http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/5854/ List of Publications en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/38880/ 2012-10-01T00:00:00Z Triggered by highly publicised corporate scandals, changing societal expectations and the collapse of financial markets, the roles of boards of directors have changed significantly in safeguarding the interest of shareholders and other stakeholders. Yet, relatively little is known about contemporary challenges non-executive directors face and whether their boards are well-equipped for their new tasks. Based on self-assessment reports by supervisory boards, a survey and interviews with supervisory board members, this paper investigates the challenges non-executive directors face in the Netherlands, particularly after a decade of corporate governance reform. Non-executive directors' inadequate role in scrutinising executive directors' performance, information asymmetries and dysfunctional working relationships between executive and non-executive directors are among the greatest challenges indicated by non-executive directors on Dutch supervisory boards. The paper discusses several implications for scholars and practitioners and provides a unique insight in boardroom dynamics. Copyright http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/38256/ 2012-02-01T00:00:00Z Over the last ten years, the corporate governance context in most Western countries has changed as a result of irregularities, increased regulation, heightened societal expectations and shareholder activism. This paper examines the impact of the changing context on the role of chairmen of supervisory boards in the Netherlands. Based on a combination of thirty semi-structured interviews with board members of leading Dutch corporations and secondary data on the position of supervisory board chairmen at the top-100 listed firms in the Netherlands, the study reveals that board chairmen have become increasingly involved in both their control and service roles. While the demographics (i. e., age, tenure, gender and nationality) of chairmen have hardly changed over the last decade, chairmen are spending considerably more time on boards and committees, have reduced the number of board interlocks and have become more active on the forefront of the corporate governance discussion. The paper highlights several implications for scholars and practitioners. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14652/ 2008-01-01T00:00:00Z Van oudsher bestaan de hoofdverantwoordelijkheden van de raad van commissarissen uit het houden van toezicht op het beleid van de raad van bestuur en het bijstaan van de raad van bestuur door het geven van advies en het dienen als klankbord. Op het eerste gezicht lijken deze beide hoofdverantwoordelijkhedenmet elkaar te conflicteren: voor toezicht is namelijk onafhankelijkheid noodzakelijk, terwijl voor advisering een zekere mate van betrokkenheid noodzakelijk is (VanManen enVan der Reijden, 2005;Huse, 2007). In de praktijk worstelen commissarissen dan ookmet dit vraagstuk. Temeer doordat het wettelijk raamwerk in Nederland geen duidelijke oplossing aandraagt. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14532/ 2007-11-01T00:00:00Z During the last decade, globalisation and liberalisation of financial markets, changing societal expectations and corporate governance scandals have increased the attention for the fiduciary duties of non-executive directors. In this context, recent corporate governance reform initiatives have emphasised the control task and independence of non-executive directors. However, little attention has been paid to their impact on the external and internal service tasks of non-executive directors. Therefore, this paper investigates how the service tasks of non-executive directors have evolved in the Netherlands. Data on corporate governance at the top-100 listed companies in the Netherlands between 1997 and 2005 show that the emphasis on non-executive directors' external service task has shifted to their internal service task, i.e. from non-executive directors acting as boundary spanners to non-executive directors providing advice and counselling to executive directors. This shift in board responsibilities affects non-executive directors' ability to generate network benefits through board relationships and has implications for non-executive directors' functional requirements. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14769/ 2007-09-01T00:00:00Z Recente corporate governance initiatieven, zoals de ‘Sarbanes-Oxley Act’ en corporate governance codes, hebben voornamelijk de onafhankelijkheid en de controle-rol van commissarissen benadrukt. De aandacht voor de implicaties hiervan voor de service-rol van commissarissen is echter beperkt. Deze implicaties staan centraal in dit artikel. De analyse van longitudinale data van de top-100 beursgenoteerde ondernemingen in Nederland toont dat de service-rol inderdaad is veranderd als gevolg van twee corporate governance codes. De nadruk lijkt te zijn verschoven van de externe service-rol naar de interne service-rol, dat wil zeggen van waardecreatie door het commissarissennetwerk naar waardecreatie door het adviseren en begeleiden van bestuursleden door commissarissen. Deze ontwikkeling heeft belangrijke consequenties voor zowel ondernemingen als commissarissen. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/10698/ 2007-08-08T00:00:00Z During the last decade, globalization and liberalization of financial markets, changing societal expectations and corporate governance scandals have increased the attention for the fiduciary duties of non-executive directors. In this context, recent corporate governance reform initiatives have emphasized the control task and independence of non-executive directors. However, little attention has been paid to their impact on the external and internal service tasks of non-executive directors. Therefore, this paper investigates how the service tasks of non-executive directors have evolved in the Netherlands. Data on corporate governance at the top-100 listed companies in the Netherlands between 1997 and 2005 show that the emphasis on non-executive directors’ external service task has shifted to their internal service task, i.e. from non-executive directors acting as boundary spanners to non-executive directors providing advice and counseling to executive directors. This shift in board responsibilities affects non-executive directors’ ability to generate network benefits through board relationships and has implications for non-executive directors’ functional requirements. