http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/14301/ List of Publications en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/38998/ 2013-02-08T00:00:00Z This paper explores the goals and implementation of reforms introducing choice of and competition among insurers providing statutory health coverage in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. In theory, health insurance competition can enhance efficiency in health care administration and delivery only if people have free choice of insurer (consumer mobility), if insurers do not have incentives to select risks, and if insurers are able to influence health service quality and costs. In practice, reforms in the four countries have not always prioritised efficiency and implementation has varied. Differences in policy goals explain some but not all of the differences in implementation. Despite significant investment in risk adjustment, incentives for risk selection remain and consumer mobility is not evenly distributed across the population. Better risk adjustment might make it easier for older and less healthy people to change insurer. Policy makers could also do more to prevent insurers from linking the sale of statutory and voluntary health insurance, particularly where take-up of voluntary coverage is widespread. Collective negotiation between insurers and providers in Belgium, Germany and Switzerland curbs insurers' ability to influence health care quality and costs. Nevertheless, while insurers in the Netherlands have good access to efficiency-enhancing tools, data and capacity constraints and resistance from stakeholders limit the extent to which tools are used. The experience of these countries offers an important lesson to other countries: it is not straightforward to put in place the conditions under which health insurance competition can enhance efficiency. Policy makers should not, therefore, underestimate the challenges involved. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/37510/ 2010-04-01T00:00:00Z The effects of supplemental health insurance on health-care consumption crucially depend on specific institutional features of the health-care system. We analyse the situation in Belgium, a country with a very broad coverage in compulsory social health insurance and where supplemental insurance mainly refers to extra-billing in hospitals. Within this institutional background, we find only weak evidence of adverse selection in the coverage of supplemental health insurance. We find much stronger effects of socio-economic background. We estimate a bivariate probit model and cannot reject the assumption of exogeneity of insurance availability for the explanation of health-care use. A count model for hospital care shows that supplemental insurance has no significant effect on the number of spells, but a negative effect on the number of nights per spell. We comment on the implications of our findings for equality of access to health care in Belgium. Copyright http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/16988/ 2009-10-01T00:00:00Z Objectives: Although there is a comprehensive public health insurance system in Belgium, out-of-pocket expenditures can be very high, mainly for inpatients. While a large part of the official price is reimbursed, patients are confronted with increased extra billing (supplements). Therefore, the government imposed various restrictions on the amount of supplements to be charged, related to the type of room and the patient's insurance status. We investigate how prices are set and whether the restrictions have been effective. Methods: We use an administrative dataset of the Belgian sickness funds for the year 2003 with billing data per hospitalisation and hospital characteristics. Boxplots describe the distribution of several categories of supplements. OLS is used to explore the relationship between hospital characteristics and extra billing. Results: There is a large and intransparent variation in extra billing practices among different hospitals. Given the room type, supplements per day are smaller for patients qualifying for protection, confirming that the regulation is applied quite well. However, because of their longer length of stay this does not result in lower supplements per stay for these patients. Conclusions: Currently the price setting behavior of providers lacks transparency. Protective regulation could be refined by taking into account the longer length of stay of vulnerable groups. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/37570/ 2007-01-01T00:00:00Z Ondanks de genomen beschermingsmaatregelen (bv. de maximumfactuur) zijn de eigen betalingen voor gezondheidszorg van de patiënten gedurende de laatste jaren gestegen. Deze eigen betalingen bestaan uit remgelden en supplementen. In dit artikel onderzoeken we de sociale gevolgen van deze evolutie: we analyseren de omvang van de supplementen en vooral ook hun verdeling over de Belgische bevolking. De analyses gebeuren op basis van de administratieve gegevens van de terugbetalingen binnen de verplichte ziekteverzekering in 2003 voor een steekproef van 300.000 individuen. We vinden dat http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/37571/ 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z Overal in Europa komt de financiering van publieke systemen van ziekteverzekering of gezondheidszorg onder druk door de sterke stijging van de uitgaven. België ontsnapt niet aan deze evolutie. De stijging van de uitgaven voor gezondheidszorg lag bij ons zeker gedurende de laatste jaren zelfs duidelijk boven het Europese gemiddelde. Ondanks de grote maatschappelijke populariteit van ons systeem van verplichte ziekteverzekering, vormt het probleem van de kostenbeheersing toch steeds één van de belangrijkste discussiepunten tijdens de regeringsonderhandelingen. Wanneer de stijging van de uitgaven niet kan worden afgeremd, zullen in de toekomst ongetwijfeld fundamentele vragen over de organisatie van het systeem naar voor worden geschoven (Schokkaert en Van de Voorde, 2003). http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11384/ 2001-08-29T00:00:00Z The effects of cost sharing on the demand for ambulatory care in experimental circumstances are well understood since the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). However, in a non-experimental real-world context, supplier-induced demand of doctors might erode some of the significant negative out-of-pocket price elasticity identified in the HIE. Belgium is an interesting test case for this hypothesis because it has relatively high rates of patient cost sharing in its public health insurance system and a very high density of physicians, all remunerated fee-for-service. We have exploited the price variation generated by a substantial increase in patient co-payment rates in 1994 to estimate out-of-pocket price elasticities for three groups of users, and for three types of services using a fixed-effects model in levels and in differences. We obtain significant out-of-pocket price elasticities for the general population in the range from -0.39 to -0.28 for GP home visits, -0.16 to -0.12 for GP office visits and -0.10 for specialist visits. The estimates were generally lower and less significant for the groups of elderly and disabled. The differences we find in price responsiveness appear to be fairly robust and consistent with the HIE predictions. These results suggest that - at least in the short run - non-experimental utilization effects of cost sharing are very similar to the experimental evidence, even in a situation of favourable conditions for supplier-induced demand.