http://repub.eur.nl/res/aut/8452/ List of Publications en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/38253/ 2013-01-01T00:00:00Z This article assesses separately the push/pull-factor explanations in Sassen’s theory on migration from newly industrialising countries to cities in OECD countries. The push-factor explanation argues that foreign direct investments spawn migration flows to the country from which these investments stem. The pull-factor explanation revolves around demand for low-skilled workers in cities due to the clustering of advanced producer services. It is found that Dutch investment flows indeed function as a push factor for migration to Dutch cities, but that the local settlement of immigrants is not related to the clustering of advanced producer services. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/32517/ 2012-06-12T00:00:00Z This article assesses the push- and pull-factor explanation in Sassen’s theory on migration from newly industrialising countries to cities in OECD countries separately. The former explanation argues that foreign direct investments spawn migration flows to the country where these investments stem from. The pull-factor explanation revolves around demand for low-skilled workers in cities due to the clustering of advanced producer services. It is found that Dutch investment flows indeed function as a push factor for migration to Dutch cities, but that the local settlement of immigrants is not related to the clustering of advanced producer services. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/38401/ 2012-06-01T00:00:00Z Studies on the substitution thesis in advanced economies show scattered results: the impact of immigration on the wages and likelihood of unemployment of the less educated varies strongly. Both studies on the substitution thesis itself and studies on the unequal post-industrial development of urban economies, suggest that this is because the substitution thesis is conditional on the type of urban economy. The empirical validity of this suggestion is tested by comparing the impact of immigration on the employment level of the less educated among 22 Dutch metropolitan areas. The findings corroborate the central hypothesis: in strong service-oriented urban economies, the impact of immigration on unemployment levels is mitigated because of high labour demand for the less educated. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/38250/ 2012-02-01T00:00:00Z It is often assessed that the construction of nature, technology and the relation between both is in the midst of a restructuring without specifying exactly what different articulations can be distinguished and how they differ from the modern notion of nature being separated from and domesticated by technology. Through an analysis of car commercials, this study develops a typology of constellations of nature and technology. Besides the well-known modern dichotomy of nature versus technology, with the latter being superior to the former, three types of articulations were found: technology as a flexible and superior technological mimicry of nature; technological mastery as harmful to nature; and nature and technology as two holistically connected realms. Implications for theories about the changing nature of nature and the restructuring of the relationship between nature and technology are discussed. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/26142/ 2011-05-04T00:00:00Z This article studies whether and why less educated natives are less ethnocentric in postindustrial Dutch cities than in industrial ones, as suggested by several theories in urban studies. A multilevel analysis of survey data collected among the native working populations (source: Cultural Change in the Netherlands Surveys 2004 and 2006) of 22 Dutch metropolitan agglomerations (sources: Statistics Netherlands Statline and Atlas of Municipalities) confirms that those concerned are indeed less ethnocentric in the most postindustrial cities. This pattern proves not to stem from the better opportunities at the bottom end of the labor market in these cities, as the ethnic competition theory suggests, but from the more tolerant cultural climate in these cities, as emphasized by Richard Florida in his work on creative cities. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/26018/ 2011-04-01T00:00:00Z This article assesses the consequences of the transition to a post-industrial urban economy for labour demand and ethnocentrism in the 22 Dutch urban agglomerations. Using municipal-level data as well as surveys, it is shown that the labour market of the least post-industrial cities yields low labour demand for lower-educated urbanites (upgrading/professionalisation thesis), while the labour market of the most post-industrial cities yields high labour demand for lower-educated urbanites (polarisation thesis). It is furthermore found that lower-educated natives in the former are more ethnocentric than in the latter. However, contrary to what is often claimed in urban studies and the social sciences at large, this proves not to be driven by job scarcity in the least post-industrial cities. The article concludes with suggestions on what might be responsible for this finding. