http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/16794/ List of Publications en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/18056/ 2009-03-01T00:00:00Z In order to induce people to follow rules, sanctions are often introduced. In this paper we argue for the importance of studying the positive influence of sanctioning systems on people's moral convictions regarding the rule advocated by the sanction and of studying factors that moderate this influence. In three experiments we tested the influence of sanction severity and showed that severe sanctions evoke stronger moral judgments with regard to rule-breaking behavior and stronger social disapproval towards rule-breakers than mild sanctions. This was particularly the case when trust in authorities is high rather than low. Implications of these findings are discussed. Also, a framework is proposed to understand the possible circumstances that determine whether sanctions either increase or decrease moral norms. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14503/ 2007-12-01T00:00:00Z In the present paper, we stress the importance of the concept respect in a wide variety of social settings and provide a working definition of this concept by emphasizing how respect relates to the act of communicating full recognition to other people on the dimensions of belongingness and morality. Subsequently, in two separate parts, we discuss why respect is so desired and valued. The first part looks at respect as a means to fulfil important human social concerns (“respect as a means to an end”). The second part looks at the potential moral underpinnings of respect and thus interprets “respect as an end in itself.” Finally, it is suggested that both reasons to value respect explain respect effects as a function of the working selfconcept that is salient (i.e., pragmatic versus idealistic self). http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14573/ 2006-10-01T00:00:00Z Previous social dilemma research has shown that sanctioning defection may enhance cooperation. The authors argue that this finding may have resulted from restricting participants to two behaviors (cooperation and defection). In this article, the authors introduce the concept of a "social trilemma" (a social dilemma in which an alternative option to defect is present) and tested the effect of a sanction. The authors show that a sanction only increased cooperation and collective interests in the traditional social dilemma. In a social trilemma, the sanction failed because it caused some people to choose the alternative option to defect. Moreover, the results indicate that this was especially the case when people did not expect fellow group members to cooperate. In this case, the sanction even worked counterproductive because it decreased collective interests. It is concluded that allowing individuals to consider alternative options to defect can reveal the potential detrimental effects of sanctioning systems for the collective. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14980/ 2006-03-01T00:00:00Z Sanctioning systems in social dilemmas are often meant to increase trust in others and to increase cooperation. We argue, however, that sanctioning systems may also give people the idea that others act in their own self-interest and undermine the belief that others are internally motivated to cooperate. We developed the “Removing The Sanction” paradigm and a new trust manipulation, and showed in three experiments that when there is a sanction on defection, trust in others being internally motivated to cooperate is undermined: Participants who had experienced the presence of a sanctioning system trusted fellow group members less than participants who had not. In a similar vein, the sanction undermined cooperation when trust was initially high. The implications of these paradoxical findings are discussed. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14993/ 2005-06-01T00:00:00Z When do people support sanctioning systems in social dilemmas? Sanctions increase collective efficiency, but have the disadvantage of restricting people’s autonomy. This paper studies the effects of feedback about collective (in)efficiency and the influence of the presence or absence of a sanctioning system. The results show that, except after feedback about collective inefficiency, people were reluctant to support installation of a sanctioning system. When a sanctioning system was already present, however, sanction support was strong and not affected by feedback. Interestingly, the presence of a sanctioning system increased pessimism about attaining collective efficiency. This suggests that the mere presence of a sanctioning system creates the need to have that sanctioning system, and that installing one can have irreversible consequences.