http://repub.eur.nl/res/concept/jel-C93/ Recent publications classified by JEL Code C93 en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/39189/ 2013-03-04T00:00:00Z This paper reports the results from a controlled field experiment designed to investigate the causal effect of public recognition on employee performance. We hired more than 300 employees to work on a three-hour data-entry task. In a random sample of work groups, workers unexpectedly received recognition after two hours of work. We find that recognition increases subsequent performance substantially, and particularly so when recognition is exclusively provided to the best performers. Remarkably, workers who did not receive recognition are mainly responsible for this performance increase. This result is consistent with workers having a preference for conformity. Bradler, C. Dur, A.J. Neckermann, S. Non, J.A. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/38004/ 2012-12-06T00:00:00Z Empirical studies have shown that entrepreneurs earn, on average, less than the market wage for employees with otherwise similar characteristics. We examine whether having previously been self-employed is in itself a negative signal on the job market. In a field experiment where two applications of otherwise equally qualified individuals were sent for the same vacancies, we find that entrepreneurs systematically receive fewer responses than non-entrepreneurs. Thus, it appears that the earnings differential is partially explained by the fact that entrepreneurs do not have access to the reference jobs in practice. We discuss what type of unfavorable information self-employment may carry. Koellinger, Ph.D. Mell, J. Pohl, I. Roessler, C. Treffers, T. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/34707/ 2012-07-03T00:00:00Z Field-experimental studies have shown that people litter more in more littered environments. Inspired by these findings, many cities around the world have adopted policies to quickly remove litter. While such policies may avoid that people follow the bad example of litterers, they may also invite free-riding on public cleaning services. This paper reports the results of a natural field experiment where, in a randomly assigned part of a residential area, the frequency of cleaning was reduced from daily to twice a week during a three-month period. Using high-frequency data on litter at treated and control locations before, during, and after the experiment, we find strong evidence that litter begets litter. However, we also find evidence that some people start to clean up after themselves when public cleaning services are diminished. Dur, A.J. Vollaard, B. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/26506/ 2011-09-26T00:00:00Z We analyze the behavior of experts who quote forecasts for monthly SKU-level sales data where we compare data before and after the moment that experts received different kinds of feedback on their behavior. We have data for 21 experts located in as many countries who make SKU-level forecasts for a variety of pharmaceutical products for October 2006 to September 2007. We study the behavior of the experts by comparing their forecasts with those from an automated statistical program, and we report the forecast accuracy over these 12 months. In September 2007 these experts were given feedback on their behavior and they received a training at the headquarters' office, where specific attention was given to the ins and outs of the statistical program. Next, we study the behavior of the experts for the 3 months after the training session, that is, October 2007 to December 2007. Our main conclusion is that in the second period the experts' forecasts deviated lesser from the statistical forecasts and that their accuracy improved substantially. Legerstee, R. Franses, Ph.H.B.F. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/25711/ 2011-08-01T00:00:00Z We conduct a field experiment in a large retail chain to test basic predictions of tournament theory regarding prize spread and noise. A random subset of the 208 stores participates in two-stage elimination tournaments. Tournaments differ in the distribution of prize money across winners of the first and second round of the tournament. As predicted by theory, we find that a more convex prize spread increases performance in the second round at the expense of first-round performance, although the magnitude of these effects is small. Moreover, the treatment effect is significantly larger for stores that historically have relatively stable performance as compared to stores with more noisy performance. Delfgaauw, J. Dur, A.J. Non, J.A. Verbeke, W.J.M.I. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/32481/ 2011-04-15T00:00:00Z This paper presents evidence from a field experiment designed to evaluate the efficacy of anonymous application procedures. While the policy evaluation itself is of interest, more importantly the experiment provides a unique opportunity to detect race based differential treatment in a controlled market environment. Over a 6 month period we observe all applications sent in response to local public sector vacancies. We observe both the callback and the job oer decision. We compare decisions of recruiters when they can observe ethnic markers (control) with a treatment condition where ethnic markers are absent. We find a substantial differential in the callback decision. Interestingly, we do not find evidence for differential treatment in the job offer decision. A follow up experiment provides indications that recruiters respond strategically to the announcement of the results of the first experiment. Bøg, M. Kranendonk, E. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/34805/ 2011-01-01T00:00:00Z Wagner, N. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/21864/ 2010-12-01T00:00:00Z We conduct a field experiment among 189 stores of a retail chain to study dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay. Employees in the randomly selected treatment stores could win a bonus by outperforming three comparable stores from the control group over the course of four weeks. Treatment stores received weekly feedback on relative performance. Control stores were kept unaware of their involvement, so that their performance generates exogenous variation in the relative performance of the treatment stores. As predicted by theory, treatment stores that lag far behind do not respond to the incentives, while the responsiveness of treatment stores close to winning a bonus increases in relative performance. On average, the introduction of the relative performance pay scheme does not lead to higher performance. Delfgaauw, J. Dur, A.J. Non, J.A. Verbeke, W.J.M.I. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/16517/ 2009-07-31T00:00:00Z We ran a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores. In a random sample of these stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores. We find that sales competitions have a large effect on sales growth, but only in stores where the store's manager and a large fraction of the employees have the same gender. Remarkably, results are alike for sales competitions with and without monetary rewards, suggesting a high symbolic value of winning a tournament. Lastly, despite the substantial variation in team size, we find no evidence for free-riding. Delfgaauw, J. Dur, A.J. Sol, J. Verbeke, W.J.M.I. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14061/ 2008-04-30T00:00:00Z This study investigates loss aversion when the reference point is state-dependent. Using a state-dependent structure, prospects are more attractive if they depend positively on the reference point and are less attractive in case of negative dependence. In addition, the structure is neutral in the sense that it avoids an inherent aversion to risky prospects and yields no loss when the prospect and the reference point are the same. Related to this, the preferred personal equilibrium equals the optimal consumption solution when the reference point is selected completely endogenously. Given that loss aversion is widespread, we conclude that the reference point generally includes an important exogenously fixed component. De Giorgi, E.G. Post, G.T. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7230/ 2006-01-11T00:00:00Z The popular television game show deal or No Deal offers a unique opportunity for analyzing decision making under risk: it involves very large stakes, simple take-or-leave decisions that require minimal skill or strategy and near-certainty about the probability distribution. Based on a panel data set of the choices of contestants in all game rounds of 53 episodes from Australia and the Netherlands, we find an average Pratt-Arrow relative risk aversion (RRA) between roughly 1 and 2 for initial wealth levels between 0 and 50,000. The RRA differs substantially across the contestants and some even exhibit risk seeking behavior. The cross-sectional differences in RRA can be explained in large part by the previous outcomes experienced by the contestants during the game. Most notably, consistent with the break-even effect,the RRA strongly decreases following earlier losses and risk seeking arises after large losses. Post, G.T. Baltussen, G. Assem, M.J. van den