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/26141/ 2011-01-01T00:00:00Z ABSTRACT Some studies fi nd that interethnic propinquity leads to ethnic tolerance, while others conclude that it underlies ethnic confl ict. Using data on 50 Dutch cities in 2006 and 2010, this article assesses whether the consequences of interethnic propinquity for votes for Wilders’s PVV – the Dutch anti-immigrant party par excellence – are conditional on the economic and cultural urban contexts in which these contacts take place. In line with the ‘confl ict hypothesis’ it is found that a higher level of interethnic propinquity leads to more support for the PVV in cities with a high level of unemployment and an intolerant cultural climate (as measured by the bohemian index and the gay-scene index), whereas the relationship is reverse in cities with low unemployment levels and a tolerant cultural climate (corroborating the ‘contact hypothesis’). http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/20105/ 2010-12-31T00:00:00Z In this article we assess the consequences of the transition to post-industrial urban economy for labour demand and ethnocentrism in the 22 Dutch urban agglomerations. Using municipal-level data as well as surveys, we show that the labour market of the least post-industrial cities yields low labour demand for lower-educated urbanites (upgrading/professionalisation thesis), while the labour market of the most post-industrial cities yields high labour demand for lower-educated urbanites (polarisation thesis). It is furthermore found that lower-educated natives in the former are more ethnocentric than in the latter. However, contrary to what is often claimed in urban studies and the social sciences at large, this proves not to be driven by job scarcity in the least post-industrial cities. The article concludes with suggestions on what might be responsible for this finding. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/26144/ 2010-12-01T00:00:00Z Verklaringen voor de migratie van laaggeschoolden van arme naar rijke landen worden, conform klassieke migratietheorieën, vanouds gevonden in slechte economische omstandigheden in de herkomstlanden. Volgens Sassen brengt het hedendaagse mondialiseringsproces echter nieuwe, aanvullende push en pull factoren voor deze migratiestromen met zich mee. Buitenlandse investeringen in nieuwe industrielanden zouden migratiestromen veroorzaken richting steden in de landen waaruit de investeringen afkomstig zijn. Bovendien zouden migranten zich binnen die landen vooral vestigen in steden waar geavanceerde producentendiensten geclusterd zijn, omdat die een hoge arbeidsvraag naar laaggeschoolden kennen. In dit artikel wordt de empirische houdbaarheid van deze veronderstellingen onderzocht door te kijken naar migratie vanuit nieuwe industrielanden naar Nederlandse steden. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/26139/ 2010-11-01T00:00:00Z Internationale waarnemers verbazen zich al tijden over het verhitte integratiedebat dat in Nederland woedt. Ze vragen zich af hoe zoiets mogelijk is in een land dat bekendstaat als baken van seculiere tolerantie. Dit roept de vraag op hoe etnische tolerantie en afwijzing van traditionele christelijke stellingnamen over morele vraagstukken zich tot elkaar verhouden. In dit artikel onderzoeken we daarom of en waarom het aanhangen van een post-Christelijke moraal voor sommigen leidt tot etnische intolerantie, terwijl het voor anderen samengaat met etnische tolerantie. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/26143/ 2010-11-01T00:00:00Z In hedendaagse westerse samenlevingen kan intolerantie jegens etnische minderheden met name worden gevonden onder laagopgeleiden. Op basis van verschillende theorieën in de stadsstudies kan echter worden verondersteld dat zij in de meest postindustriële steden minder etnocentrisch zijn dan in de minst postindustriële steden. Dit artikel vergelijkt het etnocentrisme van laagopgeleide autochtonen woonachtig in de 22 Nederlandse grootstedelijke gebieden, en toont aan dat dit inderdaad het geval is. Vervolgens wordt onderzocht of dit kan worden verklaard door de grotere arbeidsmarktkansen aldaar of het tolerantere culturele klimaat. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/21721/ 2010-10-01T00:00:00Z Various studies have demonstrated that while the lower educated support economic redistribution more than the higher educated do, they nonetheless dislike welfare support for immigrants more strongly. This paper aims to explain this remarkably particularistic application of the principle of economic egalitarianism ('welfare chauvinism') by testing three theories by means of survey data representative of the Dutch population (N = 1972). The first theory asserts that the low level of political competence of the lower educated is responsible, the second focuses on their weak economic position, and the third claims that their limited amount of cultural capital is decisive. Only the latter explanation is confirmed and implications for debates about ethnocentrism, deservingness and welfare state legitimacy, as well as the ideological profile of the lower-educated working class are discussed. