http://repub.eur.nl/res/concept/jel-J42/ Recent publications classified by JEL Code J42 en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6812/ 2005-05-01T00:00:00Z This paper develops a model in which workers to a certain extent like to exert effort at the workplace. We examine the implications of workers' motivation for optimal monetary incentive schemes. We show that in the optimum motivated workers work harder and are willing to work for a lower wage. In addition, we examine whether job seekers have an incentive to be truthful about their motivation in a job interview. When the firm has sufficient bargaining power, workers hide their motivation so as to increase the firm's wage offer. As a result, an inefficient allocation of workers over firms may arise. We show that a commitment to a minimum wage may help to restore allocational efficiency and may be in the interest of the firm. Delfgaauw, J. Dur, A.J. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6622/ 2004-07-15T00:00:00Z I consider a situation in which heterogenous senders (applicants) compete in order to be selected by one receiver (employer). Productivity is private information to the senders, and the receiver processes imperfect signals (applications) to screen among applicants. The information-processing technology is imperfect: the accuracy of each signal in predicting the unknown productivity decreases with the total number of signals processed. I show that, for a sufficiently large market, information overload occurs as there exist equilibria in which too many people apply and the receiver neglects some applications. For any information-processing technology level, information overload equilibria emerge when the cost of sending applications is low relatively to the existing technology level. The magnitude of information overload is bounded and it is larger if the receiver cannot neglect applications. As a result, an overloaded market in which the receiver has to process all applications is less efficient than an overloaded market where neglecting excessive information is an option. Ficco, S.S. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7693/ 2000-04-12T00:00:00Z In this paper, I study the wage a firm sets to attract high ability workers (hipo's) in situations of unemployment. I show that the higher unemployment, the larger a firm's incentives to sort high and low ability workers. Moreover, workers will signal their (high) ability in situations of (high) unemployment only if a job offers a high enough wage. The main result, therefore, says that a firm sets higher wages, the higher unemployment. As the model is applicable to the upper segment of the labour market, the result is in line with the empirical fact that income inequality increases when more people are unemployed. Janssen, M.C.W.