http://repub.eur.nl/res/concept/jel-C90/ Recent publications classified by JEL Code C90 en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6842/ 2001-10-03T00:00:00Z This paper investigates whether transactions where the buyer (or the seller) always moves first, and the seller (or the buyer) always moves second in the exchange gives higher payoffs than exchanges in which it is randomly determined who moves first. We examine the effect of two treatment variables: Partners versus Strangers and fixed versus changing positions. We find that both with fixed and with changing positions, second movers take advantage of their position by exploiting the first mover by "not delivering" the demanded good. However, with fixed positions exploitation occurs significantly less while reciprocal exchanges happen more often. In spite of this, it turns out that with fixed positions payoffs are very unevenly distributed. Unequal payoff distributions occur both under Partners and Strangers, but they appear to be more extreme among Strangers. Heijden, E.C.M. van der Nelissen, J.H.M. Verbon, H.A.A. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6844/ 2001-10-03T00:00:00Z We examine an experimental gift exchange game in which the players can improve upon the unique no-gifts equilibrium through cooperative gift giving. The main feature of the study is that there are two different types of gift exchange, which we call simple and complex exchange, respectively. Complex exchange gives higher payoffs than simple exchange but it requires not only mutual trust, like simple exchange, but also a substantial degree of coordination. We examine whether players are able to conclude simple and complex exchanges and how this is affected by the move and matching structure of the game. Heijden, E.C.M. van der Nelissen, J.H.M. Potters, J.J.M. Verbon, H.A.A.