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/19692/ 2010-06-04T00:00:00Z It is hard to overestimate the scholarly impact of Saskia Sassen’s global city theoretical framework, which revolves around the impact of economic globalization on the social, economic, and political reality of cities in advanced economies. Yet, more than two decades of research dedicated to a ‘global city debate’ have left its main issues unresolved. In Unravelling the Global City Debate Jeroen van der Waal argues that this is because scholars have hitherto merely interpreted urban change according to the central theoretical notions in this debate, and neglected to assess their empirical validity. Therefore he unravels the global city debate into the distinct theoretical notions it consists of and puts these to rigorous empirical tests by using data on one of the most urbanized and globalized developed economies in the world: the Netherlands. By doing so, he shows that the standard research practice in the global city debate leaves much to be desired, for it yields both an under- and overestimation of the impact of economic globalization on urban labour markets in contemporary cities in the advanced economies http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/26140/ 2010-06-01T00:00:00Z Laagopgeleiden zijn meer dan hoogopgeleiden geneigd om voorkeur voor economische herverdeling gepaard te laten gaan met afkeer van sociale voorzieningen ten bate van etnische minderheden. Waarom zijn zij van mening dat sommigen gelijker zijn dan anderen? In dit artikel wordt onderzocht of hun opmerkelijke combinatie van economisch egalitarisme en ‘verzorgingsstaatschauvinisme’ voortkomt uit gebrekkige politieke competentie, hun zwakke economische positie of hun geringe cultureel kapitaal en de culturele onzekerheid die daarmee gepaard gaat. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/18240/ 2010-01-01T00:00:00Z Various studies have demonstrated that while the lower educated support economic redistribution more than the higher educated do, they nonetheless dislike welfare support for immigrants more strongly. This paper aims to explain this remarkably particularistic application of the principle of economic egalitarianism (‘welfare chauvinism’) by testing three theories by means of survey data representative for the Dutch population (N = 1,972). The first theory asserts that the low level of political competence of the lower educated is responsible, the second focuses on their weak economic position, and the third claims that their limited amount of cultural capital is decisive. Only the latter explanation is confirmed and implications for debates about ethnocentrism, deservingness and welfare state legitimacy, as well as the ideological profile of the lower-educated working class are discussed. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/22657/ 2010-01-01T00:00:00Z 1. Introduction “After nearly three centuries of utterly failed prophesies and misrepresentations of both present and past, it seems time to carry the secularization doctrine to the graveyard of failed theories, and there to whisper ‘requiescat in pace’” (Stark 1999: 269). Stark’s words, published just before the turn of the century, may count on much approval among sociologists of religion today. Secularization theory has been discredited because of its inability to account for religious change in the modern world (e.g., Berger, 1999; Heelas and Woodhead, 2005; Houtman and Mascini, 2002) and because of its sheer broadness and lack of specificity, as emphasized by Hadden (1987: 587), for instance, when he noted that it is a “hotchpotch of loosely employed ideas rather than a systematic theory”. Secularization theory’s two principal subtheses, the ‘decline-of-religion thesis’ and the ‘privatization thesis’ (Casanova, 1994), have both become increasingly contested and recent research even suggests that these two aspects of secularization may develop in a remarkably uneven way. That idea is put forward by Achterberg et al. (2009), who point out that the decline of Christian religion in the West spawns its public revitalization rather than its further privatization. This paper elaborates on this by assessing the empirical merits of two objections that suggest that these recent findings may after all not contradict the established notion that religious decline and religious privatization occur in tandem. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/17344/ 2009-12-01T00:00:00Z In this article, an assessment is made of the consequences of globalisation for urban wage inequality. Using data on employers in the Dutch cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, it is shown that simply equating global city formation with globalisation, when it comes to urban wage inequality—which is the common research practice in urban studies—leads to a blind spot for the impact of international competition, falsely equates economic restructuring with globalisation and strongly overrates the impact of globalisation on the urban wage structure. Global city formation does not lead to polarising tendencies, while exposure to international competition leads to upgrading tendencies. