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    <title>Lanteri, A.</title>
    <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/13767/</link>
    <description>List of Publications</description>
    <language>en</language>
    
    <item>
      <title>An experimental investigation of emotions and reasoning in the trolley problem (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14343/</link>
      <pubDate>2008-12-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Elaborating on the notions that humans possess different modalities of decision-making and that these are often influenced by moral considerations, we conducted an experimental investigation of the Trolley Problem. We presented the participants with two standard scenarios ('lever' and 'stranger') either in the usual or in reversed order. We observe that responses to the lever scenario, which result from (moral) reasoning, are affected by our manipulation; whereas responses to the stranger scenario, triggered by moral emotions, are unaffected. Furthermore, when asked to express general moral opinions on the themes of the Trolley Problem, about half of the participants reveal some inconsistency with the responses they had previously given.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>The Moral Trial: On Ethics and Economics (Doctoral Thesis)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12050/</link>
      <pubDate>2008-04-09T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>This dissertation investigates the experimental evidence exposing how economists’ behaviour differs from that of non-economists, in that economists display more self-interested conduct. A veritable Moral Trial has stemmed from that evidence, in which it is argued that economists are selfish, thus immoral, and it is recommended that we change the teaching of economics. I therefore disassemble the Moral Trial (Section I) and examine the psychological and logical soundness of both evidence and charges (Section II) and I find them lacking in several respects. I also suggest (Section III) a novel interpretation of the evidence: economists frame situations in a way that makes them believe self-interested conduct is fine and therefore behave self-interestedly on several occasions. This peculiar behaviour is probably responsible for the unflattering economic stereotype, which in turn represents a benchmark for young economics students. These explanations of economics students’ behaviour seem sounder than the one prevailing in the literature – namely self-selection, or the fact that selfish people voluntarily enrol in economics (no persuasive rationale has yet been proposed for self-selection). The explanations advanced here, moreover, reject any deep difference between economists and non-economists, which would make it difficult to square with the observations that, on some occasions, economists behave no more selfishly than non-economists. Finally, since the behavioural gap narrows after graduation, it seems that economics teaching has some consequences on its students, but that these consequences wear off with time. The Moral Trial should therefore not be cause of too much concern about the ethics of economists.</description>
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      <title>The Economics of Rhetoric: On Metaphors as Institutions (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/8199/</link>
      <pubDate>2006-04-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>The professional life of economists takes place within the boundaries of the institution of academic economics. Belonging to the institution enable economists in many ways. It provides a context wherein their contribution is meaningful. But it constrains, too, what economists are allowed to do or say. Thus, institutions both enable and constrain individual action. Metaphors do the same and are therefore, in this respect, institutions. They are placeholders to communicate our beliefs, feelings, and thoughts. So far, there is nothing wrong. This may become a problem, however, as Richard Rorty has once said, when the “happenstance of our cultural development [is] that we got stuck so long with place-holders.” In the essay we focus on the enabling and disabling roles of metaphors as institutions in the rhetoric of economics. We argue, from the perspective of economics of rhetoric, that some of the metaphors can lead us to path dependent circumstances where the performance of the metaphors is not as desirable as it was when the metaphors were first introduced. Sometimes certain metaphors undergo exaptation, and are employed with new functions. Altogether, we believe, the tools of institutional economics can be fruitfully employed to study metaphors.</description>
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