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    <title>DeJong, D.V.</title>
    <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/8359/</link>
    <description>List of Publications</description>
    <language>en</language>
    
    <item>
      <title>Royal Ahold: A Failure Of Corporate Governance (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/1863/</link>
      <pubDate>2005-01-25T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>Royal Ahold (Koninklijke Ahold NV) was one of the major success stories in the 1990s
and is one of the major failures in corporate governance, suffering a complete meltdown
in 2003. This clinical study analyzes Ahold’s growth strategy through acquisitions and
isolates the cause of the failed strategy, i.e. the absence of internal as well as external
oversight of management’s strategy. This study details the consequences of the strategy:
bad acquisitions, an accounting scandal and the loss of investor confidence. It illustrates
how initially a family and later professional management exploited the intent of the law
and existing regulatory structures to maintain absolute control of the company. It
analyzes in detail the applicable governance mechanisms of Ahold that were designed to
hold the self-interest of the parties in check. It asks the reader to consider whether these
governance mechanisms, properly implemented, might have helped prevent Ahold or a
situation similar to Ahold.</description>
    </item> <item>
      <title>The Role of Self-Regulation in Corporate Governance (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/148/</link>
      <pubDate>2001-01-19T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>This paper assesses the effectiveness of self-regulation to promote investor interests. The
Netherlands provides an excellent opportunity to gather such evidence for two reasons. First,
characteristics of the Dutch corporate governance structure have made it the recent focus of
attention by the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and countries (e.g., Korea)
when deliberating issues of corporate governance. Second, during the period 1996-1998, a
private sector initiative was undertaken to promote change in the balance of power between
management and investors. Not surprisingly, the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission has closely followed the Dutch "experiment" in self-regulation. We begin by
identifying corporate governance characteristics that are linked to firm value. We then
compare corporate governance characteristics and the relation between firm value and these
characteristics before and after the private sector initiative. We find that the
recommendations of the private sector initiative had no substantive effect on corporate
governance characteristics or their relationship with firm value. Using event study techniques
we document the market's skepticism about the successful evolution of corporate governance
practices in the Netherlands through self-regulation. The one exception to this general
conclusion is the market for new listings. Overall, our results confirm the importance of
shareholder voting rights, and who controls these rights, when considering the design of a
successful self-regulation process.</description>
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