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/16537/ 2009-08-19T00:00:00Z Studies on the substitution thesis in advanced economies show scattered results: the impact of immigration on the wages and unemployment of lower-educated natives and immigrants varies strongly. In both studies on the substitution thesis itself, as well as studies on the unequal development of urban economies in post-industrialism, there are suggestions that this is because the substitution thesis is conditional on the type of urban economy. More specific, they indicate there is reason to expect that a strong service-centered urban economy yields more labour demand for the lower educated, which consequently mitigates the substitution between immigrants and natives or earlier waves of immigrants. The empirical validity of this expectation is tested by comparing the impact of immigration on the employment level of lower-educated urbanites between 22 Dutch metropolitan areas. The findings corroborate the central hypothesis: immigration leads to higher unemployment levels, but this impact is weaker in the most service-centered urban economies. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/16859/ 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z In dit artikel wordt onderzocht of twee centrale aspecten van secularisering hand in hand gaan: een afname van het aantal christenen en een toenemende privatisering van het christelijk geloof. Via een analyse van gegevens over achttien westerse landen en voor Nederland over de periode van 1970 tot 1996 laat dit artikel zien dat afnemende christelijke kerkelijkheid opmerkelijk genoeg niet gepaard gaat met een afnemende publieke relevantie van het christelijk geloof. In plaats daarvan zien de auteurs een dialectische relatie tussen beide dimensies. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/17347/ 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z De substitutiethese – het idee dat immigratie de lonen van de gevestigde bevolking drukt – blijkt voor sommige geavanceerde economieën wel op te gaan en voor andere niet. Tot op heden is onduidelijk wat daarvan de oorzaak is. In dit artikel wordt de substitutiethese daarom gecontextualiseerd naar stedelijke economie. De verwachting dat een sterk ontwikkelde dienstensector neerwaartse loondruk door immigratie afzwakt, wordt vervolgens onderzocht door postindustrieel Amsterdam met industrieel Rotterdam te vergelijken. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/17348/ 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z De substitutiethese – het idee dat immigratie de lonen van de gevestigde bevolking drukt – blijkt voor sommige geavanceerde economieën wel op te gaan en voor andere niet. Tot op heden is onduidelijk wat daarvan de oorzaak is. In dit artikel wordt de substitutiethese daarom gecontextualiseerd naar stedelijke economie. De verwachting dat een sterk ontwikkelde dienstensector neerwaartse loondruk door immigratie afzwakt, wordt vervolgens onderzocht door postindustrieel Amsterdam met industrieel Rotterdam te vergelijken. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14416/ 2008-11-01T00:00:00Z Imprisonment rates are presumed to have risen in the West, and it is argued by certain social scientists that this can be explained by a comprehensive process of economic neo-liberalization. In this paper, we develop an alternative explanation, focusing on the rise of a 'new political culture'. Longitudinal cross-national analyses are performed to test the tenability of these theories. First, it is demonstrated that some countries have been witnessing a trend of penalization, but that there is no overall trend. Second, economic explanations for variations in imprisonment rates prove to be untenable. Third, it is shown that a new-rightist demand for social order, which is not found to be inspired by economic neo-liberalization, provides a better explanation. This leads to the conclusion that high incarceration rates can be understood as being part of a right-authoritarian politico-cultural complex. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12179/ 2008-04-17T00:00:00Z First we investigate how the political culture in western countries has changed over time. Three theoretical views are put to the test using data on party-manifestos. The first predicts that only new-leftist issues will increase in salience. The second predicts that both new-leftist and new-rightist issues will emerge at the same time. The third, which is empirically corroborated, predicts that first new-leftist issues will emerge followed by the rise in newrightist issues. Second, we investigate how the emergence of these new issues has affected the traditional class-party alignments. Using the International Mobility and Stratification File we show that the middle class increasingly votes left wing as new-leftist issues become more important and that the working class increasingly votes right wing as new-rightist issues become more important. What’s more, the middle class appears to alienate from the traditional party of their class as new-rightist issues rise in salience. