Tijs, S.H.( S.H. Tijs)
bargaining solution property bargaining solutions bargaining solution point theorem proof koster risk sensitivity proposition player kalai utility section sensitivity paper bargaining problem peter example player i theorem 3.1 pareto optimality pareto result bargaining pairs continuity lr *+ r element =e sc t 2- person bargaining nonsymmetric nash solutions vertice kihlstrom equivuktt utility representations equivalent utility representations science two-ptison bargaining games schmeidler bargaining solution f bargaining solutions ft ba rgaining solutions independence 3.1 / bargaining solutions roth theorem 4.1. triangle e @and f bargaining solutions r alternative nash solution f transfer property lr *be section 3 methods oper utility transfers section 4 utility sj slope tit example 4.2. proposition 2.1. tijs university comprehensiveness property disagreement point risk aversion maps f wakker institute characterization proposition completer science fa &y bargaining solutioas netherlands p solutions p corollary 2.4. =p properry player 2 game situation gob -.. properties proof nash solution
1 Most Recent Publications
Risk Sensitivity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Continuity of Bargaining Solutions
Koster, M.B.M. de Peters, H.J.M. Tijs, S.H. Wakker, P.P.