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    <title>Amtenbrink, F.</title>
    <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/7832/</link>
    <description>List of Publications</description>
    <language>en</language>
    
    <item>
      <title>Legal Developments (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/35021/</link>
      <pubDate>2012-09-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Last year's review of legal developments largely focused on the European Union's regulatory response to the global financial and economic crisis in the sphere of financial market regulation and supervision. Yet, this crisis has also revealed the shortcomings in the system of economic governance in European economic and monetary union (EMU). Indeed, in parallel and to some extent triggered by the financial market crisis, there was a dramatic deterioration of the budgetary position of several Member States resulting in - at least in one instance - the quasi-insolvency of a eurozone country, While 2010 was arguably mainly geared towards ad hoc emergency measures, in 2011 the EU could be seen taking steps towards more structural reform of the system of economic governance. This culminated in the signing, in Fe 2012, of the much talked about Fiscal Compact. Correspondingly, the first part of this review is dedicated to these important legal developments that not only change the character of EMU to some extent, but also put pressure on the Community Method. The second part of this article will turn to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). Given the vastness of developments relating to the reform of EU economic governance that require recording, and considering the limited space available, it is by no means possible to offer a comprehensive or even wider overview of the judgments of the ECJ in 2011. Thus, following last year's approach, the focus is on a number of important judgments of the ECJ that have the potential to substantially (re)shape the scope of EU citizenship and the free movement of persons.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Naar een effectievere economische governance in de Europese Unie? (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/26711/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-10-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Tegen de achtergrond van de wereldwijde economische en financiële crisis en de schuldencrisis in het eurogebied belicht deze bijdrage de kernelementen van de beoogde versterking van de economische coördinatie in de EMU. Het is twijfelachtig of de huidige voorstellen daadwerkelijk resulteren in een nieuw systeem van economische governance dat solide economisch beleid van lidstaten kan afdwingen. Een oplossing voor de huidige schuldencrisis zijn zij in ieder geval niet.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Legal Developments (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/31191/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-09-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description></description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Central Bank Challenges in the Global Economy (In Book)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/22328/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Introductory Remarks: There are few institutions linked to the exercise of public power in the economic sphere that have stood the test of time for as long as central banks. Indeed their
origins can be traced back to the seventeenth century when in 1668 the Swedish ‘Bank of the Estates of the Realm’ the forerunner of todays Riksbank was established by the Riksdag, at the dawn of two major armed conflicts with neighbouring
Denmark. Soon thereafter, in the midst of the Nine Year War between England and France the Bank of England was established by an Act of Parliament. Other European countries such as France and the German Reich would follow suit in
due course. Asserting that the role of central banks has changed in the course of their long history is hardly original. These changes can be observed both with regard to their main tasks, as well as their ownership and (corporate) institutional structure.
A number of central bank systems have emerged from private corporations ((joint-) stock companies) that were initially set up with the aim to raise capital for the financing of wars thus acting as the quasi-banker of government, while at the same time undertaking commercial banking. Eventually these banks would
become public corporations.  ...</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Regulating credit ratings in the european union: A critical first assessment of regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/20194/</link>
      <pubDate>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description></description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Introduction: Observing the Rule of Law in the European Union-Selected Issues (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/20604/</link>
      <pubDate>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>This is an editorial introduction to the theme of the Erasmus Law Review Vol. 2 No.1. Focusing on different relevant topics linked to the rule of law in the European Union, the contributions highlight both the ambiguity and broad scope of this notion, as well as its exceptional place in the European legal order; the application of the rule of law concept to a new, supranational legal order arguably being a contributing factor in this regard. The editorial introduction places the different contributions in perspective.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Continuation or Reorientation - What Future for European Integration? (Inaugural Lecture)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/8742/</link>
      <pubDate>2007-02-16T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>On the 25th of March the European Union celebrates the 50th anniversary of the Treaty 
of Rome by which the European Economic Community was established; the 
Netherlands being one of the founding members. Until this very day, albeit in revised 
form, this Treaty still constitutes the very centrepiece of the post-war European 
supranational legal order. 

Anniversaries are a time of celebration, a time of praise of previous accomplishments 
and encouragements to keep up the good work. I am confident that the Informal 
Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States planned for the 
25th of March will do an excellent job in issuing a statement to that effect. 

Yet, these celebrations come at an awkward time for Europe: there is talk of a 
constitutional crisis and of a rift that goes through Europe caused by the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe. With the negative referenda in the Netherlands 
and France the destiny of this Treaty remains unclear. The initial disbelief triggered 
by the rejection of this European prestige project by the citizens of two of the 
founding members of the European Communities has given way for a certain 
resignation regarding the current state and the future perspectives for Europe. Taken 
aback were especially those who consider the Constitutional Treaty a substantial step 
forward. For some the importance of this project has existential proportions, as its 
failure is thought to jeopardize the future of European integration as a whole.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Securing financial independence in the legal basis of a central bank (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/8350/</link>
      <pubDate>2005-09-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Together with institutional, functional and organizational independence, financial independence constitutes one of the cornerstones of central bank independence, the economic ratio of which has been demonstrated extensively in the literature. In broad terms financial independence may be defined as referring to the legal and practical arrangements identifying the finances of a central bank and the extent to which the bank is subject to outside influence in this regard. In the (legal) debate on central bank accountability, arguably arrangements relating to central bank finances have sometimes been treated in a rather step motherly fashion. Yet, with the wider debate on good governance structures having reached central banking, more attention is paid to such detailed arrangements. This contribution focuses on and aims at providing an overview on the impact on central bank independence of the legal arrangements relating to several aspects of central bank finances. While government access to central bank money undoubtedly has an impact on the financial position of the central bank, this contribution focuses on those elements, which are arguably more directly linked to the financial position of a central bank, including capitalization and recapitalization, the determination of the central bank budget and the arrangements on profit and loss distribution. In legal studies these arrangements have certainly received less attention. To this end a critical assessment of the role which the legal basis of a central bank plays in enhancing or undermining the financial position of a central bank vis-à-vis government and, thereafter. In this context, legal arrangements which do not only support the financial independence of a central bank but also enhance its accountability are observed. Where appropriate, references are included to legal arrangements in existing central bank systems so to provide for negative and positive examples.</description>
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