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    <title>Stasser, G.</title>
    <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/7046/</link>
    <description>List of Publications</description>
    <language>en</language>
    
    <item>
      <title>Information Sharing, Cognitive Centrality, and Influence among Business Executives during Collective Choice (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6664/</link>
      <pubDate>2005-06-09T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Laboratory studies have shown that decision-making groups tend to focus on common information at the expense of unique information. In the current study, high level business executives completed a personnel selection task. Access to information about the candidates was not controlled as in a typical study of information sharing, but common, partially shared, and unique information arose naturally from the individual members’ information searches.  During subsequent discussions, groups mentioned more common than partially shared than unique information. However, the underlying processes seemed to be different from what has been observed in laboratory studies.  The popularity of information in the population from which groups were composed predicted both the number of a group’s members who accessed an item in their information searches and whether the group discussed the item.  However, the number of group members who accessed an item did predict whether information was repeated during discussion, and repetition predicted which items were included on a final written summary.   Finally, cognitively central group members were more influential than cognitively peripheral members.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Continuous versus Step-Level Public Good Games (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/1937/</link>
      <pubDate>2005-04-03T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>We will firstly outline the rationale of a public good game and explain the distinction between a
continuous public good game and a threshold public good game. As a vast majority of
experimental research in social psychology on public good games has used threshold public
good games, we will then outline the structure of a dilemma game with a provision point. Our
point is that dilemma games with a provision point violate two important assumptions commonly
held for public good games: a) there is always a conflict between the group’s interest and the
individual’s interest; and b) an individual is always better off defecting. A threshold dilemma
game is a dilemma with a coordination game embedded in it. Hence it provides focal point
solutions and may as a consequence leave less room for other factors to affect behavior.
Moreover, games with a provision point might yield different results than games without a
provision point. We will argue that above that threshold dilemma games do not provide good
models of many the public goods problems that are encountered in real life. We will propose that
a public good game with a tilted S function provides a more appropriate model of real life
dilemmas while fulfilling the defining properties of public good games.</description>
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