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    <title>Deneffe, D.</title>
    <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/28289/</link>
    <description>List of Publications</description>
    <language>en</language>
    
    <item>
      <title>Eliciting von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities when Probabilities Are Distorted or Unknown (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/23096/</link>
      <pubDate>1996-08-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>This paper proposes a new method, the (gamble-)tradeoff method, for eliciting utilities in decision under risk or uncertainty. The elicitation of utilities, to be used in the expected utility criterion, turns out to be possible even if probabilities are ambiguous or unknown. A disadvantage of the tradeoff method is that a few more questions usually must be asked to clients. Also, the lotteries that are needed are somewhat more complex than in the certainty-equivalent method or in the probability-equivalent method. The major advantage of the tradeoff method is its robustness against probability distortions and misconceptions, which constitute a major cause of violations of expected utility and generate inconsistencies in utility elicitation. Thus the tradeoff method retains full validity under prospect theory, rank-dependent utility, and the combination of the two, i.e., cumulative prospect theory. The tradeoff method is tested for monetary outcomes and for outcomes describing life-duration. We find higher risk aversion for life duration, but the tradeoff method elicits similar curvature of utility. Apparently the higher risk aversion for life duration is due to more pronounced deviations from expected utility.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Mergers, Strategic Investments and Antitrust Policy (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/23010/</link>
      <pubDate>1996-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Established firms can diversify into new markets in two distinct modes: through internal development or through conglomerate merger. Building on a dynamic three-stage bargaining model with variable threats, this paper shows that a lenient antitrust position toward horizontal mergers can induce established firms that would otherwise not have entered to enter via conglomerate merger. The vigor of antitrust enforcement toward horizontal mergers also affects the conglomerate acquisition price but it does not influence the choice of entry mode. Finally, the paper brings to light a heretofore neglected avenue through which conglomerate mergers can increase welfare.</description>
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