http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/27405/ List of Publications en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/26627/ 2011-08-01T00:00:00Z The management of large engineering projects is often a combination of the focus on planning and control, and the ambition to be flexible given the complexity and uncertainties that characterises these kinds of projects. However, control and flexibility impose contradictory requirements upon the management of these projects. The literature on project management reflects this contradiction. Some authors underline that projects require firm planning and control, thus downplaying the role of flexibility. Others emphasise that projects require flexibility and responsiveness, thus moving away from rigid planning and control. In this contribution, we suggest that in practice project managers acknowledge the weakness of both extremes and therefore strive to combine the two. Moreover, we argue that project success is at risk when project managers do not succeed in meeting the requirements of control and flexibility. To be able to investigate how these competing requirements are dealt with in practice, a framework is developed. The usefulness of the framework is explored by applying the framework to the large engineering project Randstadrail-a light rail project in The Netherlands. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/22012/ 2010-11-11T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/22075/ 2010-03-01T00:00:00Z Due to the uncertainty involved in many complex infrastructure engineering projects, it is not always possible for managers to establish detailed terms of reference at the departure. Although the flexibility of ‘open’ terms of reference is often indispensible, it makes the arrival at a successful outcome much of a gamble. Complex infrastructure construction projects often include the tension that the values and interests of clients and functional managers diverge or even contradict each other. This is especially evident when managing the project management values of time, cost, scope and quality in relation to each other while the results of trade-offs and decisions can not be predicted. Client’s administrators defend objectifiable, instrumental values, while functional managers have an interest in relaxing them in order to realise the project. If these two contradictory sets of interests are not recalibrated, either the values are not met, or trade-offs may be made in an uncontrolled way, which can lead to suboptimisations or even project failure. Using RandstadRail as an example, this paper will show the problems that may occur in such situations and how unmanageability arises. A few lessons are derived to provide entrance to better manageable practice. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/22708/ 2008-01-01T00:00:00Z Onderzoeksopdracht en onderzoekvragen: Doel van het onderzoek was het tot stand brengen van een rapport, op basis waarvan de verantwoordelijk bestuurder verantwoording kan afleggen aan het Algemeen Bestuur van Haaglanden en lessen getrokken kunnen worden voor de aanpak van toekomstige grote infrastructuurprojecten. De volgende vragen stonden in het onderzoek centraal: - Wat was de feitelijke gang van zaken rond de gebeurtenissen en incidenten die zich bij de bouw en indienstneming van RandstadRail voordeden? - Welke rol speelde de organisatie en aansturing van het project op strategisch en bestuurlijke niveau daarbij in de periode vanaf 2001? - In hoeverre voldeden deze aan de eisen die daar, gegeven (toentertijd) geldende normen betreffende adequaat bestuur en management, aan gesteld dienen te worden? - Welke lessen kunnen hieruit geleerd worden ten aanzien van de organisatie en aansturing van toekomstige infrastructurele projecten? Onderzoeksaanpak: De werkwijze is als volgt geweest. Uitgaande van de incidenten is nagegaan welke gebeurtenissen en beslissingen daaraan ten grondslag lagen en welke actoren daarbij betrokken waren. Vervolgens is nagegaan voor welke dilemma’s de actoren zich op het moment van handelen gesteld zagen en in hoeverre zij, gegeven (professionele) normen die in de situatie waarin zij verkeerden golden, adequaat gehandeld hebben. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/22709/ 2007-01-01T00:00:00Z In this contribution, we provide a comparative analysis of the Dutch government’s attempts to realize private investments in three national railway mega-projects: the Betuwe Route, a dedicated freight railway line connecting the Rotterdam harbour to the German rail network, the High Speed Line (HSL South) between the Belgian border and Amsterdam and the Zuiderzee Line between Amsterdam and Groningen, for which a private consortium led by Siemens suggests the use of Maglev technology. The privatization of the first two railway lines was attempted for during the nineties and beginning of this decade. In June 2007 operation of the Betuwe Route began. To date, the government has not succeeded in involving private parties in the Betuwe Route. Although the privatization of the HSL South has partly been realized by engaging into a complex mix of contract-arrangements, it has proven difficult to keep under control. Recently operation has been postponed until October 2008. During the project study of the third railway project, which started in 2000, government again tried to realize privatization while avoiding the mistakes of the earlier two projects. In 2005 government decided not to move forward with the tender procedure and consider alternatives. Building on theory and earlier experiences with privatization and public private partnerships we compare the three cases with respect to motives for privatization, strategies and results. We seek explanations for the way privatization evolved within each project and generic lessons that can be drawn from the cases.