Conrado, M.

player indi fferent players shapley value fferent value shapley j ∈ n indi fferent property enemy players property e fficiency t ⊆ n fficiency contribution i ∈ n allocation allocation rule ψ enemy allocation rule − ψ i ψ i 1 class shapley values finition weights λ i players i g satis fies axiom proof characterization game theory coalition − ψ j proposition v ∈ gn axiomatization irv j function i ∈ si fi xed player relation indi fference 3.1 player i tu-game allocation rules t ∩ si ψ i 2 ks-weighted shapley value j ∈ si theorem − ϕ j symmetry equivalence relation rv j ∈ t n → n theory section lemma myerson institute result weight paper corollary 3.1 equivalence brink tinbergen amsterdam remark 3.2 university fference e fficiency symmetry ψ satis fies fairness property ϕ satis fies equivalence relation vu university amsterdam 3.3