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/10937/ 2005-12-01T00:00:00Z Dit artikel geeft een overzicht van toezichthoudende commissies (audit-, belonings- en selectie- en benoemings commissies) in beursgenoteerde ondernemingen in Nederland en stelt de centrale vraag in hoeverre ondernemingen onder druk van omgevingsfactoren commissies hebben ingesteld gedurende de laatste tien jaar. Het artikel concludeert dat het gebruik van commissies in belangrijke mate is toegenomen sinds 1996 als gevolg van internationale corporate governance standaar den, de introductie van gedragscodes waaronder de Code Tabaksblat en de toenemende mate waarin ondernemingen afstand nemen van het klassieke Nederlandse bestuursmodel. Aan de hand van literatuur kan hierbij de kanttekening worden geplaatst dat er niet een eenduidige relatie bestaat tussen de marktwaarde en fi nanciële prestaties van ondernemingen en de instelling van toezichthoudende commissies. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6455/ 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z Although self-regulation has proven to be effective for the development of voluntary corporate-governance codes, the results of this study indicate that leading European companies are not yet too concerned about compliance with these codes. While self-regulation appears to be ineffective to change the disclosure practices of companies, the study concludes that factors relevant for choosing regulatory forms and the impact and risks involved with non-compliance of companies with voluntary codes have determined the Winter Report’s emphasis on self-regulation. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/10973/ 2002-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/8028/ 1999-04-22T00:00:00Z According to Cochran and Wartick (1988), corporate governance is an umbrella term that covers many aspects related to concepts, theories and practices of boards of directors and their executive and non-executive directors. It is a field that concentrates on the relationship between boards, stockholders, top management, regulators, auditors and other stakeholders. A related definition of corporate governance comes from Monks and Minow (1995). These authors state: “What is corporate governance? It is the relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations” (Monks and Minow, 1995:1). In this definition, the group of participants includes shareholders, management, members of board of directors, employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and other interest groups. The World Bank states: “Corporate governance refers to that blend of law, regulation and appropriate voluntary private sector practices which enable the corporation to attract financial and human capital, perform efficiently, and thereby perpetuate itself by generating long-term economic value for its shareholders, while respecting the interests of stakeholders and society as a whole. The principal characteristics of effective corporate governance are: transparency (disclosure of relevant financial and operational information and internal processes of management oversight and control); protection and enforceability of the rights and prerogatives of all shareholders; and, directors capable of independently approving the corporation's strategy and major business plans and decisions, and of independently hiring management, monitoring management's performance and integrity, and replacing management when necessary” (www.worldbank.org, Jan 1999). Sheridan and Kendall (1992), suggest that “ . . . different countries have different ideas as to what constitutes good corporate governance [ . . . ] nowhere does anyone appear to have defined corporate governance per se.” These and other definitions indicate that the field of corporate governance is a rich one. As stated by Tricker (1993:2), “ . . . corporate governance can mean many things to those concerned. Institutional investors have a different perspective from corporate regulators, board members from researchers. Insights can be drawn from the professional and theoretical worlds of organisational behavior, jurisprudence, financial economics, accountancy and auditing, as well as from the experiential worlds of director behaviour and board practices.” See also Moerland (1997) for an overview of corporate governance definitions. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11012/ 1999-01-01T00:00:00Z This paper outlines the formal structure of Dutch two-tier boards and compares the formal structure with the reality of board practices of the largest Dutch companies listed at the Amsterdam Stock Exchanges. This comparison questions the supposed independence of two-tier boards. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11040/ 1997-01-01T00:00:00Z Dit artikel handelt over de vergelijking van twee belangrijke internationale corporate governance modellen: het Angelsaksische one-tier model en het Reinlands two-tier model. De modellen bieden een op het eerste gezicht alternatieve invulling van de organisatie van de board ter ondersteuning van de traditionele toezichthoudende rol van commissarissen. Vanuit een conflict perspectief kan worden betoogd dat de organisatorische vormgeving van de twee modellen is ingericht om de scheiding tussen toezicht (decision control) en leidinggeven (decision management) te faciliteren. Naast de zogenaamde 'monitoring rol' besteedt dit artikel in het bijzonder ook aandacht aan de sterk in opkomst zijnde strategische rol van commissarissen. In deze rol wordt juist vanuit een consensus perspectief een integratie van decision management met decision control voorgesteld. Het artikel betoogt dat beide perspectieven op de organisatie en taakvervulling van de board elkaar niet wederzijds hoeven uit te sluiten en dat dit in de praktijk aanleiding geeft tot aanpassingen in de twee corporate governance modellen. Deze aanpassingen kunnen wijzen op een convergentie tendens tussen beide modellen.