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  <channel>
    <title>Pecher, D.</title>
    <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/1776/</link>
    <description>List of Publications</description>
    <language>en</language>
    
    <item>
      <title>Decomposing the interaction between retention interval and study/test practice: The role of retrievability (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/38590/</link>
      <pubDate>2012-05-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Even without feedback, test practice enhances delayed performance compared to study practice, but the size of the effect is variable across studies. We investigated the benefit of testing, separating initially retrievable items from initially nonretrievable items. In two experiments, an initial test determined item retrievability. Retrievable or nonretrievable items were subsequently presented for repeated study or test practice. Collapsing across items, in Experiment 1, we obtained the typical cross-over interaction between retention interval and practice type. For retrievable items, however, the cross-over interaction was quantitatively different, with a small study benefit for an immediate test and a larger testing benefit after a delay. For nonretrievable items, there was a large study benefit for an immediate test, but one week later there was no difference between the study and test practice conditions. In Experiment 2, initially nonretrievable items were given additional study followed by either an immediate test or even more additional study, and one week later performance did not differ between the two conditions. These results indicate that the effect size of study/test practice is due to the relative contribution of retrievable and nonretrievable items. </description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Mighty metaphors: Behavioral and ERP evidence that power shifts attention on a vertical dimension (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/32618/</link>
      <pubDate>2012-02-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Thinking about the abstract concept power may automatically activate the spatial up-down image schema (powerful up; powerless down) and consequently direct spatial attention to the image schema-congruent location. Participants indicated whether a word represented a powerful or powerless person (e.g. 'king' or 'servant'). Following each decision, they identified a target at the top or bottom of the visual field. In Experiment 1 participants identified the target faster when their spatial position was congruent with the perceived power of the preceding word than when it was incongruent. In Experiment 2 ERPs showed a higher N1 amplitude for congruent spatial positions. These results support the view that attention is driven to the image schema congruent location of a power word. Thus, power is partially understood in terms of vertical space, which demonstrates that abstract concepts are grounded in sensory-motor processing. </description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>The sound of enemies and friends in the neighborhood: Phonology mediates activation of neighbor semantics (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/32621/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-12-28T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Previous studies (e.g., Pecher, Zeelenberg, &amp; Wagenmakers, 2005) found that semantic classification performance is better for target words with orthographic neighbors that are mostly from the same semantic class (e.g., living) compared to target words with orthographic neighbors that are mostly from the opposite semantic class (e.g., nonliving). In the present study we investigated the contribution of phonology to orthographic neighborhood effects by comparing effects of phonologically congruent orthographic neighbors (book-hook) to phonologically incongruent orthographic neighbors (sand-wand). The prior presentation of a semantically congruent word produced larger effects on subsequent animacy decisions when the previously presented word was a phonologically congruent neighbor than when it was a phonologically incongruent neighbor. In a second experiment, performance differences between target words with versus without semantically congruent orthographic neighbors were larger if the orthographic neighbors were also phonologically congruent. These results support models of visual word recognition that assume an important role for phonology in cascaded access to meaning. </description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Emotion-induced impairments in speeded word recognition tasks (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/31124/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-08-29T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Recent studies show that emotional stimuli impair the identification of subsequently presented, briefly flashed stimuli. In the present study, we investigated whether emotional distractors (primes) impaired target processing when presentation of the target stimulus was not impoverished. In lexical decision, animacy decision, rhyme decision, and nonword naming, targets were presented in such a manner that they were clearly visible (i.e., targets were not masked and presented until participants responded). In all tasks taboo-sexual distractors caused a slowdown in responding to the subsequent neutral target. Our results indicate that the detrimental effects of emotional distractors are not confined to paradigms in which visibility of the target is limited. Moreover, impairments were obtained even when semantic processing of stimuli was not required. </description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Mental states inside out: Switching costs for emotional and non-emotional sentences that differ in internal and external focus. (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/30612/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-08-06T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Abstract Mental states—such as thinking, remembering,
or feeling angry, happy, or dizzy—have a clear internal
component. We feel a certain way when we are in these
states. These internal experiences may be simulated when
people understand conceptual references to mental states.
