http://repub.eur.nl/res/concept/jel-D41/ Recent publications classified by JEL Code D41 en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14035/ 2008-09-03T00:00:00Z We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We test these predictions using German Socio-Economic Panel data. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay. Dur, A.J. Non, J.A. Roelfsema, H.J. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/10504/ 2007-09-11T00:00:00Z We investigate how competitive behavior affects the capital structure of a firm. Theory predicts that the impact of different types of output market uncertainty (in particular, unanticipated shocks in demand and costs) on a firm’s leverage depends on the type of competition in an industry. We test these predictions in a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms by classifying firms into Cournot competition (strategic substitutes), and Bertrand competition (strategic complements). We show that demand uncertainty is positively related to leverage for firms in both the Cournot and the Bertrand sample. Cost uncertainty has a significantly positive impact on the leverage of Cournot firms, but plays a negligible role for Bertrand firms. Our results support the strategic use of debt and highlight the role of firms’ competitive behavior in the product market in their capital structure decisions. Jong, A. de Nguyen, T.T. Dijk, M.A. van http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6771/ 2005-06-24T00:00:00Z Kevin Pak (1977) obtained his Master’s degree in Econometrics and Operations Research from the Erasmus University Rotterdam in 2000. In the same year he joined ERIM in order to carry out his doctoral research on the subject of revenue management. Throughout the years his work has been published in and presented at a number of international journals and conferences. Currently, he applies his knowledge of operations research into practice as a consultant at ORTEC bv. Pak, K. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7780/ 1998-02-09T00:00:00Z We demonstrate the possibility of shake-out of firms and emergence of inter-firm heterogeneity along the (socially optimal) dynamic equilibrium path of a competitive industry with free entry and exit, even when there is no uncertainty and all firms are ex ante identical with perfect foresight. Atomistic firms with upward sloping marginal cost curves undertake investment in firm- specific cost reduction. They earn negative net profit in early periods, compensated later by strictly positive net profits; no entry occurs after the initial time period. Some firms may exit before others even while other firms earn positive net profit. Petrakis, E. Roy, S.