http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/6092/ List of Publications en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/34914/ 2012-09-01T00:00:00Z Experiments frequently use a random incentive system (RIS), where only tasks that are randomly selected at the end of the experiment are for real. The most common type pays every subject one out of her multiple tasks (within-subjects randomization). Recently, another type has become popular, where a subset of subjects is randomly selected, and only these subjects receive one real payment (between-subjects randomization). In earlier tests with simple, static tasks, RISs performed well. The present study investigates RISs in a more complex, dynamic choice experiment. We find that between-subjects randomization reduces risk aversion. While within-subjects randomization delivers unbiased measurements of risk aversion, it does not eliminate carry-over effects from previous tasks. Both types generate an increase in subjects' error rates. These results suggest that caution is warranted when applying RISs to more complex and dynamic tasks. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/31292/ 2012-01-01T00:00:00Z We examine cooperative behavior when large sums of money are at stake, using data from the television game show Golden Balls. At the end of each episode, contestants play a variant on the classic prisoner's dilemma for large and widely ranging stakes averaging over $20,000. Cooperation is surprisingly high for amounts that would normally be considered consequential but look tiny in their current context, what we call a “big peanuts” phenomenon. Utilizing the prior interaction among contestants, we find evidence that people have reciprocal preferences. Surprisingly, there is little support for conditional cooperation in our sample. That is, players do not seem to be more likely to cooperate if their opponent might be expected to cooperate. Further, we replicate earlier findings that males are less cooperative than females, but this gender effect reverses for older contestants because men become increasingly cooperative as their age increases. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/13566/ 2008-10-16T00:00:00Z The central theme of this dissertation is the analysis of risky choice. The first two chapters analyze the choice behavior of contestants in a TV game show named “Deal or No Deal” (DOND). DOND provides a unique opportunity to study risk behavior, because it is characterized by very large and wide-ranging stakes, by a simple probability distribution, and by stop-go decisions that require minimal skill or strategy. The first chapter analyzes individual editions from different countries. The results are hard to reconcile with expected utility theory and point to reference-dependent alternatives such as prospect theory. The choices of contestants can be explained in large part by previous outcomes experienced during the game. Risk aversion decreases after earlier expectations have been shattered by unfavorable outcomes or surpassed by favorable outcomes. The second chapter compares across editions. Risky choice turns out to be highly sensitive to the context, as defined by the initial prizes in the game. Even though the initial stakes of the various editions are widely different, contestants respond in a similar way to the stakes relative to their initial level. The third chapter of this thesis analyzes random task incentive systems (RTISs), using experiments that mimic DOND. RTISs are commonly applied in risky choice experiments to implement real incentives, especially when research budgets are limited and to avoid income effects. We find that caution is warranted when applying RTISs. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14057/ 2008-03-01T00:00:00Z We examine the risky choices of contestants in the popular TV game show "Deal or No Deal" and related classroom experiments. Contrary to the traditional view of expected utility theory, the choices can be explained in large part by previous outcomes experienced during the game. Risk aversion decreases after earlier expectations have been shattered by unfavorable outcomes or surpassed by favorable outcomes. Our results point to reference-dependent choice theories such as prospect theory, and suggest that path-dependence is relevant, even when the choice problems are simple and well defined, and when large real monetary amounts are at stake. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/17276/ 2008-03-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14060/ 2007-07-13T00:00:00Z In de verschillende versies van het televisiespel Deal or No Deal staan sterk verschillende geldbedragen op het spel. Vergelijkingen van het risicogedrag binnen en tussen versies wijzen erop dat risicogedrag sterk wordt bepaald door eerdere verwachtingen die men heeft van de spelopbrengst. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7230/ 2006-01-11T00:00:00Z The popular television game show deal or No Deal offers a unique opportunity for analyzing decision making under risk: it involves very large stakes, simple take-or-leave decisions that require minimal skill or strategy and near-certainty about the probability distribution. Based on a panel data set of the choices of contestants in all game rounds of 53 episodes from Australia and the Netherlands, we find an average Pratt-Arrow relative risk aversion (RRA) between roughly 1 and 2 for initial wealth levels between 0 and 50,000. The RRA differs substantially across the contestants and some even exhibit risk seeking behavior. The cross-sectional differences in RRA can be explained in large part by the previous outcomes experienced by the contestants during the game. Most notably, consistent with the break-even effect,the RRA strongly decreases following earlier losses and risk seeking arises after large losses. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14122/ 2005-12-16T00:00:00Z Onderzoek naar de risicohouding van deelnemers aan Miljoenenjacht laat zien dat ‘pech in het spel’ deelnemers minder gevoelig maakt voor risico’s. De echte pechvogels accepteren zelfs ‘oneerlijke’ kansspelen. Psychologie lijkt belangrijker te zijn dan veel economen denken.