http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/3003/ List of Publications en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/23650/ 2011-04-04T00:00:00Z At the edge of cities, park-and-ride (P + R) facilities pop up with the aim to intercept motorists from traveling into the city. However, these facilities also appear attractive to public transport users who start using their cars for getting to the P + R location. This paper analyzes the overall impact of P + R on total car traffic and social welfare by means of a discrete modal choice model. The results show that the distribution of individuals' preferences for car over public transport is the main determinant of this impact. P + R has a larger traffic reducing effect if more individuals prefer their car. At the same time, the shift of traffic from city to periphery improves welfare. These effects get stronger when a P + R facility provides a superior access to the mainline public transportation network. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/19575/ 2010-01-01T00:00:00Z The Landlord Port model is the dominant port model in larger and medium-sized ports. The potential advantage of this organisational system is that the vertical separation of port authority and service provision allows for competition between different service suppliers in a port. This paper analyses such competition in a horizontal product differentiation model in which two ports compete for cargo trans-shipments. The model shows that the Landlord Port model is Nash equilibrium, and that this organisational form yields the highest profits for the port industry, and the highest prices for its customers. Introduction of intra-port competition into the Landlord model decreases industry profits and prices, which makes the port industry reluctant to open itself to such competition. A market organisation with vertically integrated ports, that is, Service Ports, realises even lower prices and profits. However, this organisational form is not sustainable without regulation because every individual port can realise a higher profit by separating service provision from port authority in order to become a Landlord Port. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/16811/ 2009-07-01T00:00:00Z A monopolist in public transport may oversupply frequency relative to the social optimum, as van Reeven (2008) demonstrates with homogeneous consumers. This result generalizes for heterogeneous consumers who know the timetable. Whether a monopolist oversupplies or undersupplies frequency depends on the degree of consumers’ heterogeneity as reflected in the distribution of consumers’ reservation prices. Oversupply is likely to occur when this distribution is peaked, and undersupply is likely to occur when this distribution is rather flat. In particular, monopoly production results in the oversupply of frequency when consumers’ reservation prices are concentrated around the entry costs of the private car, being the main alternative to public transport. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/18269/ 2009-05-01T00:00:00Z A growing number of cities and towns restrict the number of chain stores within their borders in order to prevent sprawl and increase in traffic problems. This paper verifies these concerns by analyzing endogenous location choices by multi-store firms, which sell heterogeneous products and can charge different prices at every store. It takes a generalized transportation cost approach to Salop [Salop, S.C., 1979. Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141-156], in which consumers' utility not only depends on real transportation costs but also on their preferences or tastes. The model confirms that firms' location strategies contribute to retail sprawl. However, the resulting locations actually minimize consumers' generalized transportation costs for given sizes of retail chains. One of the implications is that further concentration in the retail industry is welfare improving. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11764/ 2006-01-01T00:00:00Z Scheduled transport operators' pricing, departure timing and frequency decisions are analysed in a horizontal product differentiation model with two dimensions. The first dimension concerns the availability of a departure at the preferred time of consumers. The second dimension concerns exogenous quality differentiation between operators' services. This model shows that operators choose intervals between their own departures that minimise consumers' waiting costs, and set prices that do not depend on the level of competition in terms of frequency. Operators do not have a strategic incentive to duplicate each other's departures and choose similar frequencies. The combined schedule of operators' individual schedules shows interlaced departures in which a departure from one operator is followed by a departure from the other. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11627/ 2005-11-01T00:00:00Z This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using the fact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are interlaced. The location decisions of multi-store firms are completely independent of each other. Firms choose locations that minimize transportation costs of consumers. Moreover, generically, the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and when the firms have an equal number of outlets, prices are independent of the number of outlets. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6711/ 2004-01-06T00:00:00Z This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using the fact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are interlaced. Moreover, generically, the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and when the firms have an equal number of outlets, prices are independent of the number of outlets. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11646/ 1998-01-01T00:00:00Z This paper focuses on contractual relationships between two parties in which the contracted price can be interpreted by one of the parties and by an outside observer (like a court) as a signal that the other party engages in illegal activities in carrying out the contract. We use the Benckiser case as an illustration of such a situation. We construct a simple game to explain the court’s decision to sentence Benckiser to pay for the damage created by the contracted party for the fact that the price it had paid was so low that it should have been interpreted as a signal of illegal activities. More generally, the paper discusses price-setting behavior when illegal practices may occur.