http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/14656/ List of Publications en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12288/ 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z In this paper advisors are selected by two ministers with conflicting interests in order to (1) acquire information, and (2) obtain political legitimacy concerning a project. In the end, parliament decides whether or not the project, of which the consequences are uncertain, is implemented. In principle a minister wants to appoint an advisor whose preferences are similar. However, since the advisor needs to convince the decisive player in the model, the minister may appoint an advisor whose preferences are closer to those of the agents to be persuaded. We also show when polarised advice occurs (the advisors have different preferences) and when consensual advice occurs (they have the same preferences). http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12296/ 1999-01-01T00:00:00Z This article analyzes a model of the policy decision process in ministerial governments. A spending minister and a finance minister are involved in making a decision concerning a public project. The two ministers have partially conflicting preferences. Policy decisions are made in two stages. In the first stage the spending minister consults a technical expert to obtain information about the technical consequences of the project. If the technical consequences are favourable, in the second stage the finance minister consults a financial expert to obtain information about the financial consequences. The finance minister can veto a proposal for undertaking the project. This article illustrates the consequences of specialization for information transmission. A drawback of specialization is that projects are evaluated on the basis of their individual consequences rather than on the basis of their total consequences. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12297/ 1998-01-01T00:00:00Z We analyse a game theoretical model in which policy makers have superior knowledge about the working of the economy relative to voters. We show that parties increase their chances of reelection by basing their policies on the model that best fits in with their preferences. Moreover, we show that if parties care much about holding office, they may deliberately base their policies on a model that is electorally attractive, even if this model does not describe the working of the economy correctly. Our paper provides an explanation for the observation that different political parties subscribe to different economic philosophies. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12300/ 1997-01-01T00:00:00Z In this paper we consider a model where a policy maker uses advice in order to (1) obtain information about the consequences of an innovation (information motive) and (2) to support political legitimacy of her decision (persuasion motive). We conduct our analysis in the context of a cheap-talk game with three players: (1) a policy maker, (2) the median voter in parliament or of the electorate and (3) an advisor. The advisor has private information about the consequences of policy. Communication between an advisor and a recipient improves as their preferences are closer aligned. If the preferences of the policy maker and the median voter are different the policy maker faces a trade-off. On the one hand, she wants to gain information to judge whether the innovation is worthwhile. On the other hand, she needs to convince the median voter whether the innovation is desirable. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12301/ 1997-01-01T00:00:00Z In this paper we discuss a recent paper by Stephen E Haynes in which he relates electoral cycles in political support to electoral cycles in economic variables Haynes finds that the cycle in support for Republican presidents is explained by the cycle in economic variables, whereas the cycle in support for Democratic presidents is not In our opinion this shortcoming is due to his specification of the popularity function Haynes estimates a popularity function which incorporates the notion that voters reward the incumbent for favourable outcomes (score hypothesis) Our popularity function combines the score hypothesis and the notion that voters cast then ballots for the party that best fits the current economic situation (issue hypothesis) We show that the electoral cycle in popularity of both Republican and Democratic presidents is explained very well by the cycle in economic variables.