http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/46716/ List of Publications en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/39961/ 2013-04-01T00:00:00Z On the basis of the bootstrap-Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), this paper estimates technical, scale, and pure technical efficiencies for the agricultural marketing cooperatives in China's Zhejiang Province and employs a single truncated bootstrap procedure to identify the key determinants of efficiencies. The empirical results suggest that pure technical inefficiency was the main source of the technical inefficiency. Factors having significantly positive impacts on efficiency of cooperatives are local economic development level, entrepreneurship of managers, and human capital of members. The size of financial leverage and the number of board members have a negative impact on pure technical efficiency. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/39975/ 2013-04-01T00:00:00Z This paper addresses the genesis of farmer cooperatives in China in terms of the actors. Empirical results from a multiple case study indicate that the genesis of cooperatives in China is due to entrepreneurial farmers and the government, rather than a bottom-up, collective action process of many small farmers. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/39253/ 2013-03-21T00:00:00Z Governance structure specifies the allocation of ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights. A cooperative is characterized by user ownership, user control, and user benefits. The focus of this thesis is on various governance structure characteristics and the efficiency of farmer cooperatives. Special attention is dedicated to cooperatives in China. The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the structure of the thesis and provides an overview of farmer cooperatives in China, especially in terms of the history, the modes, and organization characteristics. The genesis of farmer cooperatives in China is described in chapter 2. Chapter 3 delineates the governance structure of Chinese farmer cooperatives in terms of the allocation of ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights within the membership. A principal-agent model is developed in chapter 4 to explore the efficiency of cooperatives with different CEO identities, member CEO or outside CEO. Chapter 5 examines how farmers producing differentiated quality products choose different governance structures in a non-cooperative game. Besides, the impact of the cooperatives’ presence in the market on the welfare of various stakeholders is analyzed. We conclude in chapter 6. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/37879/ 2012-11-22T00:00:00Z A principal-agent model is formulated to capture the efficiency of cooperatives with a member CEO and cooperatives with an employed outsider as CEO. Results of the model show that the incentive strength regarding the member CEO is stronger compared to that of the outside CEO in order to shift some effort of the member CEO from individual farming into the task of adding value to the cooperative enterprise. A cooperative with a member CEO is uniquely efficient when upstream and downstream tasks are substitutes to a certain extent, or complements. When the tasks are substitutes, the efficient CEO identity depends on the strength of the substitution effect and the difference of the marginal productivities between the two tasks. The scope of cooperatives with a member CEO being efficient becomes smaller when the substitution effect is at an intermediate level or the productivity difference between the two tasks is limited. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/31059/ 2012-01-23T00:00:00Z This paper addresses the distinction between core members and common members in farmer cooperatives in China in terms of the allocation of ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights. Empirical results from a multiple case study indicate that the life cycle and the governance characteristics of farmer cooperatives in China differ from cooperatives in the West world. The genesis of cooperatives in China is due to entrepreneurial farmers and the government, rather than the bottom-up, collective action process of many small farmers. The distribution of equity capital, decision rights, and income rights is quite skewed towards core members. We conclude that the development of cooperatives in China adapts to the local economic and cultural environment and goes via an alternative way to cooperatives in the Western world.