic A(H1N1) influenza virus from 2009 and 2010 [A(H1N1) 2009] distributed across this period were analyzed. Of these, 19 cases of oseltamivir-resistant virus harboring the H275Y mutation in the neuraminidase (NA) were detected. The mean 50% inhibitory concentration (IC50) levels for oseltamivir- and zanamivir-susceptible A(H1N1) 2009 viruses were 1.4-fold and 2-fold, respectively, lower than for the seasonal A(H1N1) influenza viruses from 2007/2008; for oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) 2009 virus the IC50was 2.9-fold lower. Eighteen of the 19 patients with oseltamivir-resistant virus showed prolonged shedding of the virus and developed resistance while on oseltamivir therapy. Sixteen of these 18 patients had an immunodeficiency, of whom 11 had a hematologic disorder. The two other patients had another underlying disease. Six of the patients who had an underlying disease died; of these, five had received cytostatic or immunosuppressive therapy. No indications for onward transmission of resistant viruses were found. This study showed that the main association for the emergence of cases of oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) 2009 virus was receiving antiviral therapy and having drug-induced immunosuppression or an hematologic disorder. Except for a single case of a resistant virus not linked to oseltamivir therapy, the absence of detection of resistant variants in community specimens and in specimens from contacts of cases with resistant virus suggested that the spread of resistant A(H1N1) 2009 virus was limited. Containment may have been the cumulative result of impaired NA function, successful isolation of the patients, and prophylactic measures to limit exposure. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/33273/ 2011-10-01T00:00:00Z Although increasing data have become available that link human adaptation with specific molecular changes in nonhuman influenza viruses, the molecular changes of these viruses during a large highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAI) outbreak in poultry along with avian-to-human transmission have never been documented. By comprehensive virologic analysis of combined veterinary and human samples obtained during a large HPAI A (H7N7) outbreak in the Netherlands in 2003, we mapped the acquisition of human adaptation markers to identify the public health risk associated with an HPAI outbreak in poultry. Full-length hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), and PB2 sequencing of A (H7N7) viruses obtained from 45 human cases showed amino acid variations at different codons in HA (n = 20), NA (n = 23), and PB2 (n = 23). Identification of the avian sources of human virus infections based on 232 farm sequences demonstrated that for each gene about 50% of the variation was already present in poultry. Polygenic accumulation and farm-to-farm spread of known virulence and human adaptation markers in A (H7N7) virus-infected poultry occurred prior to farm-to-human transmission. These include the independent emergence of HA A143T mutants, accumulation of four NA mutations, and farm-to-farm spread of virus variants harboring mammalian host determinants D701N and S714I in PB2. This implies that HPAI viruses with pandemic potential can emerge directly from poultry. Since the public health risk of an avian influenza virus outbreak in poultry can rapidly change, we recommend virologic monitoring for human adaptation markers among poultry as well as among humans during the course of an outbreak in poultry. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/21488/ 2010-11-01T00:00:00Z The clinical impact of the 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus (pdmH1N1) has been relatively low. However, amino acid substitution D222G in the hemagglutinin of pdmH1N1 has been associated with cases of severe disease and fatalities. D222G was introduced in a prototype pdmH1N1 by reverse genetics, and the effect on virus receptor binding, replication, antigenic properties, and pathogenesis and transmission in animal models was investigated. pdmH1N1 with D222G caused ocular disease in mice without further indications of enhanced virulence in mice and ferrets. pdmH1N1 with D222G retained transmissibility via aerosols or respiratory droplets in ferrets and guinea pigs. The virus displayed changes in attachment to human respiratory tissues in vitro, in particular increased binding to macrophages and type II pneumocytes in the alveoli and to tracheal and bronchial submucosal glands. Virus attachment studies further indicated that pdmH1N1 with D222G acquired dual receptor specificity for complex α2,3- and α2,6-linked sialic acids. Molecular dynamics modeling of the hemagglutinin structure provided an explanation for the retention of α2,6 binding. Altered receptor specificity of the virus with D222G thus affected interaction with cells of the human lower respiratory tract, possibly explaining the observed association with enhanced disease in humans. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/27599/ 2010-05-01T00:00:00Z An epizootic of avian influenza (H7N7) caused a large number of human infections in The Netherlands in 2003. We used data from this epizootic to estimate infection probabilities for persons involved in disease control on infected farms. Analyses were based on databases containing information on the infected farms, person-visits to these farms, and exposure variables (number of birds present, housing type, poultry type, depopulation method, period during epizootic). Case definition was based on self-reported conjunctivitis and positive response to hemagglutination inhibition assay. A high infection probability was associated with clinical inspection of poultry in the area surrounding infected flocks (7.6%; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.4%-18.9%) and active culling during depopulation (6.2%; 95% CI, 3.7%-9.6%). Low probabilities were estimated for management of biosecurity (0.0%; 95% CI, 0.0%-1.0%) and cleaning assistance during depopulation (0.0%; 95% CI, 0.0%-9.2%). No significant association was observed between the probability of infection and the exposure variables. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/27386/ 2010-04-01T00:00:00Z In the first 6 months of the H1N1 swine-origin influenza virus (S-OIV) pandemic, the vast majority of infections were relatively mild. It has been postulated that mutations in the viral genome could result in more virulent viruses, leading to a more severe pandemic. Mutations E627K and D701N in the PB2 protein have previously been identified as determinants of avian and pandemic influenza virus virulence in mammals. These mutations were absent in S-OIVs detected early in the 2009 pandemic. Here, using reverse genetics, mutations E627K, D701N, and E677G were introduced into the prototype S-OIV A/Netherlands/602/2009, and their effects on virus replication, virulence, and transmission were investigated. Mutations E627K and D701N caused increased reporter gene expression driven by the S-OIV polymerase complex. None of the three mutations affected virus replication in vitro. The mutations had no major impact on virus replication in the respiratory tracts of mice and ferrets or on pathogenesis. All three mutant viruses were transmitted via aerosols or respiratory droplets in ferrets. Thus, the impact of key known virulence markers in PB2 in the context of current S-OIVs was surprisingly small. This study does not exclude the possibility of emergence of S-OIVs with other virulence-associated mutations in the future. We conclude that surveillance studies aimed at detecting S-OIVs with increased virulence or transmission should not rely solely on virulence markers identified in the past but should include detailed characterization of virus phenotypes, guided by genetic signatures of viruses detected in severe cases of disease in humans. Copyright http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/27548/ 2010-03-01T00:00:00Z Introduction of a new influenza virus in humans urges quick analysis of its virological and immunological characteristics to determine the impact on public health and to develop protective measures for the human population. At present, however, the necessity of executing pandemic influenza virus research under biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) high-containment conditions severely hampers timely characterization of such viruses. We tested heat, formalin, Triton X-100, and β-propiolactone treatments for their potencies in inactivating human influenza A(H3N2) and avian A(H7N3) viruses, as well as seasonal and pandemic A(H1N1) virus isolates, while allowing the specimens to retain their virological and immunological properties. Successful heat inactivation coincided with the loss of hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) characteristics, and β-propiolactone inactivation reduced the hemagglutination titer and NA activity of the human influenza virus 10-fold or more. Although Triton X-100 treatment resulted in inconsistent HA activity, the NA activities in culture supernatants were enhanced consistently. Nonetheless, formalin treatment permitted the best retention of HA and NA properties. Triton X-100 treatment proved to be the easiest-to-use influenza virus inactivation protocol for application in combination with phenotypic NA inhibitor susceptibility assays, while formalin treatment preserved B-cell and T-cell epitope antigenicity, allowing the detection of both humoral and cellular immune responses. In conclusion, we demonstrated successful influenza virus characterization using formalin- and Triton X-100-inactivated virus samples. Application of these inactivation protocols limits work under BSL-3 conditions to virus culture, thus enabling more timely determination of public health impact and development of protective measures when a new influenza virus, e.g., pandemic A(H1N1)v virus, is introduced in humans. Copyright http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/28418/ 2010-02-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/28404/ 2010-01-01T00:00:00Z Background: Rapid and specific molecular tests for identification of the recently identified pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 virus as well as rapid molecular tests to identify antiviral resistant strains are urgently needed. Objectives: We have evaluated the performance of two novel reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reactions (RT-PCRs) targeting specifically hemagglutinin and neuraminidase of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 virus in combination with a conserved matrix PCR. In addition, we investigated the performance of a novel discrimination RT-PCR for detection of the H275Y resistance mutation in the neuraminidase gene. Study design: Clinical performance of both subtype specific RT-PCR assays was evaluated through analysis of 684 throat swaps collected from individuals meeting the WHO case definition for the novel pandemic influenza virus. Analytical performance was analyzed through testing of 10-fold serial dilutions of RNA derived from the first Dutch sequenced and cultured confirmed case of novel pandemic influenza infection. Specificity and discriminative capacities of the H275Y discrimination assay were performed by testing wild type and recombinant H275Y pandemic influenza. Results: 121 throat swaps collected from April 2009 to July 2009 were positive by at least two out of three RT-PCRs, and negative for the seasonal H3/H1 subtype specific RT-PCR assays. 117 of these were tested positive for all three (Ct-values from 15.1 to 36.8). No oseltamivir resistance was detected. Conclusions: We present a sensitive and specific approach for detection of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 and a rapid RT-PCR assay detecting a primary oseltamivir resistance mutation which can be incorporated easily into clinical virology algorithms. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/24422/ 2009-07-01T00:00:00Z Background: Experience with a highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak in the Netherlands (2003) illustrated that the diagnostic demand for respiratory viruses at different biosafety levels (including BSL3), can increase unexpectedly and dramatically. Objectives: We describe the measures taken since, aimed at strengthening national laboratory surge capacity and improving preparedness for dealing with diagnostic demand during outbreaks of (emerging) respiratory virus infections, including pandemic influenza virus. Study design: Academic and peripheral medical-microbiological laboratories collaborated to determine minimal laboratory requirements for the identification of viruses in the early stages of a pandemic or a large outbreak of avian influenza virus. Next, an enhanced collaborative national network of outbreak assistance laboratories (OAL) was set up. An inventory was made of the maximum diagnostic throughput that this network can deliver in a period of intensified demand. For an estimate of the potential magnitude of this surge demand, historical counts were calculated from hospital- and physician-based registries of patients presenting with respiratory symptoms. Results: Number of respiratory physician-visits ranged from 140,000 to 615,000 per month and hospitalizations ranged from 3000 to 11,500 per month. The established OAL-network provides rapid diagnostic response with agreed quality requirements and a maximum throughput capacity of 1275 samples/day (38,000 per month), assuming other routine diagnostic work needs to be maintained. Conclusions: Thus surge demand for diagnostics for hospitalized cases (if not distinguishable from other respiratory illness) could be handled by the OAL network. Assessing etiology of community acquired acute respiratory infection however, may rapidly exceed the capacity of the network. Therefore algorithms are needed for triaging for laboratory diagnostics; currently this is not addressed in pandemic preparedness plans. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/24423/ 2009-07-01T00:00:00Z Background: Late April 2009, human infection with variant influenza virus A(H1N1)v emerged in the Northern Americas posing a threat that this virus may become the next pandemic influenza virus. Objectives: To prepare laboratories for surge capacity for molecular diagnosis of patients suspected for A(H1N1)v infection in the Netherlands. Study design: A panel of 10 blinded specimens containing seasonal A(H1N1) or A(H3N2), or A/Netherlands/602/2009(H1N1)v influenza virus, or negative control was distributed to the outbreak assistance laboratories (OAL) together with influenza virus A (M-gene), swine influenza virus A (NP-gene) and influenza virus A(H1N1)v (H1v-gene) specific primers and probes and protocol (CDC Atlanta, USA). Laboratories were asked to implement and test this protocol. Results: All OAL were able to detect A(H1N1)v using the CDC M-gene reagents, the majority with similar sensitivity as the in-house M-gene based assays. RT-PCRs used in routine diagnostic setting in the OAL specifically designed to detect H1, H3, or NS1 from seasonal influenza A viruses, did not or at very low level cross-react with A(H1N1)v. The CDC swine NP-gene and H1v-gene RT-PCRs showed somewhat reduced sensitivity compared to the CDC and in-house M-gene RT-PCRs. In contrast, in-house developed A(H1N1)v specific H1v-gene and N1v-gene RT-PCRs showed equal sensitivity to CDC and in-house M-gene RT-PCRs. Conclusions: The Dutch OAL are prepared for detection and specific identification of A(H1N1)v, although some level of cross-reactivity was observed with seasonal influenza viruses. Additionally, M-gene based generic influenza A virus detection is recommended to be able to detect emerging influenza A viruses in routine settings. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/3978/ 2004-02-21T00:00:00Z Background: An outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus subtype H7N7 started at the end of February, 2003, in commercial poultry farms in the Netherlands. Although the risk of transmission of these viruses to humans was initially thought to be low, an outbreak investigation was launched to assess the extent of transmission of influenza A virus subtype H7N7 from chickens to humans. Methods: All workers in poultry farms, poultry farmers, and their families were asked to report signs of conjunctivitis or influenza-like illness. People with complaints were tested for influenza virus type A subtype H7 (A/H7) infection and completed a health questionnaire about type of symptoms, duration of illness, and possible exposures to infected poultry. Findings: 453 people had health complaints—349 reported conjunctivitis, 90 had influenza-like illness, and 67 had other complaints. We detected A/H7 in conjunctival samples from 78 (26·4%) people with conjunctivitis only, in five (9·4%) with influenza-like illness and conjunctivitis, in two (5·4%) with influenza-like illness only, and in four (6%) who reported other symptoms. Most positive samples had been collected within 5 days of symptom onset. A/H7 infection was confirmed in three contacts (of 83 tested), one of whom developed influenza-like illness. Six people had influenza A/H3N2 infection. After 19 people had been diagnosed with the infection, all workers received mandatory influenza virus vaccination and prophylactic treatment with oseltamivir. More than half (56%) of A/H7 infections reported here arose before the vaccination and treatment programme. Interpretation: We noted an unexpectedly high number of transmissions of avian influenza A virus subtype H7N7 to people directly involved in handling infected poultry, and we noted evidence for person-to-person transmission. Our data emphasise the importance of adequate surveillance, outbreak preparedness, and pandemic planning.