However, mental states can also be described from an
“external” perspective, for example when referring to
“smiling.” In those cases, simulation of visible outside
features may be more relevant for understanding. In a
switching costs paradigm, we presented semantically
unrelated sentences describing emotional and nonemotional
mental states while manipulating their internal or external
focus. The results show that switching costs occur when
participants shift between sentences with an internal and an
external focus. This suggests that different forms of
simulation underlie understanding these sentences. In
addition, these effects occurred for emotional and nonemotional
mental states, suggesting that they are grounded in a
similar way—through the process of simulation.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Spatial Attention is Driven by Mental Simulations (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/30613/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-03-10T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Introduction: Many studies have shown that task performance
is affected by the relation between the
spatial location and the meaning of a target
word. These effects have been obtained for
object names that have typical positions
in the physical world (Zwaan and Yaxley,
2003; Bergen et al., 2007; Šeticˇ and Domijan,
2007; Estes et al., 2008) and for concepts
that are metaphorically related to spatial
position (Richardson et al., 2003; Meier and
Robinson, 2004; Schnall and Clore, 2004;
Schubert, 2005; Giessner and Schubert,
2007; Casasanto, 2009; Van Dantzig, 2009).
Although these findings are consistent
with a mental simulation account, at least
some of the interactions between meaning
and spatial location might be explained by
polarity alignment. In our study (Pecher
et al., 2010) we tested whether spatial congruency
effects are best explained by mental
simulations or by polarity alignment. ...</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Representation of categories: Metaphorical use of the container schema (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/30614/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-03-07T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>In the present study we investigated whether the mental representation of the concept categories is represented by the container image schema (Lakoff &amp; Johnson, 1980). In two experiments participants decided whether two pictures were from the same category (animal or vehicle). Pictures were presented inside or outside a frame that should activate the container schema. We found that performance to pictures was influenced by the frame in congruence with the metaphorical mapping (same category - inside bounded region; different category - not in same bounded region). These results show that the concept categories is metaphorically represented by containers. </description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>A sharp image or a sharp knife: Norms for the modality-exclusivity of 774 concept-property items (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/26028/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-03-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>According to recent embodied cognition theories, mental concepts are represented by modality-specific sensory-motor systems. Much of the evidence for modality-specificity in conceptual processing comes from the property-verification task. When applying this and other tasks, it is important to select items based on their modality-exclusivity. We collected modality ratings for a set of 387 properties, each of which was paired with two different concepts, yielding a total of 774 concept-property items. For each item, participants rated the degree to which the property could be experienced through five perceptual modalities (vision, audition, touch, smell, and taste). Based on these ratings, we computed a measure of modality exclusivity, the degree to which a property is perceived exclusively through one sensory modality. In this paper, we briefly sketch the theoretical background of conceptual knowledge, discuss the use of the property-verification task in cognitive research, provide our norms and statistics, and validate the norms in a memory experiment. We conclude that our norms are important for researchers studying modality-specific effects in conceptual processing. </description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Introduction to the special topic embodied and grounded cognition (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/30611/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Introduction: In the last 10–15 years, the embodied and
grounded (E and G) cognition approach
has become widespread in all fields related
to cognitive (neuro) science, and a lot of
evidence has been collected. The approach
proposes that cognitive activity is grounded
in sensory–motor processes and situated in
specific contexts and situations.
This special topic had two aims: first,
give an idea of the field in its broadness.
