http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/19176/ List of Publications en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/37799/ 2012-06-01T00:00:00Z Where does the study of hybrids stand at present? Through a review of existing research, this paper provides a number of contributions to the literature on inter-organizational relations, or hybrids. For one, basing ourselves on the traditional theories used in the study of hybrids, we propose an integrative definition and classification of hybrids. We classify explanations of the formation, functioning and implications of hybrids using agency theory, property rights theory, transaction cost economics and the resource-based view. For another, based on a review of recent qualitative studies on hybrids, we extend our classification to include the more recent theories used in the study of hybrids. These recent studies combine the traditional theories on hybrids with network and evolutionary theories, and literature on strategy and trust. Our review also provides new insights on the dynamics and environment of hybrids, and suggests avenues for future research. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/37734/ 2012-03-01T00:00:00Z This article presents evidence on opportunistic behaviour by network operators in the liberalized British, Dutch and French electricity industries. The evidence is supplied by 303 regulatory decisions on dispute resolutions for the period 2002-2010. We observe a significant difference in how the regulators resolve disputes between network operators and producers on the one hand, and between network operators and consumers on the other hand. Consumers are negatively affected by the opportunistic behaviour of network operators, mainly by paying tariffs that are higher than is allowed by law. Policy recommendations focus on the protection of consumer interests in competitive electricity markets. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/26483/ 2011-04-15T00:00:00Z Many theories on the economics of the firm assume that economic actors are opportunistic. The focus of these theories is on the mitigation of the uncertainty that economic actors may behave opportunistically, and on the ability of contracts and governance structures to reduce this behavioral uncertainty. Previous studies did not analyze the properties of behavioral uncertainty in detail, nor did they emphasize the empirical verification of behavioral uncertainty with revealed opportunistic behavior. This article addresses both of these lacunae in the literature by focusing on incentive alignment between parties to information transactions and on empirical proof of opportunistic behavior. When a context aligns incentives, contracting parties do not behave opportunistically. When a context does not align incentives, contracting parties strategically distort or disguise information. A study of 239 regulatory decisions on dispute resolutions and enforcements of energy laws in the Dutch and French electricity industries confirms these propositions. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/16096/ 2009-06-11T00:00:00Z For more than a decade, the European governments have focused their energy policies on creating one European competitive electricity market. Several regulations are introduced into the European electricity industries for this purpose: the energy firms have to unbundle the electricity networks from electricity generation and retail, and the consumers should be able to choose their electricity retailer. This thesis analyses which new governance structures emerged in the Dutch and French electricity industries as a result of these regulations for four types of electricity transactions: the network connection, network access, balancing and switching transactions. The parties in these electricity industries did not adopt a market, but hybrid forms of governance that remained extensively regulated. The efficiency of these new governance structures cannot be explained with the attributes of the transactions, as is proposed by transaction cost economics. This thesis therefore introduces the concept of adaptation into transaction cost economics. Adaptation is the adjustment by economic actors from one governance structure to another, and is characterized by three attributes: the identity of the future contracting party, the laterality of the adaption, and the type of response in the adaptation process. These attributes explain the governance transformations and the new governance structures in the two industries. Regulation continues to play a pervasive role in the liberalized electricity industries. It influences the attributes of the transactions, the new governance structures and the adaptation process. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/31495/ 2006-09-01T00:00:00Z The European liberalising electricity industries are still heavily regulated. A prominent form of regulation is directed at the energy companies' forms of governance. European and national regulations prohibit the vertically integrated structures that characterised these companies for almost a century. Detailed rules on unbundling, independence of the transmission and distribution system operators, and network access influence to a large extent the type of new governance structures that are adopted. This paper takes the institutional organisation of regulation into account to explain the regulatory influence on governance changes at the level of the firm. Examples of the Dutch and French electricity industries illustrate that the new forms of governance are heavily influenced by the institutional organisation of regulation. © 2006 The Authors. Journal compilation