http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/14199/ List of Publications en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/23950/ 2011-06-06T00:00:00Z We analyze several proposals to restrict CEO compensation and calibrate two models of executive compensation that describe how firms would react to different types of restrictions. We find that many restrictions would have unintended consequences. Restrictions on total realized (ex-post) payouts lead to higher average compensation, higher rewards for mediocre performance, lower risk-taking incentives, and the fact that some CEOs would be better off with a restriction than without it. Restrictions on total ex-ante pay lead to a reduction in the firm's demand for CEO talent and effort. Restrictions on particular pay components, and especially on cash payouts, can be easily circumvented. While restrictions on option pay lead to lower risk-taking incentives, restrictions on incentive pay (stock and options) result in higher risk-taking incentives. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/19567/ 2010-01-01T00:00:00Z We analyze the role of bankers on the boards of German non-financial companies for the period from 1994 to 2005. We find that banks that are represented on a firm's board promote their own business as lenders and as M&A advisors. They also seem to act as financial experts who help firms to obtain funding, especially in difficult times. We find little evidence that bankers monitor management and suggest that bankers on the board cause a decline in the valuations of non-financial firms. Banks' equity ownership declined sharply during our sample period and the German financial system lost some of its formerly distinctive features. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/13574/ 2008-08-25T00:00:00Z Between 1997 and 2004, Preussag, a diversified German conglomerate of "old economy" businesses, transformed itself into TUI, a company focused almost entirely on tourism and logistics. We analyze how Preussag executed this change, and how the change contributed to Preussag's underperformance in the stock market. We find that only the divestitures created value, that the strategy to invest in tourism destroyed value, and that the acquisition premiums Preussag paid were mostly unjustified. The case shows how divestiture programs increase the liquid resources available to management and casts doubt on the positive governance role of institutional blockholders. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11212/ 2007-02-01T00:00:00Z We calibrate the standard principal–agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices to a sample of 598 U.S. CEOs. We show that this model predicts that most CEOs should not hold any stock options. Instead, CEOs should have lower base salaries and receive additional shares in their companies; many would be required to purchase additional stock in their companies. These contracts would reduce average compensation costs by 20% while providing the same incentives and the same utility to CEOs. We conclude that the standard principal–agent model typically used in the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11345/ 2006-05-09T00:00:00Z In the period 1997-2004, Preussag, a diversified German conglomerate of old economy businesses, changed itself into TUI, a company focused almost entirely on tourism and logistics. This paper analyzes how this strategy was executed and how it contributed to Preussag's underperformance of the stock market. We collect 417 announcements of acquisitions, financial disclosures and other news and disentangle the impact of different parts of the company's strategy. We find that only the divestitures created value, that the strategy to invest in tourism destroyed value, and that the acquisition premiums Preussag paid were mostly unjustified. Bad luck like the events of September 11, 2001 cannot account for the poor performance of the stock. Poor management resulted from poor governance, combining a state-owned bank as the largest shareholder, board interlocks, and insufficient managerial incentives. The case shows how divestiture programs increase the liquid resources available to management beyond free operating cash flows and casts doubt on the positive governance role of institutional blockholders. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11350/ 2004-12-01T00:00:00Z This paper studies how the use of alternative valuation methodologies affects investment performance for a sample of 53 German venture capitalists. We measure investment performance by the amount of investments they need to write off and by the number of companies they take public. We find that a significant number of investment managers use discounted cash flow (DCF) techniques, but only a minority appears to use a discount rate related to the cost of capital. The majority applies DCF using subjective discount rates. We present evidence that the use of DCF is correlated with superior investment performance only if applied in conjunction with an objectifiable discount rate. Also, funds that invest with a longer horizon perform better. The use of multiples is not significantly correlated with investment performance. We conclude that a focus on fundamental values confers an advantage.