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    <title>Cnossen, S.</title>
    <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/3994/</link>
    <description>List of Publications</description>
    <language>en</language>
    
    <item>
      <title>Commemorating Richard Musgrave (1910-2007) (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15895/</link>
      <pubDate>2008-06-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description></description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Taxing Tobacco in the European Union (Research Report)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/821/</link>
      <pubDate>2003-09-04T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Tobacco taxes in the European Union are the highest in the world. These taxes are mainly rationalized as a quid pro quo for the social costs of smoking. This paper argues that the arguments are not as persuasive as is often believed. A more likely reason is that governments are addicted to this lucrative and cheap source of revenue. The high taxes involve trade diversion. In the EU, these aspects are overshadowed by the debate on the most appropriate balance between specific and ad valorem taxation. Southern Member States favor the ad valorem rate which tends to protect their cheap, home-grown tobaccos. Northern Member States have a preference for specific taxation which is more favorable to the exchequer, more effective in reducing the level of tobacco consumption, and accords better with the competition objectives of the internal market.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Europe's New Border Taxes (Research Report)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/828/</link>
      <pubDate>2003-09-04T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Instead of abolishing internal border controls in 1992, the European Union (EU) replaced them with VAT and statistical requirements that appear to be just as onerous and costly. This paper shows that the compliance costs of the new requirements are on average 5 percent of the value of intra-EU trade of Dutch businesses. Clearly, the costs constitute a (differentiated) border tax that impedes intra-EU trade and violates the Treaty of Rome. The paper analyses the magnitude and determinants of the compliance costs, as well as their effects on intra-EU trade intensity. It is shown that even minor additional compliance costs have a significant negative effect on intra-EU trade.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>How should tobacco be taxed in EU-accession countries? (Research Report)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/817/</link>
      <pubDate>2003-09-03T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Ten Central and Eastern European countries, as well as Cyprus and Malta, have applied for membership of the European Union. Membership involves, among others, alignment of the taxes on tobacco products. Within the acquis communautaire, accession countries can choose between a predominantly specific and a predominantly ad valorem excise regime. The choice affects revenue, tobacco consumption control, and EU competition. This paper examines the arguments and concludes that a predominantly specific regime seems to be the preferred choice.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Introduction: Tax Coordination in the European Union (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11786/</link>
      <pubDate>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description></description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Towards a new tax covenant (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/31881/</link>
      <pubDate>1995-08-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>In The Netherlands, the high tax burden on employment income cripples the labor market, whilst the highly differentiated, if low, tax burden on capital income distorts the capital market. Building on the experience with dual income taxation in the Nordic countries, a new tax covenant is proposed comprising lower average and marginal tax rates on labor income and a more even-handed treatment of capital income. Specifically, capital income should be taxed at a low, proportional rate. Flanking measures are required to improve the workings of the labor market; notably, social benefits for people who can work as well as housing subsidies should be reduced. More fundamentally, a change in the social order is desirable which places greater weight on equal opportunities instead of equal outcomes. </description>
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