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12180/ 2008-04-17T00:00:00Z By means of a re-analysis of the most relevant data source (Nieuwbeerta & Ganzeboom 1996), this paper criticizes the newly grown consensus in political sociology that class voting has declined since World War II. An increase of crosscutting cultural voting, rooted in educational differences, rather than a decline of class voting proves responsible for the decline of the traditional class-party alignments. Moreover, income differences have not become less, but more consequential for voting behavior during this period. It is concluded that the new consensus has been built on quicksand. Class is not dead – it has been buried alive under the increasing weight of cultural voting, systematically misinterpreted as a decline of class voting, due to the widespread application of the Alford index. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12181/ 2008-04-17T00:00:00Z http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12182/ 2008-04-17T00:00:00Z Drawing upon problems of interpretation in political sociological research, this article questions the common practice of lumping together moral traditionalism and authoritarianism. First, it is demonstrated that of the two only moral traditionalism relates to religious orthodoxy. Second, the well-established strong correlation between both value orientations proves to be caused, in the case at hand solely by the circumstance that nontraditionalism and nonauthoritarianism go hand in hand; moral traditionalism and authoritarianism are almost unrelated. Third, moral traditionalists are shown to vote for Christian right-wing parties, whereas authoritarianism more commonly leads to a vote for a secular right-wing party. Fourth, whereas moral traditionalism proves decisive for the voting behavior of Christians, it is authoritarianism that underlies the non-Christian vote. These findings from The Netherlands (consistent with theories on cultural modernization) lead to the conclusion that attention should be paid to the distinction between these orientations because this aids the interpretation of research fi ndings, and because authoritarianism will probably gain a more central role in politics at the cost of moral traditionalism. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12183/ 2008-04-17T00:00:00Z By means of a re-analysis of the most relevant data source - the international social mobility and politics file - this paper criticizes the newly grown consensus in political sociology that class voting has declined since World War II. An increase of crosscutting cultural voting, rooted in educational differences, rather than a decline of class voting proves responsible for the decline of the traditional class-party alignments. Moreover, income differences have not become less, but more consequential for voting behavior during this period. It is concluded that the new consensus has been built on quicksand. Class is not dead – it has been buried alive under the increasing weight of cultural voting, systematically misinterpreted as a decline of class voting, due to the widespread application of the Alford index. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12184/ 2008-04-17T00:00:00Z By means of a reanalysis of the most relevant data source—the International Social Mobility and Politics File—this article criticizes the newly grown consensus in political sociology that class voting has declined since World War II. An increase in crosscutting cultural voting, rooted in educational differences rather than a decline in class voting, proves responsible for the decline of traditional class-party alignments. Moreover, income differences have not become less but more consequential for voting behavior during this period. It is concluded that the new consensus has been built on quicksand. Class is not dead—it has been buried alive under the increasing weight of cultural voting, systematically misinterpreted as a decline in class voting because of the widespread application of the so-called Alford index. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12185/ 2008-04-17T00:00:00Z Analyzing the social consequences of globalization in cities based on global city theory is therefore not only obscuring a core feature of globalization as international competition, but also overstates the social consequences of globalization for many workers in cities in the advanced economies. After all, as argued before, economic restructuring in cities with the advanced economies is largely driven by local and national processes instead of international or global ones. Our findings indicate that even in the global age, local geographical, institutional and historical idiosyncrasies of individual cities seem to be decisive in understanding their socio-economic structure (cf. Smith, 2001). http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12186/ 2008-04-17T00:00:00Z De afgelopen twee decennia heeft Sassen verschillende werken afgeleverd met als thema de verhouding tussen het lokale, het nationale en het mondiale (Zie o.a.: Sassen, 1988; 1991; 1994; 2001; 2006). Aanvankelijk richtte zij zich op de analyse van internationale migratiestromen, maar zij maakte naam met haar magnum opus The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo in 1991. Hierin beschrijft zij het ontstaan van ‘global cities’; steden die fungeren als cockpit van waaruit de mondiale economie wordt aangestuurd. In 2001 publiceerde zij de tweede editie, waarin de uitvoerige kritiek op de eerste editie werd geïncorporeerd – en deels werd weerlegd. