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    <title>Public Sector Labor Markets</title>
    <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/concept/jel-J45/</link>
    <description>Recent publications classified by JEL Code J45</description>
    <language>en</language>
    
    <item>
      <title>Intrinsic Motivations of Public Sector Employees: Evidence for Germany
 (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/38215/</link>
      <pubDate>2012-12-06T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        We examine differences in altruism and laziness between public sector employees and private sector employees. Our theoretical model predicts that the likelihood of public sector employment increases with a worker's altruism, and increases or decreases with a worker's laziness depending on his altruism. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study, we find that public sector employees are significantly more altruistic and lazy than observationally equivalent private sector employees. A series of robustness checks show that these patterns are stronger among higher educated workers; that the sorting of altruistic people to the public sector takes place only within the caring industries; and that the difference in altruism is already present at the start of people's career, while the difference in laziness is only present for employees with sufficiently long work experience.


      </description>
      <author>Dur, A.J.</author> <author>Zoutenbier, R.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>On the Merits of Meritocracy
 (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/34712/</link>
      <pubDate>2012-07-20T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        We study career choice when competition for promotion is a contest. A more meritocratic profession always succeeds in attracting the highest ability types, whereas a profession with superior promotion benefits attracts high types only if the hazard rate of the noise in performance evaluation is strictly increasing. Raising promotion opportunities produces no systematic effect on the talent distribution, while a higher base wage attracts talent only if total promotion opportunities are sufficiently plentiful
      </description>
      <author>Morgan, J.</author> <author>Sisak, D.</author> <author>Vardy, F.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Working for a Good Cause
 (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/30601/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-11-24T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        A rich literature in public administration has shown that public sector employees have stronger altruistic motivations than private sector employees. Recent economic theories stress the importance of mission preferences, and predict that altruistic people sort into the public sector when they subscribe to its mission. This paper uses data from a representative survey among more than 30.000 employees from 50 countries to test this prediction. Our results show that only those individuals who are willing to contribute to the welfare of others and, in addition, feel that by working in the public sector they contribute to a good cause are significantly more likely to work in the public sector. Our results are most pronounced for highly educated employees.
      </description>
      <author>Dur, A.J.</author> <author>Zoutenbier, R.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Management Practices: Are Not For Profits Different? (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/25709/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-07-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        Recent studies have demonstrated the importance of good management for firm performance. Here, we focus on management in not-for-profits (NFPs). We present a model predicting that management quality will be lower in NFPs compared to for-profits (FPs), but that outputs may not be worse if managers are altruistic. Using a tried and tested survey of management practices, we find that NFPs score lower than FPs but also that, while the relationship between management scores and outputs holds for FPs, the same is not true for NFPs. One implication is that management practices that work for FPs may be less effective in driving performance in NFPs.
      </description>
      <author>Delfgaauw, J.</author> <author>Dur, A.J.</author> <author>Propper, C.</author> <author>Smith, S.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Labor market discrimination of minorities? yes, but not in job offers (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/32481/</link>
      <pubDate>2011-04-15T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        This paper presents evidence from a field experiment designed to evaluate the efficacy of anonymous application procedures. While the policy evaluation itself is of interest, more importantly the experiment provides a unique opportunity to detect race based differential treatment in a controlled market environment. Over a 6 month period we observe all applications sent in response to local public sector vacancies. We observe both the callback and the job oer decision. We compare decisions of recruiters when they can observe ethnic markers (control) with a treatment condition where ethnic markers are absent. We find a substantial differential in the callback decision. Interestingly, we do not find evidence for differential treatment in the job offer decision. A follow up experiment provides indications that recruiters respond strategically to the announcement of the results of the first experiment.
      </description>
      <author>Bøg, M.</author> <author>Kranendonk, E.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Managerial talent, motivation, and self-selection into public management (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/20324/</link>
      <pubDate>2010-10-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        The quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many countries. Calls to attract the economy's best and brightest managers to the public sector abound. This paper studies self-selection into managerial positions in the public and private sector, using a model of a perfectly competitive economy where people differ in managerial ability and in public service motivation. We find that, if demand for public sector output is not too high, the equilibrium return to managerial ability is always higher in the private sector. As a result, relatively many of the more able managers self-select into the private sector. Since this outcome is efficient, our analysis implies that attracting a more able managerial workforce to the public sector by increasing remuneration to private-sector levels is not cost-efficient.
      </description>
      <author>Delfgaauw, J.</author> <author>Dur, A.J.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Public Sector Employees: Risk Averse and Altruistic? (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/16515/</link>
      <pubDate>2009-07-29T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        We assess whether public sector employees have a stronger inclination to serve others and are more risk averse than employees in the private sector. A unique feature of our study is that we use revealed rather than stated preferences data. Respondents of a large-scale survey were offered a substantial reward and could choose between a widely redeemable gift certificate, a lottery ticket, or making a donation to a charity. Our analysis shows that public sector employees are significantly less likely to choose the risky option (lottery) and, at the start of their career, significantly more likely to choose the pro-social option (charity). However, when tenure increases, this difference in pro-social inclinations disappears and, later on, even reverses. Our results further suggest that quite a few public sector employees do not contribute to charity because they feel that they already contribute enough to society at work for too little pay.
      </description>
      <author>Buurman, M.W.J.M.</author> <author>Dur, A.J.</author> <author>Bossche, S. van den</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Managerial Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection into Public Management (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/14050/</link>
      <pubDate>2008-10-14T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        The quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many countries. Calls to attract the economy's best and brightest managers to the public sector abound. This paper studies self-selection into managerial and non-managerial positions in the public and private sector, using a model of a perfectly competitive economy where people differ in managerial ability and in public service motivation. We find that, if demand for public sector output is not too high, the equilibrium return to managerial ability is always highest in the private sector. As a result, relatively many of the more able managers self-select into the private sector. Since this outcome is efficient, our analysis implies that attracting a more able managerial workforce to the public sector by increasing remuneration to private-sector levels is not cost-efficient.
      </description>
      <author>Delfgaauw, J.</author> <author>Dur, A.J.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>The Effect of Job Satisfaction on Job Search: Not just whether, but also where (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7092/</link>
      <pubDate>2005-10-21T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        Using survey data of public sector employees in the Netherlands, this paper shows that workers' satisfaction with various job domains not only affects whether but also where workers search for another job. An intuitive pattern emerges. Workers try to leave their current employer when their job search is instigated by dissatisfaction with an organisation-specific job domain, like management. Conversely, more job-specific problems, like a lack of autonomy, lead workers to opt for another position within their current organisation. Dissatisfaction with job domains which may have an industry-specific component, such as job duties, drives workers out of their industry. These findings suggest that on-the-job experience provides workers with information about the quality of their own job as well as of other jobs in their organisation and industry.
      </description>
      <author>Delfgaauw, J.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Where To Go? Workers' Reasons to Quit and Intra- versus Interindustry Job Mobility (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6593/</link>
      <pubDate>2005-03-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        This paper employs survey data on the reasons to quit of Dutch job changers who entered or left a public sector job in 2001. We show that workers' reasons to quit their public sector job influence their decision to stay in or leave their industry of employment. A bad experience with, for instance, pay, work pressure, or job duties makes a change in industry more likely. Likewise, many workers who quit out of dissatisfaction with pay or management leave the public sector altogether. Lastly, it is shown that workers' reasons to quit fully explain the differences in wage growth between intra- and interindustry job movers.
      </description>
      <author>Delfgaauw, J.</author>
    </item>
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