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    <title>Central Banks and Their Policies</title>
    <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/concept/jel-E58/</link>
    <description>Recent publications classified by JEL Code E58</description>
    <language>en</language>
    
    <item>
      <title>Bayesian Forecasting of Federal Funds Target Rate Decisions (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/25708/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-07-13T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        This paper examines which macroeconomic and financial variables are most informative for the federal funds target rate decisions made by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) from a forecasting perspective. The analysis is conducted for the FOMC decision during the period January 1990 - June 2008, using dynamic ordered probit models with a Bayesian endogenous variable selection methodology and real-time data for a set of 33 candidate predictor variables. We find that indicators of economic activity and forward-looking term structure variables as well as survey measures have most predictive ability. For the full sample period, in-sample probability forecasts achieve a hitrate of 90 percent. Based on out-of-sample forecasts for the period January 2001 - June 2008, 82 percent of the FOMC decisions are predicted correctly.
      </description>
      <author>Hauwe, S. van den</author> <author>Dijk, D.J.C. van</author> <author>Paap, R.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Treasury Bond Volatility and Uncertainty about Monetary Policy (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/23936/</link>
      <pubDate>2010-08-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        We show that dispersion-based uncertainty about the future course of monetary policy is the single most important determinant of Treasury bond volatility across all maturities. The link between Treasury bond volatility and uncertainty about macroeconomic variables is much stronger than for the more traditional time series measures of macroeconomic volatility and adds beyond the information contained in lagged bond market volatility. Uncertainty about monetary policy subsumes the uncertainty about future inflation (consumer price index and the deflator) and economic activity (unemployment, real and nominal gross domestic product and industrial production). In addition, causality clearly runs one way: from monetary policy uncertainty to Treasury bond volatility.
      </description>
      <author>Vrugt, E.B.</author> <author>Arnold, I.J.M.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Instability and Nonlinearity in the Euro-area Philips Curve (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/16383/</link>
      <pubDate>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the functional form of the euro-area Phillips curve over the past three decades. In particular, compared with previous literature, we analyze the stability of the relationship in detail, especially as regards the possibility of a time-varying mean of inflation. Moreover, we conduct a sensitivity analysis across different measures of economic slack. Our main findings are two. First, there is strong evidence of time variation in the mean and slope of the Phillips curve occurring in the early to mid-1980s, but not in inflation persistence once the mean shift is allowed for. As a result of the structural change, the Phillips curve became flatter around a lower mean of inflation. Second, we find no significant evidence of nonlinearity - in particular, in relation to the output gap.
      </description>
      <author>Musso, A.</author> <author>Stracca, A.</author> <author>Dijk, D.J.C. van</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>How committees of experts interact with the outside world: Some theory, and evidence from the FOMC (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/28632/</link>
      <pubDate>2008-04-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        Some committees are made up of experts, persons who care both about the matter at hand and about coming across as able decision makers. We show that such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. That is, once the decision has been reached, they show a united front to the outside world. Also, if such committees are required to become transparent, for example, by publishing verbatim transcripts of their meetings, members will organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. A large part of the article is dedicated to a case study of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee in the United States. It provides suggestive evidence supporting our theory. 
      </description>
      <author>Swank, J.</author> <author>Visser, B.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>An empirical analysis of euro cash payments (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/13359/</link>
      <pubDate>2007-11-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        If the denominational structure of the euro is used in an optimal way, there should be no preferences for certain coins and notes when making cash payments. In Kippers et al. [2003. An empirical study of cash payments. Statistica Neerlandica 57, 484–508] it is documented that the Dutch public did have certain preferences concerning the Dutch guilder in the sense that a few notes and coins were used less often than they should have been. With the advent of the euro, which changed the denominational structure from 1––5 (guilder) to 1–2–5 (euro), it is of interest to examine whether there are any preferences for euro coins and notes. In this paper we use a unique dataset for the Netherlands to empirically examine if the euro range is used in an optimal way. We find that there are no preferences for certain euro denominations.
      </description>
      <author>Franses, Ph.H.B.F.</author> <author>Kippers, J.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>On the Optimality of Decisions (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6611/</link>
      <pubDate>2004-10-29T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        Most monetary policy committees decide on interest rates using a simple majority voting rule. Given the inherent heterogeneity of committee members, this voting rule is suboptimal in terms of the quality of the interest rate decision, but popular for other (political) reasons. We show that a clustering of committee members into 2 subgroups, as is the case in a hub-and spokes systems of central banks such as the Fed or the ESCB, can eliminate this suboptimality whilst retaining the majority voting rule.
      </description>
      <author>Berk, J.M.</author> <author>Bierut, B.K.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>The Effects of Learning in Interactive Monetary Policy Committees (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6659/</link>
      <pubDate>2004-03-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting behaviour.Therefore, and in contrast to earlier literature, we find that interaction is beneficial for the collective outcome.
      </description>
      <author>Berk, J.M.</author> <author>Bierut, B.K.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Committee Structure and its Implications for Monetary Policy Decision-making (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6706/</link>
      <pubDate>2003-07-07T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        We investigate the implications for the setting of interest rates when monetary policy decisions are taken by a committee, in which a subset of members may meet prior to the voting in the committee and therefore has the possibility to reach consensus ex ante to vote unanimously ex post. We allow for different committee sizes, various voting rules and differences in skills among committee members. We find that the size of the committee is much less important in deter- mining the degree of interest rate inertia than the skills of committee members. Moreover, prior interaction of a subgroup only has a minor effect on the setting of interest rates by the committee, provided that members on average are equally skilled and voting takes place using a simple majority rule. If either of those assumptions are relaxed, prior interaction has substantial effects on the setting of interest rates. In addition, prior interaction increases the optimal size of the Committee, ceteris paribus.
      </description>
      <author>Berk, J.M.</author> <author>Bierut, B.K.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Regional Price Adjustment in a Monetary Union: the case of EMU (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6800/</link>
      <pubDate>2002-08-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        Using a New-Keynesian framework, we investigate how far the inflationary processes in member states of EMU cause regional price levels to converge. We fail to produce hard evidence of the present existence of such an adjustment mechanism, notwithstanding that inflation in some countries tends to converge towards the euro area level. Overa11, inflation persistence has declined significantly over the years, but there are still marked differences between countries on this score. We conclude that the euro area is not an optimal currency area yet, lending support to the quest for further structura1 reforms in European labour and product markets.
      </description>
      <author>Berk, J.M.</author> <author>Swank, J.</author>
    </item>
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