http://repub.eur.nl/res/concept/jel-F35/ Recent publications classified by JEL Code F35 en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/32452/ 2009-01-14T00:00:00Z ABSTRACT This paper focuses on two areas of security concern for the European Union: terrorism and international crime. I present a model of game-theoretic interaction between a European state and a domestic dissident group, who, on occasion, may resort to acts of terrorism. Here, identity is crucial to the putative terrorist, providing the microfoundations of dissident group behaviour by solving the collective action problem. I also sketch a macromodel of drugs production in a conflict-ridden developing country, where I argue that demand-side policies of regulation may be better than policies that are aimed at eradicating supply. As far as the policy implications are concerned, first excessive deterrence against potential terrorists may backfire. Secondly, space needs to be created so that Muslim migrants are able to merge their personal identities within their adopted European homelands. Thirdly, the economic discrimination against Muslims in Europe needs to be redressed. Finally, aid to fragile drug producing states should be broad-based and poverty reducing, not just benefiting warlords. Murshed, S.M. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/10438/ 2007-07-02T00:00:00Z How does global aging affect the convergence in global economic development? Both the developing and developed world will be characterized for the coming decades by aging populations. Changes in the age distribution of a population are an important determinant of economic performance as they affect wealth accumulation and dependency burdens, yielding a demographic dividend of extra growth. During the twenty years from 1975 to 2005 Europe and the US have benefited from a strong demographic dividend. However, in the decades to come this effect will be reversed and the driving force behind the wealth of nations has to be sought elsewhere. Africa and, to some extent, India might benefit from the demographic dividend. However, this potential growth phase may well disappear if supporting conditions for growth are absent. Large-scale migration is not expected to be a sustainable solution to unbalanced global economic developments. Remittances, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA) will remain necessary capital flows for the developing world in the near future. Remittances offer no structural solution to reduction of poverty as these funds flow to a selective group of families and are allocated generally to consumption rather than to investment purposes. Migration of a temporary nature in conjunction with offshore outsourcing of services and production may offer a solution for the dilemmas of population and development, which OECD donors face in offering development assistance and designing immigration policy. Dalen, H.P. van http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/12985/ 2007-01-01T00:00:00Z A key issue in development economics is the explanation of core-periphery patterns around the world. Combining this issue with that of analyzing unilateral transfers (e.g. foreign aid) points in the direction of the use of New Economic Geography (NEG) models which, so far, has not been done explicitly. This paper tries to fill this gap in the literature by studying the (possibly ‘catastrophic’) effects of aid around the so-called break-points and sustain-points in a NEG model. We also analyze the effects of a “bystander”, that is a country which is not directly involved in the transfer. In the traditional transfer literature a bystander is known to potentially cause transfer paradoxes. Our findings in this NEG setting are as follows. First, direct transfer paradoxes are not possible in a symmetric setting even if a bystander is present. Second, the effects of foreign aid depend on the level of economic integration between donor and recipient. Third, if the equilibrium from which aid is given is stable, aid only has a temporary effect (even if there is a bystander present). Fourth, if the donor is relatively large, not only the recipient but also the bystander benefits from foreign aid. Brakman, S. Garretsen, J.H. Marrewijk, J.G.M. van http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7424/ 2006-01-06T00:00:00Z This paper tries to establish who carries the burden in supporting reproductive health and AIDS programs worldwide. The 1994 International Conference of Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo established goals for the expansion of assistance in matters of reproductive health and AIDS. This global effort has so far not sufficiently been supported by funds and this paper looks at what lies behind the level of funds and the sharing of financial burdens. Panel data on expenditures for population and AIDS activities funded by 21 donor countries for the years 1983-2002 are examined by means of dynamic panel data estimation. On an aggregated scale small donors 'exploit' the large donors: large donors give more resources than their 'fair share', i.e. their income weight in the group of donors. However, this picture is not true for the finance and support for multilateral organizations where every donor country pays its fair share. The exploitation hypothesis is true for the cases of bilateral aid and NGOs. The exploitation model gives however a partial view of what determines the sharing of burdens. To understand burden sharing across countries fully one needs to take account of the most dominant religions in a country, the pro-foreign aid stance of a government and the government size. Donor countries are not much affected in their funding behavior by the state of development of the least developed countries. Dalen, H.P. van http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/13045/ 1998-01-01T00:00:00Z A two-country trade model of foreign aid is developed. The aid-receiving country suffers from Harris-Todaro type unemployment. Aid is either untied, tied to sector-specific capital, or tied to intersectorally mobile capital. These types of aid are compared by examining their terms-of-trade and welfare effects to show that (i) welfare paradoxes are possible, (ii) the world as a whole may gain from aid, (iii) a conflict of interest concerning the type of aid may arise between donor and recipient, and (iv) under plausible conditions untied aid is better for the recipient and the world. Michael, M.S. Marrewijk, J.G.M. van http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/13077/ 1996-01-01T00:00:00Z We examine transfers and tied aid in a model with increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition. Transfers give rise to an additional (love of variety) welfare effect and affect the utility possibility locus. Generic tied aid may exacerbate or reverse these results. The popularity of aid tied to specific manufactured goods can be explained through rent-seeking behavior since such aid gives rise to profits in the donor country. These profits in turn largely repatriate the transfer such that donors can appear to be more generous than they really are. Brakman, S. Marrewijk, J.G.M. van