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12122/ 2008-04-14T00:00:00Z This article demonstrates that studies in political sociology are flawed, because they fail to distinguish between moral conservatism/progressiveness and authoritarianism/libertarianism. Such a distinction is necessary, because historically and theoretically speaking, it is the process of modernization (de-pillarization in the Dutch case) that erodes the former’s salience and, through the alienation and anomie this creates, increases the latter’s. Hypotheses derived from this theory are strikingly confirmed. First, the well-established strong correlation between both value dimensions proves solely caused by the circumstance that moral progressiveness and libertarianism go hand in hand: moral conservatism and authoritarianism are almost unrelated. Second, whereas moral conservatism/progressiveness proves decisive for the voting behaviour of those who belong to a pillar, it is authoritarianism/libertarianism that underlies the vote of those who do no not belong to a pillar. It is concluded that the common practice in political sociology to lump both value dimensions together needs to be abandoned, because it produces theoretically unclear research findings. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15139/ 2008-01-01T00:00:00Z Imprisonment rates are presumed to have risen in the west, and it is argued by certain social scientists that this can be explained by a comprehensive process of economic neoliberalisation. In this paper, we develop an alternative explanation, focussing on the rise of a ‘new political culture’. Longitudinal cross-national analyses are performed to test the tenability of these theories. First, it is demonstrated that some countries have been witnessing a trend of penalisation, but that there is no overall trend. Second, economic explanations for variations in imprisonment rates prove to be untenable. Third, it is shown that a new-rightist demand for social order, which is not found to be inspired by economic neo-liberalisation, provides a better explanation. This leads to the conclusion that high incarceration rates can be understood as being part of a right-authoritarian politico-cultural complex. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15141/ 2008-01-01T00:00:00Z Dat in westerse landen steeds meer mensen in de gevangenis lijken te zitten is volgens een invloedrijke theorie het gevolg van economische neo-liberalisering. In dit artikel formuleren we een alternatieve verklaring gebaseerd op de opkomst van een nieuwe politieke cultuur. Na een analyse van de vermeende groei van gevangenispopulaties toetsen we de houdbaarheid van beide theorieën. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/16389/ 2008-01-01T00:00:00Z One of the key arguments in the grand narratives on globalization is that of time-space compression. Reflecting the discussion on the relations between globalization and inequality, this chapter argues that the most important local effect of the immensely increased mobility has been a process of fragmentation of cities. The chapter will focus on an empirical background on the changing international division of labour, which caused the deindustrialization of the advanced economies and consequently put the Keynesian welfare-state under heavy pressure; the spectacular growth in and use of communications technology, especially the internet; and the rapidly growing international mobility of people, both in the form of long distance migration and of international tourism. The chapter will elaborate the notion of the fragmentation of cities, using illustrations from the city of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15164/ 2007-01-01T00:00:00Z De sociale gevolgen van mondialisering zijn zonder twijfel een van de meest bediscussieerde onderwerpen in de sociale wetenschappen gedurende de afgelopen decennia (vgl. Burgers, 2006a en b; Wilterdink, 2006). En het ziet er niet naar uit dat dit in de nabije toekomst zal veranderen want dit thema is een belangrijke plaats toebedacht op de sociologische onderzoeksagenda (vgl. Engbersen & De Haan, 2006). Dat is ook niet zo vreemd, want ondanks de enorme aandacht die mondialisering alweer geruime tijd krijgt, is het nog lang niet duidelijk welke nu precies de gevolgen ervan zijn. Daar zijn minstens twee redenen voor aan te geven. De eerste is dat hoewel – of misschien juist wel omdat – het begrip zich in een grote belangstelling mag verheugen, het doorgaans weinig precies wordt ingevuld waardoor er zowat alles mee in verband kan worden gebracht. Een sprekend voorbeeld hiervan vinden we bij Bauman (1998), die er op wijst dat het bij ‘mondialisering’ om een vaag en inflatoir begrip gaat, maar daar zelf niet veel verandering in brengt door er de wel erg algemene inhoud van ‘time-space compression’2 aan te geven (Bauman, 1998: 2). Vervolgens verbindt hij er dan een veelheid van – zonder uitzondering vaak als negatief ervaren – verschijnselen mee, variërend van illegale migratie, het opsluiten van grote delen van de onderklasse tot het ontstaan van ‘gated communities’. 