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    <title>Gorter, J.</title>
    <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/14029/</link>
    <description>List of Publications</description>
    <language>en</language>
    
    <item>
      <title>Hoe wordt Nederland Miss Europe? (In Book)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12030/</link>
      <pubDate>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>De Nederlandse welvaartsstaat is niet voldoende toegesneden op
de toekomst. De vergrijzing jaagt de kosten van de oudedagsvoorziening
en de zorg op, waardoor de spanning tussen jong en
oud groeit. Tegelijkertijd dreigen economische integratie en technologische
ontwikkeling de positie van laaggeschoolden op de arbeidsmarkt
te verslechteren (Nahuis en De Groot, 2003). Verder is
de verzorgingsstaat onvoldoende aangepast aan de toegenomen
heterogeniteit in de samenleving en werken instituties langdurige
inactiviteit in de hand. Er moet daarom verder worden hervormd
in de Nederlandse verzorgingsstaat. Maar hoe?</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Who benefits from tax competition in the European Union? (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/10903/</link>
      <pubDate>2006-08-22T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>This memo documents version 7 of the model, which is used in in Bettendorf et al. (2006). The
first chapter documents the derivation of the equations. The calibration of the model is described
in chapter 2. Section 1.1 derives the first-order conditions for consumption and labour supply
from utility-maximising households. Section 1.2 derives from profit maximisation, the demand
for labour, capital, location specific capital, intermediate inputs and financial assets for domestic
and multinational firms. Taxes on corporate income, labour income, consumption and wealth are
introduced when appropriate. The tax revenues have to meet the government expenditures on
consumption, transfers and debt, see section 1.3. The market equilibria and the linkages with the
Rest of the World are presented in section 1.4. Section 1.5 presents the solution procedure.
Notation follows some simple rules. Upper case symbols are used for aggregated values
whereas lower case characters are reserved for per capita variables (in terms of the young
generation in the country of origin). In the case of variables with two dimensions, the first index
refers to the country which owns the resource (residence), whereas the second index denotes the
using country (destination). Time subscripts and country indices are dropped in the exposition
whenever this is possible.
The rates of return on bonds ( ˆ rwb) and equities ( ˆ rwe) are assumed fixed. The considered
countries are small in the sense that they can import (or export) capital from the Rest of the
World (ROW) without affecting the world interest rates. In other words, the net supply of capital
by the ROW is perfectly elastic. Multinationals are assumed to operate only in the other ‘small’
countries, but not in the ROW (and vice versa). The ROW block does not need to be fully
modelled. International capital and good flows are restricted by the current account for each
country.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Cooperation in a modified version of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11674/</link>
      <pubDate>1997-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>In this paper we consider a series of finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which the payoff the players receive in a period depends on how they have played the game in the past. We show that this modification of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game makes cooperation a feasible equilibrium configuration in the beginning of play.</description>
    </item>
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