Second, focus on some challenges for E and
G theories. The first important challenge is
to account for understanding abstract concepts
and words. Evidence on the representation
of concrete concepts is compelling,
whereas evidence on abstract concepts is still
scarce and limited to restricted domains. A
second important challenge concerns the
role of computational models. E and G
theories of cognition need to formulate
more precise hypotheses, and models help
to constrain and specify in more detail the
predictions and the claims advanced.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Modality Switching in a Property Verification Task: An ERP Study of What Happens When Candles Flicker after High Heels Click (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/30615/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>The perceptual modalities associated with property words, such as flicker or click, have previously been demonstrated to affect subsequent property verification judgments (Pecher et al., 2003). Known as the conceptual modality switch effect, this finding supports the claim that brain systems for perception and action help subserve the representation of concepts. The present study addressed the cognitive and neural substrate of this effect by recording event-related potentials (ERPs) as participants performed a property verification task with visual or auditory properties in key trials. We found that for visual property verifications, modality switching was associated with an increased amplitude N400. For auditory verifications, switching led to a larger late positive complex. Observed ERP effects of modality switching suggest property words access perceptual brain systems. Moreover, the timing and pattern of the effects suggest perceptual systems impact the decision-making stage in the verification of auditory properties, and the semantic stage in the verification of visual properties.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Abstract Concepts: Sensory-Motor Grounding, Metaphors, and Beyond (In Book)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/30616/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Abstract
In the last decade many researchers have obtained evidence for the idea that
cognition shares processing mechanisms with perception and action. Most of
the evidence supporting the grounded cognition framework focused on representations
of concrete concepts, which leaves open the question how abstract
concepts are grounded in sensory-motor processing. One promising idea is
that people simulate concrete situations and introspective experiences to
represent abstract concepts [Barsalou, L. W., &amp; Wiemer-Hastings, K. (2005).
Situating abstract concepts. In D. Pecher, &amp; R. A. Zwaan (Eds.), Grounding
cognition: The role of perception and action in memory, language, and thinking
(pp. 129–163). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.], although this has not
yet been investigated a lot. A second idea, which more researchers have
investigated, is that people use metaphorical mappings from concrete to
abstract concepts [Lakoff, G., &amp; Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by.
Chicago: Chicago University Press.]. According to this conceptual metaphor
theory, image schemas structure and provide sensory-motor grounding for
abstract concepts. Although there is evidence that people automatically activate
image schemas when they process abstract concepts, we argue that
situations are also needed to fully represent meaning.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Similarity is closeness: Metaphorical mapping in a conceptual task (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/19728/</link>
      <pubDate>2010-05-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>The conceptual metaphor theory states that abstract concepts are represented by image schemas from concrete domains. In the present study we investigated the mapping for SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS using tasks with nonlinguistic materials. In Experiments 1 and 2 participants decided whether two squares were similar or dissimilar in colour. The spatial distance between the squares was varied. Performance to similar colours was better at shorter distances, whereas performance to dissimilar colours was better at longer distances. In Experiments 3 and 4 participants made distance decisions to similar and dissimilar colours squares. Performance was not affected by similarity. These results show that metaphorical mappings can be found even beyond the context of linguistic metaphors and that the mapping between SIMILARITY and CLOSENESS is asymmetrical.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Are Independent Probes Truly Independent? (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/17782/</link>
      <pubDate>2009-07-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>The independent cue technique has been developed to test traditional interference theories against inhibition theories of forgetting. In the present study, the authors tested the critical criterion for the independence of independent cues: Studied cues not presented during test (and unrelated to test cues) should not contribute to the retrieval process. Participants first studied a subset of cues (e.g., rope) that were subsequently studied together with a target in a 2nd study phase (e.g., rope-sailing, sunflower-yellow). In the test phase, an extralist category cue (e.g., sports, color) was presented, and participants were instructed to recall an item from the study list that was a member of the category (e.g., sailing, yellow). The experiments showed that previous study of the paired-associate word (e.g., rope) enhanced category cued recall even though this word was not presented at test. This experimental demonstration of covert cuing has important implications for the effectiveness of the independent cue technique.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Unconstraining theories of embodied cognition (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/16104/</link>