2 De tweede reden is, dat mondialisering geen eendimensionaal verschijnsel is, maar verschillende facetten kent. Waar er bijvoorbeeld op het gebied van de economie duidelijke manifestaties zijn van mondialisering of op z’n minst van voortgaande geografische schaalvergroting, is het veel minder duidelijk of dat ook geldt in politiek en cultureel opzicht (vgl. Held & McGrew, 2002). Wordt de rol van nationale staten minder belangrijk, of verandert die alleen maar van aard zonder aan belang in te boeten (vgl. Sassen, 2006c)? Eroderen lokale culturen als gevolg van mondialisering of worden zij juist versterkt door de beschikbaarheid van nieuwe technologieën die deze culturen meer en intensiever kunnen reproduceren? Afhankelijk van het aspect dat bekeken wordt, kunnen er vele maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen mee verbonden worden. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/17343/ 2007-01-01T00:00:00Z Op het terrein van de stadsstudies woedt al geruime tijd een discussie over de sociale gevolgen van internationalisering van grootstedelijke economieën. Die discussie is vooral aangezwengeld door Saskia Sassens theorie over global cities waarin zij poneert dat mondialisering tot polarisering van stedelijke arbeidsmarkten leidt. Polarisering is echter vooral het gevolg van economische structuurveranderingen en die worden niet door mondialisering veroorzaakt. Toenemende internationale concurrentie leidt in westerse steden niet tot polarisering maar tot upgrading van lokale arbeidsmarkten. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12178/ 2006-04-17T00:00:00Z In this paper we investigate the linkage between changes in the political culture on the one hand and changes in class-party alignments on the other. First we investigate how the political culture in Western countries has changed over-time. Three views are tested using data on party-manifestos. The first predicts that only new-leftist issues will increase in salience. The second predicts that both new-leftist and new-rightist issues will emerge at the same time. The third, which is empirically corroborated, predicts that first new-leftist issues will emerge followed by a rise in new right-wing issues. Second, we investigate how the emergence of these new issues has affected the traditional class-party alignments. Using the International Mobility and Stratification File we show that the middle class increasingly votes left-wing as new-leftist issues become more important and that the working class increasingly votes right-wing as new-rightist issues become more important. Next to that, the middle class appears to alienate from the traditional party of their class as new-rightist issues rise in salience. At the end of the paper we discuss the implications of our findings. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15137/ 2006-01-01T00:00:00Z By means of a re-analysis of the most relevant data source – the International Social Mobility and Politics File – this paper criticizes the newly grown consensus in political sociology that class voting has declined since World War II. An increase in crosscutting cultural voting, rooted in educational differences, rather than a decline in class voting proves responsible for the decline of the traditional class-party alignments. Moreover, ncome differences have not become less, but more consequential for voting behavior during this period. It is concluded that the new consensus has been built on quicksand. Class is not dead – it has been buried alive under the increasing weight of cultural voting, systematically misinterpreted as a decline in class voting, due to the widespread application of the so-called Alford index. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/17342/ 2006-01-01T00:00:00Z Silent Revolution, Counter-revolution or Cultural Conflict? Political Cultural Change and its Influence on Class Voting This paper deals with the linkage between changes in the political culture and changes in class-party alignments. First, we investigate how the political culture in Western countries has changed over time. Three views are tested using data on party-manifestos. The first predicts that only new-leftist issues will increase in salience. The second predicts that both new-leftist and new-rightist issues will emerge at the same time. The third, which is empirically corroborated, predicts that first new-leftist issues will emerge followed by a rise in new rightist issues. Second, we investigate how the emergence of these new issues has affected the traditional class-party alignments. We show that the middle class increasingly votes left-wing as newleftist issues become more important and that the working class increasingly votes rightwing as new-rightist issues become more important. The middle class also appears to alienate from the traditional party of their class as new-rightist issues rise in salience.