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    <title>Regulation and Industrial Policy: General</title>
    <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/concept/jel-L50/</link>
    <description>Recent publications classified by JEL Code L50</description>
    <language>en</language>
    <image>
      <url>http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png</url>
      <title>RePub, Erasmus University Rotterdam</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl</link>
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    <item>
      <title>Auctions as Coordination Devices (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11625/</link>
      <pubDate>2006-04-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        This paper develops an economic argument relating auctions to high market prices. At the core of the argument is the claim that market competition and bidding in an auction should be analyzed as part of one game, where the pricing strategies in the market subgame depend on the bidding strategies during the auction. I show that when there are two licenses for sale the only equilibrium in the overall game that is consistent with the logic of forward induction is the one where firms bid an amount (almost) equal to the profits of the cooperative market outcome and follow a cooperative pricing strategy in the market game resulting in high prices. With three or more licenses the auction format co-determines whether or not the forward induction argument works.
      </description>
      <author>Janssen, M.C.W.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Auctions as Collusion Devices (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6724/</link>
      <pubDate>2003-02-19T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        This paper develops an economic argument relating auctions to high market prices. At the core of the argument is the claim that market competition and bidding in an auction should be analyzed as part of one game, where the pricing strategies in the market subgame depend on the bidding strategies during the auction.I show that the only equilibrium in the overall game that is consistent with the logic of forward induction is the one where firms bid an amount (almost) equal to the profits of the cooperative market outcome and follow a cooperative pricing strategy in the market game resulting in high prices.
      </description>
      <author>Janssen, M.C.W.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>An Eclectic Theory of Entrepreneurship: Policies, Institutions and Culture (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6873/</link>
      <pubDate>2001-03-14T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        The level of entrepreneurship differs considerably across countries and periods. Both the causes and consequences of entrepreneurship are a matter of extensive scientific debate as well as of great policy importance. A high level of entrepreneurial activity is assumed and shown to contribute to innovative activities, competition, economic growth and job creation. The present paper deals with the determinants of entrepreneurship. An eclectic theory of entrepreneurship is introduced. This eclectic theory provides an integrated framework, drawing on disparate strands of literature, to create a better understanding of the different role that entrepreneurship plays in different countries and time periods. This framework is designed to guide future empirical research in this area and to provide insights for policymakers striving to promote entrepreneurship.
      </description>
      <author>Verheul, I.</author> <author>Wennekers, A.R.M.</author> <author>Audretsch, D.B.</author> <author>Thurik, A.R.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Deregulation in Retailing: The Dutch Experience (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7713/</link>
      <pubDate>1999-10-08T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        Institutional barriers to entry were removed to a considerable extent in 1996 in the Dutch retail sector. Three years before that the regulator decided to not take legal actions anymore against entrants violating institutional requirements. In the current analysis we investigate the effects of the deregulation during that 1993-1995 period using a recently developed model by Carree and Thurik (1999). The results show that the equilibrium number of firms has increased significantly. Results on the adjustment speed from the disequilibrium number of firms to the equilibrium number are more weak but tend to show a picture of increased speed. The deregulation of the Dutch retail industry seems therefore to have enlarged market dynamics (faster displacement and replacement) and to have reversed the concentration process to some extent. The results also show that the increase in the speed of adjustment is the consequence of lowering barriers to entry while the barriers to exit have not changed
      </description>
      <author>Carree, M.A.</author> <author>Nijkamp, J.</author>
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