http://repub.eur.nl/res/concept/jel-H20/ Recent publications classified by JEL Code H20 en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/32975/ 2011-10-25T00:00:00Z In this article, the author examines, through examples, the effects of Member States subjecting taxpayers to unlimited income taxation whilst granting double tax relief under a Netherlands-style tax exemption from the perspective of how such an approach would affect the cross-border taxation of intra-firm transactions. Wilde, M.F. de http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/10502/ 2007-09-04T00:00:00Z Het belastingsysteem is een van de beste startpunten voor een onderzoek naar China's transitie omdat de transformatie van een maatschappij altijd gepaard gaat met snelle veranderingen in het oude fiscale regime. Dit boek ziet de centrale overheid, lokale overheden en ondernemingen als de drie grote spelers en laat zien dat interactie tussen deze drie spelers heeft geleid tot China's unieke, "centraal-lokaal tweesporige" belastingsysteem. De centrale overheid mobiliseert lokale overheden door fiscale decentralisatie, wat resulteert in toenemende lokale autonomie en hen drijft tot maximalisatie van lokale belastingopbrengsten. Zij concurreren voor mobiele belasting bases ondernemingen door het lokale belastingbeleid te manipuleren. Dus, in tegenstelling tot een formeel en gestandaardiseerd nationaal belastingsysteem dat gecontroleerd wordt door de centrale overheid, worden informele en flexibele lokale belastingsystemen geleid door lokale overheden. Dit boek bevat vier essays. Het eerste essay analyseert systematisch de evolutie en huidige status van China's belastingsysteem. Het illustreert hoe de formele en informele interactie tussen de centrale overheid, lokale overheden en ondernemingen vorm geeft aan de instituties van China's belastingsysteem. Het tweede essay onderzoekt de interactie tussen de eerstgenoemde twee spelers in fiscale decentralisatie en laat zien dat deze de grootte van de overheid beperkt. Het derde essay modelleert de interactie tussen de laatstgenoemde twee spelers in een onderhandelingsspel waarin een onderneming een exit en voice strategie gebruikt om te onderhandelen met een lokale overheid voor gunstige belastingen en verklaart daarmee de diversiteit in lokale belastingsystemen. Het laatste essay modelleert de veranderingen van het belastingsysteem als een interactie tussen de drie spelers onder varierende economische, politieke en sociale beperkingen; de veranderingen bereiken een evenwicht waarin efficiency, macht en legitimiteit in balans zijn. Zhu, Z. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7188/ 2005-12-21T00:00:00Z China like other transition economies needs to establish a tax system compatible with a market economy, in particular, an efficient tax administration system with capable tax bureaucrats. The paper singles out the general and China-specific features by which central government attempts to accompany economic transformation via tax farming to tax bureaucratisation in tax administration. Based on empirical study in two provinces this paper shows that without including local government agencies and their budgets, China’s fiscal federalism cannot be analysed and argues that China’s emerging tax system depends on the institutional and organizational design that shapes the interaction between central government, local governments and economic agents. Zhu, Z. Krug, B. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/1787/ 2004-10-29T00:00:00Z This article firstly present a systematic overview on national tax regime by classifying China’s tax regime into three broad phases in context of underpinning market-oriented institutional development during last two decades and, then, in supplement to previous literatures that largely stop at provincial level, unveil the complex and obscure local tax regime based on sub-provincial field research in Zhejiang and Jiangsu province. The authors observed dual existing tax regimes: the hard and standardized state tax regime under central custody versus de facto soft and flexible local tax regime under local promotion and argue that despite central persisting initiatives in unifying tax regime and recentralization, local variation and divergence continue to play indispensable role in implementation of central reform due to China’s sheer size, geographical, cultural and resource endowment disparity as well as local state’s self-interest seeking inevitably induces localized adaptation of central policy and, consequently, calls for further decentralization. Zhu, Z. Krug, B. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/1841/ 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z China like other transition economies needs to establish a tax regime compatible with a market economy. The paper singles out the general and China-specific features by which national legislation attempts to accompany economic transformation. Based on an empirical study in two provinces this paper shows that without including local government agencies and their budgets, China’s fiscal federalism cannot be analysed. This paper argues that China’s emerging tax regime depends on the institutional design that shapes the interaction between firms (as major tax payers at the local level), local government agencies, and the national tax administration. Krug, B. Zhu, Z. Hendrischke, H. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/808/ 2003-09-01T00:00:00Z Using a multi-tier model of the housing market, we show that both starters and movers benefit from mortgage interest deduction for higher income groups. However, such tax favouring also tends to facilitate house price explosions, especially when interest rates and downpayment ratios are low. More in general, the efficiency of implicit tax subsidies to homeowners depends critically on the price responsiveness of new construction, which is found to differ strongly from country to country. Irrespective of supply conditions, running down mortgage interest deduction is likely to detract from the profits of lending institutions. Swank, J. Kakes, J. Tieman, A.F. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6714/ 2003-03-27T00:00:00Z This paper examines the effects of taxation on long-run growth in a two-sector endogenous growth model with (i) physical capital as an input in the education sector and (ii) leisure as an additional argument in the utility function. The analysis of the effects of taxation - including income taxation, capital income taxation and labor income taxation - distinguishes between the case with a unique (interior) balanced growth path and the case with multiple balanced growth paths. Due to the flexibility of labor supply, taxation of income may induce agents to spend more or less time on leisure activities. In the case of income taxation, where capital and labor income are taxed equally, the resulting effect on the growth rate is negative. The contribution of endogenous leisure is confined to reducing or increasing the size of the effect on the growth rate. If only capital income is taxed, the direction of the effect may reverse. In that case, the positive effect of the increase in total non-leisure time dominates the direct negative effect, implying that capital taxation increases the long-run growth rate. Hek, P.A. de