http://repub.eur.nl/res/concept/jel-H23/ Recent publications classified by JEL Code H23 en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/38197/ 2012-10-24T00:00:00Z This paper develops a general-equilibrium model of skill-biased technological change that approximates the observed shifts in the shares of wage and non-wage income going to the top decile of U.S. households since 1980. Under realistic assumptions, we find that all agents can benefit from the technology change, provided that the observed rise in redistributive transfers over this period is taken into account. We show that the increase in capital’s share of total income and the presence of capital-entrepreneurial skill complementarity are two key features that help support the wages of ordinary workers as the new technology diffuses Lansing, K.J. Markiewicz, A. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14785/ 2008-12-04T00:00:00Z Hundreds of millions of electrical and electronic appliances are manufactured every year. Furthermore, it is expected that this number will not substantially decrease in the near future. These equipments have a significant impact on the environment, and ceteris paribus, such environmental impact increases with the number of appliances manufactured. Consumers, NGOs and Governments have acknowledged the potential threat posed by these electrical and electronic products. They have systematically demanded companies to reduce the environmental impact caused be their products and services. Companies have responded to these pressures and have engaged in a number of environmentally friendly initiatives. This thesis is motivated by the task of reducing the environmental impact caused by the myriad of electrical and electronic products that make our lives more conformable and enjoyable. More specifically, it addresses the challenge of efficiently and effectively mitigating such impacts. We show that companies will need a mixture of strategies to respond to this challenge. Furthermore, we show that these strategies must consider environmental, technical and marketing aspects of the business of electrical and electronic products. These three aspects need to be considered systemically, and the solutions will vary greatly according to the companies, the products they manufacture, and the ways in which their supply chains are organized. Quariguasi Frota Neto, J. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14438/ 2008-12-01T00:00:00Z This paper proposes a …first step towards a positive theory of tax instruments. We present a model that extends models of redistributive politics by Myerson (1993) and Lizzeri and Persico (2001). Two politicians compete in terms of targeted redistributive promises …nanced through distortionary taxes. We solve for the case of both targetable and non-targetable taxes. We prove that there is an imperfect efficiency-targetability trade off on the tax side. Politicians prefer targetable taxes over non-targetable ones, especially when the latter are less efficient. Yet, targetable taxation is always used even when it is very inefficient compared to non-targetable taxes. Crutzen, B.S.Y. Sahuguet, N. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14202/ 2008-11-24T00:00:00Z Market-based instruments are believed to create more efficient incentives for firms to adopt new technologies than command-and-control policies. We compare the effects of a direct technology regulation and of an adoption subsidy under asymmetric information about the costs of technological advances in controlling the socially undesirable activities. We show that the policy maker may want to commit to her policy. The reason is that asymmetric information about adoption costs induces the policy maker to set subsidy levels that increase over time; firms, expecting higher subsidies in the future, postpone investment. Direct regulation offers a commitment possibility that allows to prevent firms from postponing investment. Ossokina, I.V. Swank, O.H. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/1585/ 2004-09-13T00:00:00Z Governments wishing to encourage the private sector provision of a public good can choose amongst a wide variety of economic instruments. This paper analyses how governments in the EU(15) countries have succeeded in stimulating investment in wind turbines between 1985 and 2000, using national laws and decrees, IEA/OECD data on wind turbines, and one hypothetical investment project to calculate Tobin's Q. The main question addressed is whether the portfolio of policy instruments matters, or whether government support for the private provision of a public good is a matter of a pecuniary transferral. Mulder, A. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6641/ 2004-06-01T00:00:00Z This paper estimates Nash-type fiscal reaction functions for European governments competing for revenue from diesel excises. It appears that European governments strategically set their excise levels by responding to their neighbors’ tax rates. This provides evidence for the presence of tax competition in diesel excises. In fact, a 10% higher rate in neighboring countries (in terms of the user price) induces a country to raise its own rate by between 2 and 3%. This impact is robust for alternative specifications. By imposing restrictions on excise levels, EU harmonization of excises in 1987 and the introduction of a minimum in 1992 exerted a positive impact on the excise level in a number of EU countries. It has not, however, significantly reduced the intensity of tax competition. Indeed, strategic tax responses have not significantly been reduced by these harmonization policies. We also find that high-tax countries appear to compete more aggressively tha! n low-tax countries in the sense that they feature larger strategic tax responses. There is no significant difference between large and small countries. Evers, M. Mooij, R.A. de Vollebergh, H.R.J. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/833/ 2003-09-05T00:00:00Z A dynamic overlapping-generations model of a semi-small open economy with monopolistic competition in the goods market is constructed. A tariff increase reduces real output and employment and improves the terms of trade, both in the impact period and in the new steady state. The tariff shock has significant intergenerational distribution effects which are different for creditor and debtor nations. Bond policy neutralizes the intergenerational inequities and allows the computation of first-best and second-best optimal tariff rates. The first-best tariff exploits national market power, but the second-best tariff contains a correction to account for the existence of a potentially suboptimal product subsidy. Bettendorf, L.J.H. Heijdra, B.J. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6784/ 2003-02-14T00:00:00Z Market-based instruments are believed to create more efficient incentives for firms to adopt new technologies than command-and-control policies. We compare the effects of a direct technology regulation and of an adoption subsidy under asymmetric information about the costs of technological advances in pollution control. We show that the policy maker may want to commit to her policy. The reason is that uncertainty about adoption costs induces the policy maker to set subsidy levels that increase over time; firms, expecting higher subsidies in the future, postpone investment. Direct regulation offers a commitment possibility that allows to prevent firms from postponing investment. Ossokina, I.V. Swank, O.H. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11414/ 1997-10-01T00:00:00Z This paper employs the method of Aronson et al. (1994) to decompose the redistributive effect of the Dutch health care financing system into three components: a progressivity component, a classical horizontal equity component and a reranking component. Results are presented for the health care financing system as a whole, as well as for its constituent parts. A final section sets out to uncover the relative importance (in terms of their effects on progressivity, horizontal equity and reranking) of the key institutional features of one component of the Dutch system — the AWBZ social insurance scheme. Wagstaff, A. Doorslaer, E.K.A. van http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11807/ 1997-01-01T00:00:00Z This paper explores how an environmental tax reform impacts pollution, economic growth and welfare in an endogenous growth model with pre-existing tax distortions. We find that a shift in the tax mix away from output taxes towards pollution taxes may raise economic growth through two channels. The first channel is an environmental production externality, which determines the positive effect of lower aggregate pollution on the productivity of capital. The second channel is a shift in the tax burden away from the net return on investment towards profits. The paper also shows that the optimal tax on pollution may exceed its Pigovian level if tax-shifting towards profits is large and production externalities are important. Mooij, R.A. de Bovenberg, A.L. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/1948/ 1994-01-01T00:00:00Z It is sometimes argued that by using the revenues from environmental taxes to reduce distortionary taxes on labor, governments can reap a ‘double dividend’, namely, not only an improvement in environmental quality, but also a reduction in the efficiency costs associated with raising public revenue. By employing a general equilibrium model, this paper finds that, contrary to common wisdom, environmental taxes typically render the overall tax system a less efficient instrument to finance public spending. Furthermore, high estimates for the marginal efficiency costs of existing taxes weaken, rather than strengthen, the case for environmental taxes. Mooij, R.A. de Bovenberg, A.L.