      <pubDate>2009-02-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>The approach/avoidance effect refers to the finding that valenced stimuli trigger approach and avoidance actions. Markman and Brendl [Markman, A. B., &amp; Brendl, M. (2005). Constraining theories of embodied cognition. Psychological Science, 16, 6-16] argued that this effect is not a truly embodied phenomenon, but depends on participants' symbolic representation of the self. In their study, participants moved valenced words toward or away from their own name on the computer screen. This would induce participants to form a 'disembodied' self-representation at the location of their name, outside of the body. Approach/avoidance effects occurred with respect to the participant's name, rather than with respect to the body. In three experiments, we demonstrate that similar effects are found when the name is replaced by a positive word, a negative word or even when no word is presented at all. This suggests that the 'disembodied self' explanation of Markman and Brendl is incorrect, and that their findings do not necessarily constrain embodied theories of cognition.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Language comprehenders retain implied shape and orientation of objects (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/16742/</link>
      <pubDate>2009-01-10T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>According to theories of embodied cognition, language comprehenders simulate sensorimotor experiences to represent the meaning of what they read. Previous studies have shown that picture recognition is better if the object in the picture matches the orientation or shape implied by a preceding sentence. In order to test whether strategic imagery may explain previous findings, language comprehenders first read a list of sentences in which objects were mentioned. Only once the complete list had been read was recognition memory tested with pictures. Recognition performance was better if the orientation or shape of the object matched that implied by the sentence, both immediately after reading the complete list of sentences and after a 45-min delay. These results suggest that previously found match effects were not due to strategic imagery and show that details of sensorimotor simulations are retained over longer periods.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Perceptual processing affects conceptual processing (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15974/</link>
      <pubDate>2008-08-27T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>According to the Perceptual Symbols Theory of cognition (Barsalou, 1999), modality-specific simulations underlie the representation of concepts. A strong prediction of this view is that perceptual processing affects conceptual processing. In this study, participants performed a perceptual detection task and a conceptual property-verification task in alternation. Responses on the property-verification task were slower for those trials that were preceded by a perceptual trial in a different modality than for those that were preceded by a perceptual trial in the same modality. This finding of a modality-switch effect across perceptual processing and conceptual processing supports the hypothesis that perceptual and conceptual representations are partially based on the same systems.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Verifying Visual Properties in Sentence Verification Facilitates Picture Recognition Memory (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12119/</link>
      <pubDate>2008-04-14T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>According to the perceptual symbols theory (Barsalou, 1999), sensorimotor simulations underlie the representation of concepts.
We investigated whether recognition memory for pictures of concepts was facilitated by earlier representation of visual properties of
those concepts. During study, concept names (e.g., apple) were presented in a property verification task with a visual property (e.g., shiny)
or with a nonvisual property (e.g., tart). Delayed picture recognition memory was better if the concept name had been presented with a
visual property than if it had been presented with a nonvisual property. These results indicate that modality-specific simulations are used
for concept representation.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Evidence for long-term cross-language repetition priming in conceptual implicit memory tasks (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/961/</link>
      <pubDate>2003-07-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Previous studies have failed to find evidence for long-term
cross-language repetition priming (e.g., presentation of the English
word frog does not facilitate responding to its Dutch translation
equivalent kikker on a later presentation). The present study tested the
hypothesis that failure to find cross-language repetition priming in
previous studies was due to the use of tasks that rely primarily on
lexical or orthographic processing of the stimuli instead of conceptual
processing. Consistent with this hypothesis we obtained reliable
cross-language repetition priming when conceptual implicit memory tasks
were used. The present results support theories of bilingual memory that
assume shared conceptual representations for translation equivalents.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Verifying Different-modality Properties for Concepts Produces Switching Costs (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/959/</link>
      <pubDate>2003-03-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>According to perceptual symbol systems (Barsalou, 1999), sensory-motor
simulations underlie the representation of concepts. It follows that
sensory-motor phenomena should arise in conceptual processing. Previous
studies have shown that switching from one modality to another during
perceptual processing incurs a processing cost. If perceptual simulation
underlies conceptual processing, then verifying the properties of
concepts should exhibit a switching cost as well. For example, verifying
a property in the auditory modality (e.g., BLENDER-loud) should be
slower after verifying a property in a different modality (e.g.,
CRANBERRIES-tart) than in the same modality (e.g., LEAVES-rustling).
