http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/700/ List of Publications en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/39974/ 2013-04-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/39975/ 2013-04-01T00:00:00Z This paper addresses the genesis of farmer cooperatives in China in terms of the actors. Empirical results from a multiple case study indicate that the genesis of cooperatives in China is due to entrepreneurial farmers and the government, rather than a bottom-up, collective action process of many small farmers. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/39977/ 2013-04-01T00:00:00Z While most economic organisation literature on cooperatives has focused on changes in income rights, we study changes in the allocation of decision rights between board of directors (representing members) and managers. The traditional role of the board is to direct the activities of the managers. However, professional management increasingly makes most strategic decisions, pushing the board into a supervisory role. We present two groups of findings on changing board-management relationships. We identify three corporate governance models: traditional, management and corporation. And we present an empirical illustration showing a relationship between the choice of board model, and product portfolio and performance. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/37879/ 2012-11-22T00:00:00Z A principal-agent model is formulated to capture the efficiency of cooperatives with a member CEO and cooperatives with an employed outsider as CEO. Results of the model show that the incentive strength regarding the member CEO is stronger compared to that of the outside CEO in order to shift some effort of the member CEO from individual farming into the task of adding value to the cooperative enterprise. A cooperative with a member CEO is uniquely efficient when upstream and downstream tasks are substitutes to a certain extent, or complements. When the tasks are substitutes, the efficient CEO identity depends on the strength of the substitution effect and the difference of the marginal productivities between the two tasks. The scope of cooperatives with a member CEO being efficient becomes smaller when the substitution effect is at an intermediate level or the productivity difference between the two tasks is limited. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/37346/ 2012-08-27T00:00:00Z This paper compares the product quality provision of cooperatives and investor owned firms (IOFs) by highlighting the impacts of uncertainties in agricultural production and marketing, and farmers’ risk aversion. In a principal-agent model, we show that the linear contract can shift the risk of market uncertainty from farmers to processors, and pooling can share the risk of production uncertainty among cooperative members. Complete pooling places the cooperative at a disadvantage relative to the IOF in a quality-differentiated market due to the loss of free-riding dominating the gain of risk-sharing. Product quality of cooperatives decreases when the membership size increases. Cooperatives can overcome this disadvantage by partial pooling. Product quality of cooperatives will be equivalent to that of IOFs when an optimal income rights structure with partial pooling is adopted. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/37345/ 2012-08-08T00:00:00Z While most economic organisation literature on cooperatives has focused on changes in income rights, we study changes in the allocation of decision rights between board of directors (representing members) and managers. The traditional role of the board is to direct the activities of the managers. However, professional management increasingly makes most strategic decisions, pushing the board into a supervisory role. We present two groups of findings on changing board – management relationships. We identify three corporate governance models: traditional model, management model, and corporation model, and we present an empirical illustration showing a relationship between the choice of board model and product portfolio and performance. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/37798/ 2012-04-01T00:00:00Z We determine the circumstances when the absence of public listing, often believed to be a disadvantage, makes a cooperative the unique efficient governance structure. This is established in a multi-task principal-agent model, capturing that cooperatives are not publicly listed and their CEOs have to bring the downstream enterprise to value as well as to serve upstream member interests. Not having a public listing prevents the CEO from choosing the level of the downstream activities too high. Cooperatives are uniquely efficient when the upstream marginal product multiplied with a function increasing in the strength of the chain complementarities is higher than the downstream marginal product. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/31059/ 2012-01-23T00:00:00Z This paper addresses the distinction between core members and common members in farmer cooperatives in China in terms of the allocation of ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights. Empirical results from a multiple case study indicate that the life cycle and the governance characteristics of farmer cooperatives in China differ from cooperatives in the West world. The genesis of cooperatives in China is due to entrepreneurial farmers and the government, rather than the bottom-up, collective action process of many small farmers. The distribution of equity capital, decision rights, and income rights is quite skewed towards core members. We conclude that the development of cooperatives in China adapts to the local economic and cultural environment and goes via an alternative way to cooperatives in the Western world. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/32154/ 2011-09-01T00:00:00Z Dual distribution in franchising is addressed from an incomplete contracting perspective. We explicitly model cooperative (dual distribution) franchising as an organizational form, next to wholly-owned, wholly-franchised, and dual distribution franchise systems. Key conclusions of the model are: (1) dual distribution as an efficient governance mechanism does not depend on heterogeneous downstream outlets, and (2) whether dual distribution or some other organizational form is efficient depends on the size of the benefits to dual distribution relative to the parties' costs of investing. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/23924/ 2011-06-30T00:00:00Z Fruit and vegetable marketing organization the Greenery has experienced various governance structure changes, like horizontal merger, forward integration, and the emergence of grower associations. A multilateral incomplete contracting model is presented to account for these changes by analysing the interactions between pooling, access, and countervailing power. This model does not only explain the changes at the Greenery, but it contributes also to the design of efficient channel governance. This paper was accepted by Pradeep Chintagunta and Preyas Desai, special issue editors. This paper was accepted by Pradeep Chintagunta and Preyas Desai, special issue editors. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/22815/ 2011-03-24T00:00:00Z Fruit and vegetable marketing organization The Greenery has experienced various governance structure changes, like horizontal merger, forward integration, and the emergence of grower associations. A multilateral incomplete contracting model is presented to account for these changes by analysing the interactions between pooling, access, and countervailing power. This model does not only explain the changes at The Greenery, but it contributes also to the design of efficient channel governance. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/22720/ 2011-01-17T00:00:00Z We determine the circumstances when the absence of public listing, often believed to be a disadvantage, makes a cooperative the unique efficient governance structure. This is established in a multi-task principal-agent model, capturing that cooperatives are not publicly listed and their CEOs have to bring the downstream enterprise to value as well as to serve upstream member interests. Not having a public listing prevents the CEO from choosing the level of the downstream activities too high. Cooperatives are uniquely efficient when the upstream marginal product multiplied with a function increasing in the strength of the chain complementarities is higher than the downstream marginal product. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/19424/ 2010-04-26T00:00:00Z The aim of the study is to explain the determinants of contractual completeness in franchise relationships by formulating and testing various propositions derived from transaction cost theory, agency theory, property rights theory, organizational capability theory and relational view of governance. The degree of contractual completeness depends on behavioural uncertainty (negatively), trust (positively), franchisees’ specific investments (negatively), environmental uncer-tainty (negatively), intangibility of system specific know-how (negatively) and contract design capabilities (positively). The hypotheses are tested with a data base consisting of 52 franchise systems in Austria. The empirical results support the hypotheses regarding behavioural uncertainty, trust and intangible system-specific know-how. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/17528/ 2009-12-15T00:00:00Z A cooperative business consists of a cooperative society and a cooperative business firm. The society of members intends to control the business in such a way as to focus the business operations on its interests. The two organizational units tend, however, to follow different behavioral logics. Borrowing some core concepts from classical sociology, Gemeinschaft norms rule ruling within the membership, while Gesellschaft norms dominate the business firms. Thereby it may be difficult to accomplish alignment between the membership organization and the business organization in order to be competitive. This paper addresses the difficulties of following the different logics by exploring Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft within agricultural cooperatives with a focus on the membership logics. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12872/ 2008-07-15T00:00:00Z This article addresses the influence costs problem in the governance structure ‘agribusiness cooperative.’ Influence costs are higher in cooperatives than in investor-oriented firms due to the unique governance structure of the former. Hypotheses are formulated and tested regarding the relationship between influence costs and seven variables: membership size, member heterogeneity, average member age, singleness of purpose, managerial power over members, level of managerial compensation, and professional versus inside management. The main results are that heterogeneous member preferences, older average member age, and investment in multiple product lines all contribute to higher influence costs. At the same time, cooperatives with well-paid, powerful and professional managers incur lower influence costs. The impact of membership size on the level of influence costs is undetermined. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/10886/ 2007-12-19T00:00:00Z In the 1950s and 1960s there was a debate about the nature of an agricultural cooperative: the cooperative as extension of the farm, the cooperative as vertical integration or the cooperative as a firm. We revisit this debate with various concepts from the theory of the firm that have been formulated since 1990. Two concepts shed light on this debate: the enterprise as a system of attributes and the delineation of a governance structure in terms of ownership rights, control rights and income rights. We argue that viewing the cooperative as a system of attributes integrates these three views. It emphasizes that a cooperative is a firm in itself, with many input suppliers as owners. The feature of many input suppliers as owners implies that the behavioral differences between a cooperative and an investor owned firm have to be addressed by highlighting the unique aspects of the stakeholder owning the enterprise. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/10717/ 2007-10-31T00:00:00Z We empirically examine the determinants of the allocation of decision rights in the context of fruit and vegetable contracting. The main conclusion is that under contract farming, many decision rights are shifted from farmers to firms. Quality, reputation and specific investments by firms positively influence the number of decision rights allocated to agri-business firms under contract farming, while monopsony-oligopsony power and specific investments by farmers have no effect on the allocation of decision rights. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/10505/ 2007-08-30T00:00:00Z Agent-based methodology is adopted to analyze the relationship between governance structure and the evolution of product portfolio. A corporation and a cooperative are distinguished by the single origin constraint. The single origin constraint entails that the product requiring the inputs of the members of a cooperative will never be divested. It is es-tablished that a concentric diversification strategy results in randomly distributed clusters of related products of the product portfolio of corporations, while the single origin constraint of a cooperative is responsible for pulling all prod-ucts together in one cluster. More general, the centripetal effect of one product with infinite lifetime on portfolio com-position dominates the centrifugal effect of products with finite lifetime, regardless the number of products with finite lifetime. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/10462/ 2007-08-21T00:00:00Z For the purpose of explaining governance structure variety in franchising, we explore the impact of governance structure on the incentives to invest in specific assets for the franchisor as well as the distributors. Wholly-owned, wholly-franchised, and mixed (dual distribution) franchise systems are considered. Circumstances are identified when a dual distribution governance structure uniquely allocates efficient ownership over assets. Whether dual distribution benefits are realized in a franchise or a cooperative franchise depends on whether most value is added upstream or downstream. A disadvantage of a dual distribution system is the deterioration of the investment incentives of the party having no authority, i.e. either the company-owned outlet manager in a traditional franchise or the franchisor in a cooperative franchise. A wholly-franchised system may therefore be efficient even when unique dual distribution benefits are present. A necessary condition for the efficiency of a dual distribution governance structure is a positive systemic effect, not the value of the brand name or location (or other) differences between outlets. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15773/ 2007-06-01T00:00:00Z A contract between an upstream and a downstream party consists of a contract price and a delivery requirement. Contract formation entails an externality. It changes the probability distribution of the spot market price by removing high reservation price buyers and various sellers from the spot market. The first effect decreases the expected spot market price when the number of contracts is small, whereas the decrease in the number of sellers and additional residual contract demand increase the expected spot market price beyond a certain number of contracts. It implies an endogenous upper bound on the number of contracts. Contract prices are positively related to the number of contracts. Finally, additional contract formation reduces the variance of the spot market price when the number of contracts is sufficiently large. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15774/ 2007-01-01T00:00:00Z This article addresses two observations regarding the board of directors in agricultural cooperatives. First, it is sometimes stated that cooperatives seem to behave like ordinary enterprises. Second, it is argued that cooperatives may have advantages compared to corporations with publicly exchanged shares. These observations are analyzed from complete as well as incomplete contracting theory. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7577/ 2006-03-10T00:00:00Z Bearing the legacy from central-planned system, the tax system in local China still lacks transparency and, in many cases, the liabilities of firms, especially those with extensive influences, are subject to negotiation despite the new tax-reform 1994. Applying Hirschman’s Exit-Voice theory, we construct a game model of interplay between firm and local government, in terms of exit and voice for preferential tax treatments, thereby revealing dynamics of these two options under rational entrepreneurship of economizing transaction cost. Suggested by the model, exit not only induces firm to opt for voice, it also underpins firm’s voice that forces local government to compromise. Particularly, when holding private information of exit cost, firm is able to mimic behaviors of those with high mobility so as to boost the effectiveness of voice. The empirical cases fully illustrate such rational entrepreneurship of exit plus voice to profit from local preferential policy. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7191/ 2005-12-21T00:00:00Z Plural form franchising is modeled from an incomplete contracting perspective. Complete franchising is the unique, efficient governance structure only when the plural form externality is limited and the costs of investment are low for both franchisees. Governance structure choice is irrelevant when the costs of investment are high for all franchisees, because no franchisee will invest. Finally, a plural form governance structure is the unique, efficient equilibrium in all other cases because the power allocated to independent franchisees makes them confident that they will be able to recoup their investments. Not locational or other differences between units are necessary for the emergence of plural form franchising, but positive externalities being specific for the plural form. