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    <title>Horn, H.</title>
    <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/4856/</link>
    <description>List of Publications</description>
    <language>en</language>
    
    <item>
      <title>Antitrust in Open Economies (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7422/</link>
      <pubDate>2006-01-06T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>We examine antitrust rules in a two county general equilibrium trade model, contrasting national and multilateral (cooperative) determination of competition policy, exploring the properties of the policy equilibrium. It is not imperfect competition, but variation in competitive stance between sectors that matters for trading partners. Beggar-thy-neighbor competition policies relate to countries' comparative advantages, and hurt the factor intensively used, or specific to, the imperfectly competitive sector. They also create a competitive advantage for export firms. FDI can be pro-competitive in this context, reducing the scope for beggar-thy-neighbor policies and reducing the gains from a multilateral competition agreement.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Competition Policy in an Open Economy (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7747/</link>
      <pubDate>1998-08-07T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>We examine the setting of national competition policy in a two-country setting, emphasizing the relationship of trade to the goals of competition policy (such as the degree and nature of competition). The issues we address involve the general equilibrium distributional effects of competition policy, the relationship of national competition policy to terms-of-trade gains and losses, the implications of "distinct national markets" linked through trade (the starting point for all trade theorists) for the analysis of national competition policy, and the characteristics of the Nash equilibrium policy sets.</description>
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