Only words were presented to subjects, and there were no instructions to
use imagery. Nevertheless switching modalities incurred a cost,
analogous to switching modalities in perception. A second experiment
showed that this effect was not due to associative priming between
properties in the same modality. These results support the hypothesis
that perceptual simulation underlies conceptual processing.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Evidence for long-term cross-language repetition priming in conceptual implicit memory tasks (Miscellaneous)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/1006/</link>
      <pubDate>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Previous studies have failed to ?nd evidence for long-term cross-language repetition priming (e.g., presentation of the English word frog does not facilitate responding to its Dutchtranslation equivalent kikker on a later presentation). The present study tested the hypothesis that failure to ?nd cross-language repetition priming in previous studies was due to the use of tasks that rely primarily on lexical or orthographic processing of the stimuli instead of conceptual processing. Consistent with this hypothesis we obtained reliable cross-language repetition priming when conceptual implicit memory tasks were used.The present results support theories of bilingual memory that assume shared conceptual representations for translation equivalents.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Associative repetition priming: A selective review and theoretical implications (Miscellaneous)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/1010/</link>
      <pubDate>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description></description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>False memories and lexical decision: even twelve primes do not cause long-term semantic priming (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/960/</link>
      <pubDate>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Semantic priming effects are usually obtained only if the prime is
presented shortly before the target stimulus. Recent evidence obtained
with the so-called false memory paradigm suggests, however, that in both
explicit and implicit memory tasks semantic relations between words can
result in long-lasting effects when multiple 'primes' are presented. The
aim of the present study was to investigate whether these effects would
generalize to lexical decision. In four experiments we showed that even
as many as twelve primes do not cause long-term semantic priming. In all
experiments, however, a repetition priming effect was obtained. The
present results are consistent with a number of other results showing
that semantic information plays a minimal role in long-term priming in
visual word recognition.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Automatic Priming Effects for New Associations in Lexical Decision and Perceptual Identification (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/1576/</link>
      <pubDate>1999-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Information storage in semantic memory was investigated by looking at
automatic priming effects for new associations in two experiments. In
the study phase word pairs were presented in a paired-associate learning
task. Lexical decision and perceptual identification were used to
examine priming effects during and after the study phase. There was
automatic priming for new associations. The priming effect was greatly
reduced when different semantic tasks were used at study and test
compared to when identical tasks were used at study and test. The
results show that new associations in semantic memory can be accessed
automatically but are still context dependent. This suggests that rather
than being abstract and static, retrieval from semantic memory interacts
dynamically with the context.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Does pizza prime coin? Perceptual priming in lexical decision and pronunciation. (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/958/</link>
      <pubDate>1998-05-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>In 6 experiments the authors investigated priming for perceptually
related word pairs (i.e., words that refer to objects with the same
shape such as pizza-coin), trying to replicate earlier findings by R.
Schreuder et al (see record 1985-06198-001) while avoiding some of the
methodological problems that were present in that study. University
students participated in the experiments. Under standard conditions no
perceptual priming was obtained. However, in all experiments priming for
associated pairs was found. Only after activation tasks that focused on
perceptual features was priming for perceptually related word pairs
found in pronunciation. Perceptual priming was also obtained in lexical
decision after activation tasks, but only when strong associates were
not presented in the experiment. The results show that priming for
perceptually related word pairs is not a general finding.</description>
    </item>
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