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    <title>Swank, J.</title>
    <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/252/</link>
    <description>List of Publications</description>
    <language>en</language>
    
    <item>
      <title>Jury Report on the KVS Award for the Best Doctoral Thesis in Economics of the Academic Years 2006–2007 and 2007–2008 (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/26090/</link>
      <pubDate>2009-06-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description></description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>How committees of experts interact with the outside world: Some theory, and evidence from the FOMC (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/28632/</link>
      <pubDate>2008-04-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Some committees are made up of experts, persons who care both about the matter at hand and about coming across as able decision makers. We show that such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. That is, once the decision has been reached, they show a united front to the outside world. Also, if such committees are required to become transparent, for example, by publishing verbatim transcripts of their meetings, members will organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. A large part of the article is dedicated to a case study of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee in the United States. It provides suggestive evidence supporting our theory. </description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>How committees of experts interact with the outside world: some theory, and evidence from the FOMC (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11755/</link>
      <pubDate>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Some committees are made up of experts, persons who care both
about the matter at hand and about coming across as able decision-
makers. We derive two propositions about the way members of such
committees interact with the outside world. First, they would like
to conceal disagreement from the public. That is, once the decision
has been reached, they show a united front to the outside world.
Second, if such committees are required to become transparent, e.g.,
by publishing verbatim transcripts of their meetings, members will
organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. Large part of the
paper is dedicated to a case study of the U.S. Federal Open Market
Committee in the United States. It provides suggestive evidence
supporting the two propositions.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Transparency and Pre-meetings (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7814/</link>
      <pubDate>2006-05-29T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Some committees are made up of experts, persons interested in both the (subject) matter at hand and in coming across as able decision-makers. Such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. We present a theory that describes the reaction of experts to the requirement to publish verbatim transcripts of their meetings: the emergence of an informal ‘premeeting’; the move of the real debate from the formal meeting to the premeeting; and the drop in disagreement in the formal meeting. We analyse what the effect is on accountability and quality of decision-making. Finally, we present evidence suggesting that our model describes the way members of the Federal Open Market Committee in the United States responded to the publication of verbatim transcripts of their meetings.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Economische integratie in Europa; een inventariserende literatuurstudie (Research Report)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/894/</link>
      <pubDate>2003-09-16T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Dit rapport doet verslag van een in opdracht van het Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid door OCFEB verrichte studie. Het onderzoek is mede geïnspireerd door het zogenoemde ?proces van Lissabon?, dat erin moet resulteren dat de Europese Unie (EU) binnen tien jaar de meest concurrerende en dynamische kenniseconomie van de wereld is. Op basis van empirische feiten ontleend aan recente economische literatuur wordt in kaart gebracht hoe het proces van economische integratie in de EU zich heeft gemanifesteerd, welke verschillen er (nog) bestaan tussen de lidstaten en wat mogelijke belemmeringen van de economische dynamiek in Europa zijn.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>The housing ladder, taxation, and borrowing constraints (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/808/</link>
      <pubDate>2003-09-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Using a multi-tier model of the housing market, we show that both starters and movers benefit from mortgage interest deduction for higher income groups. However, such tax favouring also tends to facilitate house price explosions, especially when interest rates and downpayment ratios are low. More in general, the efficiency of implicit tax subsidies to homeowners depends critically on the price responsiveness of new construction, which is found to differ strongly from country to country. Irrespective of supply conditions, running down mortgage interest deduction is likely to detract from the profits of lending institutions.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Regional Price Adjustment in a Monetary Union: the case of EMU (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6800/</link>
      <pubDate>2002-08-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Using a New-Keynesian framework, we investigate how far the inflationary processes in member states of EMU cause regional price levels to converge. We fail to produce hard evidence of the present existence of such an adjustment mechanism, notwithstanding that inflation in some countries tends to converge towards the euro area level. Overa11, inflation persistence has declined significantly over the years, but there are still marked differences between countries on this score. We conclude that the euro area is not an optimal currency area yet, lending support to the quest for further structura1 reforms in European labour and product markets.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>In Search of the Motives behind US Fiscal Macroeconomic Policy (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12311/</link>
      <pubDate>1993-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>In this paper optimal control techniques are applied to estimate the motives behind US fiscal macroeconomic policy. Starting from a range of possible objectives and given the perception of policy makers about the environment in which they operate, the priorities of policy makers are estimated on the basis of their past actions. Our statistical approach allows for testing the empirical relevance of alternative hypotheses with respect to the objectives of governments. Democratic and Republican administrations are found to aim at different targets. Some support is also found to political business cycle theories.</description>
    </item>
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