http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/6463/ List of Publications en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11672/ 2007-10-01T00:00:00Z We investigate how market shares change when a new, superior technology exhibiting network externalities is introduced in a market initially dominated by an old technology. This is done under the assumption that consumers are heterogeneous in their valuation of technology quality and network externalities and that goods are not (perfectly) durable and thus have to be bought repeatedly. When both technologies are unsponsored, the old technology dominates when the quality difference is small, and it disappears when the quality difference is large. When the new technology is sponsored, the relationship between the quality difference and the long-run market share of the new technology is non-monotonic and the old technology always continues to exist http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11787/ 2006-01-01T00:00:00Z OPTA heeft besloten mobiele gespreksafgiftetarieven te reguleren. Dit artikel presenteert argumenten die de wenselijkheid van de voorgestelde regulering bestrijden. Asymmetrische regulering verdient de voorkeur of moet overwogen worden, als al gereguleerd moet worden. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11628/ 2004-11-01T00:00:00Z We study the impact of financial incentives on social approval, showing that in a society with altruists and egoists, who all care about social approval, introducing financial incentives to agents to contribute to a socially desirable outcome may actually decrease the number of contributions. Withdrawing the financial incentive does not restore the norm to contribute and may reduce the level of contributions even further. When the norm has disappeared, it may be possible to restore voluntary contributions by first introducing high price and then reducing it, but such an operation is costly and its success uncertain. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6861/ 2001-06-30T00:00:00Z There is increasing empirical and experimental evidence that providing financial incentives to agents to perform certain socially desirable actions may permanently reduce other types of motivations to undertake these actions. We study the impact of financial incentives on the desire for social approval, using the example of blood donation. We show that in a society with altruists and egoists, who all care about social approval, introducing a payment into a voluntary system may actually decrease the amount of blood donated. Withdrawing the financial incentive does not restore the norm to donate and may reduce the supply of blood even further. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6933/ 2000-10-23T00:00:00Z In this paper we investigate whether markets with heterogeneous network externalities can be locked-in by old technologies even if superior technologies are available. Heterogeneous network externalities are present when some consumers care more about the size of the market share of a good than others. Interestingly, the answer depends on the quality difference between the old and the new technology and on whether firms compete in prices. Without price competition, a partial lock-in occurs if (and only if) the quality difference is small. In the presence of price competition, lock-in in the traditional sense completely disappears, although the old technology may keep some market share in some periods as the new technology is priced higher in equilibrium.