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6995/ 2005-10-18T00:00:00Z A description and analysis of China’s Farmer Specialized Cooperatives is presented. Data is presented regarding the historical development of farmer cooperatives in China, the membership composition of a sample of 66 farmer cooperatives in the Zhejiang province, and the various attributes (governance, quality control system, and strategy) of a watermelon cooperative in this province. Many cooperatives are being transformed in organizations with a market orientation. These cooperatives exhibit substantial heterogeneity, in terms of farmers being member and skewness in the distribution of control rights. Human asset specificity in terms of establishing and maintaining relations and access to markets seems to be more important than physical asset specificity in accounting for governance structure choice in the current institutional setting. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6883/ 2005-09-05T00:00:00Z This article addresses three observations regarding the board of directors in agricultural cooperatives. First, many scholars and practitioners worry about the competency of the member dominated board of directors in agricultural cooperatives. Second, it is sometimes stated that cooperatives seem to behave like ordinary enterprises. Finally, it is argued that cooperatives may have advantages compared to firms with publicly exchanged shares. These observations are analyzed from various contract theoretic perspectives. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15772/ 2005-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15769/ 2004-12-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15567/ 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z The Ph-D defense of ‘Essays on Agricultural Cooperatives; Governance Structure in Fruit and Vegetable Markets’ by Jos Bijman (2002) brought a number of Cooperative experts together at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. It provided the opportunity to ask the Ph-D committee members, and a few others, to participate in a workshop ‘Restructuring Agricultural Cooperatives’. This book is the outgrowth of this event. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15767/ 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z De economische ordening van de Nederlandse gezondheidszorg staat aan de vooravond van drastische veranderingen, waarbij prijsvorming en toetreding aanzienlijk zullen worden geliberaliseerd. Deze veranderingen nopen tot een herziening van de relaties tussen en binnen de (organisaties van) zorgvragers, zorgverzekeraars en zorgaanbieders. In dit artikel geven wij een aanzet om te komen tot een systematische indeling van mogelijke beheerstructuren voor de relaties tussen zorgverzekeraars, ziekenhuizen en medische specialisten. Doel van een dergelijke indeling is te komen tot een selectie van beheersstructuren die geschikt zijn voor de gewijzigde verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling in het nieuwe zorgstelsel. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15768/ 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z Organisaties zijn complexe entiteiten die keuzen dienen te maken ten aanzien van accounting, financiering, logistiek, marketing, en personeelsbeleid. Dit artikel is gericht op de afstemming van deze keuzen. Organisaties worden hiertoe geconceptualiseerd als systemen van attributen, zoals het marketingbeleid en financiering, waarbij afstemming tussen de attributen gelegen kan zijn in het uniforme compensatie principe of het principe van de orthogonaliteit. Tenslotte wordt op een aantal aspecten van systeemverandering ingegaan. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15770/ 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15771/ 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/1064/ 2003-11-27T00:00:00Z Co-operatives play a major role in the agricultural and food industry. Co-operatives, by the very nature, are producer-oriented firms. As market conditions for food products have changed in recent decades, the question is raised whether co-operatives are still efficient organisations for carrying transaction with agrifood products? Bijman (2002) has addressed this question for the fresh produce industry in The Netherlands. Traditionally, fruits and vegetables were sold through auctions, organised by grower-owned co-operatives. In the 1990s several auction co-operatives merged, transformed into marketing co-operatives, and vertically integrated into wholesale. In addition, growers have set up many new bargaining associations and marketing co-operatives. These new co-operatives have started crop and variety specific marketing programmes. For reasons of asymmetric information and investment-related transaction costs several of the new co-operative firms have also included the wholesale function. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/298/ 2003-03-24T00:00:00Z Governance concerns the organisation of transactions. Four research themes regarding the governance of chains and networks are identified: decision rights, income rights, alignment, and cognition. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/270/ 2003-02-10T00:00:00Z Two extensions are formulated of the analysis of the allocation of decision rights in Hendrikse and Veerman (2001). First, the incomplete contracts in their article can be viewed as simple long-term contracts, i.e. it is not allowed to make the allocation of authority contingent on the circumstances. Contingent long-term contracts are now considered. Second, another aspect of decision rights is the frequency of meetings between the owners and managers of enterprises. This aspect will be addressed from a long-term contract perspective as well as a loss aversion perspective. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15765/ 2003-01-01T00:00:00Z Co-operatives play a major role in the agricultural and food industry. Co-operatives, by their very nature, are producer-oriented firms. As market conditions for food products have changed in recent decades, the question has been raised of whether co-operatives are still efficient organisations for carrying transactions with agrifood products? This article addresses this question for the fresh produce industry in the Netherlands. Traditionally, fruits and vegetables were sold through auctions organised by grower-owned co-operatives. In the 1990s several auction co-operatives merged, transformed into marketing co-operatives, and vertically integrated into wholesale. In addition, growers set up many new bargaining associations and marketing co-operatives. These new co-operatives have started crop and variety-specific marketing programmes. For reasons of asymmetric information and investment-related transaction costs several of the new co-operative firms have also included the wholesale function. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15766/ 2003-01-01T00:00:00Z Governance concerns the organization of transactions. Four research themes regarding the governance of chains and networks are identified: decision rights, income rights, alignment, and cognition. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15762/ 2002-06-01T00:00:00Z Increasing differentiation on the supply side of agricultural and horticultural markets has resulted in the emergence of new growers' associations (GAs). These GAs face a trade-off between self-selection and countervailing power, which is analysed with an incomplete contracting model. Heterogeneous GAs frustrate high-quality growers as a result of the policy of applying the equality principle, but they are strong in terms of countervailing power of the growers collectively. The opposite holds for homogeneous GAs. Homogeneous GAs prevail when the benefits of product differentiation are large, or when low-quality producers can be driven out of the market. An efficiency rationale for EU Regulation (EC) No. 2200/96 is formulated. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/203/ 2002-05-28T00:00:00Z Product diversification and its financial outcomes have been studied exhaustively. However, previous literature has focused on corporations, ignoring other important legal organizations or governance structures. In this paper, we study the diversification strategies of cooperatives and compare them with corporations. We develop hypotheses that predict that cooperatives differ from corporations with respect to the extent, type, and performance of product diversification. Data obtained from a sample of 118 cooperatives and corporations are used to test the hypotheses. We find significant differences between cooperatives and corporations. Therefore, our main conclusion is that governance structure does matter for product diversification and its performance. Other governance structures, besides corporations and cooperatives, and their influence in other areas, besides product diversification, could be promising directions for future research. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/202/ 2002-05-23T00:00:00Z This article addresses the impact of governance structure on diversification behavior. Hypotheses are developed regarding the differences in diversification strategy of cooperatives and stock listed companies. The analysis shows that stock listed companies are more diversified than cooperatives, related as well as unrelated. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15763/ 2002-02-01T00:00:00Z Globalization, technological developments, and consumer concerns press farmers and food producers to enhance product innovation and to seek more efficient production and distribution structures. These changes in agrifood markets shift the relative importance of the investments by different chain partners. It may therefore be necessary to change the allocation of ownership of essential assets to induce agents to make those investments that generate the chain optimum. This article analyzes the impact of ownership structure on investments in a three-tier supply chain from an incomplete contracting perspective. Circumstances are determined in which a marketing cooperative is the unique first-best ownership structure. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15764/ 2002-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15698/ 2001-12-01T00:00:00Z The relationship between the financial structure of a marketing cooperative (MC) and the requirement of the domination of control by the members is analysed from a transaction costs perspective. A MC receives less favourable terms on outside equity than a conventional firm because the decision power regarding new investments is not allocated to the providers of these funds. This is a serious threat to the survival of a MC in a market where efficient investments are characterised by an increasing level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production. A MC is predicted to be an efficient organisational form when the level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production is at a low or immediate level compared to the level of asset specificity at the farming stage of production. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/98/ 2001-06-13T00:00:00Z Cooperatives in agricultural and horticultural markets have faced problems in responding to the increasing differentiation in demand as well as supply. One response is the emergence of growers' associations. They are not vertically integrated forward into a processor/retailer stage of production like cooperatives. This gives processors/retailers the freedom to invest in the direction they most like, given the increasing differentiation in demand. Growers' associations face on the supply side a trade off between self-selection and countervailing power regarding the increasing differentiation in supply. Heterogeneous growers' associations frustrate high quality growers due to the policy of uniform treatment of members, but they are strong in terms of countervailing power of the growers collectively. The opposite holds for homogeneous growers' associations. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/81/ 2001-03-22T00:00:00Z The banks in the Dutch chipcard market initially agreed on one chipcard system. One system is attractive for companies as well as consumers. Companies, banks and retailers, prevent costs of duplication, while consumers enjoy the benefits of a widespread acceptance of one card and do not face uncertainty regarding the chipcard standard. Two standards could harm the development of the chipcard market. However, one bank withdrew from the initial agreement and introduced its own chipcard system in December 1995. This has resulted in a costly battle between the two banking chipcard standards, duplication costs for retailers, the introduction of a gateway technology in order to establish compatibility for users, and low market acceptance of the chipcards. March 2001, after a struggle of more than five years, the banks decided to return to one chipcard. The rationality of the decision to withdraw, despite the prospect that everybody may be worse off, will be analyzed from the perspective of game theory and the theory regarding standards battles. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15704/ 2001-01-01T00:00:00Z The banks in the Dutch chipcard marker initially agreed on one chipcard system. One system is attractive for companies as well as consumers. Companies, banks, and retailers prevent costs of duplication, while consumers enjoy the benefits of a widespread acceptance of one card and do not face uncertainty regarding the chipcard standard. Two standards could harm the development of the chipcard market. However; Pastbank withdrew from the initial agreement and introduced its own chipcard system in December 1995. This has resulted in a costly battle between the two banking chzpcard standards, duplication costs for retailers, the introduction of a gateway technology in order to establish compatibility for users, and low market acceptance of chipcards. In March 2001, after a struggle of more than five years, the banks decided to return to one chipcard. The rationality of Posibank's decision to withdraw, despite the prospect that everybody may be worse off will be analyzed from the perspective of game theory and the theory regarding standards battles. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/30/ 2000-06-22T00:00:00Z The nature of organizational change and the value of headquarters is analyzed in a dynamic bargaining model. Organizational change can be either imposed, or voluntary and immediate, or voluntary and delayed. Headquarters derives it value from preventing surplus reducing endogenous commitments. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/29/ 2000-06-21T00:00:00Z This article analyses the impact of ownership structure on investments in a three-party supply chain from an incomplete contracting perspective. Circumstances are determined in which a marketing cooperative is the unique first-best ownership structure. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/22/ 2000-05-18T00:00:00Z Marketing co-operatives (MCs) are analysed from an incomplete contracting perspective. The requirement of the domination of control by the members of a MC is a threat to the survival of a MC in markets where the level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production is increasing. However, a MC may remain an efficient governance structure when the increasing level of asset specificity is compensated for by a sufficient increase in the extent of product differentiation. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/19/ 2000-05-12T00:00:00Z The relationship between the financial structure of a marketing cooperative (MC) and the requirement of the domination of control by the members is analysed from a transaction costs perspective. A MC receives less favorable terms on outside equity than a conventional firm because the decision power regarding new investments is not allocated to the providers of these funds. This is a serious threat to the survival of a MC in a market where efficient investments are characterized by an increasing level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production. A MC is predicted to be an efficient organizational form when the level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production is at a low or immediate level compared to the level of asset specificity at the farming stage of production. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/18/ 2000-05-09T00:00:00Z Changes in the market conditions for fruit and vegetables have induced Dutch co-operative auctions to restructure their sales and marketing activities. Nine auctions merged into VTN and established the marketing organisation The Greenery International BV. VTN/The Greenery have encountered many problems in their first years of operation. Part of these problems can be explained by the lack of organisational coherence in the new co-operative enterprise. VTN/The Greenery is analysed from the perspective of a system of organisational attributes. While the old system is taken apart, a new, coherent system has not been fully established. Further restructuring may have to take place before the new system of attributes will be efficient. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15626/ 1999-01-01T00:00:00Z In de rubriek 'Onderweg' van NRC Handelsblad zijn het afgelopen jaar topmanagers van Nederlandse bedrijven geïnterviewd in hun auto met chauffeur. Hieruit bleek dat, ondanks de 36-40 urige werkweek, werkdagen van meer dan twaalf uur gedurende zes dagen per week geen uitzondering zijn. Voor leidinggevenden van kleinere bedrijven geldt waarschijnlijk hetzelfde. Sommigen geven als reden voor een dergelijk werkschema dat zij het goede voorbeeld dienen te geven. Waarom geeft men ondergeschikten echter niet gewoon een financiële prikkel om aanwijzingen van hen op te volgen? http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15568/ 1998-01-22T00:00:00Z Rede, uitgesproken bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van gewoon Hoogleraar Bedrijfskunde, in het bijzonder Methodologie aan de Faculteit Bedrijfskunde van de Erasmus Universiteit op 22 januari 1998 http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15685/ 1998-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15680/ 1997-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15681/ 1997-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15683/ 1997-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15624/ 1996-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15625/ 1996-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15621/ 1995-10-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15622/ 1995-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15623/ 1995-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15617/ 1994-01-01T00:00:00Z Veel activiteiten in ondernemingen vinden gezamenlijk plaats met de intentie om schaalvoordelen of synergieen te realiseren. Voorbeelden zijn niet alleen het door meerdere personen gezamenlijk uitvoeren van dezelfde taak, zoals schilder- en metselwerk, maar ook functies die meerdere taken behelzen, zoals kwaliteitskringen in de bedrijfstakken elektronica en auto's. Samenwerkingsverbanden zijn in principe aantrekkelijk, maar de problemen die met individuele bijdragen aan een gezamenlijk project geassocieerd zijn kunnen de venvezenlijking van een goed resultaat in de weg staan. Enkele problemen van en verscheidene oplossingen voor teamproduktie komen aan de orde. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15618/ 1994-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15619/ 1994-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15616/ 1993-10-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15615/ 1993-01-01T00:00:00Z The study of organizations has been approached by anthropologists, sociologists, (social) psychologists and economists. The share of economics has been modest. This seems surprising because economists have developed a "theory of the firm", but this theory is rather silent about the internal functioning of firms. It would probably be more appropriate to characterize this theory as a theory of markets. However, we believe that recent developments in economic theory provide room for a new attempt to analyse many aspects of the internal functioning of organizations (Hendrikse (1993)). This article will concentrate on corporate culture. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15610/ 1992-06-01T00:00:00Z A model based on differences between workers regarding their preferences for wage and leisure drives the heterogeneity of firms result. The more industrious workers are driven to small firms due to free riding in large firms. An industry consisting of small and large firms turns out to produce more output than an industry consisting of only large firms. Some comparative statics results are derived with respect to the size of large firms, the productivity difference between firms, and monitoring capabilities. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15614/ 1992-03-19T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15612/ 1992-03-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15611/ 1992-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15607/ 1991-10-01T00:00:00Z A centralized structure will set higher prices and locate products closer together than a decentralized one. A decentralized organizational structure is chosen because the entry-deterring effect of such a structure outweighs the monopoly effects of a centralized one for sufficiently low entry fee levels. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15606/ 1991-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15608/ 1991-01-01T00:00:00Z De aard van de investeringen, de aard van de concurrentie en de toetredingsbeslissingen zijn cruciaal voor de keuze van strategische investeringen en bet daarop volgende concurrentieproces. Op basis van deze variabelen onderscheidt de auteur acht bedrijfstrategieen en past deze toe op een aantal aspecten van de concurrentie op oligopolistische markten. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15609/ 1991-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15583/ 1989-09-01T00:00:00Z A simple model is constructed to show how partial vertical integration may emerge as an equilibrium market structure in a world characterized by rationing, differences in the reservation prices of buyers, and in the risk attitudes of buyers and sellers. The buyers with the high reservation prices turn out to be vertically integrated. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15603/ 1989-06-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15605/ 1989-06-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15582/ 1989-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15581/ 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z Onze samenleving is een georganiseerde samenleving. Niet alleen de produktie, maar ook de consumptie, het onderwijs, de vrije-tijdsbesteding en de religie worden in organisaties bedreven. Vele wetenschappen hebben zich met het bestuderen van organisaties beziggehouden. Vergeleken met de inbreng van andere disciplines is de bijdrage van de economic tamelijk bescheiden gebleven. Met name de laatste tien jaar zijn er in de economische theorie echter interessante ontwikkelingen gaande die nieuw licht op het verschijnsel organisaties werpen. Dit artikel biedt een inleidend overzicht van enkele recente aanzetten tot economische theorievorming omtrent organisaties.