http://repub.eur.nl/res/concept/jel-D71/ Recent publications classified by JEL Code D71 en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/34803/ 2011-01-01T00:00:00Z Using unique village census data collected in 2003 and 2008 in Senegal, we assess the impact of a major World Bank-funded Community Driven Development (CDD) program on membership and assortative matching in community-based organizations (CBOs). We implement both standard discrete choice and dyadic regression techniques. We find that channeling development aid through CBOs makes these organizations more inclusive in the sense that a number of traditionbound assortative matching patterns are partly broken. Ceteris paribus, this leads to more heterogeneous CBOs. On the other hand, the likelihood of CBO membership is reduced in treated villages, with significant differences between men and women. Our results suggest that grassroots level development projects which target CBOs must be carefully designed and executed if they are not to result, paradoxically, in a greater degree of social exclusion, with differentiation by gender playing a crucial role. Wagner, N. Arcand, J.-L. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/13977/ 2008-05-27T00:00:00Z In experimental investigations of the effect of real incentives, accountability—the implicit or explicit expectation of a decision maker that she may have to justify her decisions in front of somebody else—is often confounded with the incentives themselves. This confounding of accountability with incentives makes causal attributions of any effects found problematic. We separate accountability and incentives, and find different effects. Accountability is found to reduce preference reversals between frames, for which incentives have no effect. Incentives on the other hand are found to reduce risk seeking for losses, where accountability has no effect. In a choice task between simple and compound events, accountability increases the preference for the simple event, while incentives have a weaker effect going in the opposite direction. It is thus shown that the confounding of accountability and incentives is relevant for studies on the effect of the latter, and that existing conclusions on the effect of incentives need to be reconsidered in light of this issue. Vieider, F.M. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/28632/ 2008-04-01T00:00:00Z Some committees are made up of experts, persons who care both about the matter at hand and about coming across as able decision makers. We show that such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. That is, once the decision has been reached, they show a united front to the outside world. Also, if such committees are required to become transparent, for example, by publishing verbatim transcripts of their meetings, members will organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. A large part of the article is dedicated to a case study of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee in the United States. It provides suggestive evidence supporting our theory. Swank, J. Visser, B. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/10440/ 2007-07-17T00:00:00Z Transparent decision-making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens may suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not promote their interests. Why else the secrecy? We provide a model of committee decision-making that explains the public’s demand for transparency, and committee members’ aversion to it. In line with case study evidence, we show how pressures to become transparent induce committee members to organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. Outcomes of pre-meetings are less determined, more anarchic, than those of formal meetings, but within bounds. We characterize feasible deals that are credible and will be endorsed in the formal meeting. Swank, O.H. Visser, B. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11755/ 2007-01-01T00:00:00Z Some committees are made up of experts, persons who care both about the matter at hand and about coming across as able decision- makers. We derive two propositions about the way members of such committees interact with the outside world. First, they would like to conceal disagreement from the public. That is, once the decision has been reached, they show a united front to the outside world. Second, if such committees are required to become transparent, e.g., by publishing verbatim transcripts of their meetings, members will organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. Large part of the paper is dedicated to a case study of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee in the United States. It provides suggestive evidence supporting the two propositions. Visser, B. Swank, J. Swank, O.H. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7814/ 2006-05-29T00:00:00Z Some committees are made up of experts, persons interested in both the (subject) matter at hand and in coming across as able decision-makers. Such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. We present a theory that describes the reaction of experts to the requirement to publish verbatim transcripts of their meetings: the emergence of an informal ‘premeeting’; the move of the real debate from the formal meeting to the premeeting; and the drop in disagreement in the formal meeting. We analyse what the effect is on accountability and quality of decision-making. Finally, we present evidence suggesting that our model describes the way members of the Federal Open Market Committee in the United States responded to the publication of verbatim transcripts of their meetings. Swank, J. Swank, O.H. Visser, B. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6592/ 2005-03-10T00:00:00Z We consider a committee that makes a decision on a project on behalf of 'the public'. Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care both about the value of the project and about being considered well informed. Before voting on the project, members can exchange their private information simultaneously (so no herding). We show that reputational concerns make the a priori unconventional decision more attractive and lead committees to show a united front. These results hold irrespective of whether information can be manipulated or not. Next, we show that reputational concerns induce members to manipulate information and vote strategically if their preferences differ considerably from those of the member casting the decisive vote. Our last result is that the optimal voting rule balances the quality of information exchange and the alignment of interests of the decisive voter with those of the public. Visser, B. Swank, O.H. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6611/ 2004-10-29T00:00:00Z Most monetary policy committees decide on interest rates using a simple majority voting rule. Given the inherent heterogeneity of committee members, this voting rule is suboptimal in terms of the quality of the interest rate decision, but popular for other (political) reasons. We show that a clustering of committee members into 2 subgroups, as is the case in a hub-and spokes systems of central banks such as the Fed or the ESCB, can eliminate this suboptimality whilst retaining the majority voting rule. Berk, J.M. Bierut, B.K. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6659/ 2004-03-01T00:00:00Z We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting behaviour.Therefore, and in contrast to earlier literature, we find that interaction is beneficial for the collective outcome. Berk, J.M. Bierut, B.K.